Justice for Whom? The ICC in the Central African Republic
Developments in international justice have filled the papers in recent weeks, with the capture of Serbia’s Radovan Karadžić and the charges leveled against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir. Far from this spotlight, former DR Congolese rebel leader and vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo has moved from arrest to Belgian jail to the custody of the International Criminal Court (ICC), his case proceeding uncharacteristically quickly. Because it serves a number of political motives without ruffling too many feathers, his trial will likely come to set some of the precedents the fledgling Court needs to establish. The effects for the two countries on whose behalf the Court is acting – DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR) – are a bit more ambiguous.
Bemba finds himself in the dock for the crimes allegedly committed by members of his Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC) in the CAR in November 2002 – March 2003. Former CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé had called in these strong-armed neighbors in a last-ditch, and ultimately failed, attempt to stave off the insurgent (now President) Jean-Franí§ois Bozizé. The formal charges comprise three counts of crimes against humanity and five counts of war crimes, with emphasis on the legion rapes his men relentlessly perpetrated. Locals refer to Bemba’s men as the “Banyamulenge,” an inaccurate appropriation of the moniker that describes Congolese Tutsis. The name is rarely uttered without an accompanying shudder of fear, or head-shake of disgust.
Like the northern Uganda case, this one was referred by a head of state. In December 2004, President Bozizé asked the ICC to investigate the crimes committed in CAR during the period of upheaval that led to his “rebels'” transformation into “liberators.” Many armed groups beset the country at the time, all committing abuses. The utter disregard for CAR citizens evinced by the MLC stands out as particularly brutal, though, as organizations like the Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), working with a couple of local organizations it was training, has documented.
ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced the Court’s decision to open investigations in the CAR on May 22, 2007. During this period, Bemba’s uneasy European exile from the DRC was being negotiated. He had lost the presidential elections of the previous year, officially taking some 42% of the vote to Joseph Kabila’s 58%. Tension between the two opponents mounted, and when Kabila’s presidential guard attacked Bemba he got a ride out of the country courtesy of a UN MONUC peacekeeping force helicopter. From Europe, Bemba expressed an eagerness to return and participate peacefully in the political process. But he stayed abroad, saying he feared for his safety.
The ICC opened an office in Bangui, capital of the CAR, in October 2007 (it had been conducting some research for a few months prior to that). Just seven months later – breathtaking speed compared with, for instance, the operations of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – the Court had Bemba arrested. It appears Bemba and his family had planned a United States vacation, and the Court feared losing him to exile in a country that is not party to the Rome Treaty.
We will likely never know whether Bemba’s conversion to peaceful politics was sincere. Heinous as his methods of rebel leadership were, the uncomfortable fact remains that for nearly half of the Congolese population he was a support-worthy head of state. His arrest foreclosed the prospect of a credible national-level opposition in the DRC in the foreseeable future. (Many of his old allies have since joined the Kabila camp.) His trial will entrench Kabila, who hardly has an angelic past himself.
And what about the impacts of this case on the CAR, home to the victims whose experiences form the basis of the whole prosecution? One hopes they would feel relief and satisfaction that their tormentor is being held to account. The country wears the legacy of Bemba’s men’s brief stay in the CAR like a suit of nails. MLC encamped at PK12 and Bégoua, at the outskirts of Bangui and site of the last big market before the road continues into the sparsely-populated hinterlands. Murder, rape, torture, pillaging – all manner of cruelty happened here, by MLC, by Central Africans they forced to carry out this dirty work. There has been no substantive reconciliation process, whatever that might entail in this context.
The MLC also continued northward toward Bozoum. While in that town last year I met a group of women who had all been taken to live as the “wives” of these “Banyamulenge.” I was asking them about their participation in a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, an opportunity afforded them as a result of this servitude. “One of the good things about the [DDR program],” one vibrant merchant said, “Was that we got an AIDS test. We had been so stressed with worry about that,” and they had faced discrimination owing to fear of their infection. “It was such a relief.” A young woman beside her, as thin as a Giacometti sculpture, explained that though the news for her had been bad, she was nevertheless glad to know. She hadn’t had any treatment for the disease (in the theoretical framework of the DDR program, she should have received it). That evening, the vibrant woman came to me with a gift of peanuts and eggs and confided that she, too, had been infected.
I describe what these women have endured at such length in the vain hope of sketching the contours of what remains unspeakable violence and cruelty. The victims’ right to justice is clear. However, they are more likely to express their need for material assistance – money, food, medicines – than any desire to see a courtroom procedure play out. Even the leaders of the victims’ organization trained by FIDH with whom I spoke used my questions about the trial primarily as an entrée to graphic descriptions of victims’ experiences and their resultant right to assistance, diatribes so impassioned as to be nearly impossible to interrupt.
The Court has carried out little “outreach” (public education and dialogue; in the French used in CAR, sensibilisation, an awful term evoking more a forced-inoculation campaign than the kind of stakeholder discussion it is meant to connote) about the case. Some of the mimeographed Bangui newspapers reproduced the ICC’s press releases; there were a few radio discussions, especially on the NDI-funded Radio Ndéké Luka.
But in general, the ICC has kept a low profile in Bangui. The office is unmarked, tucked beside the river, in a beautifully renovated compound across from the notorious Ngaragba prison. Only a logistical support office, its investigators and other staff commute from the Hague, and its halls and swimming pool are usually empty. A fleet of unmarked, sparkling white, be-snorkeled Land Cruisers stand at the ready. Hardly anyone knows where the office is. The ICC’s presence here thus exemplifies its real function, which is less about incarnating justice and fairness for victims than installing public order from afar.
In calling in the ICC, Bozizé had hoped to restrict the inquiry into the crimes of his opponents. He had reason to wish to avoid judicial spotlight. Particularly in the two years after his 2005 election, his Presidential Guard soldiers ran roughshod over their fellow citizens. When Bemba was arrested, some wondered whether Bozizé could be next. But though the Court’s official position upon taking the case states that it will investigate all crimes under its jurisdiction, regardless of who has committed them, the international community’s decision to back Bozizé and related logistical/political issues mean that Bozizé’s gamble was likely a safe one.
Some observers have speculated about whether former President Patassé will come under the Court’s scrutiny. This seems unlikely. Doing so would return attention to the fact that he was violently shoved from power by Bozizé in a feat of regional coordination that involved the support of several governments. And it would disrupt the fitful peace process between Bozizé and the several armed groups that emerged after the 2005 presidential election, partly as a result of Patassé’s exclusion from the ballot.
This current peace process has derailed because leaders of the three armed groups felt the terms of the proposed amnesty weren’t generous enough, compared to the all-encompassing carte blanche accorded to government forces, arguably the worst abusers of civilians during the conflicts under discussion. The pedagogical motives of the Court (the idea that fear of prosecution will lead to fewer breaches of the international law it presides over) have thus already been compromised. On the surface, at least, impunity reigns unopposed.
Nevertheless, when discussing the Court with CAR leaders, whether government or rebel, it is clear that the actions of the ICC have injected a degree of uncertainty about the future. However unlikely additional prosecutions may appear to outside observers, the chance that there might be has become an additional factor in CAR leaders’ calculations, whether in terms of reassessing their violent pasts or maneuvering based on speculation about who might be arrested next. Here, the ICC still represents a credible threat. This must count as a success toward the underlying premise of the Court, namely, to shape a public order out of judicial proceedings – a necessarily selective task, rhetoric of omniscient fairness notwithstanding.
As has happened throughout its history, the CAR is serving as a staging ground for far-flung motives. The anonymously-named country is a kind of mirror in which outsiders tend to look only long enough to find what they need, a tendency people in the country use to draw in resources, artists of what Jean-Franí§ois Bayart has called “extraversion.” (For instance, over a period in 2006 – 2007 the international community saw in CAR violence the “spillover of the Darfur conflict.” Though analytically inaccurate, this proved a useful line for reeling in global resources.) The Court needs a trial, conviction and precedents to justify its continued existence. And the victims deserve justice. But even many of them seem to suspect they are the actors for a play that has less to do with their rights than the politics of an often clumsy Court.
Louisa Lombard is a PhD student who has been studying CAR.
Louisa,
I found your entry interesting. I must ask however if you believe the responsibility of one side is relative and proportional to the responsibility of the other side? Or are we talking about absolute wrongs?
I agree there is much need for outreach by the ICC in CAR. I know they have advertise the key position for this for a year failing to find an adequate candidate. Maybe another way of contributing to justice for the victims….
http://www.icc-cpi.int/jobs/vacancies/940.html
The ICC prosecutor’s decision to search Mrs Teixeira’s business office in Spa, Belgium, simply because she’s JPBemba sister-in-law.
Last Updated: 3.35 PM GMT 06 Dec 2008
Dec 4, 7.15 a.m: I was listening to the news in my bed, when I realized someone was knocking on my door and the bell was ringing and ringing. I was surprised and somewhat scared.
From my window, I had a look outside. 3 policemen were standing on my doorstep, in the dark, shouting and urging me to open the door: they had a warrant to search my house. At 7.15 a.m?
Scared, I’ve decided to let them in. They were 4 of them. They did not produce the warrant immediately. I asked the purpose of the search.
“You’ll be told later”, that’s the answer I’ve got. I kept talking and trying to know the reason of the search.
Two policemen (a man and a woman) went immediately upstairs, another one in the kitchen and the other kept me in the dinning room. They started searching my office upstairs, my computers, the shelves, my company’s books.
Then I was allowed to read the content of the warrant. The policeman told the me that they had found in Bemba’s computer (my sister’s computer?) my address and phone number with an indication that my sister has an office in my house. They have been told they got it wrong: it was my house, my business office, my company’s mobile number. Of course they were right, and I was wrong. They had a mission: looking for evidence.
I asked them how long was it going to take because I had to leave to work at 8.15. The answer given to me was: “forget it, you can call your business partners and cancel all your meetings. It will take a couple of hours. When calling your partners, you must speak French”.
Those searching my office came downstairs 45 minutes later. With a few documents. Then they went on asking me about 30 questions like, for instance:
Does your brother-in-law or your sister owns other houses, other bank accounts, who owns the one I live in, where the money comes from, where do I work, who ows my company, what is Bemba’s car, what is my sister’s car, what is my niece and nephew’s car, did I ever fly in Bemba’s plane and sail his yatch, his he a business partner, did I ever received money from my sister, from my brother-in-law, when did I pay my last visit to them and where, in which country, and so on…the policeman was writing every answer in a small diary.
The moment came where I had to acknowlegde the documents they were taking with them; I was absolutely amazed, I can say. The keywords were: Portugal, bank transfers, house documents and my daughter’s balance sheets. She’s 20 and she’s studying in Copenhagen. They even took the invoice billing my daughter’s last summer holiday to Lisbon.
Here are the facts: we have settled in this country, my daughter and I, in 1992; my daughter was born here, was at school here; my house was bought in 1997 by me; I’m a very hard working mom for more than 14 years in this country, paying my taxes every single year. So what’s up?
6 months after his arrest, and a week before the confirmation of the charges* does the world’s most powerful prosecutor lack enough evidence in Bemba’s case to think they can find some in my house and in my company’s office? *( it was scheduled 8-12 Dec, postponed since).
Now, my second and most important question is: Am I guilty by association just because I’d been palling around with my little sister and my daugther with her cousins?
To be continued.
Affaire Bemba : les ONG des droits de l’homme pour la CPI accusent Moreno de partialité
Bemba’s case: Human rights NGO’s pointing out Moreno Ocampo political posturing, incompetence.
Kinshasa | 19 Février 2009 à 17:13:10
«Manque de professionnalisme, enquêtes jugées légères et subjectives, politisation de l’affaire», tels sont les reproches formulés à l’endroit du procureur de la Cour pénale internationale, Moreno O Campo, dans l’affaire l’opposant à l’ex-vice président de la RDC, Jean-Pierre Bemba, rapporte radiookapi.net
Luis Moreno Ocampo, procureur de la CPI
C’était au cours d’un point de presse tenu, ce jeudi à Kinshasa, par le Réseau national des ONG des droits de l’homme au Congo, Rénadhoc. Le secrétaire exécutif de ce réseau et membre de cette coalition des ONGDH pour la Cpi, Floribert Chebeya, a fait la restitution de l’observation de l’audience de confirmation des charges contre Jean-Pierre Bemba, du 12 au 15 janvier 2009 à la CPI.
Floribert Chebeya, secrétaire exécutif de ce réseau, explique : «Ce que nous envisageons voir, c’est que la CPI ne puisse pas décevoir des nombreux espoirs placés en elle. Et cela, tant au niveau des États comme au niveau des organisations internationales pour la Cour pénale internationale. Il y a des problèmes par rapport à la pratique professionnelle du procureur actuel qui, de plus en plus, est récusé par les États, par les ONG mais également par la défense des prévenus. Nous attendons que la Chambre préliminaire 3 puisse dire effectivement les droits en dehors des pressions politiques, diplomatiques. Parce qu’on a le sentiment qu’il y a une connexion entre les charges contre Jean-Pierre Bemba, donc les crimes commis en République Centrafricaine, et la situation en RDC. Ça risque de fausser un peu le jeu de droit. »
Copyright Radio Okapi
Jean-Pierre Bemba, victim of a political trial?
Is the proceeding against J.-P. Bemba intended to hold him accountable for crimes his men may have perpetrated in the Central African Republic (CAR), to give hope to victims that justice will be done, as alleged by the Prosecutor, or the point is simply to put J.-P. Bemba out of the political scene in the Democratic republic of Congo, in order to secure the presidency of Joseph Kabila regime, by weakening his opposition?
This case raises multiple questions we can’t deal with in these papers. We are going to focus only on just a few of them by relying essentially on an analysis of the Pretrial chamber (PTC) decision under the Prosecutor application for an arrest warrant under art. 58 of the Statute dated from the 10th June 2008 (ICC-01/05-01/08), as well as on questions and replies raised during the confirmation of charges hearings held from 12 to 15 January 2009. Given some erroneous ideas that have circulated and are continuing to circulate, it seems important to shed light on the question related to the status of Bemba as a gig fish of the ICC, to recall that the Bemba case is the result of investigations that have lasted more than four years, which in fact would suggest that the Prosecutor had enough time to make a good case. Unfortunately, the Defense team seems to have succeeded in weakening the arguments of the Prosecutor set in the arrest warrant of the 10 June 2008, in relation with two points, a) the Prosecutor’s allegations on the existence of a common plan to commit crimes, allegation that cannot go with the notion of risk developed by the same Prosecutor and the PTC in the same Decision; b) the question related to the responsibility of the M.L.C., as well as that of the individual criminal responsibility of Mr. Bemba in the commission of the crimes in the CAR. Above all the question is to know whether Mr. Bemba is not an “expiatory victim†of these horrendous crimes and atrocities committed in the CAR, without being necessarily guilty of them. The allegation of a political trial against Mr. Bemba can be confirmed, if the case is not sound, and if, in the case, charges are not confirmed against him, he is nevertheless maintained in detention in order to allow the Prosecutor to collect other evidences in support of his case against him. In the latter case, it will be easy to the Prosecutor to fall in the trap of setting aside exculpatory evidences, and violating the requirement of a fair trial for the accused. The concrete and final result on the ground in the DRC, will be to put Mr. Bemba out of the political scene, on the base of a file that is not addressing each of the fundamental questions.
It seems also important for us to precise that I am not a M.L.C. supporter. I am just a human right activist, and I think that justice is served, and human rights must be defended regardless of any kind of distinction based on the race, the sex and political affiliations of the accused. Let’s begin by the addressing the question concerning the status of J.P. Bemba as a big fish of the ICC.
I- Is Mr. Bemba, a “big fish�
As a reminder, Mr. Bemba has been always presented as a big fish of the ICC. This conception is not true. If Mr. Bemba can be considered as a big fish in the DRC, that is not necessarily the case in the CAR where crimes have been committed. In the CAR Mr. Bemba is not the big fish. The former as well as the incumbent CAR presidents are the real “big fishes†in the commission of crimes in their country. The troupes loyal to the incumbent CAR president seem to be implicated in crimes committed in the Northwest part of the CAR. As a reminder, the Prosecutor of the ICC had notified his intention to bring to justice the most responsible of crimes committed to that part of the CAR; crimes that are attributed to Bozizé’s men. The latter “wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Ban-Ki moon on August 1, 2008, asking the UN to intercede in any possible ICC investigations of crimes in the north of the country pursuant to article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which empowers the UN Security Council to suspend court proceedings for up to 12 months, renewable, if required to maintain international peace and security†Human Rights Watch, Improving Civilian Protection in Northwest Central African Republic, December 2008, n° 1, p. 22 available on line at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/car1208web.pdf ).
Another point is to stress the fact that crimes Bemba is charged of, are subsequent to his status as a DRC Vice-President, as well as that of senator at the time of his arrest in Brussels. The crimes seem to have been committed when he was only the President of the M.L.C.
Third, as a reminder, when he was arrested, Mr. Bemba was preparing to return in the DRC, to work as an opposition leader. As the Prosecutor spokeswoman said, his return in the DRC would make difficult his arrest, because it was easier to arrest him in Brussels than in Kinshasa in the DRC. Obviously this argument is not sound, because right now, all ICC detainees are Congolese arrested in Kinshasa. On this point the quality of the cooperation offered by the RDC government has never been challenged and the fear advanced is not founded.
II.- The base case: the result of investigations that have lasted more than four years
As a reminder, it is since 22nd December 2004, that the CAR referred the situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC. Two years later, given the inaction of the Prosecutor, the CAR government reminded the case to the ICC. On the 30 November 2006, the PTC of the ICC decided to request the Prosecutor “to provide the Chamber and the Government of the CAR, no later than 15 December 2006, with a report containing information on the current status of the preliminary examination of the CAR situation including an estimate of when the preliminary examination of the CAR situation will be concluded and when a decision pursuant to art. 53 (1) of the status will be takenâ€. On this basis the Prosecutor submitted a Report on 15th December 2006, in which he provided general information on the status of the preliminary examination and the problems this examination is facing on the ground in the CAR situation.
On 22nd the ICC Prosecutor, decided finally to open an investigation (Doc. n° ICC-OTP-BN-20070522-220-AA_Fr). In this decision, the Prosecutor promised to focus on crimes committed between October-November 2002 and February-March 2003. He affirmed his determination to collect information and to pay a particular attention to allegations of crimes committed in other parts of the CAR, namely in the North at the end of 2005.
On 9th May 2008, the Prosecutor submitted a sealed application for a warrant of arrest under art. 58 of the Statute against Mr. Bemba. But on 21st May, the PTC requested additional information and evidences concerning some aspects of his application namely in support of of the charges of others forms of sexual violence and murders, these two crimes envisaged in their double qualifications of crimes against humanity and war crimes (Decision of 10 June 2008, § 6). But the Prosecutor, before giving these additional information and evidences, came back to the judges to request an application for a provisional arrest under Art. 92, against Mr. Bemba alleging a risk of fleeing in the DRC if he is not arrested. On this basis, Mr. Bemba, the only suspect in the CAR situation, was arrested on 24th May 2008 in Brussels, on the basis of the PTC decision to request his provisional arrest under Art. 92. This decision was delivered at the previous day of his arrest and the judges were relying on Art. 58 as well as Art. 92 of the Statute, before obtaining additional information and evidences they requested in their previous Decision. The hurry will lead to some inconsistencies in the Decision and during the confirmation of charges hearing.
III.- Are the crimes committed the result of a common criminal plan or the result of an activity the realization of which entailed the risk of committing the alleged crimes?
In the 10 June 2008 decision under hands, the judges came back several times on the notion of the “risk†(paragraphs 72, 80 and 82). The fact of resorting on the notion of risk seems to be inconsistent with the existence of a criminal plan as alleged by the Prosecutor. If the crimes were committed because Bemba accepted the risk, that is to say we are facing accidental or collateral victims of a war led by “non-professionals†of war, that is to say a war done by uncontrolled soldiers. These kinds of acts are out the scope of Art. 8 of the Rome Statute. In reality, every war contains a risk of the commission of war crimes. The notion of a “clean war†does not exist in practice. It seems important to remind here that Art. 8 of the Rome Statute applies on war crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimesâ€. Concerning crimes against humanity, Art. 7-2-a defines the term “attacks against any civilian population†in crimes against humanity, as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraphs 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attackâ€. Such formulation of Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the Rome Statute is excluding, for sure, the hypothesis of crimes committed as a result of a risk that may have been assumed, and is excluded the hypothesis of collateral victims of isolated acts committed by uncontrolled soldiers. It seems to be inconsistent to allege that those crimes were committed as the result of risks assumed by Mr. Bemba, and to allege at the same time the existence of a common plan the purpose of which was to commit the alleged crimes.
IV. On the question of responsibility
A.- The imprecision on the attribution of the crimes committed on the MLC troops
What has led the Prosecutor’s to allege that it was MLC troops that committed alleged crimes? In the Decision under hands, the criteria taken were that of the language used by the attackers. They were speaking “lingalaâ€. This criteria seems to be uncertain and not reliable, because in one hand, there is a part of CAR population speaking this language; and in another hand, the attackers are called Banyamulenge. Now the Banyamulenge, as it is known, are people living in the high plateau of Minembwe, near the Uvira city, in the South Kivu, province of the DRC. These people speak Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili and not lingala, and are well known for their rebellion launched against the presidency of Mobutu which led Laurent-Désiré to the Power in Kinshasa in 1997. That is to say, the language criteria cannot be used to identify the attackers as the MLC fighters. If we assume that the attackers were banyamulenge, we should exclude the MLC fighters in the commission of the alleged crimes because those who committed them were speaking lingala. Obviously, the question of Mr. Bemba’s responsibility cannot be raised before establishing the responsibility of MLC troops in the commission of those crimes. But even in the case the MLC troops committed those crimes; the establishment of Mr. Bemba’s individual responsibility is not as such simplified. On this point, one observes the imprecision of the type of mode of liability used against Mr. Bemba. Even by retaining the lower one, liability as a commander or other superiors, what could obviously simplifies the work of the Prosecutor, some imprecision and even inconsistencies can be seen, in relation to a well established jurisprudences of the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and even the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
B.- The imprecision on the choice concerning the mode of liability in the commission of alleged crimes in the Bemba case (Art. 25-3-a and 25-3-b of the Rome Statute).
This imprecision derives mainly from the wording of the decision of 10 June 2008. Many people thing erroneously that Mr. Bemba is charged on the basis of superior or commander who failed to take appropriate measures to prevent or punish crimes committed by his men. This mode of liability is set in Art. 28 of the Rome Statute. Other people think he is charged for having ordered the commission of those crimes. The latter mode of liability is more serious than the first and is based on Art. 25-3-b of the Rome Statute. But the true is that he is charged with a more serious mode of liability, as a co-perpetrator (Art. 25-3-a). The aggravation of his accusation is unfortunately not supported by available evidences in the file. These evidences, as it could be seen during the confirmation of charges hearing, does not allow to take even the lower level of liability, that of a commander or superior who might have failed to take appropriate measures to prevent or to punish the alleged crime committed by his men.
Such high level of liability, that of co-perpetrator, requires not only a high level of control on the troops that committed the alleged crimes, but also something more than the simple fact of ordering to commit those crimes. It is question to commit the alleged crimes “through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible†(Art. 25-3-a). It is not easy to demonstrate this mode of liability when the alleged responsible was very far from the place of the commission of the crimes.
Now the Prosecutor’s team was not able to prove that Mr. Bemba knew or had reasons to know that his troops had committed or were committing or about to commit the alleged crimes. Even in this case this level of proof would be required for the case of prosecution based on the liability as a commander or superior, and not as a co-perpetrator. The only clues available were some newspapers from the RFI (Radio France International). Whereas the thing is those are indirect sources, whose impartiality can be challenged, given the fact that France was involved in the CAR conflict at this time. Another point is the confusion between the facts of receiving report from the field on the general situation on the ground, the numbers of the wounded that of the killed etc. and to receive report on the crimes they were committed abroad. This distinction does not appear in the file of the Prosecutor. It is also the same confusion that appears once more concerning the control of the troops on the battle field.
C.- The difficulty to establish the individual criminal liability of Mr. Bemba, even as a commander or superior (Art. 28 of the Rome Statute).
Who had the control of MLC troops in the CAR? This is the central question. Given the fact the alleged crimes were committed by abroad by the MLC troops that were sent in the CAR, under an invitation of the legal et democratically elected government of this sovereign State, the question related to the responsibility of Mr. Bemba on his troops abroad can be addressed according to the guidelines set forth by Art. 8 of the Draft Article on State responsibility of the International Law Commission (ILC), adopted on 2001 by the General-Assembly of the UN (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 vol. II(2), page 47) which provides: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conductâ€. (http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf )
One of its applications is the Nicaragua case in which the ICJ set the criteria of an effective control. (ICJ, Nicaragua v. USA, Decision of 27 June 1986, para 115), the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY, in the Tadic case, thought sufficient the criteria of a “global control†to attribute to the FRY acts committed by the Bosnian Serbs and to qualify the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an international (Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para 145). It is once more on the same criteria of the effective control that the ICJ came back by affirming in the Bosnia-Herzegovina case (Decision of the 26th February 2007, in the case opposing the DRC to Uganda, decision of 19th December 2005. The ICJ is not the only Tribunal affirming that criteria. Some decisions from the European Court of Human Rights can be mentioned, namely the Decision in Bankovic v. Belgium, 19 December 2001, and specifically the Decision in Behrami v. France, and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, 2 May 2007, para 133-139). We will make an in-depth analysis of these jurisprudences later after the decision of the PTC on confirmation of charges. For now, what we need to bear in mind is that the criteria of effective control is fundamental I the establishment of the state responsibility and consequently that of individual responsibility of states authorities. It is these same criteria which appear to be fundamental in the establishment of the individual criminal responsibility of rebels’ leaders when crimes are attributed to their troops. We discover then, as argued by the Defense, that one of the weakness of the Prosecution allegations is to infer from the control that Bemba exerted on his men in the DRC, in the territory under his leadership, to infer from this control in the DRC the control in the CAR. This reasoning appears to be too simplistic, because the troops were sent abroad following the invitation from the democratically elect government. The simple logic in this case is commends to go rather from the opposite presumption, that is to say to consider that it is the CAR authorities who have the full technical and operational control in the ground. It is hard to understand the opposite way of thinking consisting to go from the idea that it is Mr. Bemba who continued to exercise control on the battle field abroad, and to put the burden of proof on him, by asking him to prove that he did not have the control over his men in the CAR. The presumption must be in favor of Mr. Bemba because military operations were done abroad, in a country in which he had no power. In so doing, it is up to the Prosecution to prove that even abroad; Mr. Bemba continued to give instructions to his men in the battle field. Even in this hypothesis, nothing allows us to say that these instructions were necessarily criminal, because of the occurrence of war crimes. The criminal instructions have to be demonstrated and not simply supposed from the result on the ground.
The second problem consists to blame Mr. Bemba for having done nothing to punish his men when he had that they might have committed crimes in the CAR. This is absurd simply because Mr. Bemba wrote to the special representative of the UN in the CAR on 4th January 2003, as well as to the President of the ONG FIDH, to request their support in order to conduct an investigation and shed lights in the allegations concerning war crimes that might have been committed by his men and that might have occurred during the military campaign in the CAR, and to bring those who will be found responsible for that to trial. Since they have been no reply to these two letters from the UN as well as from the FIDH, it is absurd to blame mR. Bemba for having done nothing to punish his men for the perpetration of the alleged crimes in the CAR.
V.- Conclusion : Is Mr. Bemba an expiatory victim?
The movement of the fight against impunity can lead to a conflict with the requirement of a fair trial. Since the authority and the prestige of the international justice lays essentially on its ability to set a balance between these two requirements. The Bemba case seems to be an illustration of this dilemma. In one hand, considering the situation of victims of these atrocities, which chokes the universal consciences, it is clear that this kind of crimes can not go unpunished. But when some suspects are brought before justice, the requirements of a fait trial must be respected in order to avoid making the latter, expiatory victims of an unbalanced system in favour of direct victims of crimes under international law. In the Bemba case, it seems like the Prosecutor, touched by the cries of victims (that is legitimate), has fallen in the trap of searching not necessarily the guilty but someone who must pay the price, the expiatory victim. The question is then to know if the sword of justice might have fallen on the wrong person, Mr. Bemba Gombo, after four years of investigations. One could object by saying even if the charges are confirmed the suspect is still enjoying his presumption of innocence, because the PTC would have decide not on his guilty but on the confirmation of charges. But this presumption is nothing but theoretical. As a reminder, Mr. Bemba was arrested in Brussels since 24 May 2008. All his belongings as well as his bank account, that of his wife and even that of his children have been seized by the ICC; that he was arrested when he was about to go in the DRC to assume his task as the leader of the opposition in the DRC. No matter whet the final result in this case, his arrest and his detention in The Hague, has been a way to sully his reputation of a political leader. Finally the triumphalism of NGO, the media on his arrest betrayed the fact that he is already judged and convicted by the Tribunal of the public opinion, that of the media and NGO, in such a way his eventual acquittal by the ICC judges will be considered as a scandal. This state of thing will obviously continue when the PTC, in the case it does not confirm the charges, nevertheless holds Mr. Bemba in detention, so the Prosecutor can continue to collect evidences against him. In this case, it will be easy for the prosecutor to fall in the trap of collecting only inculpatory evidences and put aside exculpatory evidences, contrary to the requirement to investigate in both sides. In any case the result is the same: Mr. Bemba is put out of the political scene in the DRC. And if the file is not consistent, it would be very hard to reject the argument of a political trail against Mr. Bemba.
Done in The Hague, this 20th January 2009.
Jacques MBOKANI
Jean-Pierre Bemba, mis en examen et écroué à La Haye par la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) pour “crimes de guerre†et “crimes contre l’humanité†recherche désespérément une terre d’asile.
Même des pays africains se montrent moralisateurs à son sujet, un comportement qui réconforte la position du procureur de la CPI Moreno Ocampo et la thèse de la préméditation des nombreux crimes reprochés à Bemba .
Le box des accusés à moitié vide
L’homme, anciennement Chef de guerre, il a créé en 1998 le Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) et son bras armé, l’Armée de Libération du Congo (ALC) avec le soutien des troupes ougandaises, s’est reconverti en homme politique sérieux et fréquentable. Mieux, il suscite crainte, espoir et admiration au sein du peuple congolais et dans la sous région.
Selon le procureur de la CPI, les Nations-Unies et la communauté internationale européenne, il aurait ordonné et planifié la destruction de l’économie centrafricaine, le viol de 3.000 femmes et plus de 500 assassinats. Il aurait surtout encouragé aussi le cannibalisme au sein de ses troupes. Des allégations que la confusion médiatique du dossier et la versatilité des témoignages ne permettent pas d’étayer. Bien sûr, la Belgique, les Nations-Unies et la CPI peinent à prouver tout ça depuis des années. Ni la qualité des témoins, ni les circonstances troubles de l’intervention des hommes de Bemba en Centrafrique, ni la qualité du parrain Kadhafi – jamais inquiété dans cette affaire – ni le mutisme du protégé d’alors Ange Félix Patassé, depuis débarqué par Bozizé et en exile doré au Togo, n’aideront à apporter des preuves tangibles et irréfragables des accusations pouvant conduire à la qualification des crimes en génocide ou crime contre l’humanité. Il y a eu des exactions voire des abominations commises dans un climat de guerre et de violents combats opposant deux forces armées sur des populations civiles, c’est indéniable. Mais, l’on ressens comme une gêne l’absence des trois personnes citées supra au côté de Jean-Pierre Gombo BEMBA sur le banc des accusés. Mais qui oserait accusé le Guide Libyen de quoi que ce soit. Et au nom de quelle justice internationale et universelle ? Quand à Ange-Félix Patassé n’est-il pas toujours dans la course en Centrafrique pour la prise armée du pouvoir ou sa reconquête par les urnes, au nez et à la barbe de BOZIZE ?
Celui là , il faudra forcement l’inculper de quelque chose afin de le mettre hors d’état de nuire.
Entre-nous, comment J-P BEMBA pouvait-il planifier la destruction de l’économie centrafricaine au moment du règne de son ami et protégé Patassé ? En tant que Chef de guerre certes, il avait manqué à son devoir de surveillance et de discipline envers ses milices qui se trouvaient en Centrafrique pour aider le pouvoir Patassé en proie à la violente rébellion conduite par BOZIZE . Ses hommes ont sûrement commis tous les crimes dont on l’accuse lui aujourd’hui : assassinats, viols, tortures et vols. De tout cela J-P BEMBA en est entièrement responsable mais pas forcement seul coupable. Pour sortir des fanfaronnades des américains avec leurs frappes chirurgicales dont ils nous abreuvent depuis la première guerre du Golf, il n’y a pas de guerre propre. Toute guerre est sale et comporte ou entraîne des dégâts collatéraux. Toute guerre a aussi un coût. Et cela, J-P BEMBA a semble t-il ignorer. Comment ça ? Sa milice recrutée, formée sur le tas, était sous-payée et archaïquement ou lourdement armée, elle semblait tout ignorer du noble art de la guerre – le respect et la protection des pacifiques populations civiles – ce qu’ont du mal à respecter les troupes régulières des forces armées africaines sur le théâtre des affrontements. Alors comme des brutes épaisses les miliciens de BEMBA ont disposé, usé et abusé des populations civiles pygmées accusées de connivence avec les troupes ennemies ou de résistance. Des femmes pygmées obligées, soi disant par les miliciens de BEMBA, à tuer, cuisiner et puis manger leurs maris avaient témoigné leurs peurs et désarrois. Tant pis – ou plutôt tant mieux – si les soi disant victimes devaient réapparaître plus tard sous les projecteurs d’une presse objective ou non. Peu importe l’amateurisme de J-P BEMBA et ses miliciens, l’humanité est heureuse de savoir que les hommes pygmées n’ont pas été bouilli en sauce graine par leurs épouses sous la menace des †branquignols soldatesques †de BEMBA. L’histoire retiendra que Patassé fut quand même renversé par le Général François BOZIZE bien agrippé au pouvoir depuis. Et c’est ce que BEMBA et son armée était censé empêché. Comme quoi une dictature en cache toujours une autre. Et BEMBA qui avait du s’exiler une première fois à l’avènement de Kabila père en savait pertinemment quelque chose. D’ailleurs, il décidera à partir de cet échec de mettre en sourdine la lutte armée et de s’orienter dans la branche politique et le débat d’idées, ce qu’il réussira avec les pourparlers, la réconciliation nationale et le gouvernement de transition de juin 2003 à octobre 2006 où il occupera le porte feuille de vice-président de son pays.
A la croisée des ambitions
Le nouveau militant et leader politique civil contre toute attente se révélera une grande force politique en mouvement ascendant avec une aura à toute épreuve. Il fascine et inquiète aussi. Le Prince héréditaire Kabila Joseph trouve un sérieux adversaire à sa taille. L’élection présidentielle de 2006 ne fut pas gagnée au premier tour comme on l’espérait du côté du pouvoir en place. Le second tour n’avait aussi rien d’une promenade de santé, alors on commence forcement à s’énerver, à s’inquiéter d’autant que l’adversaire peut renouer à tout moment avec ses vieilles habitudes de Chef de guerre avec des troupes en embuscade. Le pouvoir élève le ton, les milices de BEMBA et les forces armées régulières s’accrochent ; des bombes explosent, des mitraillettes et AKM tonnent, la cuisine diplomatique mitonne de jolies promesses pour l’acheter mais Gombo le milliardaire sénateur – ayant réussi dans les affaires civiles et militaires n’en a cure – veut voir clair dans la marmite de la République au nom d’une aspiration populaire forte. Et ce ne fut pas facile à trouver et à mettre en place le stratagème qui va mieux le faire glisser Gombo. Ce fut laborieux et pitoyable même si ce fut rapide. La cohorte de conseillers et de stratèges politiques du camp d’en face a fait mouche. Le nouveau venu n’avait pas vite percuté, mais c’est sûr, il ne refera pas les mêmes erreurs.
Jean-Pierre Gombo BEMBA a fait les frais des enjeux de politiques intérieurs congolais et des jeux des licences et concessions. J-P BEMBA avait hérité du poste de vice président jusqu’à l’organisation des élections présidentielles d’octobre 2006 où il parviendra à se hisser au second. Après sa défaite face à Joseph Kabila, Jean-Pierre Bemba s’était engagé à mener une †opposition républicaine †au gouvernement de celui-ci. Son refus de fondre sa garde personnelle au sein de l’armée gouvernementale, au début de l’année 2007, l’a conduit à un affrontement direct avec le pouvoir s’en suivra son exil au Portugal après sa rocambolesque exfiltration, et quelques semaines après, son arrestation par la police Belge sous mandat délivré par la CPI la veille. Quelle rapidité alors ? Et dire qu’il en a eu plus chevronnés en ex-Yougoslavie avec toute une batterie de casseroles qui ont eu le temps de se transformer et de circuler au nez et à la barbe de cette police internationale. C’est vrai qu’avec sa stature imposante – 1m90 et près de 130 kg peut-être – Gombo aurait du mal lui à réussir sa métamorphose afin de passer incognito. Peu importe, on lui a laissé aucune chance à lui
L’opinion nationale congolaise, l’opinion internationale africaine sait très bien que c’est au prix d’une relative stabilité intérieure sous fond d’intérêts économiques et stratégiques que l’ arrestation de J-P BEMBA a été coordonnée et décidée par la Belgique ancienne puissance coloniale. Une Belgique qui était aux trousses de J-P BEMBA un pur produit du système belge et européen avec un parcours universitaire et professionnel exemplaire, son enfant malade qui en avait assez de rester dans les rangs et de cautionner le pillage éhonté des ressources de son pays d’origine la RDC par le colon belge et la dérive monarchique sans alternative républicaine du régime Kabila père, et il a pris ses responsabilités.
J-P BEMBA a été donc curieusement arrêté en Belgique par la police de ce pays qui l’a rendu sans autres formalités à la CPI – Cour Pénale Internationale – . Une CPI qui après avoir tournée en rond tel un écureuil dans une cage en se mordant la queue, a finalement conclu à la requalification des charges contre BEMBA. Et ironie du sort, c’est au moment où le peuple congolais meurtri et blessé dans son amour propre, commençait, par ces temps de crises diverses, à ressentir la cruelle cessation d’activité de l’opposition congolaise – devenue amorphe depuis la mise aux arrêts de BEMBA – et face aux actions de mobilisation et de résistance des diasporas congolaise, que la CPI après des mois et des mois de manÅ“uvres dilatoires avec des reports d’audiences en cascade sous des prétextes familiaux, fallacieux et fantaisistes des juges et autres intermédiaires, envisage la libération provisoire de BEMBA. Mais pourquoi une libération provisoire alors que sans risque aucun on pourrait l’élargir tout de suite en abandonnant les charges contre lui pour des raisons que nous savons tous. Jean-Pierre Gombo BEMBA est sénateur et Chef de l’opposition de la RDC et sa place est auprès de son peuple pour qui il est prêt à tout moment à se dévouer. Les cyniques marchandages sur son pays d’accueil dans l’éventualité d’une liberté provisoire n’auraient pas lieu d’être si la CPI avait décidée de se comporter comme une institution internationale respectable et respectueuse des droits de l’homme et des peuples. La Belgique et tout le conglomérat de pays de l’Union Européenne pourraient refuser de l’accepter sur leur territoire par solidarité au pouvoir Kabila. Mais tous les pays africains qui ont refusé d’accueillir Jean-Pierre Gombo BEMBA ont justement peur de l’effet d’émulation du phénomène BEMBA sur leur sol, car les rares démocraties du continent qui se ferment à BEMBA ne sont pas en réalité de vraies démocraties. Et malheureusement, les autres pays – plus nombreux – à la solde d’autocrates tropicaux ont peur à juste titre pour la pérennité de leur régime dictatorial.
Une Autre aventure
Le combat de BEMBA c’était d’aller soutenir un régime démocratiquement élu – celui de PATASSE – en difficulté, qui le lui a demandé. C’est aussi de porter les aspirations politiques, économiques et idéologiques de tout un peuple – congolais, le sien – en donnant l’exemple qu’il pouvait négocier et conduire aussi la paix. Une paix qui n’a été possible en RDC que grâce à la volonté et à l’implication personnelle de Jean-Pierre BEMBA qui reste très populaire et très influent à Kinshasa, dans l’Equateur, dans le Bas-congo, le Bandundu et dans le Kasaï. Et certaines de ces populations qui ont déjà eu à prendre leur responsabilité en se lançant dans de sombres aventures avec des Chefs de guerre , désarmées de patience, elles se détourneront vite de la voie de la légalité et du dialogue tracée par BEMBA et autres pacifistes et démocrates du pays : la recherche de solutions politiques par le dialogue politique aux problèmes de société ; au profit sûrement de la lutte armée avec ses corollaires comme on en a connu dans la région. Aucune puissance coloniale, aucune institution internationale ne peut délibérément décider de barrer la route à la volonté d’un peuple de réaliser l’alternance et de choisir librement son leader ou son mode de gouvernance.
Jean-Pierre Gombo BEMBA a vite compris l’importance de la pacification et de l’ancrage national de son mouvement – qui de toute façon a vu son influence et sa vague de sympathisants dépassées le seul mur du Congo RD – avec un discours plus policé axé sur les perspectives analytiques réelles, politiques, économiques et sociologiques du pays et du continent. C’est pour ça qu’il fait autant peur aux colons belges et au roitelet de Kinshasa et leurs affidés. Aujourd’hui encore J-P BEMBA est bien le seul à même de battre à la prochaine échéance présidentielle le candidat du conglomérat americano-belgo-européen – Kabila qui aurait déclaré récemment être à la recherche de 8 ou 15 personnes compétentes pour redresser le pays. C’est sûrement des compétences qui font défaut dans son entourage immédiat à Kabila, c’est vraiment triste pour le Congo RD qui regorge pourtant de compétences comme de minerais -. 8 ou 15 congolais compétents ? Sans être congolais, je lui en référerai, les yeux fermés entre 80 et 150 congolais de l’intérieur comme de l’extérieur hyper compétents, qualifiés et de bonne moralité sans être forcement du MLC, †Bembistes †ou de l’opposition. A quand cessera alors l’auto-dévaluation sous nos tropiques ?
Il serait de bon aloi que J-P Gombo BEMBA, quant à lui, garde à cœur de faire dans le futur une action humanitaire d’envergure de réparation à l’endroit des populations des villages ayant souffert des méfaits et des exactions de ses miliciens. Le Congo, l’Afrique entière, le lui rappellera au moment opportun. Comme quoi la repentance aussi est une affaire personnelle et permanente et en bon chrétien il devrait le savoir.
30 juillet 2009
Par Guillaume ADOUVI
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