The Road of Sudanese Self-Determination: Where Does It Lead?
Last week President Omar al Bashir and the cabinet visited South Kordofan State in the heart of the Nuba Mountains. While the residents welcomed this long overdue recognition of the importance of their state and its significance to the implementation of the CPA, the event also reminded them that the CPA was, for them, not truly an agreement at all. The many members of the SPLM/A in South Kordofan fought long and hard against extreme odds for the right of self-determination for the Nuba people. They demanded self-determination as an inalienable right in recognition of their distinct ethnic and cultural identity, their massive sufferings during the war and their strong stand in solidarity with their brothers and sisters in the South, but were denied that right in the Karen Accords and only received an inadequate substitute, a “popular consultation” on the status of South Kordofan within Northern Sudan. Many Nuba people, especially those living within the “closed district” controlled by the SPLM with its headquarters in Kauda, are still living under the erroneous impression that they will be able to cast their votes to join the South, like the Ngok Dinka people of Abyei.
The CPA was in fact the latest in a long line of agreements in which the SPLM won rights for the Southerners but conceded an inadequate compromise for the Nuba. In the 1994 SPLM-Umma Party agreement and the 1995 Asmara Declaration of the NDA, the right of self-determination for the Nuba was explicitly excluded. In the 2002 Machakos Protocol there was no mention of the Nuba. When Nuba organizations convened a consultation in Kampala soon after Machakos to discuss the right of self-determination, the SPLM undermined it by holding a “Convention” in Kauda in which the Nuba members of SPLM were persuaded to give unconditional support to the SPLM leadership to negotiate on their behalf.
Where will the Nuba stand in 2011 if the Referendum goes as expected for separation? This is the question that preoccupies many residents in the Nuba Mountains. The New Kush Division of the SPLM did not fight all those years, many of them without even a single ammunition box supplied from the parent Movement in the South, many of them without a single promotion given to the front-line commanders, to have their rights traded away. If self-determination is a right for the South and Abyei it should be no less a right for the Nuba.
The genie of self-determination is out of the box for Sudan and it can not be put back inside. It is out of the box for Southern Sudan and it is out of the box for the Nuba and all the other marginalized peoples. If there is a new war in South Kordofan the Nuba will be demanding nothing less than the full rights of self-determination.
The NCP opposed the right of self-determination for the South because they know it will not stop there. They categorically opposed to the extension of self-determination to the Nuba and Blue Nile because they knew full well that all the marginalized peoples of Sudan would be up in arms, demanding either to run the country in which they form a demographic majority or to pull it to pieces and enjoy control of their own ancestral homelands.
If the Darfuri people can not settle their differences by 2011 then the new war in Darfur will also be a war of self-determination as well. In fact Dr. Khalil Ibrahim has already put self-determination on the table. Historically speaking, Darfur’s claim to an independent statehood is as strong or stronger than anybody else’s in Sudan. Darfur was independent until 1916 and before then had hundreds of years of existence as an independent state.
The National Congress is preparing for this eventuality. The economic investment of the regime is focused on the “Hamdi Triangle” and completely ignoring the rest of the country. The security policy shows the same calculations at work, building up a hierarchy of security institutions depending on the value they place on the territory in question. According to the evidence before our eyes they will consolidate their defences around the Hamdi Triangle using security agencies staffed exclusively from the Three Tribes and play divide and rule with the remainder finding many willing takers in the tribes who will lose out in any self-determination for the marginalized. The Arabs of South Kordofan and Darfur will become minorities if confederal or independent states come into being and for sure they will resist and take arms from Khartoum.
Gaafar Numeyri’s policy of redivision of the South in 1981 set in motion an unstoppable logic of division among the tribes of the south, with the Dinka opposing redivision because they forfeited their dominant share of power in the Southern Autonomous Region, and the Nuer and Equatorians supporting it because they could dominate their smaller regions of Upper Nile and Equatoria respectively, and the smaller tribes opposing redivision because they were now more vulnerable to their neighbours taking control of the apparatus of government. The policy of Korkora (redivision) set the South on a slippery slope war, a war that included both the SPLA rebellion and also the tribal wars of small tribe militias that fought on the side of Khartoum and made the war into an internal South-South civil war.
From the vantage point of South Kordofan, the road of self-determination may become the logic of Korkora taken to its ultimate limit, the disintegration of the Sudanese nation. Within our one million square miles we have 570 tribes and 130 languages, each one which can claim the right to self-determination. If we follow where this road is taking us, each one will become its own separate tribal kingdom. Our leaders, focused only on their manoeuvering for tomorrow, need to rise to the challenge of saving our nation, whether as one state, or two states, or many states. Since the Darfur rebellion and the purging of the Sudan Armed Forces there are no national institutions left and the security institutions which are the pillars of the NCP rule are drawn more and more from the kinsmen of the ruling clique. Since the death of the late Dr. John Garang the champions of a different vision of Sudan have faded from the political scene and the programme of the New Sudan has become a slogan under which each is taking care of his own.
The true meaning of “self determination” is a people taking charge of their own destiny and forging their vision of a common future. In Sudan today “self determination” is becoming the road to fragmentation and ruin.
Dear Noah Kodi,
thank you for raising this important issue that deserves a wide debate. The right of self-determination is quite problematic in itself, and the call for self-determination of the Nuba in South Kordofan is a perfect example of why it is such a complex issue. I would like to take a closer look at it and see where it leads us indeed…
The right of self-determination:
From a legal point of view the right of self-determination is nowhere defined as the right to establish an independent state. It is the right of all peoples to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. In general, international consensus is against unilateral secession. An important exception is made, however, for peoples suffering from a repressive, authoritarian regime.
In Sudan the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM addresses the issue of self-determination differently for three distinct territorial situations.
1. For South Sudan the right to self-determination has been specified to mean the right to form an independent state if the peoples of South Sudan support this option.
2. For Abyei the parties agreed that its peoples can not form an independent state, but that, in case South Sudan secedes, they may choose to which state they would want to belong.
3. For Blue Nile and South Kordofan, the CPA limits the right of self-determination to allow the peoples of the respective territories to either endorse or reject (in whole or in part) the constitutional, political and administrative arrangements of the agreement.
What stands out is that the peoples whose right of self-determination is in one way or another aknowledged in the CPA are defined by administrative boundaries rather than by ethnic identity. Not the Dinka or the Nuer or the Misseriya or the Nuba will exercise their right of self determination, but the inhabitants of South Sudan, of Abyei, and of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Each of these arrangements applies the right of self-determination in a different way, which is very confusing for the peoples involved.
The Nuba and their demand of the right of self-determination:
The Nuba who joined the SPLM/A from 1984 onwards did not fight for the right of self-determination and certainly not in terms of forming an independent state. The main reason for the Nuba to join the SPLM/A was that they shared the Movement’s objectives as stated in its Manifesto. This explicitly included the fight for a united Sudan.
The demand for a right of self-determination that would include the possible formation of an independent Nuba state has been strongly advocated by the distinguished Nuba spokesperson Dr. Suleiman Musa Rahhal. He critizised the SPLM/A saying it was not genuine about garantueeing self-determination for the Nuba, and he insisted that the Nuba should become more independent. This brought him in direct conflict with the leader of the Nuba in the SPLM/A, the late Yousif Kuwa Mekki, who believed that the rights of the Nuba would best be secured in a unified Sudan, and in any case could only be guaranteed by a strong partnership with the SPLM/A.
The two near-simultaneous conferences in Kampala and in Kauda in 2002, seemed to reflect this conflict of visions. Dr. Suleiman Rahhal, who believed the Nuba should not let their fate be determined by the SPLM/A, was one of the driving forces behind the Kampala conference, while the conference in Kauda reiterated and formalized the position of Yousif Kuwa Mekki, who had passed away in 2001, that the Nuba would be best off trusting the SPLM/A to guarantee their rights.
Interestingly, the Kampala conference did not follow Dr. Rahhal’s call for an explicit recognition of the Nuba’s right of self-determination to include an independent state. In fact the resolutions of the Kampala conference stated:
“Since self-determination includes among other options, secession, and taking into consideration the fragile national formation of Sudan, and to safeguard the unity of Sudan in the time when other communities of nations are heading towards greater unity, participants resolved that the choice of a united Sudan should remain the priority.”
In contrast, the Nuba in the Kauda conference clearly demanded the right to self-determination regardless of the outcome of the peace process. Among the speakers was veteran Nuba politician, the late Fr. Philip Abbas Ghaboush, who, as the leader of the United Sudan National Party, also called for self-determination for the Nuba and for all the peoples of Sudan.
During the peace negotiation between the Government and the SPLM/A, the Nuba in the SPLM/A pushed hard for an official recognition of their right of self-determination to be included in the agreement. But the Government, including its Nuba delegates, fiercely opposed it. The Southern Sudanese were not prepared to endanger their own chance at an independent state for the sake of the Nuba and there was no support from the mediators of the CPA negotiations for an agreement that would give the Nuba a right to declare an independent state.
In the end the Protocol for the resolution of the conflict in Abyei and South Kordofan translated the right of self-determination into a public consultation on the reached settlement, that obviously fell short of expectations.
Disillusion:
From then on, more and more Nuba people started to voice their deception with the result of the CPA negotations. The South had its right to secede, Abyei had its right to join the South… and the Nuba in the SPLM? They had the ardeous task to work things out with the NCP themselves.
After the death of Dr. John Garang, what hope there had been that the SPLM would work to maintain Sudan’s unity evaporated, making the future of the Nuba even more uncertain. The lack of development in South Kordofan added to their disillusion. Many Nuba people felt betrayed.
Even the Nuba in the SPLM/A were at times close to breaking with Juba. But breaching the CPA and reverting to war was not much of an option – so they have persevered, hoping that the elections and the following popular consultation at least will give them a strong mandate to renegotiate the settlements for South Kordofan, as they could according to the CPA in case the chosen legislative rejects any part of the settlement.
Renewed call for self-determination:
Let me return to what I wrote above: that self-determination is such a complex issue, and certainly so in South Kordofan. There are several points to consider:
Firstly: the right of self-determination is understood to be the rights of ‘all peoples’, but this cannot be seperated from the territories these peoples inhabit. In South Kordofan – as in many other places – this immediately raises the concern of the rights of the other inhabitants of the state. The Nuba may be the largest population group in South Kordofan, but with a number of probably over a million the Misseriya are a minority that can hardly be ignored.
Certainly one could start a long discussion about ‘who was there first’ or who owns the land in South Kordofan, and as the elections draw nearer this will probably come to a head soon. Another discussion that is likely to resurface is that of the administrative boundaries: it would not make much sense to demand a seperate state based on the present borders of South Kordofan, but when the area would be redefined to include only the Nuba Mountains, things might be different.
Secondly: the Nuba are made up of a large number of distinct peoples. This is not neccessarily an argument against treating them as one entity, it does raise additional questions as to who is representing who. From the signing of the cease fire in 2002 to the the signing of the CPA in 2005 untill today, the Nuba have not displayed a high degree of unity. This makes any renewed claims for self-determination a bit problematic. But perhaps free and fair elections will give a clear indication of who can claim to represent the Nuba.
Thirdly: would it actually be desirable for the Nuba to join South Sudan in case it would secede? And would it be desirbale to have an independent Nuba state? It is not up to me to argue either way, but I think the questions are genuine.
Conclusion:
Representation, territorial borders, the right of minorities – these things tend to complicate the right of self-determination when interpreted as te right to form an independent state, and they would certainly do so in South Kordofan.
The genie of self-deterination is out of the box. As we have seen, it has many faces of which Popular Consultation is undoubtly the palest. But this is what the Nuba politicians from both parties signed for and unless they want to declare the CPA dead, this is what the Nuba people have to work with.
It still means that the best way of getting more out of the CPA is coming up with a united stance in the post-elections state legislative and a good relationship with the other peoples in South Kordofan. This is evidently far from easy, but there seems to be only one alternative…
John Stuart Mill demonstrated that the right of self-determination is to be earned and not granted. It is the political struggle for the right that qualifies a people to exercise the right. The SPLM, both subjectively and objectively, did not articulate the right of self-determination as its primary or even strategic objective, but adopted the right of self-determination into its political programme at a late date and by default as a concession to a kind of primordial nationalism. The SPLM’s nationalism was always a Sudanese nationalism and the historical tragedy of the Movement was that it failed to build a political movement commensurate with its political vision. The SPLM will consequently be impaled on the contradiction of its position, committed to a national vision with a national constituency, hostage to the regressive nationalism of southerners who are understandably fed up with their lot, and without either the vanguard or the mass organization capable of delivering on either agenda.
The position of the Darfurians is even worse. The SLM was a peasant jacquerie which would, had it succeeded, have only imposed a social revolution which supplanted one state-dependent bourgeois faction for another without grappling with the fundamental problem of Darfur within the Sudanese state order. JEM has inherited the vanguardist organization and national vision from its Islamist parent but its objective reality is that it has regressed to being a tribal vanguard. Any call for self-determination by JEM will be correctly interpreted by the Darfuri masses as a shortcut to state power by this tribal group.
As for the Nuba, they are grasping at straws. Any threat of Nuba separatism amounts to a political suicide note which would at best serve the purpose of drawing attention to their demands.
In 54 years of existence the Republic of Sudan has not made unity attractive to its citizens. In fact it hasn’t made the Sudanese state attractive. It does not have a moral case to argue against those citizens who wish to try their luck through self-determination.
Dear Khalid Al Nur
isn’t it the most impossible dilemma? Nobody in his sane mind wants other people to continue suffering from an opressive regime, and at the same time it seems utterly undesirable to allow the world to splinter into countless ethnic states.
Apart from the moral argument that you mention, there are so many things to consider when self-determination is defined as forming an independent state. I mentioned representation, borders, minorities, and I would add resources and recognisiton.
The problems mentioned by Abd al-Wahab in reference to Darfur are mainly a matter of representation: who is representing who – what is the legitimacy of a party or movement that strives for independence?
Looking at Kosovo for example, where the international community intervened on behalf of an opressed people, anyone might think twice about calling for independence. A recent report about minority rights in Kosovo said many minorities are leaving because of discrimination. Economically the country is in a mess – partly because it has not been widely recognised internationally. It has tremendous debts that it will never be able to repay. Drugs trafficing and human trafficing pose huge problems and there simply is no capacity to maintain order, if only because weapons are so readily available.
All in all there might be many moral grounds to argue against ‘people trying their luck’ through self-determination. Representation, borders, minorities, resources, recognition… all these issues have impact on the fate of ‘the people’.
Pehaps that is what Abd al-Wahab referred to when he quoted Mill. Is there any chance that – in this case, as we discuss Kordofan – the Nuba would be able to solve all the issues mentioned above? Abd al-Wahab obviously does not think so, but others might beg to to differ?
As a Sudanese from Khartoum, and politically marginalized myself, I will bet although only three Arabized tribes/peoples have the highest stakes in political power in the Sudan, and they amount to only 15% of the population of the Sudan; The rest of the people of the North, East or Central, exluding the Nuba and Ingessanah mountains, will not raise arms against Khartoum, regardless. The people of North, East and Central in total are 65% of the population according to many agencies besides the last census(Excluding Nuba and Ingessanah mountains).
They share a common history of 7000 years, a long history they don’t share with the South of Sudan and the non arabized Darfurians and areas adjacent to those two troubled regions of the the Sudan. Our common history with non Arabized Darfur and South Sudan started in 1820.
That long history shared between the different tribes of the North, Central, East, thorugh intermixing of peoples through very long times will make it impossible to repeat the same extreme scenes of Darfur and South Sudan in those relatively stable areas today.