The European Union is playing an increasingly important role in mediating how the UK relates to Africa across a range of policy areas including international development, foreign policy, security, and trade. This offers both opportunities and constraints to the UK in its relationship with Africa. This is increasingly a subject of discussion within Parliament, with a House of Commons International Development Select Committee inquiry on the comparative advantage of EU aid published in April 2012 arguing that less EU aid should go to Middle Income Countries (MICs), and a House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee report on the impact of aid published in March 2012 calling for reduced funding of the EU’s aid programmes.

The evolving role of the EU however remains somewhat unknown to many decision-makers in the UK. As such the Africa APPG organised a visit to Brussels, attended by a cross-party group of 9 MPs and Peers, on 31st January 2012, in order to investigate the political relationship between the EU and Africa. The Group met with MEPs and parliamentary staff working on Africa issues, African Ambassadors and representatives of the UK Permanent Representation to the EU, the European External Action Service, and the European Commission. Members noted that the visit was taken seriously, with each of these groups engaging with the Members in a positive and productive way. This following report (pdf) details the content of the discussions held.

This included a focus on:

• The geopolitical landscape -  security, regional integration

• EU architecture – External Action Service, DEVCO, ECHO, European parliament and delegations to African countries/AU

• EU dealing with Africa as a single entity

• Co-ordination between EU members

Read AAPPG EU visit report in full here

Soldiers from the SPLA-North surround a grenade launcher captured from the Sudan armed forces in the Nuba mountains.

The tactical calculations in the conflict between North and South Sudan are staggeringly complex but they have one thing in common: neither party has the slightest consideration for the wellbeing of the population. I tend to feel that there is little use for analyses when the men in charge are so determined to wear each other out at any cost.

Alex de Waal’s conclusion that the parties are unable to compromise seems to be about the only sensible thing to say. The other issues he mentions follow from this inability to co-operate and compromise. Both parties have operated under the assumption that the other side would eventually try to get the upper hand – and rightly so: Khartoum and Juba constantly look for slight advantages on the ground, with public opinion, in the international arena.

To discuss both parties’ rationale in the conflict is pure speculation. If I were to give it a shot my analysis would run along the lines of a mutual expectation with the NCP and the SPLM that the other side will, sooner or later, crumble and lose the ability to continue its rule.

At the time of signing the CPA, the NCP might have believed it would be better to leave the South to its own devices for a while and concentrate on reinforcing its grip on the North. Knowing that the South Sudan government would depend entirely on oil revenue while the existing pipelines run through the North and estimating that an alternative (up-hill) line to Kenya would be too expensive, the NCP calculated that the SPLM would rather contribute to the North’s economy by paying high oil transport fees than risk being cut off from any revenues at all.

The NCP probably also figured that fear of revenue loss combined with the fear of losing too much credit internationally could refrain Juba from taking action when the Sudan Armed Forces would try to deal with the remaining SPLA forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. After all, that is an internal affair. Furthermore, the NCP might have thought that, with its obvious lack of development and human resources and all the ensuing problems of corruption, popular discontent and tribal conflict, the South might well implode within a few years.

The SPLM in its turn might have believed that being the ruling party of an independent country with large proven oil reserves would secure substantial sums in foreign investment and strengthen its position in the international arena. China in particular would no longer be so eager to defend Khartoum, while the United States, for a host of reasons, would be happy to continue its support to Juba.

Knowing that the government in Khartoum had become entirely dependent on oil revenues that were now severely reduced, the SPLM figured that the NCP would be in a tight corner economically, no matter what. Add to this the enormous and continuing cost of fighting the armed opposition in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and it would be only a matter of time before the NCP government would collapse.

In this line of reasoning it is entirely logical not to budge on transport fees and to give covert support to opposition groups across the border. If you can’t win the war, try to win the peace. Whatever the exact calculations were on either side, the peace obviously has not lasted long enough yet for one of the parties to collapse.

In the North, the Sudan Armed Forces defeated SPLA forces in Blue Nile rather decisively and managed to hold on to the large towns in South Kordofan. The rebel movements from Darfur, though still active, seem unable to make any progress in the West. The NCP government is in dire need of foreign currency but so far it shows no clear signs of losing its grip on power.

In the South the SPLM faces strong criticism over corruption, nepotism, tribalism and incompetence but the internal division of the South is nowhere near the level of 1991, when a rift in the movement nearly caused its demise. The SPLM government seems to be in firm control, even though it has a serious budgetary problem since the North provoked it into shutting down oil production.

There is little chance that the NCP and the SPLM will actually compromise on anything. This is a serious game of poker: which country will run out of chips first?  I guess that beyond today’s horizon all kinds of other calculations are being made for the event of full scale war: who will let himself be provoked into continuing his advance beyond the border areas? Who can count on support from his allies? Who can sustain a prolonged military campaign when the financial resources are all but depleted? Is there any chance the international community will intervene?

I see no reason why either side would now be in a better position to defeat the other than seven years ago when they signed the CPA. They both used the oil money to build up their respective armed forces. Perhaps Juba has the better fighters, but Khartoum has the fighter jets. At the same time I think neither party is comfortable with letting time alone decide who might win the peace. So they up the ante. Sudan continues to harass South Sudan along the borders, South Sudan shuts down the wells.

Personally I think it is clear Khartoum has the greatest contempt for the people, bombing civilian areas day in day out, with al Beshir calling the SPLM ‘insects’ and Haroun telling his troops in South Kordofan to ‘hand over the place clean’ and ‘make no prisoners’. It is evil, I have no better words for their conduct. Meanwhile Juba seems to gamble recklessly with the future of millions of citizens of a new nation… what to make of that?

All I know for sure is that the population is the party that is certain to lose, and for the most part they are not even allowed to play.

Nanne op’t Ende is the author of Proud to be Nuba and long-time commentator on South Kordofan.

Amanda Taub – blogger at Wronging Rights – has been quick out of the blocks in producing what would appear to be the first book-length analysis of the Kony 2012 phenomenon.

Taub is clearly well-connected, and has managed to attract an impressive line-up including Adam Branch (long-time academic on N.Uganda), Beck Hamilton (of Saving Darfur fame) and Laura Seay (@texasinafrica).

You can buy for $0 to $3 here

The book’s description tells us that it’s ‘for those who know a little about Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army, and want to know more.’

And it looks at the ‘story’ systematically and analytically from the history of the conflict to the phenomenon of viral advocacy videos in campaigns related to African conflicts.

You can see the full description here:

‘Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 has become the most viral video ever. Concerned citizens around the world, from middle school students to celebrities like Oprah and Justin Bieber, watched the film and shared it with their friends. It has now been viewed more than 87 million times.

That success was soon met by a critical backlash. Critics nearly as varied as the campaign’s supporters pointed out that Invisible Children was offering an oversimplified, even misleading narrative. They faulted the campaign for failing to provide a context for the LRA conflict, and pointed out that the video portrayed Africans as either helpless victims, or heartless killers.

This book is both a collection of that criticism, and a constructive response to it. The authors each wrote a short essay offering information that they felt was missing from the video, or explaining how they thought the campaign could be improved.

The first several chapters provide historical and political context. Adam Branch, Daniel Kalinaki, and Ayesha Nibbe explain the roots of the conflict, and how it has persisted for so many years. Alex Little and Patrick Wegner discuss various attempts to end the conflict through peace negotiations, ICC arrest warrants, and military operations, and why they have not been successful.

Later chapters consider the ethics and effectiveness of awareness campaigns like Kony 2012. Glenna Gordon and Jina Moore draw on their experiences as journalists to critique the video’s portrayal of Africa and the people who live there. Rebecca Hamilton, Laura Seay, Kate Cronin-Furman, and Amanda Taub examine the weakness of “awareness” advocacy. Alanna Shaikh explains the ethical dangers of bad aid work. Teddy Ruge offers a different view of Africa, as a place of dynamic innovation instead of violence and helplessness. And youth activist Sam Menefee-Libey describes his frustration with the tone and substance of the campaign meant to target his generation.’

Table of Contents

Preface

Contributors

How Civilians Became Targets: A Short History of the War in Northern Uganda

Adam Branch

Kony2012: Treat the Political Causes of the LRA, Not Just Its Violent Symptoms

Daniel Kalinaki

The Making of a “Humanitarian Emergency”: Night Commuters, Invisible Children, and the Business of Aid and Advocacy

Ayesha Nibbe

Three Strikes and Kony’s Still There: What I Learned from Negotiations with Joseph Kony and the International Criminal Court’s Efforts to Indict Him

Alex Little

Peace from Juba: Peace Talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda (2006-2008)

Mark Kersten

Can a Military Intervention Stop the Lord’s Resistance Army?

Patrick Wegner

Ethical or Exploitative?: Stories, Advocacy and Suffering

Jina Moore

The Power of Images: Who Gets Made Visible?

Glenna Gordon

Learning From Save Darfur

Rebecca Hamilton

Avoiding “Badvocacy”: How to Do No Harm While Doing Good

Laura Seay

What Have They Got to Lose?

Alanna Shaikh

Moral Agents and Patients: Trayvon Martin and Invisible Children

Hawa Allan

Armchair Critics Respond

Kate Cronin-Furman and Amanda Taub

Africa’s New Status Quo: Connected, Bold and Vocal

TMS Ruge

Beyond Kony2012 – Reasserting the Transformative Power of Youth Activism

Sam Menefee-Libey

Marine Le Pen's success in France is the clearest manifestation of the anti immigrant far right in European politics.

Francois Hollande’s victory in France’s recent Presidential election may have dampened the focus on the stubborn rise in support for France’s far-right Front National and its leader Marine Le Pen; yet the general rise of the far right across Europe raises questions for the African Diaspora.

In Greece, the breakthrough of the neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, and Marine Le Pen’s increase of her party’s share of the vote in France are but the most recent examples of the lurch to the populist right in Europe led by figures like the deceased (and not much lamented) Jorg Haider in Austria and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands.

Diaspora communities may have to be equally as vocal in defending their presence to ensure that the dark past of Europe is not revisited.

The mainstreaming of the far-right is perhaps the most worrying aspect for diaspora Africans; Marine Le Pen’s, dare it be said, glamour and charisma add to the visceral threat she poses to mainstream parties, who increasingly echo the rhetoric of the far-right. In concrete terms, mainstream candidates have found it necessary to talk tough on immigration; for those who are immigrants or the children of immigrants this often makes for uncomfortable topics. Yet perhaps it’s time the bull was tackled by the horns. Diasporans should not rest easy in the belief that these are just protest votes – concern with immigration and the unease of cultural change, coupled with the global economic downturn, suggest the resurgent right-wing is here to stay. In the victory of parties like the Golden Dawn in Greece, a nation whose recent economic humiliation echoes Germany’s after World War Two, it is finding its most virulent expression, despite the simultaneous rise of radical and moderate leftist parties.

Even Francois Hollande declared that in periods of economic uncertainty immigration should be restrained. While unpalatable, it is important that Diasporans are able to empathize with that position and its articulation in the mainstream, while simultaneously arguing the merits of a diverse and pluralistic society and the very real economic benefits of immigration and freedom of movement, as well as the flaws in a system that demands cheap labor but is not willing to pay the social cost.

Gordon Brown, Britain’s former prime minister, was famously accused of dog whistle politics when he declared he wanted ‘British jobs for British workers’, yet he echoed a view many Britons hold. A silence on issues of immigration has only provided more grist to the mill of the far right. The co-option of the far-right rhetoric by Nicolas Sarkozy was only the most recent manifestation of a lurch to the right by mainstream parties desperate to attenuate the far-right’s growth. Arguably though such rhetoric might be a turn-off for many voters, including Diasporan Africans, yet hasn’t it drawn away voters who may otherwise have turned to the full-throated call of the far-right beast?

Dele Meiji Fatunla is editor of Diaspora Debate.

Putting the world to rights with Meles and Gordon.

The World Economic Forum is best known for its annual meeting at Davos in the Swiss Alps where, recently, focus has been on the poor state of the world economy – particularly that of Europe. So, the annual Africa version of the event (held last week in the swanky surroundings of the Sheraton, Addis Ababa) must make a welcome change, as the atmosphere was robustly positive. African economies are on the rise, none more so than Ethiopia’s which, if you believe the numbers, (and most informed sources do) grew at between 5 and 10 percent over the past half a decade.

Sitting astride this economic growth, and taking pride of place at this year’s WEF, was Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. In an event that boasted such political heavyweights as former British PM Gordon Brown, and private sector luminaries like the Ivorian boss of The Prudential, Tidjane Thiam, whose $600 billion worth of assets makes Ethiopia look like a minnow, I was surprised by how much Meles came out as the dominant figure.

A fiercely intelligent man, with a grasp of figures redolent of Brown (whom Meles referred to as ‘Prime Minister’ throughout) he seemed totally in his element. Perhaps it was the nature of the audience. He was never going to have to field too many tricky questions about Ethiopia’s political space, (un)free press or tight government control over telecommunications and banking in front of a room full of CEOs and fellow technocrats.

One senses that in certain crowds his statement that “there is no direct relationship between economic growth and democracy” would have got him in to trouble – important players were gnashing their teeth at this but Meles, kingpin of Western policy in the Horn of Africa, knows exactly how much he can loosen his Marxist instincts without upsetting his donors. To this end, the above was quickly followed by the rider that “democracy is a good thing in and of itself, irrespective of its impact on economic growth.” When it was asserted that Africa’s post Cold War democratisation was a reason for more recent economic success, Meles scathingly referred to this as “old stuff”.

One of the bigger topics of debate across many panels was how public and private sectors can most effectively work together for both economic growth and development. During a discussion on developing African infrastructure, Meles asserted that government would have to lead in the construction of roads, railways, power systems etc because private sector investment in these areas was “miniscule” – the risks are simply too high. Gordon Brown, ever the flexible social democrat, championed the public-private partnership as a means to raise capital for the kind of infrastructure projects that the private sector won’t do, and the public sector can’t afford.

There were, however, complaints from a number of voices over how public agencies crowd out a stream of private money otherwise poised to flow in to African economies. Although Donald Kaberuka (President of the African Development Bank) countered that any small private investment that had taken place in infrastructure was because public agencies had brought it in.

Whilst Meles asserted that the Ethiopian government would continue to be vigilant over the commercial ‘whizzkids’ who “come in and use instruments that we don’t understand,” Jubril Tinubu, CEO of the Nigerian firm, Oando – an energy servicers provider – countered that African governments shouldn’t be scared of such people, and instead must realise that the private sector is much bigger and can do things more quickly and cheaply than government. In Nigeria, at least, it is government that is the problem.

Amid the bullishness about economic growth there was caution from, amongst others, Kofi Annan, who stressed the importance of not confusing economic growth with economic transformation. Much work still needs to be done to make African growth inclusive, and the GINI coefficient must be viewed as a central indicator of effective economic policy.

Aside from Meles, several other big names played a significant role in the forum. South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan did his international reputation no harm with his measured style, always keeping the most disadvantaged people as the focus of discussion. During a panel on market integration, whilst other panellists were distracted by the bluster of continental currencies and the Trans African Highway, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Nigeria’s Minister of Finance, displayed her characteristic good sense. She pointed out that organic integration, whether it be informal border trade, or the multinational African staff of South African universities, was already taking place outside of big, top-down projects.

Okonjo-Iweala is clearly a popular figure across the continent – this was shown by the near universal support her candidacy for President of the World Bank received from her African constituents. Like Gordhan, her instincts seem to be in support of the poor, whilst her keen economic brain seeks to facilitate the free movement of goods and people to unlock commercial potential. The World Bank’s loss is Nigeria’s gain.

So what was the prevailing feeling about this year’s WEF? Whilst Meles demonstrated his star quality (with a roguish tendency towards the autocratic and nationalistic) there were a number of other figures of real stature in attendance with claim to positions of continental leadership. Whilst it would be hard to identify a grand narrative, the technical discussion was frighteningly high, underlining the quality of African leadership now available in both the public and private sectors.

It’s difficult to think of a panel where a non-African speaker really stole the show, and the most high-profile Western politician in attendance, Gordon Brown, seems to be far better regarded in Africa than he is in the UK. Coming to the continent must be a relief, although it can only be a shock returning home, where it’s been 2 years since anyone referred to him as the PM. Maybe it tells us something about Meles, who can’t seem to fathom that a political heavyweight like Brown would ever allow himself to be removed from power.

Magnus Taylor is Managing Editor, African Arguments Online.

On May 1^st I took the battered little old train into town to see what was going on. It starts off in one of Tunis’s posher blue and white seaside suburbs, stops at 17 stations – six of them called Carthage – and then whizzes across the causeway that divides the enclosed lake and ends at the base of the capital’s main street, Habib Bourguiba.

I had been warned by a gloomy old Tunisian that the May Day marches might spark a second revolution, so I thought I’d take a look. By mid afternoon, the promenade that divides the main street was packed with people, young and old, many of them carrying Tunisian flags. Most were men (who all dressed in similar drab clothes) – many of the women among them wore headscarves in varying degrees of strictness; some dull and severe, others bright and stylish. I noticed there were also children among them. Clearly not everyone was expecting trouble. The cafes that line the street were packed, hardly a seat to be found.

In the promenade avenue small crowds of 40 or 50 people – rather like at Hyde Park Corner – were trying to listen to a speaker or an argument. Small gangs of police waited at each end of the street but in uniform, not riot gear. Some parts of the street were cordoned off with rolls of razor wire. Behind them were parked armoured Humvees and larger vehicles with water canon.

Earlier in the day two large trade unions had paraded peacefully down the main avenue. Suddenly there were shouts and a crowd of about 150 started to run and scatter into the side streets. The crowd after all was nervous and jittery. But after running a few yards, they turned and waited, then drifted back. It was becoming clear that revolution was not in the air.

On my way back an old man talking on his mobile phone was knocked over by a young man dodging through the crowd, running fast. The phone broke up but immediately people picked up the pieces and went to his help. Two young men took off in pursuit. On the packed train on the way back, a man gave up his seat to a pregnant woman and noisy kids were scolded by their elders. This does not feel like a society that is likely to go further down the revolutionary road.

Tunisians are proud that they sparked the Arab Spring – though the manner of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self immolation in December 2010 was horrific. Now after a free and fair election they have a coalition government led by Ennahda, a moderate Islamic party. They are into process, drafting a new constitution. There are no ongoing street battles of Egypt or the chaos of Libya, Tunisia’s neighbours. Tunisians have done their revolutionary bit and now want a decent process towards greater freedom and a better life. Some are furious that Ben Ali and his family stole so much from the country and ruled it with a secret police. But today words like dignity, freedom and fairness come up a lot. What little violence there has been seems to come from the former secret police, now jobless.

What are the threats to this? One is the economic divide. Tunisia is not Tunis and there are terrible levels of poverty in the south away from the coast. Secondly, there is a feeling that Ennahda is holding back now but if it wins the next election outright it will impose stricter Islamic codes. Already the owner of a TV station has been fined for showing the film Persepolis. Thirdly, only about 25 percent of the 18 to 25 year olds voted in the recent election. Yet it was that generation who put their lives on the line on the streets to drive out President Ben Ali. No one quite knows why they stayed away but if they do not participate in making the new constitution it could be destabilizing at a later stage.

Richard Dowden is Director of the RAS.

Mozambique's President Guebuza

On 8^th May2012 the President of Mozambique, Amando Guebuza, spoke at the latest Oppenheimer lecture in London. Mr Guebuza came to London at the invitation of the Oppenheimer group and used the visit to meet David Cameron and other British and Mozambican dignitaries.

Guebuza had two central messages; that global challenges require global solutions, and that security is essential for development.

It is ironic, that in this extended period of African economic growth (some of it double digit), achieving the millennium goals remains a real challenge. Even when/if they are reached, there will still be many who live in poverty. Conflict stops development in many of these flourishing economies. To highlight the extent of the problem, Guebuza stated that the UN spends more on security personnel in conflict areas than France spends on development.

The end of the Cold War brought a period of relative peace to Africa and it was hoped that this would lead to security in the South of the continent. The absence of two competing political ideologies and a better understanding of how to resolve political warfare, have both contributed to a decline in these state-level conflicts.

Mr Guebuza argued that now conflict comes not from state agents, but from non-state protagonists, terrorists being the most obvious example. For Guebuza, social/economic problems are the main cause of this new type of conflict.

Within Guebuza’s own country, in recent years, a constant flow of immigrants has caused social and economic unrest. Arms and drugs have permeated Mozambique’s boarders with the influx of foreign labor. No country can prevent this entirely and no country can solve these problems alone.

Mr Guebuza went on to emphasize the interdependence of nation states. Thus resolving these new types of conflict must be a collaborative process. Mozambique shares boarders with many of central Africa’s landlocked countries, offering them links to maritime trading networks and collecting essential revenue in return. However these coastlines are now under threat. They are hard to police and their protection cannot be the responsibility of a single nation state.

Somali piracy started as a non-newsworthy event but since 2010, the cost of maritime piracy has exceeded $150,000,000 and 10 incidences have now been recorded off the southern coast of West Africa. In November 2010, the highest ransom was paid to release the son of a Korean Oil trader; a staggering $9.5million. Diversion is not an option – a report by the African Development Bank suggested that it would cost $3.5billion to re-route trade vessels round the African cape. According to the UN, pirates gained $170million in 2011. The sea off the Mozambican coastline offers livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans and must be made safe for the country to develop.

Furthermore, discoveries of gas have recently been made off the Mozambican coast, offering huge potential revenues. Again, a lack of security down the East African coast could threaten further extraction and the benefits it would bring to Mozambique.

Mr Guebuza argued that a number of UN conventions and reports on the growing piracy problem have concluded that a larger military presence at sea is not the answer to solving the problem. Rather, greater security at the state level in Somalia will provide the stable conditions whereby piracy won’t be relied upon for Somalis to earn a living.

In the Mozambican context, Mr. Guebuza stated that the Mozambican Intelligence Agency is achieving results and its research is showing that security can’t be guaranteed unless social and economic stability is achieved. The lack of local opportunity is what leads to immigration and the illicit pursuit of wealth, as seen in Somalia. These must be resolved for security to be guaranteed.

Finally Mr. Guebuza stated that these challenges and threats cannot be faced in national isolation. Regional and national co-operation are essential for a peaceful and prosperous world.

By Jack Chapman

· FDI projects into Africa have more than doubled from 339 in 2003 to 857 in 2011

· Intra-African investment has grown exponentially increasing from 27 in 2003 to 145 in 2011 – 17% of all new FDI projects on the continent last year

· 60% of respondents say perception of Africa as a business location has improved over past 3 years and three quarters say attractiveness will improve further over next 3 years

· African GDP forecast to grow between 4 and 5% pa in next decade and FDI into Africa to reach US$150b by 2015
Growing optimism and confidence among international and African investors has lead to significant inward investment into Africa over the last decade according to Ernst & Young’s second African Attractiveness Survey. The report combines an annual analysis of investment into Africa since 2003, with a survey of 505 global executives on their views about how and where investment will take place in the next decade and predicts that Africa is poised to enter the premier league of investment destinations.

There was strong growth in the number of new foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in Africa in 2011 with project numbers almost up to levels last seen in 2008. In the last decade Africa has seen an increase in inward investment from 339 new projects to the continent in 2003 to 857 in 2011 (an increase of 153%).  Investment has come from across the world, with strong growth in project numbers from rapid-growth markets and developed markets alike with projects from the former increasing from 99 to 319 and developed markets projects from 240 to 538 since 2003. Intra-African investment has also been a key driver of this growth.

Among rapid growth markets, India has led the way as the fourth largest FDI investor by number of projects since 2003 with annual compound growth of 46% since 2007. China and the UAE remain prominent too, but there is high growth in investment from an increasingly diverse range of other rapid growth markets, with South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey among those at the forefront.

At the same time, and despite the challenges they face, there has also been robust growth in investment into Africa from many developed markets. In the period from 2007 to 2011 UK project numbers have been up 27%, with the US and Germany also both increasing by 21%.

Mark Otty, Area Managing Partner Ernst & Young Europe, Middle East, India and Africa says, “With rapid-growth markets not only dominating investor attention and capital flows, but also playing an increasingly strategic role in defining the global economic agenda, the competition for global FDI is intensifying. African countries must position themselves appropriately in this shifting landscape to attract a greater proportion of the investment that will accelerate growth and development.”

Perception versus reality

Overall this year’s survey paints a positive picture reflecting growing confidence in Africa’s prospects. Sixty percent of survey respondents say that their perception of Africa as a place to do business has improved over the past three years. Looking forward, 73% of respondents anticipate that Africa’s attractiveness will improve over the next three years, while only 4% believe it will deteriorate.

Of those who believe that Africa’s growth prospects in the near term are significantly positive, half have a dedicated Africa strategy in place, and 92% have an active business presence on the continent.

The survey results do, however, also highlight that there is stark difference in perception between those who already have a business presence in Africa and those who do not.

This perception gap is reflected in the fact that, despite the positive African growth story, and Ernst & Young forecasting that growth in the region will remain at a robust rate of four and five percent per annum in the next decade and that FDI into Africa to reach US$150b by 2015, the continent still only attracted 5.5% of global FDI projects in 2011.

While this is up from 4.5% last year and is, in fact, the highest proportion of global FDI that Africa has ever received, reservations remain among those who have not yet invested into the continent.

Ajen Sita, Managing Partner: Africa at Ernst & Young comments “Despite high optimism, high growth and high returns, the perception gap still exists and the African continent as a whole still attracts fewer FDI projects than India and far fewer than China. There is still clearly work to be done by Africans – government and private sector alike – to better articulate and “sell” the growth story and investment opportunity for foreign investors.”

Intra-African investment leads the way

A key theme highlighted in the report is the growing confidence, self-belief and commitment by Africans to move Africa forward, reflected in the substantial growth of intra-African investment. Between 2003 and 2011, there has been 23% annual compound growth in intra-African investment into new FDI projects. This growth has been accelerating, with the growth rate up by 42% since 2007

Over a period in which the annual number of FDI projects into Africa has more than doubled – from 339 in 2003 to 857 in 2011 – intra-African investment has grown exponentially with project numbers increasing from 27 in 2003 to 145 in 2011. As a result, in 2011, intra-African investment accounted for 17% of all new FDI projects on the continent.

The growth in intra-African investment is being led by the respective regional powerhouses of Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. All three of these African economies are ranked among the top 20 investors into the rest of the continent between 2003 and 20011, and since 2007 the growth rate in investment from Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa has been 78%, 73% and 65% respectively.

Ajen comments, “There has been a radical shift in mindset and positioning over the last decade, with Africans themselves increasingly leading from the front by providing African solutions to Africa’s challenges.  Clearly work still remains to be done, but pushing ahead with key initiatives such as regional integration and investment in infrastructure will ensure that Africa remains on a sustainable growth curve.”

Moving beyond dependence on commodities

Last year’s African Attractiveness Survey highlighted the growing diversification of FDI as a key trend. This has continued this year with even greater levels of investment into less capital intensive sectors, resulting in a growing number of FDI projects in manufacturing, business services and sales, marketing and support  highlighting the shift away from extractive activities on which Africa has historically been dependent.

Looking ahead

Africa remains high on the agenda of those looking to invest in foreign markets but despite the growth and progress a perception gap still remains. However, significant improvements in trade agreements, regional integration and an increased investment in infrastructure will push Africa into the top league of investment destinations.

Ajen comments, “In the midst of a global economy that is being reshaped, with growth and capital flows shifting from north to south and west to east, Africans have a unique opportunity to break the structural constraints that have marginalized the continent for decades, if not centuries.”

Ernst & Young is a global leader in assurance, tax, transaction and advisory services.

THE NEW LIBYA: PLUS ÇA CHANGE?

The most recent political developments in Libya strongly support the sense that the country is quickly moving from one autocracy to another one. The only question is whether it will be theocratic, regional-ethnic or some combination of the two.

The slide into repression and authoritarianism has been highlighted by the recent publication of laws that immunize the former insurgents for the atrocities and crimes committed during the revolt, punish “any glorification” of Kaddafi, his regime, ideas or sons and prescribe life sentences for the spread of reports, “rumours,” or “propaganda” that “damages” the state. Libya is declared to be still at war; in effect, basic rights are suspended indefinitely. Anyone spreading information and rumours that “disrupt military preparations” or “weakens the citizen’s morale” is subject to imprisonment.

Other punishable “crimes” include “offending” the “17^th February Revolution”, “insulting” Islam, the state or its institutions. In brief, opposition by former supporters of the old regime or anyone who could be roped into that category is outlawed.

The measures also provide for the confiscation of the properties of former Kaddafi officials as well as members of his family. There is no indication of any judicial or other due process that would precede the confiscations. Vengeance appears to be the key factor.

In the meantime, up to 8,000 people continue to be detained in various prisons without charge. Many of them are Sub-Saharan immigrant workers accused of being “mercenaries” but include supporters or suspected supporters of the old regime. In January, UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay affirmed what international media had been reporting for months, i.e. widespread torture of the prisoners. An undetermined number of them have died as a result. In March, a video appeared on the Internet showing Sub-Saharan African prisoners in a zoo cage being forced to eat the old Libyan flag.

The 30,000 Black Libyans, who were ethnically cleansed and exiled from their homes in the now deserted town of Tawergha by the Misrata militia, are probably the most notable citizen victims of the post-Kaddafi repression. According to reports, they continue to be hunted down, killed or imprisoned by the armed militias that are beyond any central control. International human rights organizations should seriously consider treating them as a seriously threatened group that requires special protection.

A recent report from Benghazi indicates that repression of immigrants extends beyond Sub-Saharan Africans. The Ganfouda detention center houses up to 400 inmates from Somalia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Syria, Eritrea, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana. In this case, the “offense” is living in the country without official documents. The conditions are harsh. According to the IRI report, “Garbage lies scattered in the hallways of one of the buildings; detainees eat, sleep and use the toilet all in the same room. The food, which authorities say is provided three times a day, consists of one large bowl of spaghetti shared between groups of five people”.

A curious aspect of the report was the random use of captives on agricultural establishments. Under the circumstances, although they appear to be paid for work, it is difficult not to look at this arrangement as a form of slave labor since they are rotated from the detention center.

NATO forces that were the decisive factor in the destruction of the Kaddafi regime and state should not be allowed to behave like Pontius Pilate and look the other way in the face of atrocities and abuses. The have a moral obligation to prevail upon their erstwhile allies to maintain at least minimal human rights standards towards both foreigners as well as fellow Libyans who supported the old regime. the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union and the United Nations have a similar obligation to live up to their proclaimed commitment to the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy.

On 2 May 2012, security forces used stun grenades and tear gas to disperse a sit-in numbering in the thousands in Mauritania’s capital Nouakchott. Issues such as unemployment, drought and corruption regarding the sale of land to senior military officers and well-connected businessmen, are driving regular protests and have led 12 opposition parties to form the Democratic Opposition Council (COD), which calls for President Mohammad Ould Abdel Aziz to step down. The group has called for a ‘million man’ march in Nouakchott on 3 May.

Demonstrations near the presidential palace and government buildings in Nouakchott, as well as in Lekreyii, Aleg and the port city of Noudhibou, are likely to increase in the coming months, with the probable use of force by security forces against protesters likely only to exacerbate matters. The likely escalation of protests in Aleg and other parts of the Inchiri region, as well as the southern parts, would raise the risk of disruption to mining projects and land cargo from mining concessions.

We assess that the existence of deep ethnic and political divisions within opposition movements mitigate the risk that protests will grow into a popular uprising that imperils political stability. However, if civil unrest were to become overwhelming, the most likely outcome would be a military coup that replaced President Aziz with a candidate more favourable to the opposition. Although security forces have thus far proved loyal to President Aziz, the military has been heavily involved in every Mauritanian government and has replaced at least eight governments by instigating coups. A future intervention would be unlikely to threaten existing energy and mining interests.

Exclusive Analysis Ltd is a specialist intelligence company that forecasts commercially relevant political and violent risks worldwide.