By Charlie Clements

Charles De Long was the U.S. Minister to Japan in 1871. After an incident in which an Okinawan vessel was shipwrecked in Taiwan and a number of its passengers murdered, De Long encouraged the Japan to falsely claim the Okinawans as Japanese wards and use the incident as pretext to wrest Taiwan away from China by force.  Minister De Long assured the Japanese Foreign Minister that according to Western international law, Taiwan “would in the final analysis be subject to possession by the country successfully holding it.”[1]

Last week President al-Bashir needed no coaching on ‘Western international law’ to assure him that in the final analysis, the Abyei region of Sudan would be subject to whomever successfully held it. Under the cover of clouds, which for two days obscured the region from the cameras in low-earth orbits of Satellite Sentinel, a consortium that has been monitoring and reporting on the militarization in and around Abyei for four months, invaded the area. The Sudanese Armed Forces accompanied by Misseriya militias used aerial bombardment, tanks, and artillery to quickly rout Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces and police from the area, terrorizing tens of thousands of civilians to flee. Eye witness accounts related scenarios similar to tactics used in Darfur:  Antonov cargo planes flew over populated areas dropping bombs or incendiary devices, soldiers and militias arrived soon after in trucks firing into dwellings and at anyone who seemed to resist.

After the residents fled, satellite imagery revealed that 70% of structures in Abyei town had been torched, but not before trucks loaded with personal goods and humanitarian stores looted from homes, businesses, and storehouses.  Casualty rates are not known, but it appears that civilians were not the primary targets. Residents in the area, who are largely Ngok Dinka, were not allowed to vote in the January referendum, in part because the National Congress Party wanted the nomadic Misseriya, who are aligned with north or government of Sudan, to be able to vote as well.

The 4000 square mile area that was captured is not only fertile, and thus an important grazing resource for the Misseriya, but is also known to contain perhaps as much as 25% of Sudan’s known oil reserves. The President of Southern Sudan, who also holds the title of First Vice President of Sudan, Salva Kiir, has contained the SPLM’s response to the invasion saying the south would not be drawn into war. He added, “We remain committed to peace but this should not be interpreted as cowardice.”  Early reports allege that the provocation for the invasion was police forces of the SPLM firing on a government of Sudan convoy that included U.N. peacekeepers; details of this incident have not been independently verified.  Prior to this incident in March and April there were several attacks by government of Sudan military forces and Misseriya militias on Ngok Dinka villages, which were razed, leading to tensions between the two armed camps just north and south of Abyei town. According to Satellite Sentinel’s observations, the region was brimming with police and military forces with tanks, attack helicopters, and light trucks used for small unit attacks sited on bases of the government of Sudan. Both sides may have been violating terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Clearly, in the end the incentives (carrots) that President Obama had offered the government of Sudan if they permitted an orderly and peaceful secession of Southern Sudan (and whatever the international community threatened as consequences of a resort to violence), were not sufficient to intimidate a national leader already indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide and crimes against humanity.  This is the second time in three years that Abyei town has been razed by forces of the government of Sudan. This invasion appears to have effectively ‘ethnically cleansed’ the Abyei region of the Ngok Dinka, who never considered themselves allies of the ruling National Congress Party.

Under the supervision of the United Nations a new several mile wide buffer zone has been established between the north and south of Sudan, but the government of Sudan may have what it wants. Minimally, it has  made a land grab of disputed territory and created a humanitarian crisis with more than 100,000 internally displaced  persons (IDPs), many in need of medical care and all are desperate for  food, water, and shelter.  “Most of the roads in Southern Sudan are not passable during the rains and so that will make the movement of food difficult,’ World Food Programme (WFP) spokeswoman Amor Almagro told IRIN.”

In the end, it appears the Abyei region will be subject to the government of Sudan, which is successfully holding it, without major protests from the international community. President al-Bashir has seemingly given the finger to the so-called ‘community of civilized nations.’ His calculations were astute regardless of whether his actions were criminal.

Charlie Clements is Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School

[1] Peter Booth Wiley, Yankees in the Land of the Gods:  Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan, Viking Adult, 1990, page 81.

A new report from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs examines the situation of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Chad, and responses of the MINURCAT and other UN agencies. It also discusses the implications for the exit of MINURCAT, with termination scheduled for 31 December 2010, and for early recovery initiatives, as well as the prospects of protection measures provided by the government of Chad.

As with any other country, it is difficult to gauge the exact extent of SGBV committed against civilians in Chad. However, SGBV is high on the agenda and a cross-cutting issue for various sectors in MINURCAT and humanitarian agencies. SGBV appears to have been used as a part of a deliberate conflict tactic, with women being attacked once they leave camps to fetch firewood, water etc. On the other hand, many of the reported cases of SGBV are committed inside the camps by family members and neighbours. A central focus of the fight against SGBV has been to sensitize the targeted population, refugees and IDPs to harmful customary practices and human rights violations as preventive measures, as well as to encourage victims to report SGBV and other violations. This work has been especially important for the various gender and women’s committees in the refugee camps. Other main activities have been area security and facilitating returns for the displaced population, provided by MINURCAT and its partners to ensure the protection of civilians.

A major achievement has been to establish the national community policing, Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS). The DIS is responsible for maintaining the rule of law in refugee and IDP camps and key towns within a 10 km radius. Members of the DIS have been trained in gender issues, and all its units have a gender focal point. Throughout our field visit, however, we were told that the important work of the DIS was being hampered by a dysfunctional judicial system, as well as a substantive lack of material and personnel capacity. Furthermore, SGBV victims who report their cases to DIS are vulnerable to reprisals and stigmatization from their communities, so it was proposed that victims should be offered protection in a safe house next to the DIS compound within 24 to 72 hours of filing a report.

Notwithstanding the important advances, the Chadian government, weary of repeated promises of construction of airport aprons and hard-wall commissariats for the DIS, early this year asked the mission to leave. President Déby announced that the mission had been a failure, unable to fulfil its promises, and that the Government of Chad was ready to take over responsibility for the security of refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers. UNSC Resolution 1926 of 26 May 2010 outlines how Chad will assume responsibility for the protection of civilians. Indeed, the commitment that Chad is showing through the detailed plan is unprecedented. The Government of Chad has committed to:

(i) ensure the security and protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons;
(ii) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by improving security in eastern Chad;
(iii) ensure the security and freedom of movement of MINURCAT staff and United Nations and associated personnel.

This is a laudable step on the part of the Chadian government. There have been far too many instances where host governments feel no obligation to present their plans for the protection of civilians to the international community. However, the extent of the tasks given to the DIS is worrisome: ‘… to provide security inside and around refugee camps and IDP sites, security escorts and area security, in coordination with the Gendarmerie and the Nomad Guard.’ Firstly, this expands the area of DIS operations from refugee camps to include IDP sites in general. Secondly, it gives the DIS responsibility for area security as well, in coordination with the Gendarmerie and the Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad (GNNT) – who are sorely lacking in capacity and are ill-informed as to how to execute a protection mandate. While the plan is praiseworthy, what is less clear is whether it is realistic. Lacking are arrangements for how the other protection measures, such as strengthening of the judicial apparatus, human rights monitoring and intercommunity dialogue efforts – currently undertaken by MINURCAT should be transferred to the Government of Chad, UN agencies and NGOs. There is a high risk that eastern Chad, which was on its way to early recovery, may again become a humanitarian crisis. The key benchmark – the return of a critical mass of IDPs – had been within striking distance. It now seems an elusive goal.

Evidence is rarely clear cut. There are often multiple interpretations for trends. And there can be a tyranny of statistical accounting, which fails to capture important elements that are not being measured. Nonetheless, a commitment to evidence-based policymaking requires a commitment to taking evidence seriously.

International peacekeeping operations are one of the last bastions that have yet to yield to evidence-based planning and assessment. The classic form of peacekeeping, as an extension of inter-state diplomacy, emphasized discretion and the cooperation and confidence of the parties to the conflict, who were also the parties to the peacekeeping agreement. Any public statements needed to be cleared through diplomatic channels. Combined with the intrinsic caution of any organization subject to multilateral decision-making, it is understandable that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was reluctant to make or publish any assessments in its own right.

The world has changed. The demand for evidence to support claims of need or policy success cannot be resisted for long. International peace support operations have much more complex tasks and operate in different environments, including ongoing complex conflicts such as Darfur and DR Congo. Most importantly, a mission with a mandate that includes the Responsibility to Protect is required to undertake tasks that usually fall upon national police services and armed forces. How should a force with an R2P mandate make its tactical deployment decisions? How should it assess its success or otherwise?

Clearly, today’s peace support missions, especially those with R2P tasks, require a rigorous evidence base for policy planning, operational deployment, and strategic evaluation of progress. Without such an evidence base, mission design and deployment, and both internal and public evaluations, will remain irredeemably subjective and prone to manipulation in support of political agendas.

In this context it is unfortunate that UNAMID’s efforts to introduce some rigor into assessments of the situation in Darfur have been so controversial. The estimates for violent incidents produced by UNAMID based upon the information compiled by the Joint Mission Analysis Centre are not perfect. There are gaps and inaccuracies, and the data for sexual violence are particularly incomplete. Nobody claims that the (more reliable) figures for violent fatalities represent the total sum of harms inflicted upon the Darfurian people.

Nonetheless, the JMAC data are the best that exist at present. Lethal violence is an important element of the crisis. If the data are incomplete then the challenge is to invest more in the reporting systems. The data show important geographical distribution, temporal trends, and patterns of violence. These are empirical claims that can be verified or falsified. If the data fail to provide a complete picture of the nature of the Darfur conflict, then those who prefer to characterize the conflict differently, must either produce better data in support of their claims, or construct different definitions for the conflict.

Without doubt, the calls for evidence-based peacekeeping will increase. Improved data collection and analysis will follow, along with metrics for the measurement of crisis and response.

A recent article, drawing upon evidence about HIV prevalence, the HIV policies of troop-contributing countries, and modeling of transmission risks, suggests that the likelihood of peacekeeping troops contributing to HIV epidemics in host countries is very low. (Massimo Lowicki-Zucca, Sarah Karmin and Karl-Lorenz Dehne, ‘HIV among Peacekeepers and its Likely Impact on Prevalence on Host Countries’ HIV Epidemics,’ International Peacekeeping, 1743-906X, 16.3, 2009, 352-363.)

The authors’ argument has the following steps. First, fear that peacekeepers posed a public health risk was founded upon unfounded scares about ultra-high levels of HIV in African militaries. In fact, HIV prevalence in soldiers is often not dissimilar to their civilian peers. Of the 15 top troop-contributing countries, only two (Nigeria and South Africa) have HIV prevalence above 3%. Thus they are a small proportion of the overall number of people living with HIV in the host country.

Sudan has an estimated HIV prevalence of 1.4%. If the peacekeepers in UNMIS and UNAMID have HIV rates equivalent to the population prevalence in their countries of origin, between them they will have 483 HIV positive members (343 among 9,200 UNAMID troops, 140 among 9,950 UNMIS), just 0.17% of the estimated number of people living with HIV in Sudan. The proportion of UNAMID soldiers with HIV to the population of Darfur will be higher but still small—about 0.9% assuming Darfur’s HIV prevalence is the same as the national average. If we take a hypothetical worst-case scenario in which 26,000 UNAMID troops have an HIV rate four times as high as their national average, then there would be 3,877 HIV positive UNAMID troops, 7% of the total number of people living with HIV in Darfur. That would represent a significant contribution to Darfur’s HIV epidemic as well as a considerable medical burden on UNAMID’s already-stretched logistical capabilities.

Fortunately this is only a hypothetical projection–the reality is much less worrying.

To understand why this is so, the authors’ second point is important. They argue that in many cases HIV rates among militaries are in fact lower than the national average. Senegal and Ethiopia are examples. In addition, most troop-contributing countries test for HIV prior to deployment and do not send HIV positive soldiers on peacekeeping missions. So the figures given above are certainly overestimates.

Among the countries that undertake mandatory pre-deployment testing for HIV are Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa (though in May 2008 the South African courts ruled the policy an unconstitutional violation of soldiers’ rights to non-discrimination). Nigeria undertakes pre-deployment testing and does not deploy HIV positive soldiers if the host country so requests. The countries that contribute the vast majority of UNAMID’s troops are systematically screening out anyone who tests HIV positive.

Mandatory HIV testing and exclusion of those found positive is widely seen as a violation of individual human rights which does not bring appreciable public health benefits. International guidelines are strongly against it. However, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the African Union give troop-contributing countries the discretion to apply their own policies as they see fit. The case of UNAMID troop contributors may be a counter-example in which the international norm that opposes mandatory testing is less appropriate than the de facto practice of screening out soldiers who are HIV positive.

Third, there is the concern that even if the vast majority of peacekeepers are uninfected on deployment, they may become HIV positive while on mission, primarily through unsafe sexual practices. In this regard, after UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (July 2000) required UN peacekeeping operations to adopt strict HIV guidelines, and UN missions have taken on HIV/AIDS advisers and established close working relations with UNAIDS, all peacekeepers are provided with HIV counseling, testing, training and sensitization, as well as provision of condoms. These policies are implemented for the two international missions in Sudan.

Even though there is little reason to fear international peacekeepers contributing to an HIV epidemic in Sudan, this is no reason for complacency. HIV/AIDS programs among peacekeepers along with zero tolerance policies prohibiting sexual abuse and exploitation, remain important. The international agencies working on this issue, including UNAIDS and UNFPA, should be given every support.

Between January 2008 and end of March 2009, about 2,000 violent deaths occurred in the region, one third of them civilian. Of the rest, 573 were combatants, and 569 died in intertribal fighting. UNAMID suffered 14 fatalities. This is by all means a remarkable turn of events. The rate of killings in Darfur has dropped below the rate of murder in some American cities, such as Chicago. During the same period, UNMIS chief in Sudan, Ashraf Qazi complained that violent deaths due to tribal conflict in the South of Sudan were much higher than casualties in Darfur.

Things continued to get better. Last June, UNAMID reported only 16 violent deaths in the whole of Darfur, almost all appeared to be the result of criminal activities not directly related to the conflict. New York usually has that number every 10 days, while Chicago nearly every week. At another level, recent UNICEF reports that infant mortality in Darfur is now lower than some other areas in Sudan, such as Kassala in the East.

The UN thus has every reason to celebrate these achievements. Its mission in Darfur has apparently achieved the impossible, in spite of limited resources and multiple constraints, and brought violence down dramatically. Self-congratulation was in order.

But New York was not at all in celebratory mood. In fact, the mood was emphatically vile, and the first thing New York did was to shoot the messenger who brought the good news. Adada became practically the victim of constructive dismissal as he was forced out of office by thinly disguised machinations. The AU, the supposed partner of the UN in the mission, was not even consulted. The mission’s top general was also abruptly replaced. At the same time, New York was actively conspiring to effectively dissolve its partnership with the AU. Its lawyers drafted “secret” memos arguing that the AU does not have any privileged role to play in what was legally and practically a purely UN mission authorised by the Security Council.

On July 30, the Council issued Resolution 1881 (2009) renewing the UNAMID mission for one more year, and at the same time “expressing concern… at the continued seriousness of the security situation and deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and at the recurring attacks on the civilian population.” More ominously, the resolution called on UNAMID “to make full use of its mandate and capabilities” in order to protect civilians and ensure unhindered humanitarian access”.

The resolution and its tone raises some disturbing questions, indicating that the mission was in serious crisis. For one thing, where did the UN Security Council got its information about the deteriorating situation in Darfur when its own mission on the ground is telling it that the situation is in fact improving, and dramatically so? And second, what is meant by the implied criticism of the current UNAMID leadership in urging the mission to use its full mandate? Is the implication that the mission is currently holding back? And does this imply a command to be more confrontational with the government in deference to the urging of some belligerent Security Council members and their activist constituencies? And how is UNAMID to do that, when it is dependent of the Sudanese for its security, as evidenced by the military police standing guard outside its offices in Darfur cities? And how does this square with the resolution’s preamble which affirms its commitment to the sovereignty of Sudan?

The mandarins in New York and the men who pull the purse strings appear oblivious to the fact the operation in Darfur is taking place in a sovereign country with a functioning government. This is not Kosovo or East Timor. And this is not Somalia or Sierra Leone either. Sudan is not –yet- a failed sate, despite the efforts of some. And Darfur is no longer the acute humanitarian crisis the UN appears –perversely- to want it to be to justify both its presence, and to appease the activists clamouring for blood.

It is clear from the “purges” UNAMID has suffered, and the belligerent tone of the resolution, together with the concerted effort to muscle the AU out of the mission in favour of more direct UN control of operations, that the top brass in New York, and the powers who run the organisation behind the scenes, are now intent on escalating matters in Darfur, a path that could at best be described as suicidal for the mission. The powers that be appear acutely uncomfortable with the mission’s African character, which they have been forced to accept under duress. They do not regard this as “their” mission, and have continued to disparage its African component and blame it for all the shortcomings.

This in turn points to the fatal flaw in the very basis of the mission: it is a peace keeping mission with no peace to keep. Theoretically, the mission is here to enforce the 2006 Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement. But not even the most deluded person believes that fiction any more. The mission was supposed to work towards achieving peace, but its mediating function remains its weakest link. To date, the most high profile achievement of the Joint Chief Mediator has been to attend a mediation session organised by Qatar, in his input was minimal. To make matters worse, the Chief Mediator has been practically at war with the rest of the mission, and refused to invite any of his senior colleagues to the talks.

Without a serious effort to advance the peace process, the Council’s affirmation of the need for “an inclusive political settlement” as the only viable solution for the crisis becomes vacuous. And with the apparent powerlessness to even bring some of the key actors to the negotiating table, let alone getting them to talk peace, such resolutions are just talk.

Up to now, the mission has been able to achieve tangible progress through the hard work of its staff and the patient wisdom of its key figures. The new gung-ho attitude and the assault on the mission is sure to have disastrous effects all round. Darfur does not need more of those.

Abdelwahab El-Affendi is an ESRC-AHRC Fellow in the Global Uncertainties Programme, UK. He is based at the University of Westminster

Sixteen fatalities have been recorded in June. Twelve of these incidents are probably criminal in nature, the only association with the overall Darfur crisis being that the crimes sometimes occur in or around IDP camps. Three killings were reported by the residents of Kalma and subsequently confirmed, including one sub-sheikh in the camp. One further incident was the death of a boy who picked up an unexploded grenade which detonated, killing him. The majority of the violent deaths in Darfur during the month of June 2009 could hardly be linked directly to the ongoing conflict and are more characteristic of common crimes. The killings of one GoS National Intelligence officer, one SAF and one policeman are however more open to speculation, as they could have some connection with the conflict.

There is also one reported incident of homicide in the non-government held areas. As investigations are completed the data will be updated.

This is the lowest monthly tally of violent fatalities on record. Reasons for the continuing decline in lethal violence include the current lull in offensive military activities by the belligerent parties, the reduction in inter-tribal conflict consequent on stepped up local peacemaking activities, and the increasing effectiveness of UNAMID deployments throughout the three Darfur states. It is no coincidence that IDP populations are expressing better confidence toward UNAMID, thus making the interaction with them more productive.

Six cases of rape were reported, confirming that female IDPs remain vulnerable to harassment in and around the camps.

Eight vehicles were stolen at gunpoint, of which three belong to UNAMID, one to WHO, and four to NGOs.

Al Salaam remains a contentious IDP camp, with the conflicting presence of PDF and SLM-Minawi members likely to continue to fuel tension there.

Restrictions continue to be imposed on UNAMID movements and actions, by different armed elements. On numerous occasions these obstructions are carried out in intimidating manner, and might be incited by what is perceived as a lack of consistent reaction from UNAMID side. Those restrictions range from preventing UNAMID from holding meetings/workshops and confiscating UNAMID funds, to delaying/denying access at checkpoints. Examples include: Wada’a, North Darfur, 4 June; Babun-Shagil, North Darfur, 21 June; Kutum, North Darfur, 24 June; Kuma, North Darfur, 28 June; Abou Dam, South Darfur, 29 June.

In the same vein, banditry against UNAMID seems to be a low-risk operation for the perpetrators. The attack on a UNAMID Formed Police Unit convoy in the vicinity of El Geneina camp is the latest example. The current deployment phase of a Chapter VII operation has never been meant to be a context whereby UN assets and personnel would be consistently targeted while wrongdoers are able to roam unhindered. UNAMID is working on improving its response to criminal attacks of this nature. The image and credibility of the Mission will be improved by a prompt and vigorous reaction to such situations.

Moudjib Djinadou is head, UNAMID Joint Mission Analysis Centre, al Fashir.

The language Amb. Adada used and evidence he presented came as a surprise to some Security Council members. The phrase ‘low intensity conflict’ was criticized by at least one ambassador. She did not question his numbers (presumably because the statistics are validated by her own country’s reporting), but disputed whether the numbers alone should be the basis for defining whether Darfur was ‘low intensity.’ (The Uppsala Conflict Data Program definition of a ‘minor’ conflict is less than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, the U.S. definition of ‘low-intensity conflict’ has no numerical threshold.) The phrase ‘a war of all against all’ was also highlighted by the UN media reporting.

Neither of these phrases are surprising to those who have been in the field in Darfur and listened to the descriptions and analyses of military observers. The UNAMID Force Commander, Gen. Martin Agwai, uses the phrase ‘war of all against all’. The incident reporting system from which Agwai and Adada drew their conclusions is supervised by a French military officer. Military attachés in Khartoum use these descriptions routinely. The estimates for overall numbers of fatalities have also been common knowledge in Sudan.

Amb. Adada made some important caveats. He is after all a professor of mathematics and at home with numbers, and he stressed that the number cannot be considered 100% precise. The 2,000 deaths are, he emphasized, too many. He described how some incidents had been prevented from escalating and resulting in more fatalities. (UNAMID is becoming an interesting and important case study in how the ‘responsibility to protect’ can actually be realized.) He said that tens of thousands of civilians had been killed in earlier phases of the war. And a low-intensity conflict is still a conflict, with major risks of deterioration.

The key purpose of Adada’s presentation, as I understand it, was to bring the best analysis from the field in Darfur to the Security Council, and ‘speak with authority on the situation on the ground.’ His intention was to anchor international policy in evidence for the current situation on the ground. The Security Council needed to hear this. Monday’s session was a dose of reality and helps clarify possible ways ahead.

Here they are:

First: United Nations peacekeepers in a country are visitors. Their presence is temporary. Their function is catalytic, no more. Peace ought to be home grown.

Second: There is no peacekeeping without peace. Peace, to be made by the parties to a conflict themselves, should precede efforts to keep the peace.

Third: The sovereignty of a state has to be respected, but brought into balance with the protection of the people within that state. Keep that balance!

Fourth: Respect national traditions and domestic cultures

Fifth: International staff members should respect national staff members, their views and their positions. They are vulnerable: they have no ticket to leave the country. They know their country better than you. National staff members should have patience with international staff members. They could have chosen for comfort back home. They are idealists, or anyway, once they have been idealists.

Sixth: All UN staff members have the duty to follow a unified approach, in whichever agency they work, as peacekeepers or as humanitarian and development workers. That implies a commitment to the same goals and a duty to respect the same boundary conditions, for instance those set by the Security Council representing the international community. A unified approach of all UN agencies also implies the duty to consult each other about each other’s work, the duty to cooperate and to use a common infrastructure and common services. Finally this unified approach requires the acceptance of a unified command.

Seventh: Delegate, decentralize, trust your staff and show this to them.

Eight: Work as a team.

Nine: The field is more important than headquarters. People in headquarters should understand this. But those who are working in the field, when critical about headquarters, should be aware that they are not “the” field, but that, farther away, other colleagues may consider them too as a headquarter

Ten: Never be satisfied. There is no room for complacency, despite many achievements.

Eleven: Insecurity, risk, uncertainty and political pressure are not a hindrance, but a challenge. They are no exceptions to a normal and stable pattern. They are not exogenous factors, but inherent to peacekeeping.

Twelve: Fight bureaucracy. Fight also the bureaucrat in yourself. Stay a movement; keep the spirit of a pioneer.

Thirteen: Care for people. People first.

Fourteen: Peacekeeping is a calling, not a job.

Fifteen: Please, stay.

Since September 2003 there has been a succession of ceasefires, declarations of cessation of hostilities, and efforts to agree an end to fighting. None has worked.

One of the reasons for failure is that all agreements thus far have been incomplete. Some groups have been left out, and as a result the agreement has led to more violence, not less, as the excluded groups assert their presence, and the included groups try to suppress their excluded rivals. That danger exists in the wake of Doha. Many of the other armed movements will see the Doha agreement as part of Khalil Ibrahim’s strategy of ensuring that JEM is the only recognized opposition group, thereby de-legitimizing all others. The mediation will need to work rapidly and in close coordination with UNAMID on the ground to ensure that this interpretation of Doha does not prevail and the agreement leads to more security, not less.

A second reason for recurrent failure is that mediators have often assumed that a ceasefire, or a cessation of hostilities, can be negotiated rapidly and simply. It cannot. The purely technical challenges of achieving a workable ceasefire are considerable, and the groundwork has not yet been done.

A ceasefire is a complex military operation which requires specific training, which is rarely provided even to graduates of military colleges. A ceasefire is not a matter of stopping firing: it involves rules about movement, deployment, resupply and communication. It allows the forces to fire under certain circumstances. The ceasefire provisions in the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 ran to 177 paragraphs over 28 pages, with another 79 paragraphs and ten pages concerning post-ceasefire security arrangements. In some ways, these provisions were too complicated to be implemented (and were quickly rendered irrelevant anyway). But in other respects they were too simple because they did not include the detailed mapping that the professional military officers on all sides recognized was essential if the proposals were to work.

Officers in a regular army need to be trained in the rules of a ceasefire. Commanders in armed movements, many of whom have not attended staff college, are in greater need of training. Rebels also tend to be suspicious of any proposals for restricting their military activities, fearing that any provisions they do not understand are a trap. It is not enough to hold a workshop for the leaders. In a poorly-organized rebel movement, all commanders must have ceasefire training because the leaders won’t pass on what they have learned and cannot give orders that their subordinates will follow. The training must therefore be done in the field.

In late 2004, African security specialists (led by former guerrillas from Zimbabwe and Ethiopia) prepared a proposal for technical training for the Darfur armed movements. Their estimate was that about six months’ training was required before the armed movements would be ready to negotiate a workable ceasefire, and that any short cuts would not only doom the process to failure but would be dangerous. They further estimated that three months’ work would be needed to negotiate the ceasefire. This proposal was rejected as being too slow. It was presented again in late 2005, in 2006 and 2007 and each time rejected as being ‘leisurely’. Even today, some international officials working on Darfur make the mistake of assuming that technical training is a longer-term activity akin to the retraining of former combatants in the skills they will need after demobilization and therefore is a non-urgent activity that can be postponed.

Another issue is the provisioning of combatants during a ceasefire. This can be a major problem for an irregular force, especially one that supplies itself by taxing trade, stealing vehicles or raiding enemy forces. Major problems of discipline arise when fighters are not paid, clothed, housed or fed. Some turn to banditry. Logistical support to the members of rebel movements may be essential to ensure that they comply with a ceasefire—and is obviously conditional on them respecting such a ceasefire. This assistance provides an incentive for the armed movements to comply with agreements including humanitarian access and cessation of hostilities. In the Abuja talks, this was one of the issues that most concerned the armed movements.

Most models of ceasefires have been developed for armies that can adopt a defensive posture within clearly-identified territories. Mapping forces and precisely demarcating areas of control are essential components of ceasefire negotiation and implementation. It has been a recurrent headache in Darfur. This is workable for the infantry forces of SLA-Abdel Wahid in and around Jebel Marra, but not for the other SLA groups or JEM, which are Landcruiser-based. In the context of these highly mobile armed groups, using four wheel drive vehicles rather than consolidated territory as the basis of their organization, it is harder to apply these models.

Darfur also poses special problems because it consists of several overlapping kinds of conflict. There is a limited insurgency/counter-insurgency war alongside various forms of political and criminal violence, much of which is best seen as a fusion between politics and criminality, in the form of violent bargaining over the price of loyalty for militias and tribal-military units. Analysis of the patterns of violence will be the subject of a later posting.

Four years ago, security experts estimated that we were six to nine months away from a workable ceasefire. Today we are six to nine months away from a workable ceasefire—though progress could be more rapid in some locations, and slower in others. This is unfortunate and unnecessary, to say the least.

Fragile states are typically defined by what they are not–they are not Weberian states in which autonomous state institutions administer the rule of law and regulate political conflicts, and not states in which governments deliver services on an efficient and impartial basis. International policies for dealing with such states, from Afghanistan to Congo, assume that these states can build ‘normal’ institutions in a brief historical span. Kofi Annan’s 2001 report, ‘No Exit Without Strategy,’ defined the criteria for success for peacekeeping operations in an identical way: ‘domestic peace becomes sustainable, when the natural conflicts of society can be resolved through the exercise of State sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance.’ This is, I fear, a formula for peacekeeping missions without end.

In this month’s International Affairs I have an article, “Mission without End” which outlines my analysis of why this is so. I argue that our starting point should be, how these states actually function–often as a patrimonial political marketplace. Based on this realistic premise, I suggest that we can begin to design strategies that are more practicable.