Sudan: No Peace With a Hostile U.S.
Are there any hopes for a Sudan peace brokered by the U.S? A focus on the historically hostile trio of Sudan: Susan Rice, Roger Winter, and John Prendergast gives us the answer for what will happen if their views prevail.
Reading the Washington Post interview with U.S. Ambassador to the U.N, Ms Susan Rice on Tuesday, September 22, 2009, has triggered different feelings and memories to me with regards to the potential of having any lasting peace in Sudan based on U.S efforts.
In her answer to a question on U.S. approach to Darfur, Susan Rice said:
“I think I’ve been very, very clear about the concerns that the US has had and continues to have about the situation in Darfur and indeed Sudan overall. It’s a very important priority for the president and we’re all spending a good deal of time both on the policy formulation and on its implementation now. [Ret. Air Force Maj. Gen.] Scott Gration is doing the very practical nuts and bolts work of trying to push implementation of the CPA which is vitally important and to try to respond initially to the outrageous decision of the Government of Sudan to kick out the international NGOs and to mitigate its consequences which I think he helped do quite admirably and effectively and he’s been working to try to unify the rebel groups and create the foundations for a successful resumption of negotiations between the government and the Darfurians, which is what is necessary at the end of the day to deal with the underlying sources of conflict”.
Despite this endorsement of Gration’s approach, in reality Susan Rice maintains a very hostile and aggressive attitude towards Sudan. She has repeatedly described the conflict in Sudan as “genocide” and reflected strong support to the ICC decision, despite of the position of the U.S. of general refusal to support for the Court. An interagency feud within the president’s national security advisers became public, when Gration told reporters, on his return from a visit to Sudan, that Sudan’s government was no longer engaging in a “coordinated” campaign of mass murder against Darfurian civilians. Two days earlier, Rice had said that Sudan was engaged in a campaign of genocide in Darfur. (The Washington Post, July 31, 2009).
I have no doubt whatsoever that one current trend of the U.S. policy remains a hostile takeover of Sudan. The architects of this policy are close to taking control of the U.S. policy direction. The U.S. is already involved in resolving the two key outstanding issues of the CPA, namely the elections in the North and the referendum in the South, and this faction in Washington is gearing itself in full towards two sets of goals, for the South: ensuring the separation of the South in the coming referendum, getting the oil contracts, and positioning U.S. in the region by embracing the newest independent African State of the South of Sudan; and for the North: creating as much chaos as possible and making all possible designs to contain or topple Beshir’s regime. This has always been the agenda of the trio who maintains great hostility to Sudan and who kept working together on this agenda for quite a long time. So, who are the members of this trio, and what are the reasons behind their hostility and hatred to Sudan?
Susan Rice: The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N: Susan Rice has long advocated for a tough stance on Sudan, which she has repeatedly stated is responsible for genocide. In 1997, as a Brookings Institute scholar, she testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to advocate in favour of U.S. military intervention if the actions of the Sudanese government in Darfur continue.
This would not be a first for Susan Rice, who in her previous position in the State Department under President Bill Clinton, was implicated in an Iran-Contra-Style caper in Africa. She was deeply involved in the wars in the Great Lakes and her current position on Sudan stems from those days. In the 1990s, the U.S. was involved in two overlapping clandestine operations. First, was the covert supply of arms to the SPLA of (Late) John Garang, which has waged an unsuccessful but nevertheless extremely destructive and destabilizing war against the Sudan government since 1983. The second involved covert military logistical aid to the so-called rebel forces arrayed against the government of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo, an operation being run directly out of the U.S. State Department with the oversight of Susan Rice. On the one hand, Rice herself was engaged in highly public peace efforts, while on the other, she was ensuring that American private contractors gave logistical support and training to belligerents in the same war.
In an article in The Atlantic issue of September 2001 entitled “Genocide Bystanders”, journalist Samantha Power indicated that at an interagency teleconference in late April 1994, Susan Rice, a rising star on the NSC by then and who worked under Richard Clarke, stunned a few of the officials present when she asked, “If we use the word ‘genocide’ and are seen as doing nothing, what will be the effect on the November [congressional] election?” Lieutenant Colonel Tony Marley remembers the incredulity of his colleagues at the State Department. “We could believe that people would wonder that,” he says, “but not that they would actually voice it.” Rice does not recall the incident but concedes, “If I said it, it was completely inappropriate, as well as irrelevant.”
A commentator on the Blog (Weekly Standard, December 1, 2008) said: “If one believes that the United Nations is a hopelessly ineffective institution and wants to make sure it stays that way, then perhaps Obama has chosen an appropriate emissary: a woman who prefers to ponder the political implications of inaction — they’re going to love her at Turtle Bay”.
During her stint at the State Department (1997-2001), it was widely believed that Rice’s closest adviser on Africa was Roger Winter, former director of the U.S. Committee on Refugees (now U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigration), and then deputy head of USAID. He was taken on to promote his two favored causes: the RPF in Rwanda and the Great Lakes, and the SPLM in Sudan. In September 1997, Winter, along with John Prendergast of the U.S. National Security Council (by then), declared Rice to be one of their “team” to lead the United States into support of a war against the government of Sudan, to be waged on the ground by the Ugandan, Eritrean and allied armies.
Similar to the calls of Susan Rice for military intervention in Sudan, On September 17, 1997, Roger Winter, spoke at a conference of the U.S. Institute for Peace, and demanded full-scale backing from the U.S. government for a war “to bring down the Khartoum government” in Sudan, adding, “even though I know it will bring about a humanitarian catastrophe.” He reassured the assembled African policymakers present, however, that U.S. troops would not be involved in the effort; this would be a proxy war using Ugandan and Eritrean troops against Sudan, with U.S. weapons and logistical and training support.
Previously, Winter had been one of the primary apologists of the RPF guerrilla war, backed by Washington, that led to catastrophies that caused the loss millions of lives in the Great Lakes of Africa since 1990. Winter acted as a spokesman for the RPF and their allies, and he appeared as a guest on major U.S. television networks such as PBS and CNN, as well as facilitating RPF access to other U.S. news outlets. During his tenure, Winter pushed for a policy of politicization of relief agencies, and away from their expected stance of neutrality in other people’s conflicts.
Roger Winter is also a staunch supporter of U.S. Rep. Donald Payne, one of the leading U.S. Democrats who has pressing for action to “stop genocide” in Darfur. Payne sponsored the Darfur Genocide Accountability Act and he was arrested in June 2001, along with John Eibner, director of Christian Solidarity International (CSI), for protesting against the Sudan government. Christian Solidarity International is famous through its continuous attempts to refuel religious tensions in Sudan, and also for its controversial role in booming the “slave trade” in South Sudan by coming as a buyer injecting big money into the business and hence creating more demand and business opportunities.
The third member of the trio, John Prendergast, also served on the Clinton Africa team where he tried to bend the rules of U.S. foreign policy to provide covert assistance to the SPLA. He tried and failed to get a post in the Bush Africa team, and instead went into the NGO sector, first with the International Crisis Group and then with “Enough.” Today he is a co-chair with the “Enough Project” and serves on the Board of the “Save Darfur Coalition”.
Although Prendergast is officially out of government, he is playing beltway politics like a seasoned professional. His ambition is manifest: it is to get rid of General Gration who he considers too dovish and replace him with someone truly dedicated to the unfinished business of the Clinton White House””perhaps himself. Following the recent trip to Sudan by General Gration, Prendergast said the north was trying to delay implementation of the deal and its “strategic objective is to never hold the referendum.” He is quoted by AP, Cairo, as saying, “If the referendum is not held on time, there will be a return to war,” (September 09, 2009).
Meanwhile Roger Winter has become an “adviser” to the SPLA, publicly promoting southern separatism if necessary by force, with a war to topple the current government of Omer El Beshir.
The most favorable explanation for why Susan Rice takes her militant anti-Khartoum line is because she is so scared of allowing “another Rwanda” to happen on her watch.
In Sudan we have a common saying: those who experienced a snake bite, easily get scared of spiral rope. My only question here is: what is all this about? Is this trio traumatized by the U.S. inaction that resulted in the Rwanda Genocide, or are they experiencing a guilt complex of their possible implication and contribution to the horrible events of the genocide the destabilization of this part of Africa? I have no fancy to ask my old questions on whether or not there is a serious tendency of shaping a U.S. policy towards peace in Sudan that is derived from concerns over the wellbeing of the Sudanese people, I would be quite naive to even entertain the idea of asking such a question. My real worries and concerns are rather related to the intentions of this trio that brings U.S. policy makers, advocacy groups, intelligence and economic interests together for compromising the unity of Sudan and shattering the meager hopes of a lasting peace in our troubled country.
It is really excellent analysis. I do agree with what you have concluded to. It seems this trio is feeling guilt of what had happened in mid 1990s in the Great Lakes region. There is no any reason for this campaign against Sudan apart from the guilt feeling. At the time the US under Obama administration concentrated on peace efforts to end conflicts in Sudan those spoilers are working very hard to avert this trend. I may also ask these naive questions also what are they aiming for? Is it to topple the government of President Bashir? What means they intended to use is it by using force and destructive means or through democratic process? if the latter they should wait outcomes of the coming elections to see what the Sudanese people will decide and choose. It seems their objective is to destabilize Sudan as a country through disguise means such as targeting the government at this critical juncture of the Sudanese history.
It is with a great sadness that I have come to conclude that I believe in the accuracy of much of what Ahmed Hassan has written in his post â€œNo Peace With a Hostile U.S.â€
It is my understanding that John Prendergast enjoys a great deal of influence on the current U.S. Administration regarding policy towards Sudan. And I doubt if there is a need to review – to the readers of this Blog – his position on the Government of Sudan.
Turning to Roger Winter and Susan Rice, I would like to point first to a New York Times article entitled: â€œThe Man for a New Sudanâ€ written by Eliza Griswold, a New America Foundation fellow and published June 15, 2008. This lengthy article follows some of Winterâ€™s activities in Abyei in 2008 and gives background information on him. One portion of the article affirms Winterâ€™s relationship with Susan Rice and states:
â€œHis colleague Susan Rice, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs under President Bill Clinton, watched Winterâ€™s views evolve. â€˜Iâ€™ve seen him be an advocate when I was a policy maker, and when I was on the outside, he was somebody on the inside we could trust to do the right thing,â€™ she told me. â€˜Roger has been a consistent, passionate, principled advocate at a time when we had reason to doubt that the Bush administration was really engaged in these issues.â€™ On Sudan, she added, â€˜people of all political, religious and racial stripes view Roger as the compassâ€™s true north.â€™â€
Another portion of the article illustrates Winterâ€™s hostility towards the current government. Some of the words in this section of the article are those of the writer, but it is hard to imagine (given the tone of the article) that these words would have been included if Winter had been uncomfortable with their usage. Referring to the current administration of the Government of Sudan, the article states:
â€œItâ€™s this murderous governance that Winter is determined to end. â€˜Iâ€™m not opposed to engagement,â€™ he said. â€˜The problem is the way weâ€™re doing this and the atmosphere which surrounds it.â€™ In Sudan, he argues, â€˜thereâ€™s a good guy and a bad guy.â€™ As he sees it, he sides with the good guys. He doesnâ€™t hang out in the middle. â€˜I guess thereâ€™s a role for that,â€™ he said. â€˜Itâ€™s just not mine.â€™
The article also states:
â€œHis job is to shout himself hoarse until someone listens to what heâ€™s saying about the worsening crisis in Abyei and the failure to do enough about it. â€˜Thatâ€™s what an advocate does,â€™ he said. â€˜No matter how good the government does, youâ€™re always goosing them to do better. Otherwise, why does anybody need you?â€™â€
This portion of the article clearly illustrates the point raised by Annette Jansen in her discussion of the need of human rights activists for crisis in her previous post on this blog: Drawn by Disasters: Why the Human Rights Movement Struggles with Good News Storiesâ€ where she states: “Without all references to war, struggle and heroism, without the legal, moral and military power it has to its availability, human rights would not be the popular and influential worldview it is today.”
While one newspaper article can not be expected to capture the sum of any individual, I believe that it does point out some key aspects of Winterâ€™s views towards the current Government of Sudan.
With regard to Susan Rice, one might consider an article that appeared in the November 20, 1998 issue of Executive Intelligence Review which alleges her opposition to the Khartoum government as early as the 1990s. The EIR, as it is called is a Lyndon LaRouche publication, and that fact may give some pause concerning its accuracy. The article is attributed to â€œAn EIR Investigative Teamâ€ and titled: â€œRice caught in Iran-Contra-style capers in Africa.â€ The article states in part:
â€œThe parallel to the Bush-North operations is precise: Incontrovertible evidence accumulated by EIR demonstrates that the same extra-governmental “assets” used by North in widespread illegal narcotics- and arms-trafficking, are channeling arms and military aid into Central Africa. In this new “Central African” supply operation, standing in for the drug-smuggling gangsters of the Nicaraguan Contra operation, are the African “rebels” fighting the governments of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and any other Central African nation targeted by British intelligence’s leading warlord in the region, Ugandan dictator Yoweri Museveni.
â€œThe two leading operatives who have been caught red-handed in such dirty operations toward Central Africa are U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice, and Roger Winter, executive director of the U.S. Committee on Refugees.â€
Regardless to the degree of credibility given to the EIR article, it is problematic that Susan Rice would, as late as April 5, 2009, state that there is “ongoing genocide” in Darfur, when even in the worst days of the crimes against humanity occuring in Darfur, the UN, the EU and the AU all came to the conclusion that the crimes committed were not “genocide.”
In response to a question posed by George Stephanopoulos on the ABC Network’s program “This Week” Secretary Rice stated in part:
“The president and the vice president, secretary, have expressed grave concern about the ongoing genocide that has preceded this latest action and will be looking at the full range of steps to try to prevent further killing and dying, and to support the north-south peace agreement that is also critically important to implement.”
It is difficult to find the logic in such a statement, and where logic fails, it is not unreasonable to suspect alternative motives for making such statements.
I cannot say, as does Ahmed Hassan, that I have â€œno doubt whatsoever that one current trend of the U.S. policy remains a hostile takeover of Sudan.â€ However I do believe that such a conclusion is not unreasonable.
With reference to the Clinton administration policies towards Sudan, readers may want to refer to this posting from November 2008: http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2008/11/19/recalling-the-secret-wars-of-the-1990s/ .
Dear Mohamed and Oscar,
Many thanks for your responses.
I definitely agree with you that it is indeed a very sad reality. I will try to respond to some of your question here.
I believe that the main reasons for this groupâ€™s policy towards Sudan could have some ideological but also strong economic and political grounds.
The trio definitely like to see an ally â€“US-Backed independent state in South Sudan as opposed to a North Sudan that is adopting a controversial political Islam ideologies, blocking vital US interest in the area, and sidelining with US traditional competitors.
The agenda for the north of Sudan are either to have a pro US government or Incarnation. Pro US means, in simple words, without political Islam agenda, supportive to global war on terror, and presenting less human security risks to the North, limiting competitors presence in and influence on Sudan (China, France), and giving access to the exploration of oil.
Means for destabilization: The SPLA and the South Sudan government and by increased pressure from neighbouring Ethiopia and Eritrea. Mounting support to Darfur repels and ensuring a protracted political conflict process by manipulating pro-US Darfuri movements, the US is already advocating for a new umbrella for Darfur movements similar to the NDA for negotiation. Careful play with the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile cards to ensure presence of allies in these areas as well that can be used as agents for stabilization or destabilization. You can also add the current political parties conference hosted by the government of South Sudan which could be another way of aorgaizing a Pro-US change in the North in relation to the coming elections.
There are many reasons to believe that the trio not only advocated for the military intervention in Sudan, but actually systematically promoted and initiated that intervention in the 1990s through various means:
1. Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) which was portrayed as a conflict resolution and peace building mechanism was in fact a tool for justifying the use of military intervention to promote peace. The Eritrean â€“ Ethiopian border conflict of 1998-2000 shattered this project with two of the â€œNew Genreâ€ of African leaders (Issias Afewrki and Meles Zenawi) engaged in a bloody border armed conflict.
2. 1994 Eritrea and Sudan engaged in an open conflict resulting in the severing of the diplomatic relations between the two countries and the closure of the Sudanese Embassy in Asmara towards the end of 1994. The sets the stage for many developments to come.
3. 1995 witnessed the creation of the Sudanese National Democratic Alliance (NDA), hosted by one of the leaders of the GHAI in Asmara, and was amazingly and boldly given the office premises of the then kicked-out Sudanese Embassy in Asmara.
4. In 1997 the support to the NDA was drastically increased, resulting in increased military operations, and the liberation in the same years of Togan, Hamishoreb, and Garora areas along the eastern borders of Sudan with Eritrean by the main faction of the NDA, the New Sudan Units of the SPLA/M and the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), SAF was initially thought to be a replica EPLF (Eritrean Peopleâ€™s Liberation Front) for the Eritrean, and replica SPLA for the North of Sudan, for the Americans as the first nortern armed group, but later on SAF disappointedly proved to be severely suffering from corrupt leadership and infiltration and serious associations with the NIF government in Khartoum which defeated the purpose of its establishment.
5. Along the Sudan border, and in the same year, 1997, SAF and SPLA liberated Menza and Yagur and Yabeshir on the Blue Nile region.
6. With the eruption of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the logistical support and the command lines of military operations of the NDA between Ethiopia and Eritrea suffered a lot, and brought to a relative halt that significant advance of the NDA on the Sudanese territories.
7. Both the involvement of Roger Winter (through the SPLA/M), and Prendergast (through SAF) were quite visible. At a certain point, the US Administration was entertaining the idea of actually extending operation lifeline Sudan (OLS) to the Blue Nile and Eastern Sudan areas controlled by the NDA.
8. It is widely believed that the developments of the NDA in the Eastern Front and the Blue Nile of Sudan, were a result to a great extent to the logistical and political support of the Clinton Admin, covertly orchestrated through the trio.
9. It is also a matter of fact that most of the Darfur associated movements received initial training and support in the mid and late 1990s through arrangements with the NDA leadership and the GHAI leaders in the Horn with a clear purpose destabilizing the Khartoum government. The trend of the support increased drastically, however, with the leakage of the news regarding the Oil in Darfur and also, the seriousness that seemed to take shape regarding the South-North peace agreement as Darfur could continue to provide and access to destabilizing the North and to negotiating with the GoS if the peace between the North and South is achieved.
10. According to a report published in Africa Security Review Vol 7, No. 1, 1998, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda received over $20 million worth of arms from the US on behalf of the liberation movements in Sudan in 1996, and in late1997 of US marines to train the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) for future missions in Africa, added another nerve-wracking military equation for Sudan.
11. As far as Darfur is concerned, there are two issues that i would like to stress here:
11.1 France Geopolitical Interests: Iran, Iraq, Libya and France have all provided military and intelligence support to Khartoum during the 1990s on the South-North Conflict. Garang received military support and protected border sanctuaries from Museveni in Uganda, with backing from the U.S. It wasnâ€™t long before Franceâ€™s worst nightmare became a reality: through low-intensity conflict, a pro-U.S. regime was installed in South Sudan. Responding to U.S. infiltration of on the continent the French Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieur (DGSE) began collaborating with Sudanese intelligence in the mid-1990â€™s; Sudanese intelligence was provided with state-of-the-art satellite imagery pinpointing SPLA bases in South Sudan. The French also provided secure communications equipment and listening devices. According to one French human rights group, Survie: “Satellite photographs were handed out so that the Sudan population in the south could be bombarded. Keith Harmon Snow, mentions in the Z Magazine, February 2005, that according to intelligence insider â€œWayne Madsenâ€, Khartoum agreed to keep its Darfur province, which bordered on Chad, free of rebels fighting against the pro-French Chadian government. In return, France agreed to pressure its ally, the government of Central Africa Republic, to permit Sudanese troops to cross its territory to attack SPLA guerrillas in South Sudan.
11.2. Global Research, February 7, 2007 states â€œAny rational examination of the Westâ€™s hunger for oil would lead one to conclude that it is precisely the existence of sanctions “forbidding” U.S. oil companies from getting at the oil that is behind the conflagration. This is not something “conveniently forgotten” but the very raison dâ€™etrefor the deep distrust of the “Save Darfur!” movement and the advocates, like Mel Middleton and Dr. Eric Reeves and John Prendergast, who are spearheading itâ€
Until April 2005, it was said that whatever oil deposits existed in Darfur were confined to its south-eastern corner. However, new seismographic studies brought a surprise. On April 19, 2005, Mohamed Siddig, a spokesman for the Sudan Energy Ministry, announced that a new high-yield well had been drilled in North Darfurâ€”several hundred kilometres northwest of the existing fields. Seismographic studies indicated that a huge basin of oil, expected to yield up to 500,000 barrels of crude per day, lay in the area. This Darfur discovery effectively doubled Sudan’s oil reservesâ€¦ Perhaps as astonishing as the oil discovery, reported in brief (Sudan Tribune, issue of Tuesday, 19April, 2005/ Reuters), was that it was not picked up by the world press.” June 2005 saw oil companies from India, France, Malaysia, China, Great Britain, Japan, and Sweden flocking to sign contracts in Sudan, while U.S. companies were officially sidelined by the 1997 sanctions.
On both left and right of the Sudanese political spectrum equally there is a proclivity to assume conspiracies driven by major but obscure political and material interest. I do not find the “oil in Darfur” explanation for U.S. policy remotely convincing and I refer readers to the earlier discussion on this topic on this blog.
The key issue correctly identified by Ahmed Hassan in this comment is the U.S. policy of regime change by proxy, and the neglected role of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda in this equation. So when Mr. Prendergast says over and over again that he is not proposing sending the 82nd Airborne to Sudan he is deliberately obscuring the point that the days of direct U.S. military intervention in Africa were ended in October 1993 in Mogadishu, while the alternative strategy of policing Africa using Africans was developed in its place. There is simply no way on earth that the Rice-Winter-Prendergast policy for the Horn of Africa or the Great Lakes could be achieved, under Clinton or under subsequent administrations, without the use of military force. The policy challenge for Washington has been to identify and develop the appropriate modalities of force, an approach which has repeatedly and inevitably led into the crisis engendered by the failure of proxies to do their master’s bidding, or at least their tendency to use their military assets and licence to pursue their own interests as well. In this regard the story of the Sudan Alliance Forces is instructive as it shows how the progressive element in Sudanese politics was irreducibly compromised by its dealings with foreign sponsors, in this case Eritrea and the U.S. In some ways it would be preferable to deal with the American Leviathan directly than to have it hiding itself behind local proxies.
I have very much enjoyed the recent, well thought out, comments to this Article by both Ahmed Hassan and Abd al-Wahab Abdalla. I find Ahmed Hassan’s comments extremely enlightening and thought provoking. And I believe that Abd al-Wahab Abdalla raises a very valid challenge to the theory that the politics of oil drive much of the U.S. foriegn policy towards Sudan.
In response to Abd al-Wahab Abdalla’s comments about the concern over the politics of oil, I would like to say that it has been my understanding, from discussions about Sudan with representatives of the U.S. oil industry that a great deal of effort has been made by the oil industry to have the sanctions lifted (at least in regards to oil). Some argue that since the sanctions do not apply to gum arabic, the sanctions are not absolute and therefore oil could be an exception just as easily as gum arabic.
During the George W. Bush years, the White House was feeling pressure from two of its significant support groups. Oil men wanted to get into Sudan and the Christian “right” wanted to obliterate the Bashier government and insisted on keeping the sanctions in place. Bush kept promising the oil interests that things would eventually be worked out for them, but the constant pressure from the Christian fundamentalists – (keeping in mind that the Darfur activists in the U.S. kept Sudan in the news as deerving of sanctions) proved to be too much for the White House and the Republicians to disregard.
That being said, I would like to add that your points about military intervention by proxy is a very important point to keep in mind.
Dear Abd Al-Wahab Abdalla,
Thank you very much for your response, and I also want you to know that I am an addict reader of your interesting postings and surgery-precision analysis.
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said “the moral arc of the universe is long but it bends towards justice”, however, I canâ€™t stop thinking and wondering over and over again if this is true in the case of the U.S politics. I just guess that, may be that was a wishful thinking from Dr. King, for something he aspired to be true, and not of a thing that he really believe does exist.
I like to read sometimes for Adam Neiman, Founder and CEO of No Sweat Apparel. Adam is a controversial American entrepreneur of socially-conscious consumerism and who also claims to be advocating a Middle East peace through his business ventures in Israel and Palestine, but that is another issue.
â€œI used to think it was as absurd to say that nothing was a conspiracy as to say that everything is a conspiracyâ€. Adam Neiman wrote on the â€œHuffington Post yesterday, September 30, 2009. â€œThat was before developing a thorough understanding of the absurdity of existence–especially in the political realm. It now seems altogether possible, even probable, that both statements could be simultaneously true. “Conspiracy” is the elephant in the living room of America politics.â€ Adam continued to say. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-neiman/clintons-vast-right-wing_b_305503.html
Adam also mentioned another important point in his article that, with two political assassinations in 1968 U.S that shaped the modern American politics and which passed without â€œsane and frank discussion of the political conspiracyâ€, is considered a significant reason why â€œthe U.S. politics has grown increasingly unhinged ever sinceâ€.
I take your point regarding the contribution of the Oil in the Sudan-US matter, but similar to Adam, I would say that â€œI think it is equally absurd to say that the U.S. Policy and interests in Sudan have nothing to do with Oil, as to say that it is all about Oil.
As for the paid role and crisis of the left and the new Sudan forces, I would prefer to tackle that in more details in another article, hopefully quite soon.