Good Enough Report on Chad
There is a good “˜Enough’ report on Chad published this week, identifying the absence of any political process in Chad save the power calculations of Idris Déby as the weakest link in the Darfur peace process.
It is widely recognized that there cannot be peace in Darfur without peace between Sudan and Chad, and nor can there be a viable settlement in Chad while war continues in Darfur. At first glance there is symmetry to the Chad-Sudan proxy war: each government is backing the military opposition of the other. Underneath it is more complicated.
While Sudan possesses viable (if troubled) processes which are grappling with its national political challenges, there is nothing comparable in Chad. The NCP is an organized party with a constituency and a substantive agenda””whether one agrees with it is a different question. The Chadian MPS is a patronage machine which has no constituency beyond the Presidential circle and no program other than staying in power. The Sudanese state has institutions, albeit weak and politicized ones. Chad has no state worthy of the name. Stabilization of the Sudanese Government of National Unity is a worthwhile goal in itself, as it will enable CPA implementation to proceed. Chad has no civil political process and the president has no succession plans. Stabilizing Déby in power can only buy time. There are two major scenarios: either Déby leaves the scene (through death or putsch) or he is forced by stronger powers (such as a combination of France, Libya and the U.S.) to broaden his power base.
The asymmetry is also present in the relationship of each government to its sponsored insurgent. For Sudan, backing the Chadian rebels is simply a matter of security against an external threat. But the N’djamena-JEM relationship is not only sponsorship of a foreign insurgent, but also a domestic political-military relationship that is fundamental to Déby’s survival. While Khartoum can stand down the Chadian forces based in Darfur, Déby cannot instruct JEM to remain on the defensive and still less can he disarm the movement.
Control of state power in Chad is all-or-nothing and is intimately and intricately linked to the political position of the Zaghawa, who are a small minority with disproportionate power and wealth. If the Zaghawa have no access state power, either in N’djamena or Khartoum, their entire collective standing will be imperiled. Déby and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim have locked themselves into a high-stakes gamble in which each requires the other but neither can control the other.
It’s unfortunate that Chadian politics is still presented as a sideshow to Darfur. Chad is an important enough country in its own right.
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After reading your write-up, I was disappointed. I found the report to be “good enough†but not as good as your posting implied. It was not in-depth. Perhaps you should have entitled it “Fair Enough” as it was balanced. Especially the recommendations are pro forma and of no value. Had the recommendations been honest to the substance of the report then “Enough†would have found itself making recommendations which contradicted its Darfur campaign which is premised on the guilt of Khartoum for everything that goes wrong in Darfur and Chad.
What it reveals is the first stages of the same contradiction which beset ICG and which in due course gave birth to “Enough†as a breakaway group, which is the phenomenon of excellent analysis alongside prepackaged recommendations which bear increasingly less and less relationship to the analysis. This, one expects, will be the fate of “Enough.†Because of its rates of pay and its profile it will attract good analysts who will produce “Good Enough” and “Fair Enough” reports. But in due course they will become increasingly disenchanted with the fact that their conclusions and recommendations have all been drafted in advance regardless of their expertise, while the “Enough” leaders continue to make their high-profile statements without reference to the in-house or commissioned expertise. Inevitably there will be an internal dispute leading to the organization splitting or abandoning one part of its self-defined mandate.
Is it possible that the Chadian connection is the missing link which explains the Bassolé enigma? Which we may define as the confidence expressed by Paris and London in a man who has in a year proven solely that he is completely unsuited to the job he has been given. I ask this question because as with many after this last year I am bemused by the choice of Bassolé and not only that, also his strategy, which bears the hallmark of a man used to operating in the shadows. The elevation of Khalid Ibrahim to be the single spokesman for Darfour was an approach that made sense only in the context of a hidden counterpart. Could it be that a secret deal has been cut by Paris, Doha, and Tripoli, to establish a new order in the Chad Basin-eastern Sahel, and this yet-to-be explained entente is the explanation for the Bassolé strategy? When all the impossible theses have been disproven, what remains, however improbable, can only be the truth. Could this be the answer of the Bassolé enigma?
Dear Alex
The impact of Darfur problem on Chad must not be underestimated. The overall analysis of the Sudanese/Chadian asymmetry needs to be addressed more thoroughly than just a cliché. Unlike Chad Sudan is a make of English colonial system well recognised for establishing state institutions and good governing in its colonies compared to its French counterpart? It is therefore the English left Sudan with better established state institutions and infra structures relative to Chad. The NCP has inherited some of those institutions, albeit their successive weaknesses by the succeeding regimes. On the other hand Chadians were left with little established state institutions and infrastructure to survive let alone flourish. President Idriss Deby is trying his best to overcome such formidable obstacles against all odds.
While the political power in Sudan remains firmly under the control of three tribes since independence, Chadian Presidency rotated among different tribes in the country and. All the major ministries in Chad are well distributed and not held by the Zaghawa tribe. The existence in Chad of an elected parliament however week it may be will eventually lead to established form of institutions and accountability. Present weakness of MPS must not be taken to blame the president. It is only a matter of time before we see strong parliamentary authority
Sudan enjoyed some degrees of state security and political stability even during the war in the South while Chad continues to suffer ongoing insecurity and political struggles long before Idriss Deby came into power. During those years Sudanese political forces strengthened their organisations and promoted some political systems. The emergence of the National Islamic Front remains an example. Chad did not have such chances.
As far as the relation between JEM and Chad is concerned it should be born in mind that JEM had not suffered as much from other countries as it had from the Chadian regime of Idriss Deby. During the first few years of the insurgency JEM remained sandwiched between Sudan government and a hostile Chad and yet it survived and came out stronger. JEM has over 50 offices worldwide and its office in Chad is one of them. Like all foreign relations there are better or best relations with certain countries base on mutual interests. JEM is not locked in any position to control a sovereign state such as Chad. On the other hand JEM will not be subject for control by others.
Dear Tahir,
JEM’s political position vis-a-vis the government of Chad is entirely understandable and your statements reflect that. It is quite correct for you to note that in the Darfur conflict Idriss Deby was at first friendly to Khartoum and tried to undermine or split JEM. This changed in 2005/06. The stability and modest democratization of Chad under the MPS was halted and reversed by the fallout from Darfur. The character of the Deby government has now changed. It is also correct that the Chadian government has rotated among different groups. However, this has not been a democratic or consensual process by any means.
Like it or not, JEM is now a political player of significance in both Sudan and Chad. In Chad, the relationship is, as you write, one of mutual interest in the security and political sphere. In the Sudanese arena, JEM has many more options than in Chad, and has a more complex agenda. Power is of course the aim. Not necessarily control of sovereign power but sufficient power to safeguard and advance a political agenda which is both a grand vision for the future of the country and also involves the interests of JEM’s constituency.
At present, the political dynamics of Sudan are located at the national level, and this is where JEM’s agenda resides, correctly. Unfortunately, the means have not yet been provided for JEM to play constructive politics at this level.
Events over the last 18 months have made JEM the most prominent political-military force in Darfur opposed to the Sudan Government. The favourable circumstances may not prevail, especially given the continued implementation of the CPA and the countdown to self-determination in southern Sudan. A moment is fast approaching in which the JEM leadership will need to make a bold decision to shift the centre of gravity of its strategy to engagement in Sudan in a way that is fundamentally political. I hope that the opportunity and framework for enabling this to happen will quickly be in place.
Dear Tahir,
much as I sympathize with JEM’s cause and admire the principles and commitment of you and your members, the more you sound like an ambassador for the Deby regime, the less credible your political critique of Sudan becomes. The injustices and inequities you eloquently describe for Sudan and the NCP are found just as much, or even more so, in the case of Chad and the Deby regime. We all understand the political reasons why JEM has made its pact with N’djamena but there is no need to become Deby’s spokesman as well. Don’t expose yourself to the double standards critique when you don’t need to.
Be alert to the shifting tides of politics. If Enough is publishing this report, now, consider what it prefigures. President Deby has had a very easy ride internationally because of the demonization of the NCP regime. If that is going to change, you are well advised to be ahead of the curve. JEM belongs in Sudan not Chad.
Jibreel
After writing my comment yesterday I read JEM’s attack on General Gratian, which looks to all the world like the flailing of a desperate leadership. After all the hard military and political work that went into positioning JEM as the leading representative of the movements, in Doha and in Washington, this is not a good signal. I also see that after spending a year betting on JEM to deliver, Bassole is now running to Libya to meet with the Tripoli group, again following in the footsteps of Mbeki, and the Libyans are promising to deliver all the movements for a meeting to take place before Ramadhan. JEM’s place in the sun is slipping away.
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