Joyce Banda meets South African President Zuma in an effort of strengthen regional relations weakened under Mutharika.

When Joyce Banda was sworn in as president on 7th April, following the death of President Bingu wa Mutharika, she was faced with an uphill struggle.  Her constitutionally-ordained succession had been briefly resisted by several members of Mutharika’s cabinet and she had to establish her authority and move quickly to put right policies that had moved the country back towards autocracy, muzzled the press, alienated key donors and damaged the economy.  Since taking charge she’s made clear who’s boss while building bridges politically and working to bring on board civil society groups and bridge the gap that had opened between Malawi, donors and financial institutions.  Addressing parliament on 18 May, for the first time as president, she said the immediate restoration of the rule of law and donor confidence will be crucial to the country’s economic recovery.  Banda added that it would take a year to bring back the economy, struggling with fuel, power and water shortages, back on track.

Her first move was to sack the unpopular police commander, Peter Mukhito, and appoint a successor, Loti Dzonzi, who is more acceptable to her supporters, civil society groups and to ordinary Malawians (African Arguments, 10 April 2012).  She followed this up with a cabinet reshuffle.  Banda sacked the foreign minister and brother of the late president, Peter Mutharika, not a surprise given his role in the attempt to prevent her succession. Several other Mutharika loyalists were fired to make way for some surprises appointees, notably the son of former President Bakili Muluzi, Austin Atupele Muluzi, who entered cabinet as the economic planning and development minister.  Muluzi is a member of United Democratic Front (UDF) and is said to have presidential ambitions.  Prior to the death of Mutharika he had drawn large crowds at UDF rallies and was arrested by the police accused of inciting violence after political unrest in Lilongwe in July 2011.

Another former detainee, lawyer and civil rights activist Ralph Kasambara, was named justice minister and attorney general – a post he had held when Bingo wa Mr Mutharika first came to power in 2004. Ephraim Chiume was appointed to the Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation portfolio, while former finance minister Ken Kandodo, a grand-nephew of Malawi’s founder Kamuzu Banda, was appointed minister of defence.  Another interesting decision was the inclusion of former vice president Cassim Chilumpha, accused by the late president of plotting to assassinate him and still involved in a treason trial, as minister of energy and mining.  The president has put herself in charge of the civil service, disaster management, nutrition, HIV and AIDS. She is also commander in chief of the Malawi Defence Force and the 8,000 strong Malawi police service. Khumbo Kachali, expelled from the DPP by Mutharika, was appointed first vice-president.

To govern effectively, Joyce Banda had to garner sufficient support in parliament. Her party, the People’s Party (PP) had few MPs and isn’t officially recognized within parliament, not having existed when parliament was elected in 2009, since her inauguration, everyone seems to want to gate-crash the party.  More than 80 former members of Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and 98 UDF members (including a number of MPs) have applied to join.  There have been relatively few defectors from the opposition Malawi Congress Party (MCP) though there are persistent rumours that the former right-hand man of the dictatorial Kamuzu Banda (ruler from 1964 to 1994) John Z U Tembo might join if he is offered the post of Second Vice-President.  Tembo, once feared as Kamuzu’s hatchet man, has offered the support of his party to the new President Banda. Whether or not he is appointed, he clearly intends to back Banda for the time being, having said recently that “the People’s Party policies and those of Malawi Congress Party are similar. Her Excellency, when she was vice-president, stood with us in opposition when we faced challenges against the then regime; therefore, I am reiterating my support to the government of the People’s Party”.

With so many people changing party to line up with the new president, it remains to be seen whether disgruntled DPP members will ask the Speaker of parliament to invoke Section 65 of the constitution, which would declare vacant the parliamentary seats of those who leave the party they were elected to represent. But for Joyce Banda what matters is not the official party designation of MPs within parliament, but their votes when she needs legislation passed.

As Banda goes about political alliance-building, she needs to keep on the right side of civil society groups and the press.  Mutharika was effectively at war with civil society, human rights groups and the media.  He had grown increasingly autocratic and sensitive to criticism in his final years.  He had openly called on DPP party militants to beat critics and had taken a tough line with the press. The late president had launched an offensive against the increasingly independent media. Angry at increasing press criticism, Mutharika amended Section 46 of the Penal Code in February 2011, limiting the freedom of the press. The amendment gave the information minister powers to prohibit the publication or importing of any publication which was deemed against the public or national interest.  This was a step backwards in media freedom and contradicted the 1995 constitution, which enshrined freedom of the press. The new law and the growing harassment of journalists by Mutharika’s party and the police resulted in Malawi falling 67 places in the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index for 2011-12 ; down to 146 out of 179.

Civil society groups and media associations are waiting to see if Joyce Banda will meet their expectations that she will be more liberal and will move quickly to repeal the media law amendment, signalling a freedom for the media. The chair of the Malawian section of the Media Institute of Southern Africa, Anthony Kisunda, has expressed concern that some senior DPP politicians who had openly threatened journalists and the freedom of the press were now part of the new government or had declared their support for it.

In the field of foreign policy, Banda has signalled a change in policy that is intended to mend fences with foreign donors and clean up Malawi’s international image. In early May, she called openly on President al-Bashir of Sudan not to attend an African Union summit in Malawi later in the year.  Bashir has been indicted for crimes against humanity and Malawi was criticized when Mutharika welcomed Bashir in Malawi in October 2011. The AU is not happy about this Malawian stance and does not support her view, but it has won her brownie points in the west.  In mid-May, she announced that she wanted to move to repeal laws that banned homosexuality.  A number of Western leaders have recently said they would cut aid to countries which did not recognise gay rights, so this move by Banda could help Malawi’s general standing among donors.

Crucially, Banda is improving relations with key donors, who supply 40 percent of Malawi’s budgetary income.  Britain, Germany, the United States and the African Development Bank all froze or cut aid to Malawi under Mutharika over his human rights policies or his obstructive approach in dealings with the IMF and World Bank.  Britain cut aid after Mutharika kicked out the British High Commissioner over leaked comments criticizing the Malawian president’s increasingly authoritarian behaviour.  In late April, it was announced that President Banda had appointed former diplomat Benard Sande as the new High Commissioner to London, with John Tembo Junior – son of John Z U Tembo of the MCP – as his deputy.  The president said that the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, had indicated that he would appoint a High Commissioner to Malawi, ending the row and preparing the way for the resumption of British aid and budget support.  This was confirmed when foreign secretary William Hague stated that London had restored full diplomatic relations with Malawi. Britain is the main bilateral donor and its aid in 2011 was due to amount to £90m before the break in relations – £19m in budgetary support was immediately frozen.  Under the previous president, the German government halved its budgetary support and the US government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation withheld a $350m grant to rehabilitate Malawi’s crumbling energy network.

A sign that donors were ready to give Banda help came in late April when the head of the African Development Bank said he was willing to provide $45m in budget financing for Malawi to help new President Joyce Banda revive the struggling economy. ADB President Donald Kaberuka said he had held “good” discussions with Malawian Finance Minister Ken Lipenga on the sidelines of IMF meetings in Washington, adding, “I am confident Malawians are doing the right thing and we want to support them”. Another boost for Banda and the troubled Malawian economy was provided by South Africa’s decision to mark Banda’s first visit there as president by agreeing a loan of $35m to help Malawi import much-needed fuel.  This loan is all the more important as the Reserve Bank of Malawi devalued the kwacha by 33 per cent in early May.  This will have done much to convince the IMF of Banda’s seriousness about economic change and Banda will hope that it will unlock IMF and donor aid.

The IMF suspended a $79m aid facility for Malawi after serious disagreements with Bingu wa Mutharika. The Reserve Bank made clear its hopes for a positive reaction from the Fund saying that it should “contribute to government’s efforts to reach early agreement with the IMF which should leading to unlocking donor flows in the next few months”.  One side effect, not appreciated by many Malawians, was a rise in prices of many commodities. Immediately after the devaluation, shoppers in Malawi were said to be scrambling to buy basic goods, fearing huge price rises. The BBC reported that many shops had run out of staple foods such as sugar, cooking oil and bread soon after the devaluation was announced. Some shops and traders were said to be increasing prices even before the actual cost of imports increased.  Price rises and public discontent over them could be the major clouds on the horizon for the new government.

Keith Somerville lectures in Humanitarian Communications in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, at Canterbury and runs the Africa – News and Analysis website www.africajournalismtheworld.com

Latest in the Africa Research Institute‘s excellent Counterpoints series is by SOAS lecturer Dr Phil Clark, and deals with Rwanda’s Gacaca courts.

INTRO

‘Since 2001, the gacaca community courts have been the centrepiece of Rwanda’s justice and reconciliation process. Nearly every adult Rwandan has participated in the trials, but lawyers are banned from any official involvement. Human rights organisations fiercely opposed the use of gacaca for trying genocide cases, on the grounds that it fell short of international legal standards of fairness. Much criticism

reflects legal rigidity towards the unprecedented challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda – and a limited understanding of the aims of the community courts. Gacaca

was inevitably imperfect, but also highly ambitious and innovative. While the full impact of the process will not be apparent for many years, gacaca has delivered benefits to Rwandans in the spheres of justice, truth and democratic participation. Other societies confronting the aftermath of mass conflict could learn much from Rwanda’s approach to local justice.’

Phil Clark is an engaging writer on this subject, and can be counted as one of the world’s foremost experts on Rwanda.

To read/download the Counterpoint in full click here

Meles Zenawi - charismatic proponent of Authoritarian Developmentalism.

Meles Zenawi is the cleverest and most engaging Prime Minister in Africa – at least when he talks to visiting outsiders. When he speaks to his fellow Ethiopians, he is severe and dogmatic. But he entertains western visitors with humour and irony, deploying a diffident, self-deprecating style which cleverly conceals an absolute determination to control his country and its destiny, free of outside interference.

He was one of four African presidents to be invited to the Camp David G8 meeting last weekend. The aid donors love Meles. He is well-informed, highly numerate and focused. And he delivers. Ethiopia will get closer to the Millennium Development Goals than most African countries. The Ethiopian state has existed for centuries and it has a bureaucracy to run it. So the aid flows like a river, nearly $4 billion a year. And Meles is the United States’ policeman in the region with troops in Somalia and Sudan. He also enjoys a simmering enmity with his former ally, now the bad boy of the region, President Isias Afwerke of Eritrea. “It’s Mubarak syndrome,” a worried US diplomat told me. “We only talked to Mubarak about Egypt’s role in the region, never about what was happening inside Egypt. It’s the same with Ethiopia.”

In the 2005 election when the opposition won the capital, Addis Ababa, and claimed to have won nationally, the government arrested its leaders and tried them for treason. Some were imprisoned, others fled into exile. Now with 99.6% of the vote, the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has created a virtual one party state. In an interview last week Meles told me he did not know of a single village in the whole country that voted for the opposition.

This is subtle totalitarianism, dubbed ‘Authoritarian Developmentalism’ by some. If you do what the government says, you get assistance – land, water, services. If you don’t, you get nothing. The basic principles of political freedom enshrined in the constitution are frequently undermined by subtle edicts from government departments. Press freedom is clearly spelt out and recently a minor ruling stated that printers must take responsibility for everything they publish and can refuse to print anything the government might consider illegal. Hardly a devastating blow to press freedom you might think until you discover that the only presses in Ethiopia capable of printing newspapers are government-owned.

Meles’ remarkable achievement since he took power in 1991 has been to attract foreign companies to Ethiopia through a policy of low taxes and a free hand. Growth has been between 8 and 11 percent over the past eight years thanks to the private sector (both western and eastern.) The economy has doubled over the last five years. Meles is rushing to develop the country as fast as he can. Using the Chinese model he has attracted foreign investors to develop agriculture and manufacturing. As he told me: “The criticism we had in the past was that we were crazy Marxists. Now we are accused of selling the family spoons to foreigners. It’s a balance.”

Meles has leased more than 4 million hectares of land to foreign or domestic companies to grow food or flowers. And to provide them with water and power he has built dams which he says are environmentally much better than power stations since they are built in gorges with little water loss through evaporation. But it is not a completely free market solution. There are government monopolies in banking and telecoms. Nor will the government give people title deeds. All land is state owned. Meles has made it clear he will keep it that way.

“Have we created a perfect democratic system? No it’s a work in progress. Are we running as fast as our legs will carry us? Yes. And it’s not just Addis but also the most remote areas. Unlike previous governments we have really created a stable country in a very turbulent neighbourhood. Our writ runs in every village. That never happened in the history of Ethiopia. The state was distant, irrelevant.”

He fiercely defends his policies, in the face of Western NGO criticism, that this development is environmentally unsound and indigenous people have been removed forcibly from their land. He insists that in every case they were consulted, dismissing a report by the Oakland Institute in the US which said people had been forcibly removed as “bullshit”. When I suggest that pastoralists should be allowed to continue their nomadic way of life, he says I am a romantic westerner. But he adds that it is their right to continue their way of life.

It is the same with the politics. Having taken power by force in 1991 and coming from a minority, Meles created a safety valve by writing into the constitution the right of every “nation” in Ethiopia to declare independence. Whenever there are local political problem he re-asserts that right to leave but it is unlikely the clause will ever be put to the test through a referendum.

The current trouble spot is the southern region of Gambela where land has been given to agricultural businesses. Meles is defensive about reports of recent forced removals. “We are making sure that the Gambela people are settled and have land and that young people can go to farms not as guards but as farmers,” he said, assuring me that the people who have been moved were consulted. Only when all those in the region who want to work have jobs will other workers be recruited from other parts of Ethiopia.

Is the Meles plan for rapid, state directed capitalism working? At the recent World Economic Forum meeting in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa earlier this month, criticism came, not from western NGOs , but from China, Ethiopia’s closest ally. Gao Xiqing of the China Investment Forum, warned Meles: “Do not necessarily do what we did”. Policies of “sheer economic growth” should be avoided, he said. “We now suffer pollution and an unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities… You have a clean sheet of paper here. Try to write something beautiful.”

Has any Chinese official ever publically criticised an African leader in such terms before?

And some foreign investors are not happy either. They have driven Ethiopia’s growth but now the government and Ethiopian firms are desperate for a greater slice of the profits. Flower and horticultural companies have been suddenly ordered by the government to only use Ethiopian companies for packing their produce, transporting it to Addis Ababa airport from where only the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines must be hired to fly it to Europe. As the distraught owner of one of the biggest flower farms told me last week: “Ethiopia does not have such companies yet”. But if they refuse, their licences will be withdrawn. It appears that having lured foreign businesses into Ethiopia, the government is now tying them down and taking their profits.

Meles is caught in a bind, under pressure on several fronts with problems that economic growth may not solve. Inflation is coming down but has been running at almost 50 percent. Everyone I spoke with in Ethiopia said that the cost of living was the highest they had ever known. There is real hardship among the poor as the staple grain in Ethiopia, teff, has quadrupled in price recently. The universities are pouring out graduates but there are few jobs. One recent graduate I spoke with said she was one of about 10 out of more than 100 in her class who had a job. The government’s hope is that it can grow the economy even faster. It is promising mining as the next bonanza and Meles hinted last week that oil has been discovered.

But this is the scenario he may soon be facing: a mass of urban poor hurt by the price rise of the staple food and large numbers of educated but unemployed urban youth. Sounds familiar? The Arab Spring was watched closely by Ethiopians. And, it appears Meles senses it is coming. He told the World Economic Forum meeting: “The going is going to get tough so Ethiopia needs a tough leader, a leader prepared to say no. You can’t please everyone.”

Richard Dowden is Director of the Royal African Society and author of Africa; altered states, ordinary mircles.

Do many existing or potential investors in London and similar settings unwittingly misconceive relative business risks in Africa?

I ask this question conscious that authors should avoid picking arguments with an editor — even on a site called ‘African Arguments’ and even on a topic as tricky and open to varying opinions as investing in Africa.

The previous blog-post was placed by this site’s editor, and concerned the Ernst and Young ‘Africa Attractiveness Survey’. The survey noted shifting perceptions towards risk in Africa, generally in favour of the continent. Happily, I do not have to argue with this blog’s editor in order to offer a simple proposition about patterns in the way analysts tend to approach the continent’s diverse economies. (This is to some extent a supplement of an earlier post on political risk perceptions in sub-Saharan Africa).

The size of South Africa’s economy is such that when the IMF last week revised downwards its outlook for average 2012 GDP growth across the continent, it cited sluggish SA growth as a major factor in that calculation. Now, external investor sentiment about the country tends to be disproportionately negative relative to other African economies.

Part of this reflects the fact that SA is a more mature destination in which it is harder to find cheap, less well-understood assets than in many other emerging Africa settings. However, I would suggest (or argue…) that part of the reason for London’s investment community being relatively bearish on SA and bullish on other destinations is an unwitting bias against markets about which we have relatively good information. In this sense, SA is to some extent damned by the very reason that its economic and political features are relatively easy to grasp and track. It may have all sorts of noisy, exhausting and multi-faceted policy and political arguments, and who really knows where it is all going, but what one sees is largely what one gets.

The point is that because investors know SA well — and can fairly readily see the problems, bottlenecks, risks and issues affecting it — they may unconsciously tend to exaggerate these relative to other settings about which data is less easily available, is certainly less reliable, and where risks are more amorphous. The result of this might be systematic analytical bias that over time becomes self-reinforcing. Since editors like analogies, think of a man who exaggerates both the attractive qualities of a woman whom he hardly knows and the foibles of one he knows well, neglecting the factual basis for either judgment or sentiment.

Making such an argument does not necessarily betray its sponsor’s ingrained or blind love for SA (that is, a biased approach that it is simply a ‘better’ place to invest than Mali or Malawi, Burkina Faso or Benin). It is just a reminder that wherever we have more information on a risk we may perversely tend to exaggerate the scale of it, compared to places about which less is written and understood.

Jolyon Ford is senior analyst (Africa) at Oxford Analytica.

Violence in the Kivus has once again caused massive displacement of local population in the region.

As the rumour mill turns and suspicion runs rife, conflict is unfolding in eastern Congo’s Kivu provinces once again, following three years of relative calm. The most recent chapter of violence can be traced back to March this year, pitting Congo’s socially and politically maladroit president against some of the very people who helped him achieve electoral victory less than seven months ago.

Having been compelled to accept the outcome of a conspicuously fraudulent ballot last November combined with the conviction in March of another Congolese war lord, Thomas Lubanga, the West appeared keen to stress-test its relationship with President Joseph Kabila over his protection of another indicted war lord, Bosco Ntaganda. The decision to crack down on Bosco, by launching operation Amani Kamilifu or ‘Perfect Peace’, has led to a mutiny and a spate of violent clashes in the east of the country that has seen tens-of-thousands of civilians flee and left NGOs unable to dispense aid.

The Kivus were the scene of some of the most appalling violence during Congo’s civil wars. In an attempt to quell the fighting that continued there long after national peace treaties had been signed, rebel groups such as the Congrès National pour la Défense du People (CNDP) were integrated into the Congolese national army (FARDC) in an agreement signed on March 23^rd 2009. The upshot of this agreement was to endorse the CNDP’s control of the provinces they once terrorized. Bosco, a former CNDP commander, was crassly identified by a few as the “lynchpin of stability” and along with his officer corps of former CNDP cronies, has since benefited from state recognition and become comfortably ensconced in his Kivu fiefdom. The price of this ‘stability’ was tacit acceptance of smuggling, requisition of land, effective enslavement of peoples and punitive acts of violence. Not, it is fair to say, a well-charted path to peace in any context.

Undoubtedly, Kabila emerged weaker in the eyes of the international community following the 2011 elections, compared with the 2006 poll. In hunting Bosco, Kabila may be attempting to eschew this image and consolidate power with a show of military strength. This also coincided with the appointment of a new, low-key government in which former ‘big names’ were ousted by a series of technocrats and where larger parties within the presidential coalition obtained fewer high-profile positions, indicating Kabila may also be looking to consolidate his status in the political sphere.

Yet to suggest that packing Bosco off to prison is Kabila’s sole motivation would be  shortsighted. With the arrival of special forces in North Kivu’s provincial capital, Goma, at the beginning of April, as well as the redeployment of former-CNDP troops outside of the Kivus, and the arrest of Bosco’s close allies, it appears increasingly likely that Kabila is keen to dismantle the CNDP’s parallel command structure in the east altogether. For better or worse, this undermines the March 23^rd agreement between Kabila, the CNDP and Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, leaving the wider CNDP hierarchy, formerly less concerned about Bosco’s liberty, now more vocal as their own prospects suddenly look rather vulnerable.

This apprehension is also reflected by the activity amongst militia groups in the east, with new alliances being formed between mutineers and rebel groups. Added to this, the emergence of the M23, a splinter group of CNDP mutineers who, distancing themselves from the notorious Bosco, cite the lack of a regular wage, poor accommodation and the government failure to uphold the March 23^rd agreement. Amid the turmoil, there is growing concern that the pro-Hutu FDLR could fill the security vacuum, further complicating eastern Congo’s already knotted security environment and upsetting relations with neighbouring Rwanda.

To make matters worse, many Congolese officers believe that the CNDP has been benefiting from support extended by Rwanda. In a recent interview with Jeune Afrique and the New Times, Paul Kagame stated that the Bosco mutiny was a “Congolese affair.” Yet his modest overtones belie the actions of a Rwandan President whose relationship and dealings with rebel groups in eastern Congo has, in the past, resembled something of a diplomatic iceberg – with most activity taking place below the surface. Indeed, whilst the FARDC may have scored a number of tactical victories against the CNDP, the upper-echelons of the group’s leadership remain unaccounted for, despite having been routed from its previously safe stronghold in the Masisi highlands. It is entirely conceivable that the group would have faltered unless external support was forthcoming.

The route that this conflict will take is anything but certain and an obvious ‘best case’ solution is yet to present itself. In recent days, Human Rights Watch have indicated that Bosco is again recruiting child soldiers – the pursuit which landed him with an ICC arrest warrant back in 2006. Meanwhile, in the absence of the former-CNDP troops, the FARDC are showing little compassion for the Tutsi population of North Kivu, accusing many of being Rwandan and beating and arresting those who have not yet fled. Such actions do little to persuade the people of North Kivu that Bosco’s incarceration is a necessary phase on the road to peace. That the FARDC has required a systemic overhaul for some time may be a convenient excuse for Kabila to shake things up in the east; for his opponents however the conflict has evolved beyond the protection of Bosco, to ensuring the survival of a parallel CNDP organization in the Kivus.

William Townsend is Editorial Assistant at African Arguments Online.

JICA representatives in South Sudan

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is clearly an organisation with a positive PR agenda. The lunch laid out after the briefing with their Vice President, Mr Kiyoshi Kodera, told you that alone. With good reason too, because JICA is not well-known in the UK despite having existed in one form or other since the 1970s.

It is however, quite quietly, doing some interesting work across the world, and clearly reaping a degree of international good will. Mr Kiyoshi himself comes from a long and successful career at the World Bank and IMF where he became Executive Secretary of the Development Committee.

Japanese international development seems to encounter many of the same problems as those pushing for it in Europe/US. In times of financial austerity, the voting public become more inward looking and naturally spendthrift. However, JICA has managed to stop the slide away from development assistance, re-orienting the focus towards the MDGs and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Another key focus is the ‘Yen loan’ programme – providing concessionary loans to developing countries at low interest rates (around 0.75 percent). This rate is further reduced if the loan is to be used for climate change mitigation projects. It was interesting to know that the Yen loan is not widely implemented in sub-Saharan Africa (North Africa is a different story) with only Nigeria on the books, and then in quite a limited fashion.

Major work south of the Sahara has focused on doubling ODA by the end of 2012 (on track) and continuing technical assistance in areas like school education in science. In South Sudan (a post-conflict country of particular focus) the Japanese ‘Self Defence Force’ ie the army, has participated in the maintenance of basic infrastructure, including the rehabilitation of Juba’s port.

So it seems JICA is running a number of high-quality, technical programmes quietly and efficiently. However, the elephant in the room was the Japanese view of democracy and human rights in relation to their professed interest in the pervasive ‘governance agenda’ of Western donors. Mr Kiyoshi clearly cares about this, and admits that “democracy and human rights have a lot do with governance.” The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is clearly less forthcoming in its views, and as Mr Kiyoshi said “doesn’t talk about it in an open manner.” Whilst JICA may contribute towards electoral observation missions, and training of officials in civil law, it doesn’t do what DFID or the FCO do and openly criticise the actions of other governments.

So, my main question is what exactly is JICA’s vision? Is the softly, softly approach ideological ie Japan has no place in the internal affairs of other sovereign states? Or is it a desire to avoid rubbing international partners/friends up the wrong way? But if, as Mr Kiyoshi acknowledges, human rights and democracy are central to the governance agenda, then why isn’t JICA talking more openly about human rights and democracy?

Magnus Taylor is Managing Editor, African Arguments Online

Crowds enjoy the Harare International Festival of the Arts this month in Zimbabwe's capital

Often it is assumed that dictatorships are completely, absolutely bad. Rotten to the core. The businessmen of that nation are corrupt. The students who are lucky enough to be in school are children of officials. The successful artists are apolitical. The media is government controlled propaganda. The people who aren’t speaking out are ignorant. Certainly, we would not travel there. We divest. We write damning stories.

I had chosen the safest thing I could think of as a reason to visit Robert Mugabe’s backyard; an arts festival in the Zimbabwean capital, Harare. What reason could a young white American boy with a camera give immigrations officials or soldiers on the streets for being in Zimbabwe (other than at Victoria Falls)? Even after going to places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where despite years of war and corruption, I found many examples of artistic creativity, I assumed the worst from Zimbabwe. After all, college graduates from there were installing my cable connection in the United States and Zimbabwean lawyers are serving clients in Johannesburg’s restaurants.

In 2008, a friend first told me about the Harare International Festival of the Arts “HIFA”, and we made plans to drive from neighbouring Botswana (where I was living) to Harare to take pictures for the press team. In the month before the 2008 festival, the nation’s currency was quickly becoming worthless; its bills had expiration dates on them. A botched presidential election had not produced a clear winner, a New York Times reporter was detained, and the US ambassador had been in an altercation with soldiers on a highway. The media, and thousands of Zimbabweans pouring out of the country that year, claimed the worst. That year I bailed on Harare.

This weekend, at HIFA, those who heard that I hadn’t made it in 2008 exclaimed, “Why didn’t you? It was great!” Or they said, “Agh, Harare is always safe. Safer than South Africa!” In fact, a couple of the performances clearly decried Mugabe and his ZANU PF political party. One singer/actress explained to me that her album includes a track that tells leaders to look over their shoulder; to make sure your friends are still supporting you. At first, the radio stations in Zimbabwe wouldn’t play the song out of fear of reprisal, but she is starting to see increasing royalties from it. Her husband told me, “Zimbabwe is a democracy! We have free speech.” He also told me that he begs the government for permission when the two perform around the country, but the officials usually agree.

This is why amongst the Jacaranda-lined streets, Harare hosts HIFA for six days. Artists from across Africa, Europe and America perform, mostly for local audiences that pay $6 a day to get into the festival gardens, or $8-$15 for each major performance (the USD is official tender in Zimbabwe). Coca-Cola and Lay’s are amongst the sponsors, with slogans like, “1 Billion Reasons to Believe in Africa.” And for at least these six days of the year, Zimbabwe does feel democratic. Zimbabwe’s artists at HIFA are not artists for just six days–no, they are playing all year long.

Not a single person I met claimed to be a Mugabe supporter. Mugabe’s bust is behind every shop counter and on most streetlights, but in the case of Zimbabwe, people seem to have figured out how to “get on” and “get by”. A Democracy with a Dictator. In March, Morgan Tsvangirai, Mugabe’s power-sharing Prime Minister helped to re-open the Book Café, an art hangout that had been foreclosed upon in December.

Maybe the power-sharing agreement has weakened Mugabe’s fist. Maybe during HIFA, the government tries to play nice. Or, maybe many of us need to rethink what it means to place a mental embargo on any country with a bad political face.

Pan-African Musical Highlights from HIFA 2012:

Oliver Mtukudzi – Zimbabwe

Netsayi – Zimbabwe

Edith WeUtonga – Zimbabwe

Prudence Mbofana – Zimbabwe

Ismael Lo – Senegal

Tumi and the Volume – South Africa

Maria De Barros – Cape Verde

Lansiné Kouyate – Mali

Maia Von Lekow – Kenya

The European Union is playing an increasingly important role in mediating how the UK relates to Africa across a range of policy areas including international development, foreign policy, security, and trade. This offers both opportunities and constraints to the UK in its relationship with Africa. This is increasingly a subject of discussion within Parliament, with a House of Commons International Development Select Committee inquiry on the comparative advantage of EU aid published in April 2012 arguing that less EU aid should go to Middle Income Countries (MICs), and a House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee report on the impact of aid published in March 2012 calling for reduced funding of the EU’s aid programmes.

The evolving role of the EU however remains somewhat unknown to many decision-makers in the UK. As such the Africa APPG organised a visit to Brussels, attended by a cross-party group of 9 MPs and Peers, on 31st January 2012, in order to investigate the political relationship between the EU and Africa. The Group met with MEPs and parliamentary staff working on Africa issues, African Ambassadors and representatives of the UK Permanent Representation to the EU, the European External Action Service, and the European Commission. Members noted that the visit was taken seriously, with each of these groups engaging with the Members in a positive and productive way. This following report (pdf) details the content of the discussions held.

This included a focus on:

• The geopolitical landscape -  security, regional integration

• EU architecture – External Action Service, DEVCO, ECHO, European parliament and delegations to African countries/AU

• EU dealing with Africa as a single entity

• Co-ordination between EU members

Read AAPPG EU visit report in full here

Soldiers from the SPLA-North surround a grenade launcher captured from the Sudan armed forces in the Nuba mountains.

The tactical calculations in the conflict between North and South Sudan are staggeringly complex but they have one thing in common: neither party has the slightest consideration for the wellbeing of the population. I tend to feel that there is little use for analyses when the men in charge are so determined to wear each other out at any cost.

Alex de Waal’s conclusion that the parties are unable to compromise seems to be about the only sensible thing to say. The other issues he mentions follow from this inability to co-operate and compromise. Both parties have operated under the assumption that the other side would eventually try to get the upper hand – and rightly so: Khartoum and Juba constantly look for slight advantages on the ground, with public opinion, in the international arena.

To discuss both parties’ rationale in the conflict is pure speculation. If I were to give it a shot my analysis would run along the lines of a mutual expectation with the NCP and the SPLM that the other side will, sooner or later, crumble and lose the ability to continue its rule.

At the time of signing the CPA, the NCP might have believed it would be better to leave the South to its own devices for a while and concentrate on reinforcing its grip on the North. Knowing that the South Sudan government would depend entirely on oil revenue while the existing pipelines run through the North and estimating that an alternative (up-hill) line to Kenya would be too expensive, the NCP calculated that the SPLM would rather contribute to the North’s economy by paying high oil transport fees than risk being cut off from any revenues at all.

The NCP probably also figured that fear of revenue loss combined with the fear of losing too much credit internationally could refrain Juba from taking action when the Sudan Armed Forces would try to deal with the remaining SPLA forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. After all, that is an internal affair. Furthermore, the NCP might have thought that, with its obvious lack of development and human resources and all the ensuing problems of corruption, popular discontent and tribal conflict, the South might well implode within a few years.

The SPLM in its turn might have believed that being the ruling party of an independent country with large proven oil reserves would secure substantial sums in foreign investment and strengthen its position in the international arena. China in particular would no longer be so eager to defend Khartoum, while the United States, for a host of reasons, would be happy to continue its support to Juba.

Knowing that the government in Khartoum had become entirely dependent on oil revenues that were now severely reduced, the SPLM figured that the NCP would be in a tight corner economically, no matter what. Add to this the enormous and continuing cost of fighting the armed opposition in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and it would be only a matter of time before the NCP government would collapse.

In this line of reasoning it is entirely logical not to budge on transport fees and to give covert support to opposition groups across the border. If you can’t win the war, try to win the peace. Whatever the exact calculations were on either side, the peace obviously has not lasted long enough yet for one of the parties to collapse.

In the North, the Sudan Armed Forces defeated SPLA forces in Blue Nile rather decisively and managed to hold on to the large towns in South Kordofan. The rebel movements from Darfur, though still active, seem unable to make any progress in the West. The NCP government is in dire need of foreign currency but so far it shows no clear signs of losing its grip on power.

In the South the SPLM faces strong criticism over corruption, nepotism, tribalism and incompetence but the internal division of the South is nowhere near the level of 1991, when a rift in the movement nearly caused its demise. The SPLM government seems to be in firm control, even though it has a serious budgetary problem since the North provoked it into shutting down oil production.

There is little chance that the NCP and the SPLM will actually compromise on anything. This is a serious game of poker: which country will run out of chips first?  I guess that beyond today’s horizon all kinds of other calculations are being made for the event of full scale war: who will let himself be provoked into continuing his advance beyond the border areas? Who can count on support from his allies? Who can sustain a prolonged military campaign when the financial resources are all but depleted? Is there any chance the international community will intervene?

I see no reason why either side would now be in a better position to defeat the other than seven years ago when they signed the CPA. They both used the oil money to build up their respective armed forces. Perhaps Juba has the better fighters, but Khartoum has the fighter jets. At the same time I think neither party is comfortable with letting time alone decide who might win the peace. So they up the ante. Sudan continues to harass South Sudan along the borders, South Sudan shuts down the wells.

Personally I think it is clear Khartoum has the greatest contempt for the people, bombing civilian areas day in day out, with al Beshir calling the SPLM ‘insects’ and Haroun telling his troops in South Kordofan to ‘hand over the place clean’ and ‘make no prisoners’. It is evil, I have no better words for their conduct. Meanwhile Juba seems to gamble recklessly with the future of millions of citizens of a new nation… what to make of that?

All I know for sure is that the population is the party that is certain to lose, and for the most part they are not even allowed to play.

Nanne op’t Ende is the author of Proud to be Nuba and long-time commentator on South Kordofan.

Amanda Taub – blogger at Wronging Rights – has been quick out of the blocks in producing what would appear to be the first book-length analysis of the Kony 2012 phenomenon.

Taub is clearly well-connected, and has managed to attract an impressive line-up including Adam Branch (long-time academic on N.Uganda), Bec Hamilton (of Fighting for Darfur fame) and Laura Seay (@texasinafrica).

You can buy for $0 to $3 here

The book’s description tells us that it’s ‘for those who know a little about Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army, and want to know more.’

And it looks at the ‘story’ systematically and analytically from the history of the conflict to the phenomenon of viral advocacy videos in campaigns related to African conflicts.

You can see the full description here:

‘Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 has become the most viral video ever. Concerned citizens around the world, from middle school students to celebrities like Oprah and Justin Bieber, watched the film and shared it with their friends. It has now been viewed more than 87 million times.

That success was soon met by a critical backlash. Critics nearly as varied as the campaign’s supporters pointed out that Invisible Children was offering an oversimplified, even misleading narrative. They faulted the campaign for failing to provide a context for the LRA conflict, and pointed out that the video portrayed Africans as either helpless victims, or heartless killers.

This book is both a collection of that criticism, and a constructive response to it. The authors each wrote a short essay offering information that they felt was missing from the video, or explaining how they thought the campaign could be improved.

The first several chapters provide historical and political context. Adam Branch, Daniel Kalinaki, and Ayesha Nibbe explain the roots of the conflict, and how it has persisted for so many years. Alex Little and Patrick Wegner discuss various attempts to end the conflict through peace negotiations, ICC arrest warrants, and military operations, and why they have not been successful.

Later chapters consider the ethics and effectiveness of awareness campaigns like Kony 2012. Glenna Gordon and Jina Moore draw on their experiences as journalists to critique the video’s portrayal of Africa and the people who live there. Rebecca Hamilton, Laura Seay, Kate Cronin-Furman, and Amanda Taub examine the weakness of “awareness” advocacy. Alanna Shaikh explains the ethical dangers of bad aid work. Teddy Ruge offers a different view of Africa, as a place of dynamic innovation instead of violence and helplessness. And youth activist Sam Menefee-Libey describes his frustration with the tone and substance of the campaign meant to target his generation.’

Table of Contents

Preface

Contributors

How Civilians Became Targets: A Short History of the War in Northern Uganda

Adam Branch

Kony2012: Treat the Political Causes of the LRA, Not Just Its Violent Symptoms

Daniel Kalinaki

The Making of a “Humanitarian Emergency”: Night Commuters, Invisible Children, and the Business of Aid and Advocacy

Ayesha Nibbe

Three Strikes and Kony’s Still There: What I Learned from Negotiations with Joseph Kony and the International Criminal Court’s Efforts to Indict Him

Alex Little

Peace from Juba: Peace Talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda (2006-2008)

Mark Kersten

Can a Military Intervention Stop the Lord’s Resistance Army?

Patrick Wegner

Ethical or Exploitative?: Stories, Advocacy and Suffering

Jina Moore

The Power of Images: Who Gets Made Visible?

Glenna Gordon

Learning From Save Darfur

Rebecca Hamilton

Avoiding “Badvocacy”: How to Do No Harm While Doing Good

Laura Seay

What Have They Got to Lose?

Alanna Shaikh

Moral Agents and Patients: Trayvon Martin and Invisible Children

Hawa Allan

Armchair Critics Respond

Kate Cronin-Furman and Amanda Taub

Africa’s New Status Quo: Connected, Bold and Vocal

TMS Ruge

Beyond Kony2012 – Reasserting the Transformative Power of Youth Activism

Sam Menefee-Libey