Race the Darkness
The referendum on national unity scheduled for 2011 is an existential crisis for Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP). This article examines the danger of war in the coming months.
Outlook for the NCP
The NCP is in a unique position. The most lucrative oil regions are along the north/south border — ground zero for serious ethnic strife. [1] Neither side possesses sufficient capability to police the 2,000km line-of-contact — a scenario which invites misbehavior. [2] Given Khartoum’s historical destabilization of neighboring Chad, and the tendency of its security apparatus to conduct what is essentially freebooting, one should expect frequent skirmishing between proxy militias in the event of secession, whether or not a wider war immediately erupts. [3] The thorny problems of “hot pursuit,” and localized violence offering pretexts for northern “oil-grabbing” and southern assistance to rebels on Sudan’s peripheries, may bedevil the region for years to come.
Northern elites have much to lose from southern secession. Three-quarters of Sudan’s oil is pumped in the South. [4] In 2005, Newsweek reported that two-fifths of total reserves were located in areas held by the SPLM/A. [5] According to Andrew Natsios, oil is central to governmental operations: “[It] allows the party to buy off opponents at home, guarantees a national growth rate of 12-14 percent a year, helps maintain prosperity in the Arab triangle, and supports a massive internal security apparatus.” [6] Present circumstances suggest that at least a temporary economic embargo is likely if the South secedes. Without prior or immediate assurances that substantial revenue-sharing will continue into the foreseeable future, war will probably result.
Currently, the NCP enjoys significant leverage. All oil is refined in, and shipped from, the North. Revenues are also managed in the capital, via a civil service dominated by the NCP. [7] Eddie Thomas warns that the present oil moneys “could be cut off in one month if the South left unilaterally.” [8] The potential impact would be enormous. About 98% of the GoSS budget is derived from its share of drilling in the Upper Nile and Unity states. [9] The SPLM is already working to reduce its vulnerability by building a refinery in Warrap and encouraging pipeline construction in Kenya. [10] Thus, if the NCP planned to contest secession, there would be no time like the present.
Turning South
Southern Sudan is committed to independence. Salva Kiir urges secession. [11] The Government of South Sudan (GoSS), based at Juba, is virtually autonomous, with a separate constitution, an oil economy worth about $800 million annually as of 2007, and an independent foreign policy. [12] Most Southerners support independence. [13] If embargoed, the South would quickly wither on the vine, becoming a virtual ward of the international community. Today, even with revenue streaming in, 1.3 million southerners are estimated to be food-insecure. [14] The South would probably guarantee revenue-sharing, and perhaps joint control of the fields themselves. If this fails to satisfy the NCP, however, war is the likely outcome.
Flush with wealth, the SPLA has expanded “in … both size and scope. [15] Juba has received limited defense assistance from the United States. [16] Kiir may request more, confident of support from both Christian conservatives on the Right, and Obama appointees like Susan Rice and Samantha Power.
Yet the balance of forces still favors Khartoum. The Military Balance indicates that the government purchased many heavy weapons since 2002, including 130 main battle tanks, and 45 light tanks, as well as an assortment of armored vehicles. [17] The Air Force deploys 63 fixed-wing combatants, including A-5 Fantan jets capable of ground attack. [18] Sources in Sudan indicate that the Sudan Armed Forces and Popular Defense Forces have approximately 450,000 men on the payroll with more than 150,000 in other paramilitary organizations, with SPLA figures ranging as high as 200,000-300,000. Precedent in Darfur may also indicate readiness to pass heavy weapons to tribal allies: Khartoum strengthened Arab militias to the extent of “a full paramilitary fighting force after 2003, with communications equipment as well as plentiful new arms, some artillery, and military advisers.” [19] Both sides should be expected to employ military contractors to provide technical and even combat services. [20]
War-Fighting
During the most recent fighting prior to the CPA, the government used tactics similar to those employed in Darfur, bombing civilian targets to discourage or punish local populations which might support the SPLA; attempting to garrison only oil infrastructure and “a few major towns;” and deploying tribal militias. The SPLA primarily conducted guerilla operations. [21] There were few conventional battles. [22] Neither side could consistently defend its oil infrastructure. [23] If the previous north/south conflict and the fighting in Darfur are any indication, then many of the strategies and tactics employed during a new war will be familiar. One might, however, expect the Sudanese Armed Forces to press its considerable advantage in equipment by launching concentrated early attacks on key population centers and oil fields. Alternatively, the SAF could employ its helicopters to add valuable strategic mobility on the battlefield — a method reportedly suggested by Russia in 2002. [24]
There are some limiting factors on Northern action. In mid-2001, the SPLA won a string of major victories contrary to the expectation of most observers. [25] Khartoum proved unable to consistently improve combat performance by buying new equipment, however, and the fighting indicated that its forces were ill-trained, badly-motivated, and poorly-led. The North is also likely to have a problem finding fresh troops, especially with new buildups for fighting in Darfur, where it deployed three divisions in 2007. [26] However, the South will have problems of its own: fighting between the Nuer and other southern tribes may distract the SPLA, while the military assistance of former allies in eastern and western Sudan is no longer assured with the South going its own way. [27]
Conclusions
Facing the potential for economic ruin, Khartoum will probably impose an economic embargo on an independent South to extract concessions, and may gamble on war. The military balance suggests a possibility of early Northern gains (assuming the SAF holds together), although a repeat of the “Toyota Wars” would be possible, depending on the assistance which Juba secured.
Matthew S. Sinn recently obtained an M.A. in International Security from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, where he focused closely on African security issues. Mr. Sinn is currently an Associate Analyst with the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute in Arlington, VA.
Notes
[1] “Investing in Tragedy: China’s Money, Arms, and Politics in Sudan,” Human Rights First, Stop Arms to Sudan, Background, China’s Arms Sales to Sudan, March 2008, p. 4.
[2] Edward Thomas, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Chatham House Report (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Chatham House, 2009), p. 28.
[3] See: Alex de Waal, “Sudan: The Turbulent State,” in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. de Waal, (Cambridge, Mass./London, U.K.: Global Equity Initiative/Justice Africa, 2007), pp. 4-5, 15, 19, 36
[4] Thomas, “Against the Gathering Storm,” pp. 14-15, 19.
[5] Alexandra Polier, “Sudan: A Catalyset for Peace,” 21 February 2005, http://www.newsweek.com/id/48576.
[6] Andrew S. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” Foreign Affairs, 87:3 (May/June 2008): 77-93, [electronic; no pagination].
[7] Thomas, “Against the gathering storm,” pp. 16, 18-20.
[8] Ibid., p. 28.
[9] James Gatdet Dak, “South Sudan to build its first refinery in Warrap state,” Sudan Tribune [online], 4 October 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32667.
[10] Ibid.; “Kenya, China mull massive corridor for Sudan oil: FT,” AFP, 15 October 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmyjd6bbuGSa5HQgpy3TBCJxmekw.
[11] “Sudan’s Kiir calls on Southerners to chose independence,” Sudan Tribune [online], 1 November 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32967.
[12] Thomas, “Against the Gathering Storm,” p. 9; Jonah Fisher, “Peace brings boom to south Sudan,” BBC News Online, 8 January 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6241259.stm; Mark Doyle, “DR Congo outsources its military,” BBC News Online, 27 February 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7910081.stm.
[13] “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis,” International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 50, 13 March 2008, p. 5.
[14] “UN needs over $50m to cover food gap in southern Sudan,” Sudan Tribune [online], 22 August 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32202
[15] Heba Aly, “Arms race, uneasy peace in Sudan,” The Christian Science Monitor, 12 November 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1112/p06s02-woaf.html.
[16] Natsios, “Beyond Darfur,” n.p.
[17] The Military Balance (London, UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2009), 1995-2008.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (London: Zed Books, 2008), p. 103.
[20] Simon Nicol, “Contractors recruiting Kenyan troops for eventual operations in South Sudan,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 26 March 2009.
[21] Prendergast, “God, Oil and Country,” pp. 15-116. On the war in Darfur, see: “Sudan: Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses in Darfur,” Amnesty International, AFR 54/139/2004, 16 November 2004, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/139/2004/en/41a51ade-d567-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/afr541392004en.pdf, p. 1; see also: Final report of the Panel of Experts as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1779 (2007), S/2008/647, p. 78.
[22] Prendergast, “God, Oil and Country,” pp. 116-117.
[23] Ibid., pp. 118-120.
[24] The Military Balance, 2002, 102:1 (London, UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 193.
[25] Prendergast, “God, Oil and Country,” pp. 117-118.
[26] On the exhaustion of manpower for the SAF c. 2002, see: Ibid., p. 117. On the recent deployment of SAF forces to Darfur, see: “War in Sudan’s Darfur ‘is over’,” BBC News [online], 27 August 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8224424.stm; “UNAMID warns of military build-up in Darfur,” Sudan Tribune [online], 20 October 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32839; “Final Report of the Panel Experts as request by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1779 (2007),” Reports by the Panel of Experts Submitted Through the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan, p. 13; “Final report of the Panel of Experts as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1713 (2006),” Reports by the Panel of Experts Submitted Through the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan, United Nations, S/2007/584, 3 October 2007, p. 3; “War in Sudan’s Darfur ‘is over’,” BBC News [online], 27 August 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8224424.stm; “UNAMID warns of military build-up in Darfur,” Sudan Tribune [online], 20 October 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32839.
[27] “160 Killed in Sudan Tribal Attack,” New York Times, 3 August 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/world/africa/04sudan.html?_r=1&ref=world; “Sudan cattle clashes ‘kill 750’,” BBC News [online], 26 March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7965309.stm; John Prendergaast, “God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan,” International Crisis Group, ICG Africa Report No. 39 (Brussels: ICG, 2002), p. 119; Prendergast, “God, Oil and Country,” pp. 119-120.
Matthew Sinn,
This is an interesting analysis of the potential military options and scenarios for the North. Hopefully the international community works to mitigate this.
Could you explain what you mean by: “The South would probably guarantee revenue-sharing, and perhaps joint control of the fields themselves.”
What is this claim based on? Why would they when they have no legitimate reason to if the oil-fields in question are within their geographic jurisdiction?
Lastly, I ask:
Most of the potential strategies and responses discussed here are based on the reaction to imminent secession premised on exclusively internal Sudanese developments. What about the EU and US, how they would react to developments, and how that would affect the NCP’s policy? The powers invariably have a significant impact on the NCP’s conduct in war. The following should be considered in reply to my question:
-The international pariah status of Pres. Omer Elbashir
-The renewal of US sanctions last weekend as a measure of laughable “incentives and disincentives” for peaceable unity or secession
-The continual branding of the NCP’s partial reform as inadequate as well as the unyielding policy of branding Sudan as a rogue nation-state which poses a threat to international/regional security
I ask this because, in the last decade, the NCP seems to be trying to ameliorate its diplomatic position with the superpowers and to woo American political and economic support. Their military conduct is not independent of how the international community views them. For example, the whole Darfur situation was ignited by the Bush administration’s tacit support for the GoS’s elimination of rebel activity in Darfur. Only after the vigilance of the international community did they ‘tone it down’.
The NCP has virtually no path towards legitimacy internationally and domestically (within an all-Northern population). Will that cause them to agree to mitigate the external and manage the internal by following a peaceable path?
In light of these and other competing internal/external interests what are your comments or refutations?
A war would be a disaster for all the Sudanese people, but the status quo of living as second class citizens is a disaster too, and if a third round of north-south war in Sudan is what is needed for south Sudan to gain our freedom, so be it. From the beginning of the second war, the real slogan of the south was “what we are fighting for, we know it.” The Late Dr John was an inspiring leader but if he had been able to declare that he was fighting for an independent South Sudan state then the war would have been over much more quickly because all southern people would have flocked to the cause instead of wasting years in confusion and internecine fighting.
The balance of forces is not so much in favour of the north as Matthew Sinn suggests. Every southerner is ready to take up arms to fight for freedom whether or not he is paid. This is the difference between north and south. The northern soldiers will be mercenaries who know that their leaders have already surrendered the jihad and the national flag, but the southern fighters will be fighting for their land and their people and ready to fight to the last. There is no braver fighter than the southern Sudanese fighting to defend his land and his people. We hope our brothers in the north do not need to learn this lesson for the third time.
Dear Matthew,
The Sudanese People have 18 months or so before they go to the Referendum, and all are praying for God’s Auspicies more than pundit’s premonitions. This is the time to advance the rationale rather than fan passions.
One would ask,why would the NCP opt for war, over a referendum to which it agreed and which is guaranteed by the International Community,and all those who witnessed the signing ceremony in Nairobi, 2005?
Salva Kiir is saying he was misquoted by the press, yet even if he urged secession, Salva Kiir is the Leader of the SPLM, one of the political parties in the South and in the country. There are other political parties,in the South, which we have to take into account, for much as the NCP does not represent the people of the Sudan, the SPLM does not represent all the people of the Sudan. Thus it would not be helpful if we were to conclude that secession is result of a referendum that is yet to come.
Moreover, this referendum will be preceded by the National Elections and hopefully, and after a long time,probably for the first time Southerners will vote in a national elections, how those elections would change things in the Sudan, is yet to be seen.
There are those of goodwill who are advancing constructive ideas to approach issues of unity and secession in the Sudan? What unites the Sudanese and what divides them, oil important though it may seem, is not the only factor here.
You may recall that the SPLM/A’s position in 1989, was that the NIF, before it split into NCP and PCP, came to power to separate the South, and establish an Islamic State in the North. The SPLM even refused to discuss the problem of South Sudan, for it , the SPLM considered the problem to be a problem of the Sudan. We may have been unfortunate to lose Dr.John Garang, but still the factors that determined his vision have not basically changed. Indeed the South could have declared an Independent State during those years, but opted for negotiations,and determined a date for the referendum, so why push into a crisis now?
I think there are many who tend to embellish the military capability of the Sudan, probably to create more sympathy to the South, and you have slightly alluded to the “religeous right”, though you might want to go into more details about that, in the context of North/South relations.
Worth mentioning also is that the popularity and support for the SPLM/A in the north (though i think), the term ‘North Sudan’ as against South Sudan may need to be clarified more,for the SPLM/A was fighting in the East, in the Nuba Mountains, in Dar Fur. I would be very appreciative if you define this “Arab Triangle” to which you refer; that is to say, the NCP, which enjoys limited support in the country, would have an uphill task to take the country into war again,and undo the agreement that gave it a new lease of life in the country.
The situation on the borders with Chad may not apply to that in the South. You may also realize that Chad has it’s internal problems too, and Chad is hosting groups that are operating against the Sudan, the Sudan from where Idris Debi himself launched his offensive against N’Djamenna, Chad, is hosting groups opposed to him, a sad game that serves no purpose except the power hungry in both states. Why should both parties of the CPA, resort to this tactics.
There are also the stipulations that govern the post referendum arrangements,w hich could cover issues ranging from national debt to other assets including the oil assets, then only we can tell, it is not helpful to speculate now and in any case,a pipeline through Kenya. The South will no doubt recall the bitter experience of the Former East African Community. Kenya too may one day seek to exercise pressure and gain more concessions, not to mention the cost to a nascent state.
I would not count much on the reports of the Panel of Experts,as it deals with Dar Fur and not the South, there is a different UN Mission for the South.
While you have reviewed,and aptly the scenario of war,I wish you would also consider the possibilities of another alternative,such as the one put across by Dr. Francis Deng.
My prayer is that we don’t seek to apportion blame for the past, rather we should wisely assume our responsibilities to the future.
Jamaledin,
I’d be glad to share a bit more detail. My hypothesis is that sooner than fight a costly war against a foe that has them in practical economic strangle-hold, the South Sudanese would agree to continue revenue-sharing while (A) proceeding to tend their still-parlous internal affairs, and (B) making all due haste to convince the Chinese and Kenyans to agree on a deal that would put see a pipeline built to Mombasa.
My sense is that the EU and US can have relatively little leverage even in the event of another war. First, Sudan buys no significant weapons from either the U.S. or the EU, and is for the most part under embargo. Second, neither will intervene militarily; the “rogue” label is little more than tongue-lashing. The U.S. might be persuaded to disperse some funds, geospatial intelligence, and man-portable weapons to the SPLA, particularly because it would probably pass muster with Congress given traditional Republican support for South Sudan and the strong antipathy of many within the Obama administration for the NCP, but that isn’t victory assured. Third, the U.S. has already suspended meaningful trade. Sudan’s primary trading partners are in the developing world, with the exception of Japan. Fourth, international action would have to first overcome traditional Russian and Chinese support for the international status-quo. Moscow and Beijing may fight to avoid setting precedents which legitimize the idea of referendums leading to the disunity of previously sovereign states, no matter how much legal fiction they really are. South Sudan is likely to receive food aid in large amounts, if needed, however, considering what has been done in the past.
The international pariah status of al-Bashir matters only if he loses; as such, it is incentive for him to fight that much harder. The same applies to his coterie within the NCP. Rhetorical condemnation of Sudanese behavior is only that — talk.
Northern military conduct is not wholly independent of international perceptions, but once pushed to the wall, the NCP is likely to feel less restrained, not more. The urgency to make big gains before unrest sets in; the overconfidence of SAF commanders (a problem identified by Natsios), and the fact that international condemnation was insufficient to prevent the ultimate ethnic cleansing of Darfur — which has now been more or less reshaped at gunpoint — suggest that the international community will not have much effect.
The NCP’s lack of internal and external legitimacy will be exactly what compels them to try and hold the South over a barrel on oil revenues, which are essentially the last lynchpin keeping the current power constellation in place.
James N,
Andrew Natsios agrees with your perception of the importance of morale in determining the outcome of any future struggle. He is rightly critical of assessments which pay insufficient homage to the resilience of southern arms. Nonetheless, the SAF order of battle is significantly expanded since 2002, and now includes more than one hundred new armored fighting vehicles, as well as a considerable number of combat aircraft. If the North gets off to a good start, that momentum may end up sustaining itself.
David,
Like you, I certainly hope that Sudan escapes war, and that the referendum leads to either unity with the promise of moderation in future national governance, or else an amicable split. However, the promise of “golden parachutes” for the losers in Sudanese political contests no longer applies to al-Bashir; he now has ever incentive to keep power as a method of personal preservation.
I take your point that Kiir and the SPLM do not speak for the whole of Southern Sudan, but as far as I am aware, secession is popular throughout the South, and has been for some time. The slow implementation of the CPA and the fighting in Darfur certainly have done unity no good. The GoSS has also exhibited a tendency to focus on southern issues exclusively (and perhaps understandably). Kiir does not appear to share Garang’s commitment to a political solution which presumes continued national unity.
My allusion to the “religious right” was a reference to the substantial number of Christian conservatives in the United States who are sympathetic to the political aspirations of co-religionists in Sudan. I was not referring to the NCP’s embrace of militant Islam. (Or have I misunderstood your argument?)
Certainly, the SPLM/A does have support in the north, and especially in Khartoum, but I think it is significant that when the JEM attacked Omdurman, the southerners in the capital did not opt for an uprising. The population of Darfur is mostly confined to refugee and IDP camps in Chad or within Sudan itself. That front has the potential to divide SAF forces and sap important strength from the border with the south, but has not generally required much in the way of heavy equipment; the North may opt to leave light forces in place, and to let tribal militia hold the line, such as it is.
Eastern Sudan appears to me to be a toss-up; the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement has held. Probably the SPLA would attempt to restore ties with old allies on the Red Sea coast, but whether the Beja and others will agree to fight alongside the South when it is obviously going to leave Sudan, that is still open for debate. Certainly I acknowledge that they could be very dangerous to the North.
The parties to the CPA have incentive to resort to cross-border instigation because of the chance for each to overthrow the opposite regime. Even if the separation is amicable, southerners will look across the border fitfully; Khartoum will never be a friend under the NCP. The NCP, meanwhile, is notorious for having poor control of its security apparatus, which itself has a reputation for freebooting. I expect border flare-ups whether or not both sides want them.
I think, with respect to the pipeline, the South prefers Kenyan hands on the spigot, to those of the NCP exclusively.
The Panel of Experts speaks to the military situation in Darfur; their conclusions, I think, are credible to the extent that they were based on eyewitness observation, and spoke to the SAF units and equipment deployed in Darfur in 2007.
If possibilities exist for another alternative, they may lie in some kind of grand attempt by the NCP to seek a coalition at the polls. That probably depended heavily on Kiir’s running for president, since his credible challenge would provide the impetus for the NCP to make a series of concessions, especially in the east and north, to periphery elites in order to obtain enough votes to hold on. It might also have given the international community some room to arrange some kind of trade for peace in Darfur.
Matthew Sinn,
“Northern military conduct is not wholly independent of international perceptions, but once pushed to the wall, the NCP is likely to feel less restrained, not more [Mattew Sinn]”. In light of your response, I feel you are out of touch with the political realities. You don’t understand how Khartoum operates.
Lastly, sprinkling words like “geospatial intelligence, man-portable weapons… coterie… current power constellation… freebooting… hands on the spigot” makes the situation sound like a board game at worse, and an English-major’s paper at best. This tells me a lot about your perception of the situation in the comfortable office you occupy in Arlington. I’ll have to agree with David’s assessment and to defer to more watchful readers. Instigation does not help anyone. It is clear what side of the political spectrum you are on. There is a great deal of opining and mischief in these forums.
Dear Jamaledin,
I have really appreciated this exchange on this topic including your very informative input. But I think to lay an allegation of ‘opining and mischief’ misses the point. It’s inevitable that an American in Arlington, relying mostly on secondary sources, and steeped in a particular tradition of analysis and writing, will write a piece that doesn’t gel with the way that Sudanese analyse their problems and write about them. And within decision-making circles in the U.S. there are many who make important strategic decisions based on exactly this kind of information and way of thinking.
(I remember one very senior U.S. decision-maker discussing the U.S. position on the Ethio-Eritrean war in 1998. I was arguing that it was more complex than Eritrean aggression. This individual replied, ‘but look whose hand was in the cookie jar when mom switched on the light.’ It’s a folksy way of putting it that really grated… but this person was actually quite a sophisticated operator.)
I find Matthew Sinn’s analysis to be a very interesting take on the prospects for armed conflict in Sudan. Even if you disagree with it, is an oversimplification and misrepresentation to assume that this kind of analysis and depiction is mischevious or partisan. There may be deficiencies and if translated into policy, the outcome may of course be in that direction. But the fact that American decision-makers analyze Sudan in this kind of way, is a reality with which Sudanese need to contend, and it reveals a power structure and discourse which they need to navigate.
Dear Jamaledin,
I am more than happy to learn about where you believe I have made an error in judgment regarding the political intentions of the NCP. I would like to hear more about your understanding of the situation.
Without oil revenue, it appears likely that al-Bashir and the current set of Sudanese leadership will be forced from power. The money to sustain the bribery and security machinery necessary to buy political outcomes will more or less evaporate. That will leave them vulnerable to possible extradition.
Darfur provides an excellent example of the methods by which the NCP skirts international action. The NCP successfully flouts the arms embargo imposed on the region, which was tragically insufficient in the first place, since it did not apply to all of Sudan. The NCP also folded the Janjaweed into the formal security structure (as much as it could; the SAF is not actually able to dictate to the militias). In short, the campaign to “cleanse” Darfur was mostly successful: Darfur is now devastated, and the population frequently confined to squallid camps on either side of the international border.
Finally, I am sorry that you found my choice of words flippant. I did not intend to trivialize Sudan’s problems in the least. Certainly I am not suggesting that war is a desirable outcome anywhere in the world.
I welcome your reply.
Best,
Matthew
Dear Alex,
You are absolutely right. This analysis represents a viewpoint that needs to be understood and reconciled. I must learn to be more accommodating to differing viewpoints. Strike two for me. Here is a promise, from myself, to absorb and contemplate a little more from future discussions.
Sincerely,
J
Dear Matthew,
Thanks for your reply again. I might not totally agree on the assessment, but it is now sensible and interesting to me nevertheless.
Please excuse my cynicism to what I perceive are mischaracterizations. In all honesty, although I would like to write a highly informed response, however, I am not professionally versed, trained, or qualified to deliver a cogent reply. My commentary is simply based on years of informal readings of political developments as well as eavesdropping on the ‘talk of the house’ as an unfettered, uncommitted, but concerned Sudanese citizen. Please don’t view this as a snub but an acknowledgement of my limitations.
Sincerely,
J
I see Matthew’s presentation as one interesting scenario of possible developments in Sudan. Among the sources for his scenario description, nearly half of them are based on newspaper/magazine reports. Therefore, the presentation is on somewhat thin ice. With a slight turn of the kaleidoscope one will see a very different pattern.
J,
No problem.
Returning to your original post again, I did some re-reading for items I may have missed.
The United States’ special envoy to Sudan, retired Gen. Scott Gration, believes that Washington has been unable to have much positive impact in Sudan because it has not offered enough incentives for the NCP to make peace in Darfur, effectively implement the CPA, and commit to domestic political reform. I think Gration makes a good point: the al-Bashir government is guilty of a great many heinous crimes, but remains firmly in control of Sudan. Punishment — the U.N. embargo on arms transfers between Sudan proper and the Darfur region; the ICC Indictment; U.S. economic sanctions — has not had the desired effect. In fact, it may only strengthen al-Bashir’s trust on those of his advisors who are hardliners. In “Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect,” Alex made some interesting observations about how that group was urging al-Bashir to allow no precedents that could give the U.S. or others any reason to think that Sudan could be made to bow to pressure.
You are right to say that the international community affects Sudan’s behavior. The NCP must know that there is a limit to Chinese friendship, and the Chinese may have played a key role in bringing about approval for UNAMID. Khartoum’s decision to fold the Janjaweed into its official security apparatus tells us that al-Bashir is sensitive to international criticism. Nonetheless, I think that the oil wealth of southern Sudan will always call to the North. The international community may have a hard time providing incentives large enough to keep the NCP from trying to extort, or punish, the GoSS.
Best,
Matthew
Vagn,
Which of the pieces of reporting strike you as far from the mark?
Am I correct to perceive that you see the NCP deciding that another war just isn’t worth the cost, perhaps because their political credibility, even in the north, is already so low?
Best,
Matthew
Matthew,
My comment is a general one. I see your scenario as possible but not as the only possible future scenario. Many scenarios are possible, even a coup d’etat by Northern officers wanting a united Sudan. Nimeiri came to power this way if you remember. My comment is just trying to point to the fact that even app. half your sources are based on newspaper/magazine reports, and, as some other discussions here on this blog shows, they could be of doubtful credibility.
My personal fear is that some of our discussions here have an impact on real political developments. I feel that a possible new war and a separate Southern Sudan will be a tragedy for both the North and the South.
But if you insist on your presented scenario as the only possible future scenario for Sudan, I completely disagree with you. There are other options.
This is an important debate and we must thank Matthew Sinn for kicking it off. It’s by contemplating what war might mean that we can best persuade warmakers from not pursuing that path.
Rule number one of any battle plan is that it does not survive the first contact with the enemy. Any war strategy, by either side, will be drastically revised as the war develops. Clausewitz makes the invaluable point that war tends towards the absolute: once it starts, the immediate calculation of each belligerent party is how best to escalate so as to gain an advantage. The immediate calculation of all others is how to get out of the way as quickly as possible.
In the event of an outbreak of hostilities, all previous calculations become of little or no value. We simply cannot calculate what happens next. A tiny border skirmish, as at Badme on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border in 1998, can escalate into a protracted all-out war that costs tens of thousands of young lives. If there’s a real war then the UN and humanitarians will focus, immediately, on getting their peacekeepers and aid personnel out of harm’s way. We would expect UN Security Council resolutions calling for restraint and ceasefire etc., but practical effort would focus on evacuating foreign nationals. By the time a serious international response had been worked out, it would be too late to do anything but some damage limitation.
Vagn,
I absolutely agree that the scenario I have sketched out is but one of many potential outcomes in 2011. Like you, I hope it doesn’t come to pass.
First, the NCP may decide that it hasn’t got the political capital to mobilize for a new war when the previous fighting went so badly.
Second, if the NCP threatened or imposed an embargo, the South might elect to negotiate rather than fight.
Third, as you point out, there may be a coup. On that matter, I can only speak to what I have read, which is that it may come from cashiered army officers, or else from allies of Hassan al-Turabi, whom Natsios says comprise about fifty percent of the SAF’s top leadership.
Dear Matthew
Thank you very,and like Alex,i too hope that your analysis would persuade all the Sudanese,and notably the NCP and the SPLM/A to avoid war. Those who know the horrors of war, know more, they know:
“…..I mean the truth untold
The pity of war,the pity war distilled.”
(Wilfred Owen, ‘Strange Meeting’.)
War in the Sudan,would benefit no one.I am afraid there will be no Sudan for either party,the NCP and the SPLM/A.but war and peace are issues we should discuss and debate.
Alex would recall that I have always urged in this blog,a serious, objective and enlightened debate on the viability of a Democratic United Sudan or otherwise. This should be decided by the people of South Sudan, all the people of South Sudan. And neither the SPLM/A nor the NCP represents all of them, that is why the current political haranguing by members of both parties, disturbing as they are, remain part of the political campaigns, as long as both parties abide by the terms of the CPA.
There are real problems too, you refer to the “golden parachutes”, and the case of President Al-Bashir, I assume you refer to the ICC. Well that is a real question, and I believe that Alex and others have drawn attention to the possible consequences of that indictment on the whole issue of peace in the Sudan. Maybe we can debate on the ways to get out of this situation. I would be interested in knowing from those who know better.
I understood your reference to the “religeous right”. This is also another issue that we should be candid about. Religion, whether we like it or not, is another factor. Is it a mere coincidence that VP Salva Kiir made his statement from a Church? The NCP claims that the SPLM/A is asking us “to renounce our faith”, said Rabie Abdel Attie on Al-jazeera. In an op-ed in the New York Times,Monday,October 26, 2009, Roth Douthat says:
“In Africa,increasingly the heart of the Anglican Communion,both (meaning Catholicism and Anglicansim),are facing an entrenched Islamic presence across a fault line running from Nigeria to Sudan”.
(Roth Douthat: ‘Benedict’s Gambit.’)
Is there indeed another type of competition (to avoid the term war), for the South that we should debate?
In a post-referendum Sudan, and in case of secession, any of the attempts you mention, would in my view be tantamount to invading an Independent Sovereign State, with all its attendant consequences. And here i wish you would consider the regional repercussions. You are no doubt aware of the regional politics of the area, and we also need to debate the interests of other neighbouring states, and their attitude towards the new state of South Sudan. Would that new state be called on to return the favours? Would we see yet the same scenario we saw in the DRC, following the overthrow of the Mobutu Regime? Questions that may be you can consider.
Of course, in case of secession, and as independent sovereign state, the state has all the freedom to decide how to export its goods. And this has been going on for sometime. Using Mombasa is nothing new. Even during the best of times of peace, 1972-83, imports to South Sudan used to come through Mombasa. Railway from the South to Kenya fits in the grand plan of railway from Cairo to the Cape, and Pan-African Highway,agreed on in the seventies, goes through the South to the North to Egypt. In themselves these projects would not justify secession,and if secession comes,the new state would be part of those projects for African Unity.
In any case, you think the South would want the “spigot” in Kenyan hand and not the NCP. Would they want it if there is no NCP in power after the elections in Sudan?
As for the other options,I would like to refer you to the views expressed by Dr. Francis Madeng Deng, in a lecture, “Prospects for reconciling Self-determination with Unity in Sudan” (Sudan Tribune, November 5 2009).
David,
Let me begin by seconding the need for debate. My great fear, however, is that there are currently parties in Sudan for whom war makes rational sense. The International Crisis Group describes some of the intra-Arab disputes in Darfur as the result of calculated attempts by some parties to gain as much as possible ahead of a final peace. I think we can all agree that the key to making or supporting good policy, as Alex hinted in his last post, is to try and understand the stakes of the conflict from the point of view of all the stakeholders and then to prepare policies that change their incentives. We are all also well-served by your reminder that to assess only the SPLM/A and the NCP is to draw only half the picture. I chose to focus on the most powerful actors in Sudan; however, I am more than prepared to acknowledge that the South in particular is far from unified, and that many Sudanese do not consider either the NCP or the SPLM to reflect their interests.
The matter of religion is certainly interesting. You are absolutely right to ask about a second “competition.” I think that, as we have seen in the past, the various parties will do all they can to gain the sympathies of coreligionists, whether in the Arab world, or in the United States and Western Europe. Identity politics often pays great dividends. I assume that Rabie Abdel Attie was trying to plant some seeds of that kind by invoking the idea of a conflict of conscience when he made his statement to the press. Let me also say that I find Ross Douthat’s description of the relationship between Islam and Christianity as one of competition between “foes” to be both misguided and tragic.
On the matter of war between states as a violation of law, I do not think that the international community can be counted on to spend blood or treasure to defend the political privileges of South Sudan. It is possible that the U.N. would impose mandatory economic sanctions. In fact, the chances are probably quite good. I could also see steps taken toward an arms embargo (which, if the usual precedent is followed, may hurt South Sudan worse than the North). However, I do not believe that the U.N. will intervene more meaningfully.
Does the South have any capacity for successful independent? I would submit that their current progress, while imperfect, testifies to the organizational and political cohesion necessary to function as well as many other states in the region. If the DRC’s invitation for the SPLA to conduct cross-border operations can be called an acknowledgement of the limitations of the FARDC, then the GoSS already has one essential advantage: a functioning armed forces. And if the threat of aggression from Khartoum is the glue that continues to hold the south together, I think that threat will be tangible for some time to come. Certainly the South may be beholden to Kenya and Ethiopia, but I think that may sometimes tend to strengthen their hand, because Khartoum will presumably offer concessions to ensure that the South pumps at least some of its oil via Port Sudan. (That, in fact, might be one bargaining chip for a negotiator to work with in trying to keep peace.)
With regard to elections, I think the South will want as many pipelines as it can build, being landlocked. It will then be able to play each off the other.
Best,
Matt
Dear Matthew,
Thank you very much.
Indeed we need the debate, dialogue is better than daggers, like you i have my fears too, but then in every community there are those who build and those who destroy, let us hope that the latter win the day.
Here we are more about the NCP and SPLM/A, I dont have enough knowledge about intra-arab fighting in Dar Fur now.
I think religion is an important factor,that any debate must deal with too.
Roth Douthot did not employ the term “foes “, I simply refered to his op-ed to show how some look at things in our world. It is also worth mentioning that not all Arabs are Moslems and all Moslems are Arabs.
In fact for those who tend to paint the war in Sudan as a war between the Arab Moslem North and the Christian African South, all too often overlook the fact that about 80% of the Arabs live in Africa and are members of the AU.
I, for one don’t question the capacity of the South to go for independence, I would want them to go into a peaceful transition to statehood.
What I was saying is that a new war might draw other parties, like the bitter war Africa saw in the DRC, following the fall of the Mobutu regime where by other countries interfered to the extent that some called it the “Africa’s World War”, and i hope a rational debate will help the Sudanese avoid that.It is not about a DRC invitation to the SPLM. And invite the SPLM to fight against whom. As for a threat from the North,this is precisely I pray for peaceful elections and more peaceful refrandum.However it will be the responsibility of the New Government that would come out of the April 2010 elections. Let us hope that things would go as planned in the Sudan and as stipulated for in the CPA.
Of course one expects two independent states to discuss bilateral relations in a manner that best serves their interest,however and as you know, the pipeline to Port Sudan would not remain idle. If I am not wrong the Arbitration of Hague gave the Heglig Oil Fields to the North.
My question to both parties in the Sudan and to other friends, is :
Is the presence of oil in one region or the other in itself cause enough for secession or unity?
The question of separation or not, as I see it, is a question of perspective. Looked upon from the perspective of the historic relationship between the North and the South, one would probably end up supporting secession, because of the cultural differences and the history of Northern marginalization of the southerners. But if one looks at it from a strategic regional perspective, a united Sudan would be a more tempting solution. Two Sudans (whatever they will be called) would be much more prone to foreign pressure and influence and weaken “both†entities. United, Sudan is much stronger in this globalized world.
The contemporary and future oil riches give the South a new opportunity to go alone, tempting as it is. This option was almost out of question in the past because of the limited resources of the South without the oil.
So, it is up to the GOS of Omar El Beshir to find a solution, which can make unity a tempting option for the southerners. And that is why I mention the possibility of a coup d’etat in the North as a possible last and desperate solution for unity, if the GOS is acting arrogantly and is about to have passed the point of no return concerning a peaceful solution to a united Sudan.
A coup d’etat with leading officers projecting themselves on the line of Johan Garang’s dream of a united Sudan would give the unification process a new chance. And that is maybe why Salva Kiir and other southern politicians are now projecting themselves as separatists in order to squeeze Northern politicians to do something serious about the situation… or else! The legitimacy of the Omar El Beshir Government among southerners is very limited after the long and terrible war in the South.
So, one scenario for a future united Sudan which could bring the situation out of the present stalemate could be a coup d’etat with fresh faces to negotiate with the southerners and to open a new chapter between the North and the South. And remember, John Garang’s dream took its point of departure in the relationship between the peripheries and the center in Sudan (including Darfur). A possible separate Northern Sudanese State (in case of secession) would anyway have to cope with these problems of the marginal regions in the North in the future.
David,
Like you, I expect that religion will become increasingly politicized by leaders in both Khartoum and Juba as they attempt to navigate the months and years ahead. Repeat experience has taught them that such appeals can be highly effective in mobilizing diplomatic and financial support.
I think that you and I must have read different editorials by Mr. Douthot. (I found an opinion piece in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette dated October 27, 2009 that has since caused a great deal of controversy.) However, I gather that the thrust of his argument must have been identical, even if we read different pieces. I am confident when I say that I doubt that the United States government shares Mr. Douthot’s position. President Obama, like Bush before him, has been keenly interested in conveying the message that the United States is not at war with Islam. Obama, I think, has been somewhat more successful than his predecessor.
I agree also that a new war would have the potential to draw in other parties. I think that Kenya is already compromised. That said, I don’t see Sudan falling prey to the armed intervention of outside powers. While Sudan has many neighbors, and not all of them friendly, not one possesses both the capability and interest to conduct direct military intervention. I do think that the South will be able to sustain itself at war, if it comes to that, unless it suffers immediate and serious reversals.
You are absolutely correct about the arbitration of the Heglig fields, although I believe that north would be more than happy to transport and refine whatever quantity of oil could be arranged — in peace as well as war.
Sadly, I think that the presence of oil — or any other similar type of wealth — is often enough to cause conflict in this world.
Vagn,
I agree that there are strategic rationales to support unity, although one might say the same of Nigeria and the DRC, as well. I think that the temptation for the South to go its own way will be overwhelming, since the consensus is that they cannot expect much benefit from continued participation in the GoNU structure. Had they absorbed the lesson you recommend, I think they’d have been more enthusiastic about involvement with the CPA. Also, one would have expected them to focus on elections more than the referendum.
A coup d’etat is absolutely a possibility — especially because of what Natsios tells us about Turabi’s supporters in the SAF.
Nobody expected a coup d’etat in Sudan in 1989. It came out of the blue after a lot of squabbling between the elected parties behind Sadiq ElMahdi’s GOS, especially concerning the war in the South. I was working in the North at the time. As far as I remember, the NIF had app. 5% votes at the election at the time.
I am not saying that a war is not a possibility. But there are other options still.