Joyce Banda - Malawi's unepected President - has heralded the start of a welcome transition from the Mutharika era.

Malawi prides itself on being a peaceful, friendly and law-abiding country, but it is also well-known for occasional lurches in the opposite direction. The recent transfer of power, from President Bingu wa Mutharika, who died on 5^th April of a heart-attack, to his Vice-President, Joyce Banda, is well within this tradition.

Although he had loathed Joyce Banda almost from the moment he had appointed her as his running-mate for the 2009 presidential election, and had seen to both her expulsion from his own ruling Democratic Progressive Party and complete isolation from government, Bingu’s obvious desire to be rid of his deputy and of her constitutional right to replace him in an emergency was thwarted by that very Constitution. He tried to do what he had done before, and more brutally, with his first VP, Cassim Chilumpha, by pretending she did not exist and by leaving his underlings to harass her in every way possible.

When Bingu died, there was a frantic attempt by some DPP party-loyalists in the Cabinet to conceal the fact of his death by having his body whisked off to South Africa. When concealment failed, they tried to secure the succession to the presidency of his younger brother, Peter, as Bingu undoubtedly would have wished, claiming that Joyce had sacrificed her vice-presidential rights by forming her own political party in opposition to the DPP. Peter Mutharika had been extracted from his academic post in USA; he had taken over the leadership of the DPP; he had been groomed for the succession with several ministerial portfolios and presidential-style motorcades. He belonged to the ‘top’ family and was clearly the man destined for the job

Malawians thought otherwise. They had never really taken to the younger Mutharika: feeling that, as Minister of Education, he could have prevented a very long strike by academic staff of the University of Malawi and, as Foreign Affairs Minister, that he could have repaired relations with ruffled foreign donors like Britain. His impact in Malawi has generally been small.

Having given the big brother, Bingu, an overwhelming vote of confidence in the 2009 General Election, the people had quickly become tired of his dour brand of finger-wagging, Hastings-Banda-esque, authoritarianism, and they now blamed him for all the multitude economic misfortunes of Malawi. Starved not only of fuel supplies, of regular electricity, of water and even of sugar (which Malawi produces), but also of the colour and jokey friendliness of the Muluzi-style of presidential government that had preceded Bingu’s, the Malawian people have lost interest in the Mutharikas and warmed to Joyce’s smiling face, and to her colourful hats and dresses.

She had also started to make her mark beyond the merely sartorial. The obvious sources of government misinformation under Bingu: Patricia Kaliati’s Ministry of Information and Bright Malopa’s Malawi Broadcasting Corporation, have had much-needed changes of leadership. The police service has lost the Inspector-Generalship of Peter Mukhito, who had been widely blamed for the murderous crackdown on last July’s demonstrators and the mysterious death (he called it “suicide”) of a student activist, Robert Chasowa.

She will certainly bring the donors back to Malawi because they have at least as great a need to disgorge their bursting International Development purses as Malawi has eagerness to dispose of them. “I expect the resumption of aid will happen” said Ken Lipenga, the canny political survivor from two decades of Malawi’s turbulent politics and now its Minister of Finance. Joyce Banda’s People’s Party will soon be swollen with opportunistic turncoats from the once-mighty DPP and will also benefit from the watchful friendliness of the opposition Malawi Congress Party and United Democratic Front. Parliament should be no immediate problem for her. The police and army can be relied-upon for unimaginative loyalty to their new Commander-in-Chief.

So the new presidency is stumbling out of the sullen night of Bingu’s second term, but Joyce Banda must surely be aware that such a statement described very well Bingu’s situation a mere three years ago when he and the DPP were emerging, blinkingly, from their great electoral triumph and preparing to govern Malawi unopposed for another 5 years. The turning wheel of fortune was a popular metaphor for medieval European kingship and modern Malawians have many variations of it in their own equally extensive arsenal of moralisms. They know that the wheel is still turning and that not everyone has fallen-off it at the same time as Bingu.

Nor has the world changed outside the Lilongwe hot-house of government departments, parliamentarians, embassies, aid-agencies and attendant “Non-Government Organizations”. Malawi’s poor harvest of its tobacco export-staple, now awaiting buyers in the auction-rooms of Limbe and Lilongwe, has to be addressed urgently by the new government, as has the maize and sorghum famine in the Lower Shire valley. The country’s massive over-population, its degraded arable land, its faltering water-supply and its erratic electricity, its long queues outside foreign exchange bureaus and petrol stations: these have not vanished as urgent issues.

Macky Sall - elected as President of Senegal through popular national support.

After months of tension, fuelled by ex-President Abdoulaye Wade’s obstinate bid for a third term, there is a great sigh of relief that Senegal has managed peacefully to elect a new president. Most western countries and international representations had advised their nationals and employees to pack and leave before the country collapsed into post-electoral chaos. But Wade’s positive reaction to Macky’s victory helped diffuse the sort of violence and disorder many observers had predicted.

So Senegal gets to keep its triple A rating as an experienced democracy despite an unprecedentedly violent election season that has left more than six people dead. Wade is known to be a wily old fox and an avowedly strategic politician, but he seems to have got it wrong this time around. His ‘constitutional coup’ was thwarted by popular determination, starkly expressed in the commanding victory of Macky Sall (known simply as ‘Macky’). Wade recognised his defeat in a dignified fashion as early results showed that his former protégé had trounced him. The smooth change brings hope in a West African sub-region beset by coups (such as the recent one initiated by mutinous soldiers in Mali).

Senegal’s relatively ‘free and fair’ elections are good news in an unstable region but how long will we continue praising and applauding African leaders for stepping down after a defeat? In the end, Wade had no choice but to leave. As with the elections in 2000, private radio, TV stations and news websites meticulously reported the results live as they came out from every local polling station. Half an hour after the vote closed on March 25, the results were instantly relayed via twitter and facebook. It soon became clear that Macky had notched up a clear majority in mainly densely populated urban centres as well as with the Diaspora. It would have therefore been difficult for the government to manipulate or create confusion around the results. In this sense, the media contributed tremendously to making the elections more transparent.

Wade is seen as having conspicuously failed in upholding the ideal for which he was elected in 2000. Sall’s victory was, in some respects, a welcome opportunity for a dignified exit by a battered octogenarian president constrained by the distributional demands of party comrades and private interests. The hoped-for Senegalese spring did in the end happen, but through the polls. What Sall’s victory demonstrates is that people’s belief in the voting card can be a powerful weapon against bad leaders. In a country where an ineffective judiciary has perpetuated a culture of impunity, elections remain crucial in advancing popular aspirations for justice and economic improvement. Sall’s victory is the result of a long civic war that has resisted the manoeuvrings of Wade and his party. Although Sall has worked hard in the past 4 years, travelling across rural Senegal, sympathising with farmers’ plight and reaching out for grassroots organisations, his landslide victory is, more than anything, a sanction against the Wade regime. The most salient outcome of the elections is a heightened, irreversible sense of empowerment, the notion that ordinary people constitute the first and most important institution in a democracy.

Living up to expectations

The expectations of the Senegalese in the aftermath of Macky’s election are extraordinary, but they are tantamount to the challenges that face the country in all sectors. The educational system is being crippled by a very long teachers’ strike and it is not even clear whether the school year can still be saved. Macky has inherited a heavily indebted and bankrupt state (public debt is about 35 percent of the gross national product). He will have to ride roughshod over private and party interests in order to become the ‘president of all Senegalese’ as he’s promised.

The Senegalese have already been deceived by a man whose ascent to power held tremendous promises for change (Sopi). One of the greatest tests for Macky will be his attitude to corruption on the one hand, and the respect of the conclusions of the Assises Nationales — a nation-wide consultation amongst opposition parties, civil society groups and the wider population on political and economic governance, institutional stability and the need for a separation between the executive, the legislative body and the judiciary. The return of open political dialogue will depend on the ability of the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party), Wade’s party, to compel its highly mobilised and radical elements to return to a measure of orthodoxy from which they have been aroused by their desperate attempt to cling on to power.

The Senegalese expect Macky to be bold enough to bring to justice those who have mismanaged or swindled public money. He will have to prove his detractors wrong; they say that he doesn’t stick his neck out enough. Macky has got to prove that he has not only broken with the practices associated with Wade’s rule, namely an egomaniacal style, a clientalist model between politicians and the religious leadership (the marabouts) who trade their support for money and privileges, the omnipresence of family in state affairs, and the banalisation of institutions. It is hoped that the election of Macky may well signal the end of the personality cult of the president, in the sense that Macky will be under much greater scrutiny throughout his term.

Wade ruled Senegal as a monarch so it was only natural for him to want to hand over to his son Karim. His rule had come to install Senegal in a permanent psychosis whereby the tyranny of the political clock trumped all priorities. More crucially, Macky is expected to break with the phenomenon of ‘transhumance’ whereby members of a defeated party join the winner of an election in order to keep their privileges, which vitiates the rules of the political competition and make a mockery of people’s choice. In a nutshell, what is expected of him is a new form of governance, a more ethical approach to public money and a return to political orthodoxy.

Unlike Wade in 2000, Macky’s honeymoon period will be short as demands in terms of the resolution of pressing issues such as the cost of basic goods can no longer be deferred. There is high order placed on redressing flouted institutions, on the reinstatement of accountability and virtue in public management, on the restoration of social cohesion endangered by Wade’s demagogic politics. The question is how to establish trust, or restore it where it has fallen apart? How do you heal a bruised, divided country?

The tasks that lie ahead are enormous, not least because the resolution of the Casamance conflict can no longer be postponed. The low turnout in the South of Senegal is nothing more than a result of continued isolation due to the low-intensity, but destabilising, conflict that has plagued the region for over 30 years. It is thus a reflection of disaffection; the people of Casamance have learned to expect very little from elections, they are inured to unmet promises from Senegalese politicians. In 2000, a newly elected Wade had promised to resolve the conflict within 100 days. Twelve years and thousands of victims later, hundreds killed or maimed by antipersonnel mines, many having deserted their villages to escape violence, ransoms and other exactions, forgotten Casamance, once the breadbasket of Senegal, has been dying a slow death. On March 25, in the department of Bignona and other parts of Casamance, rebel incursions disrupted the vote and precluded the fair expression of people’s preference.

Out with the old

Macyk’s reputation is that of a quiet, discreet strategist and competent technocrat. These are qualities he will need in order to run a country where the cost of living has spiralled in the last ten years whilst salaries have remained low. Wade’s hazardous, erratic style of governance with no clear policies was responsible for his poor record. More than any previous president, he invested the most in education but had very little success in actually improving it. Despite 40 percent of the government’s budget supposedly being put into education, the sector has never been in worse shape. On the other hand, he used scare public resources for prestige projects: an African Renaissance statue (£22 million) and a private jet, whilst the country was plunged in darkness for months because of an unprecedented crisis in the energy sector.

Macky is also well known to the Senegalese public. He ascended through the ranks of the PDS thanks to Wade. A geological engineer by training, he was several times minister (2000-2004) and prime minister (2004-2007) under Wade, then president of the National Assembly before the big fall-out that motivated him to create his own party in 2008, the Alliance for the Republic (APR). The rebellious protégé had had the audacity to summon the president’s son Karim to account for a colossal 300 percent budget overrun in the management of infrastructural works he was in charge of.

Wade’s 12 years have been marred by numerous corruption scandals, improper tender procedures involving his ministers, particularly his son, who held the largest portfolio in the last government. Despite having put in place one of the best reforms in the area of tenders and public procurement, recurrent nebulous practices under Wade have weakened the legal monitoring structure and made a mockery of the reforms. Wade amended the constitution 15 times between 2000 and 2011. The last straw was an attempt, in June 2011, to impose a law that would not only allow him to be elected with only 25 percent of the vote, but also to carry to fruition his ultimate plan to hand down power to Karim. This was thwarted by an extraordinary popular mobilisation that never subsided and was to eventually lead to his demise.

From 85 year old Wade to 51 year old Macky, there is a definite change in generation taking place. Furthermore, unlike previous Senegalese presidents, Macky was educated in Senegal and he has a good knowledge and experience of the country. The Senegalese want radical change however, but they are unlikely to see very much of that. Having been trained in Wade’s liberal school and indebted to a large coalition of politicians, the most important of which symbolise ossified politics and old practices – Moustapha Niasse, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, Abdoulaye Bathily, Amath Dansokho and many others, Macky will most likely have to compromise on principles.

So there might not be much change after change (Sopi), but there is hope (Yakaar) for a better future. And to celebrate hope, Youssou Ndour has promised a series of free concerts throughout Senegal. As an entrance ticket, he wants to see a ballot paper bearing Wade’s photo collected from the dustbin of polling stations.

Amy Niang is Lecturer in the  Department of International Relations at the University of  Witwatersrand.

So the returnees are a mixed bag indeed. Those from western countries may be the most visible and vocal, but they are not the most voluminous in numbers.

The challenge is absorbing this mass of human resources into productive endeavor in their countries of origin. The paradox for most African countries is that those most in need of their returnees’ skills are usually those least equipped to utilize them. Institutions are weak. People hold on to positions not because of merit but because of connection. They don’t want a high-skilled returnee actually getting the job done and making them look as hopelessly incompetent as some are.

In a book of essays he edited called Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills, World Bank economist Yevgeny Kuznetsov points out that barring a few notable exceptions – such as China and India (but one might add Taiwan) – most countries have so far failed to realize the promise and potential of their skilled diasporas. Apart from all the institutional and developmental challenges that make it hard for anyone – diaspora or otherwise – to be productive in those countries, the maturity of the diaspora itself is also a key factor, Kuznetsov argues.

‘In my view, Africa’s development isn’t a question of either homegrown Africans or the diaspora but “both and”: what we need to see is the blend of talent that works in the specific contexts of individual African countries starting from where they are. For this to happen, African countries need to pay attention to what elsewhere colleagues and I have coined the “3Rs” of retention, return, and retrieval. By far, retention is the most important – make Africa a comfortable and productive place for the citizens who live there now and very soon the news will reach the diaspora. Some will want to return (permanently) and others will offer what they have on a more flexible “retrieval” basis.’

The African diaspora, for its part, can do much more to achieve effective return and retrieval. The most important thing is to get organized, while in the diaspora, while managing the return process, and after having returned or while engaging in retrieval strategies. Nowadays, there are countless African diaspora networks with a degree of experience and maturity to offer something. But if you don’t see anything that works for you, create one. Recently, a group of returnee Sierra Leoneans has formed The Returnee Group (TRG) to help ease the transition process for returnees and would-be returnees. These are the sorts of innovations that will hopefully facilitate and accelerate the successful return of Africa’s diaspora and their contribution to Africa’s deserved place in the 21st century.

Chukwu-Emeka Chikezie is a co-founder of the African Foundation for Development (Afford), and a consultant and writer on international development

Robert Mugabe celebrates his 88th birthday

On the occasion of  his eighty-eighth birthday, President Mugabe gave what appears to be two separate interviews where he talked on matters to do with his political and personal reflections. The first interview which appeared in the Sunday Mail seemed to be less rehearsed while the second one which appeared on the state controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC)  television seemed to be a bit more cautious and diplomatic particularly with regards to his counterpart political parties in the inclusive government.

But overall the interviews had the same intention and probable effect to his supporters of presenting the Zimbabwean leader as a ‘revolutionary’ who is keen on being known and remembered as such. That is well and good since we all have the right to be persuaded by one political idea/individual or the other.

And since President Mugabe said in his ZBC TV interview, we are all ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ and are entitled to different opinions, I have an opinion on his leadership and the issues he has raised on his 88th birthday.

My initial point of analysis is with regards to his reference to the revolutionary intentions of the current policies of his party, Zanu Pf. This, he argues, is via the ‘taking back’  of the land and now the ongoing indigenization processes in mining and other sectors of the economy. On paper, the language appears revolutionary and talks to what can be considered nationalist sentiment stemming from the liberation struggle. In reality and practice, the policies that have and are being undertaken have been largely indicative of ‘revolution by default.’

This should be taken to mean that the land redistribution was done under specific political pressure that made it more of a political survival strategy than a value based revolutionary one. But the land redistribution exercise has occurred all the same.  It however remains a ‘default’ policy position which is now controversially being undermined by the Mugabe government’s ambiguous commitment to leasing off large tracts of land to bio fuel companies, safari operators and mineral exploration companies. This has led to the eviction of villagers as well as negatively affected the environment. As a result, there is a growing chasm between the nationalist rhetoric of the president and the realities on the ground.

Where the president mentions indigenization of the national economy as one of his policy priorities he has not done a clear ideological examination of what exactly he means. It is inadequate to merely equate the 51% taking over of a multinational company or bank by indigenous Zimbabweans as revolutionary in and of itself. There must be clarity as to the ideological purpose of taking over such companies as well as the expected societal end product.

The current rush by big business in offering communities shares in mining concerns is more indicative of a new found ‘elite cohesion’ around wealth accumulation and does not particularly point Zimbabwe toward a more equitable and economically just society. Wanting a share in a company on the basis of ‘indegeneity’ is the stuff of identity politics and nowhere near being positively revolutionary. Given the fact that there is a new found global ‘new scramble forAfrica’ Zimbabwe’s political economy is likely to lean further toward an African neo-liberal and unjust framework. In so doing, the indigenous business people will be more of a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ for global capital, no matter whether it is coming from the West, the Chinese or the South Africans.

A second point of analysis about President Mugabe’s interviews is where he outlines his views on the contentious and problematic issue of leadership succession in Zanu Pf. In both interviews he contends that he is still capable of leading. It is however in the Sunday Mail interview where he comments on how the matter is a serious cause of division in his party, a point which indicates his rather convenient claim to championing his party’s unity in place of leadership succession. It is a convenience that he must know will not last, not by dint of age but by the fact that political parties that have been in power for as long as Zanu Pf have always had an evident successor (even his erstwhile friends the Chinese have an evident  successor). It is therefore a serious indictment on his leadership style that it is not evidently so for his own party, no matter how many congratulations he may get on his birthday.

On the other matters that relate to elections, the constitution and his colleagues in the inclusive government, the President’s views have been known for some time now. Save to say that his insistence on elections is now clearly based on the constitutional prerogative of the President to call for them as he states in the ZBC TV interview. Essentially he indicated that he has no problem with unilaterally calling for an election this year, with or without a constitution. Whether that becomes a reality or not is probably dependent on the ability of the other GPA principals and the SADC appointed facilitator  to dissuade him from calling for them  in 2012.

Finally, it is evident that President  Mugabe has great admiration for Fidel Castro of Cuba and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. He makes mention of the two leaders to stress the need for exemplary leadership or to make an historical point in relation to either sanctions or the African Union. In this, he may be indicating how he might want to be remembered but I wouldn’t know if like Castro, President Mugabe is persuaded that ‘history will absolve him’.

Takura Zhangazha is the Executive Director of the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe (VMCZ)

Ruto and Kenyatta will both stand trial at the The Hague, but may survive politically.

On 23^rd January 2012 a panel of judges at the ICC (International Criminal Court) announced a majority decision that four Kenyans, part of the so-called Ocampo Six, will face charges of crimes against humanity, murder, rape, forcible expulsion and other inhumane acts. The four include Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, suspended Higher Education Minister William Ruto, the head of the public service Francis Muthaura and radio presenter Joshua Sang.

Announcing the decision, Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova of Bulgaria was quick to point out that this is only the beginning of an elaborate trial process, with the accused still presumed innocent and not barred from holding public office in Kenya. The first pre-trial hearing will be in September 2012. The four accused have the right to appeal the decision of the three person pre-trial chamber.

The reactions of Kenyan politicians to the ruling were predictably quick. All four  accused issued statements expressing their intention to appeal the ICC ruling. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, two declared presidential candidates, reaffirmed their intention to run for the top job in the next general elections. In his reaction to the ruling, President Kibaki asked the Attorney General to form a legal committee to draft a coherent government response. Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka expressed solidarity with the accused (Musyoka was the face of the ill-fated attempts last year to lobby the Africa Union and the United Nations Security Council to refer the cases back to Kenya.[i]) Prime Minister Raila Odinga stressed that the accused remained innocent until proven guilty, expressing hope that justice will be served for the victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence (PEV).

The Political Consequences

The ICC ruling will no doubt have a significant impact on Kenyan politics, especially as the country gears up for a general election in December of this year or in March of 2013. Both Ruto and Uhuru have expressed their desire to contest the presidential election. The ruling also presents important legal questions that will test the temerity of the new captains of the Kenyan judiciary, which is currently undergoing significant reforms.

Firstly, there is the question of whether or not the two of the four accused, Kenyatta and Muthaura, should resign from public office. There is an almost even split among legal experts over whether or not the constitution requires those accused of crimes such as the two are facing to vacate office. Their supporters insist that the law only bars suspects of economic crimes from holding public office. Most of Kenyan Civil Society thinks otherwise.

Related to this is the fact that on receiving the Waki Report on the PEV on 16 December 2008, Kibaki and Odinga signed an agreement mandating that those charged with crimes related to the PEV should neither hold public office nor contest for any elective office. Civil Society groups will no doubt also refer to this agreement in their calls to have the two to be let go by the president.

Secondly, come the time to nominate presidential candidates, the Chairman of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) will have to decide whether or not both Ruto and Kenyatta can run for president while facing charges of crimes against humanity. The IEBC Chairman, Mr. Issack Hassan, has so far avoided dealing with the question, insisting that it would be presumptuous to give an opinion before the two submit their candidacies. This decision point will present yet another opportunity for the country to debate the importance of personal integrity among holders of public office.

These two legal contestations will most certainly wind up in court. It is telling that immediately after the ruling was announced President Kibaki instructed the Attorney General to form a committee to draft the government’s official response. This might merely be a stalling tactic to cool down Civil Society groups (which are already calling for the dismissal of Kenyatta and Muthaura) while the president’s camp formulates a coherent and legally tenable reaction.

It is important to note that the vagueness of Chapter 6 of the Kenyan Constitution on the integrity of holders of public office will afford the judiciary immense discretionary powers in providing a ruling on the matter. Given recent spats between the executive and judiciary on ICC related issues, this must cause the latter a good deal of discomfort. [ii]

How will this affect the next general elections?

The simple answer is that it is too early to tell. The important thing to know is that given Kenya’s ethnic arithmetic and the new electoral rules it will be hard for any of the major presidential candidates to win on their own. Presently the man to beat is Odinga, who is polling at around 32%. Kenyatta is second at 22%.[iii] Kenya’s electoral law requires an elected president to garner over 50% of the vote and have majorities in at least half of the country’s 47 counties.

Given these requirements, it is very likely that the presidential election will go to a runoff between the top two candidates. Many believe that Odinga will make it past the first round. As a result, politicians united in common opposition to Odinga are working hard to form alliances with a view of beating him (Odinga) either in the first round or in a runoff.

The unfortunately named KKK (Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Kamba alliance – formed by Ruto, Kenyatta and Musyoka) and its successor, the G7, is such an alliance that has been formed by various regional politicians with a view of having competitive primaries and then fielding a joint candidate against Odinga. The other major alliance is the Party of National Unity (PNU; the party Kibaki used for his re-election bid.) But antagonisms within these alliances make unity in the anti-Odinga bloc highly unlikely. As is the case across most of Sub-Saharan Africa, incentives abound that hinder party unity.[iv]

The alternative that has been mooted is for each major candidate to go it alone in the first round (thus preventing an outright Odinga win) and then support whoever emerges second against Odinga in the runoff. But even this choice has received little enthusiasm because it effectively guarantees Kenyatta the anti-Odinga candidacy in the runoff.

So how might the ICC ruling affect alliance building ahead of the elections? Firstly, the ruling will most likely bring Kenyatta and Ruto closer, at least in the short term. While for now the two have self-interested reasons to be together, it is not guaranteed that their grassroots supporters will play along in the long run. After all the question of land, which was at the heart of the clashes in the Rift Valley between Kalenjin supporters of Odinga/Ruto and Kikuyu supporters of Kibaki/Uhuru, remains unresolved. Indeed Ruto has already witnessed a mutiny in his own backyard in which he was prevented from taking over a party that he wanted to decamp to (he is still technically in Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement, ODM.)

Secondly, there is speculation that should the two be barred from running for president they might settle for a compromise candidate in the likes of Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, MP Eugene Wamalwa or former cabinet minister Raphael Tuju.[v] But such an eventuality is also fraught with uncertainties. For one, it is unclear that the old establishment behind Kibaki and Kenyatta would settle for the untested hands of the two newcomers – Wamalwa and Tuju. Nobody, especially if you may have some ill-gotten wealth stashed away, wants surprises in the presidency. In addition, many of them already deeply distrust Musyoka whom they see as an opportunist out to benefit from Kenyatta and Ruto’s woes. In the end they may settle for the devil they know, Mr. Odinga. It is telling that a section of the Central Kenya business elite, Mr. Uhuru’s backyard, have started warming up to Raila. [vi]

While it might be too early to ascertain the full political impact of the ICC’s ruling, there is no doubt that it will provide a real test to Kenyan institutions – especially the judiciary. The courts will have to decide, amid intense political pressure, whether or not the accused are fit to hold public office and by extension whether those that want to can run for president.  Ultimately, however, a lot will turn on the decisions made by President Kibaki. Will he stand by his trusted lieutenants in Muthaura and Kenyatta or will he bow to public pressure and ditch them in an attempt to secure his legacy?

Ken Opalo is a a graduate student of Political Science at Stanford. His research interests include the political economy of development, ethnic politics and leadership accountability, and legislative development in eastern and southern Africa. He blogs at http://kenopalo.wordpress.com/

The Boy Next Door by Irene Sabatini, Little Brown and Company, New York, 2009, 403pp.

The Trial of Robert Mugabe by Chielo Zona Eze, Okri Books, Chicago, 2009, 158pp.

Reviewed by James Kilgore

The arrival of these two new voices on the Zimbabwe literary scene is cause for celebration.  Both authors offer a nuanced and creative effort to portray the complexities and ultimate degeneration of post-independence Zimbabwe.

Sabatini’s is the more ambitious and conventional of the two. Written in a minimalist style similar to Petina Gappah’s, Sabatini’s debut novel focuses on an unlikely love story between a young coloured girl, Lindiwe Bishop, and her white next door neighbor, the erratic Ian McKenzie.

The novel begins in the early 1980s with Lindiwe still a school girl and spans to the late 90s. Zimbabwe passes through its many twists and turns in the shade of the evolving romance.

Sabatini is at her best depicting the details of Bulawayo and the vagaries of the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland. The writer has a passion for the charm of Zimbabwe’s second city, an appreciation of each and every storefront and stop street. The images of central Bulawayo strike wonderful chords. Her portrayal of Lindiwe’s family, with the contradictions of long hidden secrets and the brutality of neglect, also resonates.  In particular, Lindiwe’s unearthing of the liberation war treachery of an uncle who postures as a heroic guerrilla in the post-1980 years, gives us a clear glimpse into the manufacture of wartime legends. As Lindiwe unearths her uncle’s past, the reader cannot help but think of the military records of the thousands of fraudulent war vets who have climbed on the land-and -payout bandwagon in the last decade.

While she has delivered a comfortable and engrossing read, Sabatini also occasionally stumbles. Though the relationship between Lindiwe and Ian seems credible in the early stages, after Bishop completes university and develops a distinct gender awareness, her ongoing attraction to a classic Rhodesian male who continues to use racial epithets becomes less believable .  Lindiwe seems all too eager to forgive at a time in her life where such forgiveness appears out of place. In an interview the author stated that the central question of the book was whether Lindiwe and Ian would “manage to keep this connection.”  They do, which may frustrate some readers, as it appears Lindiwe should have moved on. While Lindiwe wouldn’t be the first woman to stay in a relationship long past the sell by date, I wonder how the novel would have worked if the couple had broken up. Perhaps a more authentic reflection of the racial and political tensions of the times would have emerged.

Despite these shortcomings, with The Boy Next Door, Sabatini has established herself as a promising figure among Zimbabwean writers. Though she’s not yet in the league of Vera, Dangarembga or Chinodya, Irene Sabatini is  perfectly capable of tackling a broad canvas with fluid prose and considerable insight.  Her voice is more than welcome and her ear for dialog is superb.

By contrast Chielo Zona Eze is a Nigerian whose clear cut mission is to condemn Mugabe. In a personal communication with the reviewer, Eze labeled the Zimbabwean President as “the epitome of political dysfunction in Africa,… a symptom of wider phenomena” on the continent.  The author possesses a special antipathy for Mugabe’s attempts to “silence his critics and the voice of the people” by blaming all Zimbabwe’s problems on the West. Eze believes it is the duty of African writers to “expose such lies and deception.”

In keeping with his overtly political purpose, Eze doesn’t hold back. At first The Trial of Robert Mugabe’s premise appears a little absurd. Mugabe sits in heaven at the Final Judgment Day, his fate to be determined by a range of iconic African heroes: Zimbabwean writers Yvonne Vera and Dambudzo Marechera, Steve Biko and Chief Justice Olaudah Equiano, the 18^th century Nigerian writer and abolitionist.

Eze cites Ali Mazrui’s  The Trial of Christopher Okigbo as his structural inspiration but there are also resonances of Ngugi’s The Trial of Dedan Kemathi and the  transcripts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.  The author could have gotten into trouble with this trial setting, but he manages to make it work.

Drawing extensively on the powerful testimony by witnesses to the atrocities in Matabeleland,  Eze chronicles the Fifth Brigade’s military campaign with unforgiving frankness and extensive graphic detail.  At times, The Trial runs like a well-constructed history of Mugabe’s years in power, with the testimony serving as lively and authentic source material.

Eze’s strength lies in his international and Pan-African vision. By including Biko and Equiano among those who sit in judgment, Mugabe’s trial becomes not merely an event for Zimbabwe but one that places human rights violations under ZANU-PF into a continental and global context.

While there is much of interest in The Trial, at times the plot line does run a little thin. The conclusion is a little bit too foregone, yet for anyone who wants to get a glimpse of Mugabe’s underside, minus the self-serving diatribes of a Catherine Buckle or Eric Harrison, The Trial of Robert Mugabe is a valuable and easy read. The events of the legal proceedings flow smoothly and Eze ultimately presents an optimistic message: that justice in Africa is part of universal notions of justice and will ultimately triumph. Sadly, as Dobrota Pucherova pointed out in her review of the book, Eze’s trial may be the only one Mugabe ever faces. Perhaps that makes the work all the more worth reading.

The reviewer is an Affiliated Research Scholar at the University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana) and the author of the 2009 novel We Are All Zimbabweans Now.

Guardian journalist Diane Taylor recently filed a report from Mwenga in South Kivu depicting the plight of Congolese women rape victims who are forced to work in conditions of slavery in gold and mineral mines. Earning less than a dollar a day, these women seek employment because “their fields are in forests occupied by rebels and growing food has become too dangerous”[1]. This latest account is one of many media stories to expose the vulnerable and inhumane position Congolese women find themselves in, in a country that has experienced decades of conflict, state failure, impunity and corruption.

Taylor’s account is exceptional because she chooses to investigate into the societal consequences of illegal mining trade in the east of Congo, rather than focusing solely on war. The women in Taylor’s report find themselves in an exploitative industry because they either fear becoming, or have already become, victims of violence. The reframing of gender based sexual violence (GBSV) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is vital if governments are to take the problem of rape seriously. Rape in the east of Congo is not just the bi-product of war or a weapon of war. Rape is an integral part of a destructive regional militarized economy.

According to the UN, the DRC is one of the most gender-inequitable regions in the world, ranking 131 out of 177 of those countries reviewed[2]. Although the DRC has among the most gender-aware policies and conventions in Sub-Saharan Africa, a gap exists between the laws to protect and promote women’s rights and the reality of women’s lives, which are subject to local customary law and local political power. In some parts of the east of Congo where borders with Uganda and Rwanda are porous, local political power has been destroyed and replaced by lawlessness and military power. Women’s rights are eroded further by a culture of impunity and the absence of a fair, effective and efficient judiciary service.

A report published in June 2011 by the American Journal of Health and commissioned by the United Nations stated that the DRC was “the worst place on earth to be a woman”. Statistical estimates determined that some 1,152 women are raped daily, amounting to 48 rapes an hour. The findings indicated that between 2006 and 2007, “approximately 3.07 to 3.37 million women reported experiencing intimate partner sexual violence”, suggesting that sexual violence was more widespread across the country than previously thought[3].

These shocking statistics demonstrate the scale of the problem, yet themselves should be treated with caution. Swedish academic Maria Eriksson Baaz criticises the report’s generalising tendencies, observing that it would not be possible to glean an accurate picture in a country as vast as the DRC[4]. Provinces in the east of Congo comprise Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Oriental and Katanga and each has separate socio-political histories and highly complex politics.

Co-founder of the UK-based campaign It Must Stop Victoria Dove Dimandja maintains that prior to the invasion of Uganda and Rwanda and the onset of the civil war in 1997, rape, gang rapes and extreme sexual violence was “something we never had in our country. It was happening here and there, and in the city”. Yet, with vast numbers of Congolese civilian men, local militias and regular Congolese army soldiers perpetrating GBSV, rape cannot be understood as a product of foreign intervention alone.

The international media also has a tendency to image Congolese and/or regional political problems in isolation to the wider international political economy within which strategic military/political actors – for example, Kabila, Kagame and Museveni – operate. Where media coverage reports that rape in the east of Congo is a weapon of war used by militias, the informal mining industry is imaged as a consequence of war, rather than the reason for continued instability.

Rape and militarized economies

How then, do we re-politicise the problem of systematic and opportunistic rape in the east of Congo so that international, regional and local political and economic factors are understood to coalesce? Framing rape as an integral part of a militarized economy, where arms and war go hand in hand with the profiting from illegal mining, may bring us one step closer. Within this destructive economy, where 98 percent of mines are said to have the involvement of militia[5], women and sex have become commodities to be seized, bought and bartered.

Rape, including the rape and mutilation of men and boys, has become a form of ethnic cleansing, used to terrorize local people, destroy communities and displace populations in areas where armed groups compete for mineral-rich land. Foreign military regimes, individual soldiers and militias from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, and Zimbabwe have all, over the years, imported militarized rape into the east of Congo.

Extending beyond this, there is a wider economy of violence where women are perceived as assets, valued for their productive and reproductive labour. Attacking communities to steal food, water, clothing, cash and farming equipment (even seeds) from women is another source of income. There have been instances where local men “join the military on rape raids”, in addition to exploiting conflict situations to “sexually assault women without fear of punishment”[6]. As is now well known, militia and soldiers often regard rape as ‘payment’ for their military work and a means to climb the military ranks – this is particularly the case for child soldiers.

There are also the survivalist strategies of women and girls who enter into prostitution, quietly play the part of the military ‘wife’ or ‘camp follower’, or exchange sex for food and other resources. The women in Taylor’s report, who have been driven into an exploitative mining industry fall into this category, and there have been reports of families sending girls as young as thirteen into mining towns to seek an income through prostitution.

Coltan and cassiterite: the new Red Rubber wars

The fact that societal breakdown in the east of Congo is as much a product of the global demand for cassiterite, tin ore and coltan to supply consumers with technologies such as mobile phones and laptops, as it is to do with state failure, may explain the lack of international political will to address the problem of GBSV.

Governments and international institutions have historically been guilty of keeping Congolese women at the margins of international politics, first perceiving rape as a bi-product of war, then understanding rape to be a weapon of war and now, since the official end of the Congo wars, defining GBSV within the context of development and the Millennium Goals.

In a letter of response from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to Victoria Dove Dimandja and colleague José Musau Kalanda dated 10 January 2011, the UK government concedes that “the situation for women is not improving”. The letter states that the UK is “actively supporting Congolese women by assisting efforts to publicly challenge sexual and gender based violence and to increase the number, influence, and capacity of Congolese women in public life”.  The letter notes the UK government’s call to urgently “enhance [MONUSCO’s] efforts to protect and defend civilians”. The letter also states that “the primary responsibility for protection of civilians lies with the DRC authorities”[7]. This ignores the complexity of the regional militarized economy and isolates DRC from the rest of the world. The separation of DRC politics from international politics in turn enables governments such as the UK and the US to present themselves first and foremost as providers of humanitarian aid.

Campaigners Dimandja and Kalanda are frustrated with the UK government’s disinterest in identifying and holding to account strategic-level operators within the mining industry who by extension are perpetrators of human rights abuses, including GBSV. They contend that spending aid money promoting women’s rights amounts to “pouring money onto the symptoms without treating the cause”. They want the UK to lobby the UN and EU and put pressure on multinationals. “Let us come together to fight for a responsible government, securing the borders and legalising the mining industry,” said Dimandja, “then allow women to reorganise themselves”.

These women are encouraged to join parliamentary meetings because “it’s been seen as a positive thing for Congolese women to speak for themselves”, but often find they are not being listened to. Part of the problem, they say, is the refusal of potential influencers such as NGOs to seriously discuss the regional and international politics which are sustaining Congo’s terrible status quo.  Many of these NGOs, who receive UK government aid money to deliver DFID programmes in the absence of an effective Congolese government, prefer to remain a-political.

Oxfam maintains that it must “balance its work on the ground in very difficult and challenging environments with the political statements it makes” to ensure staff and the lives of the people they work with are protected[8]. Oxfam’s most recent campaigns have focused on the strong voices of Congolese women, and other women and men globally, who are campaigning for change in the DRC[9]. This reminds us that women are not just rape victims: those who seek employment in the mines or adopt survivalist sex strategies are choosing the best of the worst options available to them in the regional militarized economy.

DFID’s new DRC operational plan 2011-2015 recognises on paper the need to align the UK aid programme with wider UK government conflict and security policy goals for the region. This, together with a slow-growing momentum to regulate the mining industry is a step forward, but alone is not enough. Public interest must be roused if we are to see a future where consumers purchase fair trade technologies from corporations that can guarantee their products do not contain materials extracted from regions of Africa where extreme human rights abuses occur.

Georgina Holmes is a member of the Africa Research Group, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

South Sudan gained its independence on the 9th of July. A week earlier
President al-Bashir of Northern Sudan was in China meeting with senior
party figures. China has been Sudan’s most valued ally over the past 5
years as Beijing has shielded the North Sudanese leadership from
criticism over conflict in Darfur, and has been a close partner in
developing the oil industry.

Despite ongoing tension between the North and the South, China has managed to
maintain a relationship with both sides. Sudanese oil is vital to
China’s strategic interests. With South Sudan holding 75% of the known
resources in the former unified Sudan, Beijing has been keen to develop a
relationship. China took in 79% of South Sudan’s total oil exports last
year.

“Although China and the Republic of South Sudan are separated by thousands of
miles, the two peoples have a deep traditional friendship and common
wish to enhance friendly exchanges,” Hu Jintao told South Sudanese
President Salva Kiir in a telephone call.

Meanwhile North Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti accompanying al-Bashir
in China said, “We are now in need of Chinese support because the West
instead of supporting us is now doing what I can describe as a
challenge”. Beijing has managed to position itself as a key ally to both
markets at the expense of Western powers. While the efforts of the ICC
in prosecuting leaders who commit war crimes are undoubtedly noble, they
have had little clear positive on influencing al-Bashir a year later.

Despite the intention to indict war criminals irrespective of nationality, it
is unlikely that the ICC will investigate calls by Human RIghts Watch to
investigate torture under the most recent Bush regime. Nor is it likely
that the US would cooperate with charges if they were levelled.

In a region scarred by continuing conflict, the dual relationship China
holds with the North and South could be a powerful force for peace.
China’s interests on both sides of the border and its power in the
affairs of both countries mean it will lobby hard for peaceful relations
between President Kir and President al-Bashir. Having worked for a long
time to build oil security through these relationships China has a very
strong interest in preventing conflict.

In interviews with official Chinese media, al-Bashir combined reassurances
about his commitment to a peaceful secession of the south, with a
warning that the division could still go wrong.

While other Western powers largely ignored the fledgling government in Juba,
China has been active in constructing government buildings, and building
relationships. The Sudanese oil resource is so important to China that
Beijing has also been engaged in a long running battle to build and
operate the planned Lamu port and infrastructure corridor through Kenya
and Uganda.

While the country has only recently gained full independence, regional and
international powers have for a long while been planning for South
Sudan’s debut. Currently all of Sudan’s oil infrastructure runs north to
refineries in Port Sudan, but understandably the South is keen to
diversify its outlets. Kenya is only too willing to oblige.

The Lamu corridor has long been mooted in order to carry Sudanese crude to a
modern port on the East African coast. The competition to build this
port has largely been between Japan and China, as investors have brought
nearly $5bn to secure infrastructure in the region. This includes an
oil refinery, a sea port and a 1,400 kilometre oil pipeline that will
link Juba to Lamu. An accompanying train line has also been discussed.

The root of the South Sudanese succession is in the country’s isolation and
sidelining, brought about by the dominant national interest in
Khartoum. Opening up an alternative trade corridor to the South will
break Juba’s reliance on the north and allow it more control over the
receipts from its oil wealth. For China, a new port at Lamu will also
avoid funneling Chinese shipping through the Gulf of Aden, while for
Kenya it will open an easy and reliable new fuel supply, and new markets
for its manufacturing industries.

There has also been a great deal of investment in the 1,130 kilometre road
that links Nairobi to Juba to cut down journey times which currently
take up to 26 hours. Business Daily quotes the combined cost of the
projects at an estimated $10 billion (Sh750 billion) or 34 per cent of
Kenya’s Sh2.2 trillion gross domestic product (GDP).

The succession of South Sudan was inevitable considering the former Sudan’s
fractious political past. While Western attempts to effect improvements
in the Sudanese situation through the ICC are worthy, China’s carefully
built trade relationships may in reality prove more effective at
maintaining peace.

Selected Headlines:

• Africa can gain from pricier Chinese labour -The Namibian (NAM)

• Madagascar in the Chinese net -Pambazuka News (GBR, KEN)

• China shifts focus in Africa -Business Day (ZAF)

• UNBS to work with Chinese firms on quality -New Vision (UGA)

• China trumps Brazil in African showdown -Business Report (ZAF)

• Kimunya calls for calm in port privatisation plan -The Standard (KEN)