Sudanese Standards and Sensitivities
It’s election season on Sudan, and the leaders of the Sudanese political parties are understandably sensitive about criticisms of their performance. It’s soon to become self-determination season in southern Sudan, and sensitivities around this are already high.
One opposition politician berated me yesterday for being, he said, tougher on the opposition parties than on the government. I responded that, being a democrat was no excuse for having lower standards of conduct. To the contrary, those struggling for democracy, or fighting for liberation, should hold themselves to higher standards than those who took power by military coup.
Many southern Sudanese are also sensitive about criticisms of the performance of the Government of South Sudan, implying that these criticisms imply that secession would lead to a disaster or a failed state. To the contrary, the last 55 years have made it completely clear that the southern Sudanese can never be ruled without their consent. It is obvious but bears repeating: the only people who can govern southern Sudan are the southern Sudanese.
Whether the southern Sudanese want to govern southern Sudan as an independent state, or as part of a united Sudan, is up to them. My argument for frank examination of governance in southern Sudan is that a liberation government governing its own people should hold itself to higher standards than a repressive or occupation regime.
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How do you think the upcoming elections will be affected by the ceasefire between JEM and GoS? Might JEM be considered a political party in the general elections?
I think it is too late for JEM to register and organize for the elections, and the Government of Sudan has shown no readiness to contemplate any postponement, which would not now be possible without jeopardizing the timing of the referendum in southern Sudan, which is not negotiable. Much more likely is that Khartoum will hold open the possibility of adding some extra positions in the executive and legislature, at all levels, that could be filled by JEM nominees (and members of any other armed movements that reach agreement with the government), after the election and on the basis of appointment only.
Alex,
The possibility that the JEM and/or other rebel movements may receive special appointment to executive or legislative posts – particularly those without portfolio – is an interesting one. This is a fairly common tactic in Sudan (as elsewhere), and both Minni Minnawi and Musa Hilal have asked for, and received, such appointments in the past. Similar arrangements can be found in the East Sudan Peace Agreement.
My question is whether you can tell us anything about whether these portfolios have the “teeth” of an annual budget or other resources. I discussed the possible role of very similar arrangements in peace-making during a thesis I prepared while at Georgetown University in Spring 2009. The other participants in my seminar thesis warned that, in order to have value, those positions would have to be linked to money. I have never been able to satisfy my curiosity about how ministers-without-portfolio or Assistants to the President are financed, if at all. Certainly, it appears that Minni Minnawi was never very happy with his “reward.”
I look forward to any light you (or others) may be able to shed on this matter!
Dear Alex,
Let me take you to Doha. JEM and NCP are about to sign a Framework Agreement that will guide their main peace process expected to give birth to a real peace agreement. The two sides have been very upbeat about this impeding agreement; even giving timelines like ‘in three months time’ etc. But where is all this optimism anchored on?
Here’s my theory: Omar Bashir has to win the presidency in the upcoming elections, at all costs. For him to do that, he has to ‘win’ Darfur.
But there are huge obstacles here, what with the numerous rebel movements that are threatening to boycott and even disrupt the polls. The only way is for him to engage a major rebel group (read JEM) to enter some kind of special pre-election arrangement with. JEM will be asked to participate in the elections (and coerce their people to follow suite) so as to lend the impending messy process some legitimacy. In return, JEM will be given some key goodies. Perhaps these allegations on Sudan Tribune are credible? http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34209.
If this won’t work, the two new-found friends can come up with a way to postpone the Darfur elections, all the while entrenching JEM’s position in Darfur at the expense of a credible peace process and systematic weakening of the other rebel movements.
This might just work, considering that JEM is at heart an Islamist movement and some of their ideologies may resonate with NCP’s, unlike SLM. And JEM, like other rebel groups, may not be too keen to submit to the power of the vote.
Of course I may be wrong; but on this one we can all agree: that Omar Bashir will do anything to win the elections. And if it means giving some painful concessions to this JEM outfit, so be it.
Dear Matthew
your comment raises two points. First, there is an issue about the constitutionality of such appointments. In the last few days, the NCP and SPLM have agreed to allocate an additional 40 seats in the National Assembly to southern Sudan plus four for South Kordofan and two for Abyei. This is a political agreement between the two parties which is intended to correct some deficiencies in the census and the anomaly of Abyei’s representation. But the question arises as to the legality of this procedure. As so often, politics triumphs over constitutionalism — sometimes for good reason.
On the powers and budgets of these posts, a great deal depends on how the office holder actually uses them. Power resides not only in the formal position but in the ability of the individual to exert authority. In the case of Minni Minawi, his position included heading the TDRA, which had, on paper, a budget far in excess of the state governors’ funds. Minni may complain that those funds were not forthcoming, but donors were ready to put up funds if the institutions were created, and the ministry of finance too.
Dear Josh
I have no doubt that the imminence of the elections is a big part of the reason why the Sudan Government is ready to make concessions to JEM. Hopefully, if there is a ceasefire, then it will be possible for the government to lift the state of emergency in Darfur, one of the key issues of dispute over whether elections in Darfur can be considered free and fair.
I would hesitate to read too much of a detailed political agreement into the deal to be signed in Doha today. The N’djamena agreement is still elementary and is as much to do with Chad as with Sudan. The NCP will need to get the support, or at least consent, of its constituencies in Darfur before bringing JEM into a power-sharing deal. Although both sides are speaking about concluding an agreement in three weeks, there is still a vast amount of work to be done before there can be said to be an inclusive agreement in Darfur.
The reason why everybody went into a speculation rampage about the coming agreement is because its details have so far been kept on the sly. On the one hand, it makes sense that the government is scurrying to JEM to lend more legitimacy to the electoral process. On the other hand, we can explain JEM’s sudden motives to achieve a breakthrough in view of the thaw in ties between Sudan and Chad, and also the issue of Aushar and other prisoners.
I am interested, dear Alex, to find out whether you believe the agreement with JEM would lead to stabilize the situation in Darfur and ultimately put an end to the conflict? Considering your experience with Abuja talks, don’t you think that the government is making the same mistake again? Negotiating with one group and neglecting others? What of Abd-al-Wahid and other factions?
The good thing is that the agreement, if finalized without any attempts by Al-Turabi to sabotage it, opens the door for the possibility of postponing the elections. The SPLM announced a while back that it will be ready to agree to postpone the elections if the government managed to reach a settlement with Darfur groups.
“In the last few days, the NCP and SPLM have agreed to allocate an additional 40 seats in the National Assembly to southern Sudan plus four for South Kordofan and two for Abyeiâ€
Actually there were some media reports today on an NCP official denying that such agreement was made!
All the best,
MO
Dear Muhammed,
any ceasefire agreement is, by definition, a good thing, provided that it is respected by the parties. But it would not be correct to see this as a comprehensive and inclusive agreement. Whether it can be a framework for such an agreement or not depends upon the next steps of the parties.
As you say, there is a great deal of speculation about secret deals. I think that the most important context for understanding the deal is the immediately obvious one, which is that Sudan and Chad very recently made an accord committing themselves to normalizing relations, including not allowing rebels to operate from one another’s territories. As a consequence, JEM’s leadership faced the choice of either defying both N’djamena and Khartoum at the same time, or obliging them both at the same time. It chose the latter.
Dear Alex
I would appreciate if you would talk more about what you refer to as a (repressive or occupation regime).
Best regards.
Dear Alex,
You are surely right that this deal was cooked up by Idriss Deby to cover his back and neutralise the danger from JEM and those in his own circle who are closely connected to JEM. But you must not overlook the role of the Qataris who have been endeavouring to bring the Islamist movement together ever since the Beshir-Turabi split. This is a dangerous development for the vast majority of Darfurian people who will end up excluded and marginalised once again. My question to you as someone with an inside track is, do any of the 12 articles in the accord deal with bringing in other movements, consulting the people through the Darfur-Darfur dialogue, justice and the ICC, reconciliation, compensation and the right of return of IDPs or any of the issues that affect the ordinary citizen and his family?
Dear Jibreel,
I think that your question covers the agenda items that will be necessary for the ceasefire and framework agreement signed today to become an inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement. From what I understand, there is an invitation to other armed movements to join, but as yet none to other constituencies in Darfur such as political parties, IDPs, pastoralists and civil society. It is clear that without the involvement of all these groups, no peace is complete. The framework agreement includes reference to compensation, to the future status of JEM combatants, to the need to transform JEM from an armed movement into a political party, and an agenda for negotiation on wealth- and power-sharing. It does not at present contain any reference to justice, reconciliation or wider consultation, which will all be required if there is to be a comprehensive settlement.
Dear Alex,
It then appears that JEM executives will merely become political puppets to GoS as Menni Minnawi is currently, the signing of the framework agreement and ceasefire doesnt coincide with JEM politics, hasn’t Khalil always said he wanted to become the new President of Sudan? So often the JEM cabinet shows they only have in interest in their people and are not upholding the interest of the IDP’s – no wonder they have little IDP support. How exactly does incorporating Soleiman Sandal’s troops into the Sudanese army help the Darfuri apart from the soldiers on the ground who wont have to enroll in DDR programs.
It is thus a coincidence that USAID are now backing development projects in North Sudan, EU are pumping billions into the region and Egyptian investors are on board in turning Sudan into an investment haven.
I do apologize for the negativeness in my message, but wont you please write an article about your thoughts on the framework agreement, the sudden co-operation from Bashir’s side, the international pressure on Sudan, relations with Chad and South Sudan’s referendum.
Best,
Annah
I believe that Muhammed’s question about what Abd-al-Wahid will do will be on the minds of a lot of people, but this should nevertheless stop or slow the progress towards conflict resolution. It is my understanding that factions of the SLA that he leads have been fighting each other in Jebel Marra. And this shows how difficult it will be to get everyone on board with any program. Nevertheless, I feel hopeful that progress is being made.
Alex’s point about the probable absence at the table of “political parties, IDPs, pastoralists and civil society” is a valid one, but it may not be a bad idea to try to get the armed movements to the table if that is possible. There is always a possibility that dissatisfaction and a sense of exclusion by the political parties, IDPs, pastoralists and civil society could lead to violence in the future, but perhaps it is not a bad idea to take advantage of the current momentum to reach for a peaceful solution now, and then within a peaceful context try to address the concerns of all those who feel that they have been excluded at this stage of the process.
I would be interested in hearing opinions on the possible impact of the SPLM disowning those of their members who have declared themselves as independent candidates in the upcoming elections; as well as the impact resulting from those SPLM members running as independent candidates.
According to a story that ran in the Sudan Tribune on Feb. 18th, about 340 SPLM officials have declared as independent candidates.