Though I agree with the general thrust of Mamdani’s message in Saviors & Survivors and believe his book has played a valuable role in bringing some attention to the problematic political usage of the Darfur crisis in the U.S., this review by Sean Brooks does make some valid points. For instance, I share Brooks’ discomfort at with Mamdani’s “citizen”/”consumer” dichotomization of Darfuri IDPs.

Brooks does not seem to perceive that there are political reasons why Darfur garnered such traction in the United States. He does not ask why it is that “The force of Mamdani’s critique raised some eyebrows in academic and leftist circles, but largely fell silent in the mainstream media and human rights community.” Certainly it was not because the critique lacked validity.

Brooks’ contends that “the coalition’s advertising in American media markets was not designed to… make Americans feel good once again about their powers abroad.” Quite possibly that was not a conscious intention – but was that a predictable effect? Brooks might reach different conclusions if he simply reflects upon how it was that SDC, with its “small staff,” was able to attract “noteworthies like then-Senator Barack Obama and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi” to its 2006 rally. However, Brooks’ views are unsurprising coming from someone affiliated with Save Darfur Coalition and it is unnecessary to critique them further here.

I must take some issue, however, with Brooks’ contention that “Notwithstanding a difference of opinion on the ICC matter, great overlap and little difference actually exists between the coalition and Mamdani’s own policy recommendations for the Obama administration on how to resolve the crisis in Darfur and hold together Sudan’s fraying parts.” The open letter to President Obama from which Brooks’ deduces Mamdani’s policy recommendations (and which I played a role in drafting) does include some points that the SDC has also endorsed (though not always emphasized or timed properly). (And, contrary to Brooks, the letter does not comment on the ICC beyond banalities, unless the SDC disputes that the warrant for Bashir presents “both opportunities and dangers” or disagrees that Washington should also submit itself to the jurisdiction of international law.)

However, Brooks does not mention two of the most prominent of the letter’s five recommendations:

# End the CIA’s close ties with the notorious Sudanese intelligence agency, which is deeply implicated in the violence in Darfur.
# Establish a fair and accessible process by which Darfurians can seek asylum in the US

It is difficult to find any mention, let alone emphasis upon these points from any quarter of SDC. Given that these two actions would be among the easiest and most direct ways for Washington to actually support Darfuris, it is remarkable that such simple measures receive zero attention from SDC. Read in totality, the policies advocated by the letter were not “remarkably similar to the calls from Save Darfur at the very same time.” Quite to the contrary. Moreover the differences in policy recommendations reflect the ideological biases of the SDC that I touch upon above.

Mamdani’s book is certainly not “outdated” given that Bush’s War On Terror continues under different language. If we accept Brooks’ assertion that the SDC’s “intentions have always been similar to those who advocate for unheard victims in places like Iraq and Palestine (both causes that seem very close to Mamdani’s heart),” we must ask why the organization has learned so little from advocacy around these conflicts.