Darfur Lethal Violence: June
The number of confirmed violent fatalities, according to UNAMID figures, in Darfur during June was 221. Though a marked decline on the nearly 600 deaths during May, this is still well above the average for the last two and a half years. The major cause of fatalities was intra-Arab fighting in West Darfur state, which accounted for 139 fatalities. Fifty two combatants were confirmed killed, 51 government soldiers and one from the rebel side, implying a probable undercount of rebel fatalities. Twenty civilians died in violence, in all instances classified by UNAMID as criminal attacks, as well as two tribesmen, two soldiers and three rebel fighters who were victims of crime. Three UNAMID personnel were killed.
These figures show that the intensity of fighting between JEM and the Government has subsided.
The data show that the epicenter of Arab-Arab fighting has shifted from South Darfur to West Darfur. Whereas the South Darfur violence was mostly among the Baggara, this violence is between Baggara and Abbala. It is interesting that although intra-Arab fighting has killed more people in Darfur over the last three years than any other source of violence, it is still below the international radar screen, and does not figure high on the agenda for the peace talks.
Dear Alex,
At the time when genocide charges is handed down against President Omar al-Bashir, it is interesting, especially due to the fact that you seem to imply the majority of the death toll in Darfur is consisted of Arabs and they occur during intra-Arab conflicts. Of course, such implication is in line with the notion, which is suggesting that the Africans are not the only victims in Darfur and in most cases the victimization of Africans is exaggerated. Intra-ethnic violence can be as deadly, however, when the state apparatus are employed to promote ethnic cleansing, it increases the threat of annihilation of some groups, hence, bringing into focus the interest of international communities. So, the reason Darfur is under international radar is because the state is responsible for the ethnic cleansing.
Now, with charges of genocide brought against al-Bashir, one wonders why you are still trying to depict “other source of violence†to be responsible for the ongoing killings in Darfur.
Anyway, it will be interesting to see you open the discussions on the genocide charges against al-Bashir or to read your views about it. I just thought the timing of your posting is not in place with the current occurrence.
Thanks.
Steve Paterno
Dear Steve,
one of the things I have tried to do in this blog and elsewhere is to bring a standard of rigour to the presentation and analysis of data for lethal violence in Darfur, that has been absent from many other sources. I have regularly published these figures.
The findings of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber were on an entirely different issue, namely whether, in excluding the genocide charges from the arrest warrant issued last year, the earlier decision of the PTC was based on the correct standard of evidence. The Court has found that, insofar as genocidal intent was one possible and reasonable inference given the evidence presented, then it should not have been excluded from the arrest warrant.
I will need to study the decision more carefully before writing further. However, I suspect the fact that 10 IDPs were killed last month does not lend credence to the comparisons between Kalma and Auschwitz beloved of some who write on this topic.
Dear Alex,
You are right, I agree that the low rate of killing within Kalma and other displaced camps in Darfur can certainly “not lend credence to the comparisons between Kalma and Auschwitz.†However, the legitimate argument that can be made is that Kalma is not founded out of peace, but as a result of people having their villages razed aground, relatives murdered, women raped, and properties looted.
Perhaps it is here that one can see what people in Kalma and Auschwitz Camps have in common. Maybe another differences was that the NAZI regime was generally good in keeping records of their victims, but does President Omar al-Bashir even has the record of the 10,000 people he claimed to be killed. As much as the statistics can be disputed in this case, the mere existence of displaced camps such as Kalma are stark reminder of threats pose against humanity in Darfur region.
Steve Paterno
Steve,
There is nothing in common between Jewish suffering in holocaust concentration camps in the graphic images of Auschwitz that we are so attracted to because of its potency in the media and the tragic sufferings of the Darfuris who have seen “villages razed aground, relatives murdered, women raped, and properties looted”. Perhaps East Timor may be a better comparison? Maybe Congo? Alas, no, we must settle on Auschwitz.
Amongst exposing a poor understanding of history, your comment also exposed the weakness of the theory that the atrocities commited by the NCP were systemized. Systematic crime, with a directed and concerted target of murdering specific ethnicities must be instrumental, recorded, mechanized, and sustained. The lack of records cannot be written off as ‘poor organization’ or cannot be excused as African-style Nazism. In fact, if you say it was poorly organized, then how could there be a genocide? It is even more difficult to prove genocidal intent if you agree that it was a poorly organized war.
Those in control of the state are in control of the state and can certainly go to small lengths to record a larger program of destruction and annihilation. This isn’t a non-functional government. Passports, birth, and death certificates are still issued. The poor availability of records in this war does not excuse Elbashir, and he is certainly not defensible, but his crimes can be qualified by other means. In fact, many revisionist newspapers and organizations are now pushing the ‘reset’ button on the number of civilians killed in warfare and those killed from disease and malnutrition. You will also note that it is not easy for a group to commit genocide. The evidence must be beyond reasonable doubt for even the Nazis had great difficulty in administering the crimes they had committed. Even the previous Rwandan hutu regime had to invoke popular support from civilian Rwandans to spread the rampage across the country.
We must separate our political agendas from the truth. Only the truth shall allow us to respond with appropriate policy recommendations.
The existence of IDP camps is a reminder of the work that needs to be done to serve justice to those responsible for instigating the conflict, as well as a reminder for us to improve the delicate situation on the ground. It is not a reminder that we must seek blood and justice, but peace and justice. Peace has short-term and immediate benefits. Justice has long-term benefits and must be approached with steadfastness, as it must with the rigor afforded by the technicalities of the law.
Jamaledin
Shifting trends of violence will not change the facts of what happened in 2004 and 2005 anyway. Whatever’s one position on the PTC’s decision; monitoring and reporting on what’s happening today is not going to change that.
Dear Karim,
your point about the shifting trends in violence, and the record of 2003-04, is correct.
However, when the ICC Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant against Pres. Bashir on the charge of genocide, the bulk of his accusations concerned ongoing events with a special focus on current conditions in the IDP camps.
All things are secondary to the prospect of war. That very fact is driving every dissenting Sudanese. It is time that someone said what’s on every rational Sudanese person’s mind. The west and its proxies are preparing northern and southern Sudan for a long inter-border war and are creating a new frontier and middle east/african flash point. As some have suggested, Blackwater mercenaries have been training the southern Sudanese army. Southern Sudan has timid friends in the AU but a more approachable ally in AFRICOM or other military initiatives, as well as US aid-based groups who provide and fund the academic literature that newspapers thrive on. As I read on NPR that Rebecca Hamilton is preparing a book on “Listening to Darfurian Voices”, and based on some comments, I have come to realize, agendas are less about exposing and discussing facts and more about framing facts. There is a hostility or lack of receptiveness to seemingly mundane updates on violence in Darfur. Disaster-capitalist NGOs are shipping new interns to study and right books, having had little exposure or understanding of Sudan. In listening to amateurs like Rebecca Hamilton talk anecdotally about their comparative experiences in day one of Harvard law versus a week’s prior work in Darfur, one gets glimpses of Prendergastan ambitions to light up the resume and move up the ladder of aid-based relief work. Indeed, many Sudan watchers can be viewed as up-and-coming eager beavers. This is an industry with a life of its own. The only people who’s voices are not being listened to or who’s voices are being co-opted in the name of giving imbalanced university lectures are the Sudanese peoples.
Jamaledin,
Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” By this standard, genocide is essentially a crime of intent. There is no requirement of systemization or mechanization. Legal scholars such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have disputed the appropriate threshold by which to measure acts thought likely to qualify as genocide. The ICTY found “a substantial part” of the targeted group must have been affected. This clearly means that a systematic, mechanized, and sustained effort would be more likely to qualify as genocide than poorly organized, non-industrial, and spasmodic killing. You are correct that genocide without records or infrastructure is also more difficult to confirm. However, there is nothing inherent to the definition of genocide spelled out in the CPPCG to support the idea that poorly-organized killing can never be genocide.
It may also be profitable to ask the question, “Why keep records?” Because the fighting in Darfur was in part about access to useable land, the natural incentive would be to abolish, rather than maintain, any sign of prior habitation or ownership. The use of proxy militias, flying columns, and air power (however rudimentary) are hardly conducive to record-keeping.
There is ample evidence to support the idea that genocide has taken place in Darfur. “A Short History of a Long War” goes a long way in supporting that argument, even if one does not take into account the reports from other observers.
May I ask on the basis of what evidence you feel comfortable claiming that, “The west and its proxies are preparing northern and southern Sudan for a long inter-border war and are creating a new frontier and middle east/african flash point?” In what way would the west benefit if North and South Sudan returned to war? Why can the presence of private military companies (mercenaries) in South Sudan be considered good evidence of such a plot? Logically speaking, South Sudan’s defense forces are in need of technical training. That is exactly what companies like Blackwater (now called ‘Xi’) provide. I should add that most Western nations tend to assume that armies in the developing world are lacking in important skill sets whether or not they have fought lengthy wars in the recent past. Therefore, MPRI trained Croatian forces during the 1990s, despite the fact that Croatia was already at war.
Best,
Matt
Dear Matt
I would like to know about which part of Dar Fur are you talking?
Matthew,
Thanks for the reply.
With all humor intended, some of the comments presented seem like Sith (Sinn) mind tricks and others seem genuine (I’m still adjusting to so many perspectives). Either way, conflictingly amused and pleasantly surprised, I am. Humor aside, I always hope my commentary adds more colorful exposure and lends a critical voice.
“However, there is nothing inherent to the definition of genocide spelled out in the CPPCG to support the idea that poorly-organized killing can never be genocide.”
Well then to that I say: the burden of proof is on you to prove it is genocide before claiming it is. Elbashir is indicted not convicted. But how can the ICC try in absentia a sitting head of state of a nation that is not signatory to the Rome Statute? There is a fundamental hypocrisy here. I assure myself that the House WILL play this card. And we know the House always wins. Do we continue to play this game when it is obviously rigged?
Let me begin by saying that Sudan has existed since 7000 years ago (in some estimates). We are an old people with a deep history that draws on ancient Egyptian/Nubian, Coptic, Abyssinian, Nilotic, and, not least of all, Arab influences. Sudanese are no less capable of inflicting monstrous warfare, enslavement, or humiliation as Indonesians are to east timorese, Japanese to chinese, Swedes to fins, Brits to irish, pilgrim-Americans to americans & blacks (scratch that, Americans to native americans & blacks), etc. (I dare not include the Balkans in this list. With respect to that, I’m still trying to filter what exactly happened).
Anticipating the essence of my preceding point, some argue (I paraphrase) “indeed, the playing field of universal justice is not leveled, but that does not lay credence to giving up foothold on this field or the forward pursuit for [this ever elusive] universal justice”. My reply to that would be: indeed so, who ever said they were mutually exclusive concepts? Incidentally, the AU will open a liaison office to the ICC, despite protesting its machinations.
It has always been the case that the occupation of the natural universe, and the tangential life-world of human behavior or political systems, are one step beyond the constructed fruits of literature and understanding born off the pangs of the formalized scientific method, contemporarily introduced by the Islamic golden age, nay, European Enlightenment.
Maybe it is time that we re-viewed our understanding of human conflict beyond the paradigms of euro-centrically convened and post-WWII-concluded definitions on the nature of war and its universal genocidal implications. My society, of which I was nursed in, never contributed to this post-WWII ideology and was not consulted on the construction of any founding institutions that I refer as “the global establishment and its institutional ancillaries”. I do not share the “established” views on the life-world (be it from the League of nations-turned-UN or its affiliates). Neither do I frame economic theory in the language of comparative advantage and free market capitalism (perpetually pitted against command economies as the only two talking points). On that point, it is amusing to see how paralyzed the Chicago School of Economists and Republican party feel, now that they have brought the economy to its knees. Government-backed bailouts prevail for the good of all while hypocritical leaders, like former-VP of Intel, Andy Grove, propose protectionism as a necessary good to stave off the Chinese outsourcing and out-pricing of good old American manufacturing, goods, and now, services.
Digression aside, if I may bombastically say: What we have here, is a crisis of consensus in definition, distractingly and instrumentally being used to the comfort and prerogative of the global political structure; this is a ploy, a slight of hands, equivoque, multiple levels of indirection, indeed. If I sound Marxist it’s because we’re all taught to believe that anyone who speaks in such language must be so. But only Andy Grove can make protectionism not sound like communism. I encourage myself to push the envelope. We of the third world are still struggling to establish our voices in this Machiavellian and social Darwinist world. While I master English more than the average native English speaker, I am still a secondary offshoot to its historical empowerment against those who are primary beneficiaries. But I am not blind to inconsistencies.
Until now, I don’t think anyone has stood firmly to reject this genocidal claim. Most would not like to appear as sympathetic to Elbashir. Our society is not linearly defined or agreeable or agreeably understood to non-Sudanese. I hope someday, we can be, when the axis of planetary power shifts; that seems to be the only option, for being welcomed through mutual understanding is not defacto invoked.
If you had put the definition that you had quoted in the dictionary under the word “war”, it would pass by any stretch of logic, reason, or imagination. What can this mean? Well it means there is an ambiguity. If there is an ambiguity, then it is subject to interpretation. The consequences of interpretation is continual debate (as it must be) but ultimate advancement by primary constituents. Debate comes at a costly expense of addressing fundamental assumptions and definitions. Sudan’s case is one of visible disagreement in the minds of academics, right down to disagreements in the White House inner circle, which was hitherto “unfocused” (policy-wise) and uncomfortably sure about how to proceed about Sudan. Such divisions are not trivial. What we have here is not a classic case of extreme left and right considerations. Such musings are distractions. It’s a clear crisis of consensus that gets to the heart of the post-WWII fabric. Can genocide be so subjective a perspective?
It would be interesting to present a gedanken (german for thought-experiment) of a fictitious universe where the Russians were training a sovereign government of Apache and Navajo Indians, whom were surrounded by the fictitious ‘United federation of North American States (UFNAS)’, to defend themselves from potential encounters. Would that scenario be so easily qualified as training ‘others’ on the fundamentals of combat? I don’t think many in the UFNAS could think so highly of the Russians, in such a case. Incidentally, in our universe, few give the Russians credit in protecting and training Ossetians against Georgia. Ofcourse, in our universe, every group has the right to defend itself in case of war, or to solicit training from Virginia-based mercenaries if need be. Let’s just hope they’re Xi and not Blackwater. God-forbid, it be Blackwater.
I am unfamiliar with the details of the Balkan war, and I’d be surprised if anyone can lay claim to being an expert on its intricacies. But if that is an example of a successful parent-child historical development, then lets ask how Croatians and Serbs feel about each other today, when in the end, they are Slavic peoples with a common heritage?
Africans can rest assured of the spontaneity of human reasoning, continually producing children with innovative ideas that can also draw upon the historical experiences of the torch-bearing pax-Americana age, and beyond. Indeed that is what Pres. Kagame did when appropriating justice for Rwandans through a process of reconciliation, only to be eerily revisited by former friends, the same way Pres. Mugabe is being re-focalized. England and America lost its weight of moral authority over South Africa. Indeed, Britain has been correcting its historical injustices by hosting and celebrating birthday parties for Nelson Mandela. The west flirts with demonizing South Africa by evoking South African “quiet” [irresponsible] diplomacy. The French, staying true to their republican qualities of rationality, non-evangelicalism, and independent thinking, are not so timid about challenging Kagame’s government in their courts. But they’ve lost that battle. I always keep reading that China “wants to be seen” as a responsible global actor [it aspires but isn’t so] with regards to Sudan.
Indeed, independent entities that train a faction during the fog of war, or during the convenient illusory proposition of a foggy prospective return to war, is welcomed when we believe that the means and “skill set” to war is necessary ammunition for negotiation. Let me ask the contrary question: after reading the daily average American or British newspaper article on Sudan, do you envisage a glorious peace ensuing? Did you not raise alarm, a few months ago, that “both sides [NCP and SPLAM] are girding for war” when detailing weapons stock-piling? Similarly, I also entertain extreme scenarios exacerbated by the all too familiar track record of the post-Republic (post-WWII) US. It’s not a difficult exercise if you were in my shoes, to see the US’s dirty hands in this conflict. I remain critical of both the NCP and the multi-headed competing American governmental and non-governmental bodies. We remain at the mercy to her democratic incongruities.
I won’t argue against genetic predispositions for war. I will argue against its manifestations. The objective is to restrain the ability to go to war, on both sides, not to lubricate the barrels of both guns, ultimately turning it into a zero-sum gain scenario, a pyhrric war.
I’ll have to check out Ms. Flint and Mr. De Waal’s book. Thanks for the reference.
Best,
Jamal the Jedi
Jamaledin,
If you are saying that genocide is a probable outcome in all wars, I think you could make a strong argument. However, my comments on genocide were made strictly in response to your question, “In fact, if you say it was poorly organized, then how could there be a genocide?” You are correct that it is more difficult to confirm genocide when it has been “poorly organized.” Formal records produced by a recognized government are a very persuasive thing. However, I wanted to specifically address the idea of “genocide on the cheap,” if I may borrow and modify a now-famous turn of phrase from Alex de Waal. It is perfectly legitimate to ask whether international understanding of war is today informed primarily by the views held by one particular cultural group.
I suspect genocide in Darfur because I have appraised myself of what is going on there to the best of my ability. The fact that I cannot visit Darfur at the present time has not prevented me from educating myself using a variety of materials published by people with exactly that kind of first-hand experience or access to primary sources, including Alex de Waal, Samantha Power (her August 30, 2004 article in the New Yorker magazine, “Dying in Darfur,” was based in part on a visit to Chad and Darfur), Julie Flint, the BBC, and the International Crisis Group, which builds its reports on the basis of direct contact with local informants. To quote directly from Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (2005), “Month by month Khartoum ratcheted up its military infrastructure in Darfur – and central to its counterattack was its tried and tested militia strategy. In the subsequent debate over whether the war in Darfur constituted genocide or not – a debate whose burden of proof, paradoxically, became a hindrance to action – one thing is certain: the people who decided to use the Janjawiid as a counterinsurgency force knew exactly what it would mean. They had used similar militias in the Nuba mountains in the early 1990s, and in the contested oilfields of Southern Sudan starting in 1998, and had seen the results. Now they were planned a replay.” (p. 102) The question of whether genocide occurred in Darfur is wholly independent of whether it has taken place elsewhere, or even whether genocide is a human tragedy typical of national development along the Westphalian model (I would argue that it is).
I’m afraid I cannot determine whether or not you were being facetious with respect to the French. Is it that you feel the French are less hypocritical than others because of their stance on Rwanda? If so, how would you respond to the fact that they have pointedly ignored abuses in other countries where they have king-making power, as in Chad?
As for Blackwater (which now operates under a new name, Xi), I am not arguing that the U.S. has not shown its preference for a divided Sudan by allowing that training to go ahead. However, to suggest that it wants war, or that the presence of training missions is good evidence of that, is unsustainable. What would be the beneficial outcome of such a clash? You are correct to write that the U.S. has often meddled in the affairs of other countries. My suspicion is that it is anticipating a war between North and South Sudan, and would prefer that the South win. However, to argue that Xi’s presence testifies to a plot to divide Sudan solely on the basis of your abiding suspicion of the U.S. is a bit like insisting that you can correctly make a diagnosis of tuberculosis on a patient who is coughing because coughing is one symptom of tuberculosis. That is bad medicine: coughing is also a symptom of a range of other maladies, and may not reflect tuberculosis at all.
Best,
Matt
Dear Matt
Suspecting Blackwater in South Sudan, is not only because the patient is coughing, but because of the history of the patient’s coughing and its origin, and the little blood that came out some times back.
Dear Matt
Let us be open about this, if you read Jeremy Scachel’s book -Blackwater- I guess you sure know the title and the history of the founder of Blackwater, now Xi, you may see the point people like me and Jamaledin are trying to make. What can a Christian Man who considers himself a missionary be seeking in the Sudan?
However ,and we have talked about this before I think, the religious dimension of the war in the South and for the South Sudan cannot be and need not be overemphasized, it has always been there.
To stop the encroachment of Islam into Africa , you need a Christian State in South Sudan, a buffer state. The activities of the various Christian denominations in the South, with the help of the British Colonial Power, which denied the Ministry of Education of the Sudan then the right to open schools, under the pretext that they use Arabic Language, and allowed only Missionary Schools, that teach in English. The British even denied the Maronite Church access to South Sudan, because the Maronite Church preaches in Arabic. The facilities and even free education for people from the South in the Comboni Schools and some friends from the clergy in the South to-day know what I am talking about, all these testify to this religious dimension that i refer to. Not to mention the pressure groups formed by the christian Right in America.
To say that Blackwater or Xi is a benevolent enterprise or some sort of a (romantic mercenary), as you once said, is beyond my imagination.
As for France, I suspect that France is in competition with United States for influence in Africa. France seems to be holding on to Dar Fur, and may be more interested in that region and could one day come out for the same formula of a self-determination referendum in Dar Fur, i am not sure whether Abdel Wahid Nur can deliver on that though.
Matthew,
Yes I was being facetious about the French. But I admire their relationship with Africa at many levels (I have experience in this regard). Yes they are much less hypocritical but they are also losing a fighting battle in preserving their historical integrity with regards to their involvement in the Rwandan genocide.
Secondly, Robert Zoellick once told NCP members (during the early onslaught of the Darfur conflict) to “get rid of the problem”. This gave the NCP a “license to kill”. This merits investigation. What was the developing relationship between the NCP and Bush administration? How might it have changed?
What is the concern for war between North and South? You are suggesting that there is a cause for concern too? What indicators make you believe so? Maybe we are both viewing the signs from different angles.
(yes i know Xi is Blackwater)
Lastly, I’m sorry you’re currently unable to visit Sudan. But I hope you get the chance to not just visit Darfur, as in how Samantha Powers did, but to live in Sudan for a substantial amount of time (what ever happened to Samantha anyways? I haven’t heard what she’s been up to in the news with regards to genocidal Darfur). While there, I highly encourage you to learn Arabic (as best as possible) and to engage with people from all corners of Sudan. You might begin to realize an ultimate transformative experience and understanding of Sudan.
I’m afraid, I had more to say but I don’t want to give up too much at the moment.
Best,
Jamaledin
Dear Jamaledin,
Let me start to you with this true story: in the height of Darfur war, the Khartoum’s Defense Minister accompanied a delegation of US Congressional team into a Dafuri village. There, they found a deserted razed village. As they walked around, assessing the damage and horror, the Defense Minister interjected, and he exclaimed, ‘you see, where is the evidence!’ The point is not just as Matthew Sinn is trying to correctly put it when he said, “the use of proxy militias, flying columns, and air power (however rudimentary) are hardly conducive to record-keeping.†So, it is also about the regime’s attempts to deny the existence of evidence, obvious they may be. With or without the recorded evidence, we must all agree that the people of Darfur have had, “their villages razed aground, relatives murdered, women raped, and properties looted.†These have been all happening at he behest of Khartoum government.
I am very amazed by your anti South Sudanese rhetoric, when you are saying that it is the West who are fueling the South-North war. Where was the West when the Torit Munity occurred in 1955, before the infamous Sudan independence? Where was the West when Anyanya movement started in 1960s? Where was the West when SPLM/A sprung into action in 1983?
For the sake of argument, let’s agree with your view that it is the West which is fueling the South-North war, but how can you explain Khartoum’s drilling of the oil from the South and using the profit to pay for the war in South Sudan, Darfur, Nuba Mountain and the rest of the marginalized areas. South Sudan may have a ‘ready ally,’ the West, doesn’t Khartoum has any?
For your other points, I tried to read you, but I noticed you have gone into irrelevance, employing the digression tactics, by trying to talk about the Western economic theories. If no one have asked you to get back to Sudan issues, I can do that favor for you now, GET BACK TO SPEAK ABOUT SUDAN. I believe these page is dedicated for Sudan issues. Just consult with the topic to agree with me if there is nowhere in my posting you can agree with.
Steve Paterno
Dear Steve,
Yes the bit about “economics” was a digression. I’ll stay within discussion next time. My point was to convey that the talking points raised are always framed in such a manner as to put us on the defensive. Matthew Sinn brought up the CPPCG’s definition of “genocide” as if its the end all be all in making sense for the crimes committed in Sudan. I respectfully disagree with that. This is the same (you’re either with us or against us), left vs right, black and white prism that Sudan watchers appraise when addressing Sudan.
Secondly, if you had followed my writings, you would see that I am weary of the SPLA and the NCP equally. I have said nothing malicious against southern Sudan, nor the aspirations of southern Sudanese for peace, justice, economic opportunity, and good livelihood. No one can deny the historical injustices suffered by south Sudan. I never said anything about western involvement in early rebellions in southern Sudan. I never talked about the dates you listed, neither did I detract from the struggles of southern Sudanese.
My comments were purely based on current events unfolding that are leading to the referendum, starting with the presence of Blackwater (I refuse to call them Xi) mercenaries in southern Sudan. This is a hostile development. It is bad for all of Sudan, as was the weapons purchases Khartoum completed before the eyes of the SPLM and the “behind-the-back” Ukrainian weapons purchases uncovered in Kenya as destined for the SPLM. If the the US military (under the watch of the Pentagon) were training SPLM soldiers, there may have been minimum checks. But Blackwater? These are troubling signs. To me, it appears there is a preparation for war underway and it can only be encouraged with the backing of a super power like the US.
It is just confounding to myself how someone can ask me how the presence of mercenaries cannot be construed as a preparation for war? Absolutely confounding. It is either a genuine perspective or a blind-sighting proposition.
I did address matters raised on some level. Systematized war that targets specific groups with the intent to obliterate an ethnicity, tribe, race, and culture is genocide. War born with a political intent is not. This is a serious point of contention. Most denizens of Khartoum are not oblivious to the happenings in Darfur. If you cannot get Khartoum to agree that it is a genocide, then how can you achieve your aims? What I’m saying, there is a disconnect. One year ago we knew that 300,000 died from the barrel and blade of the janjaweed. Today we believe 200,000 faced forcible conditions of starvation, disease, and malnutrition. Something is up here. For the last year I have been searching the internet for pictures of graveyards: looking for the skulls, bones, and ashes of the victims of this tragedy. I still haven’t found any! Please help me believe that this tragedy was a genocide. It has caused me enough grief when I have conversations with strangers who eagerly ask for my opinion or information. I do not have ONE family member from any part of Sudan who ever raised the word genocide to me. I have a friend from Darfur who told me his parents are just as confused about the news they watch. What is going on here???
If the controversy continues, I’m afraid it will play into the hands of the NCP.
I will back out from commenting so regularly for fear of denigrating the high caliber of this blog. I fear my input has been rather inflammatory and offensive, as pointed out by Steve. My apologies to Steve and all concerned, if it was so.
David,
I have spent time reading sections of Mr. Scahill’s book, which, if I remember correctly, is long on conspiracy theories and short on evidence, which explains why I have not yet made it a purchase. He continually works up the idea that Blackwater is a latter-day Praetorian Guard, and prejudicial to liberal democracy — all while ignoring the clear departures of modern experience from that of imperial Rome. The Praetorian Guard was stationed inside the capital; Blackwater contractors are fighting overseas. Rome was eventually overthrown by mercenaries only after they had effectively replaced the army; Blackwater provides combat support services to one of the largest professional militaries on the planet. In fact, colonial America, which often depended upon fighting forces tied to particular personalities (those who financed regiments were frequently rewarded with brevet commissions in the militia); engaged aboriginal peoples as combat auxiliaries; and which authorized privateers on a regular basis was far more vulnerable to the kind of miserable end described by Mr. Scahill than is the United States today. But more than that, Mr. Scahill’s book is also depressingly one-sided: he takes it on faith that the merits of his own political ideology are self-evident, and those of the “right-wing,” non-existent. That said, your reminder has encouraged me to add Mr. Scahill’s book to my library: I look forward to discussing this subject further after I acquire a copy later this month.
Despite believing that Mr. Scahill has an unsubstantiated fear of all things Christian, I concede that it is perfectly reasonable for Sudanese to be concerned that Blackwater’s interest in South Sudan reflects its leader’s apocalyptic worldview. Prince certainly campaigned hard for a loosening of sanctions and a clear expression of American support for South Sudan. It is probably significant that, while Bush did allow the Sudanese some defense imports and training, Blackwater did not get its contract.
My immediate recommendation would be to take a closer look at the specifics of Blackwater’s behavior in Sudan, rather than just the ideological context. First, I know of no current contract between Blackwater and the Government of South Sudan, in spite of renewed campaigning since sanctions were lifted in 2006. I found a recent article by McClatchy indicating that Blackwater has escaped legal prosecution for making illegal sales pitches, first to Garang, then to Salva Kiir, for $2 million to train bodyguards and then for $100 million worth of comprehensive military training and the equipment to go with it, but nothing to suggest that such deals have yet been cemented. Apparently, an exchange of software encryption keys and satellite phones did occur, in violation of U.S. export law. More significant still, Blackwater’s sales pitch was reportedly encouraged by elements in the CIA and State Department who may have perceived Garang’s death as an assassination. Although the McClatchy article emphasizes the Christian devotion of key players in the sales pitch, the comment, “Africa was a new market, and Sudan’s Christian-Muslim divide looked to some within Blackwater as a front in Bush’s ‘war on terrorism,'” suggests that profits as much as Christian sympathy might have been behind Blackwater’s avid interest.
Second, it is unclear to me why military assistance would necessarily be evidence that the South is preparing for war, or that the United States is seeking it. Today, the Christian Right has far less political power than it once did. If George Bush planned to act on Darfur or South Sudan, why did he not do so when the clamor for American action was far greater than it is today? He lifted sanctions on South Sudan in 2006, but took no aggressive action against the north. The period of hawkish editorials has passed us by. Prince is now seeking to sell Blackwater, which, if its business interests have tended to reflect his personality these past years, may soon become a very different beast.
With all due respect, I commend you a second time to my remarks on mercenaries. I made clear distinction between the “romantic” mercenary of the 1960s and 1970s and the “corporate” mercenary that appeared after 1991. Blackwater (and Xe) clearly fall in the later category. In fact, if McClatchy is correct, than Blackwater’s offering price — a 50% share of South Sudan’s future mineral wealth — suggests that they are hardly engaging in mere Christian charity. I was frankly astonished by that bid.
The McClatchy article, from 27 June, can be found here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/27/96579/obama-wont-charge-blackwater-with.html
Best,
Matt
Jamaledin,
Could you provide more specifics about Zoellick’s alleged comment? A quick Google search didn’t turn up anything from my end.
My own perception is that the Bush administration was interested in the NCP only insofar as it wanted to bring Khartoum to the peace table for the purposes of carrying on with the CPA. There was apparently a certain degree of detente between Khartoum and Washington after September 11 — the NCP was said to be “towing the line” on terrorism with some helpful sharing of intelligence — but I know of no serious interest in stronger ties. The Bush administration was very clearly sympathetic to the South, and relaxed some of the long-standing sanctions against it.
Samantha Power is now on the National Security Council, which explains her absence from the headlines since 2008.
Best,
Matt
Jamaledin,
I am happy to entertain alternative definitions of genocide, and even to debate whether the idea itself has any real merit. It may be that murder is murder. The “logic of genocide” — if one may call it that — is sometimes painfully perverse. Can the murderer of the last green person on the planet truly be held more responsible than the murderer of the first blue person? Do the very human imperatives of truth and justice outweigh the potential promise of a silent peace? Should a silent peace ever be considered acceptable? Is genocide a historical commonplace on the road to actualization of the Westphalian state? If so, might genocide signal the necessity of abandoning reunion in favor of some other solution, possibly including formal partition?
As an idea, genocide has its moral ambiguities. However, it is important not to confuse suspicion — or even accusation — of genocide with misapprehension of the problems in Darfur. There has certainly been mass killing and extreme displacement. So many hundreds of thousands do not abandon livelihoods for the danger of camps in the absence of imminent danger. I cannot account for the silence of your contacts, Jamaledin. Speaking only for myself, I am satisfied as to the credibility of reports by the various organizations and individuals mentioned in this thread and elsewhere. It seems to me that Alex and Julie have collected evidence that the Janjaweed fought with intent to obliterate what they perceived to be an “other,” often defined racially and in terms of culture. The Sudanese government has encouraged and abetted indiscriminate slaughter of persons belonging to specific tribal or ethnic groups as part and parcel of what are sometimes called “drain the swamp” tactics of counter-insurgency: eliminating the presumptive support base for rebel forces.
The introduction of mercenaries into a conflict zone is not inherently bad, although it probably should be considered interesting (i.e., bearing close scrutiny). Sometimes, as in Sierra Leone, corporate mercenaries can be better depended upon to respect human dignity than those whom they replace, may have superior technical and combat support capabilities when compared to local security forces, and even a greater sense of cohesion.
An arms race is bad for all Sudanese, yes. However, it would be a mistake to assume that any contracts awarded Blackwater represent a hard-charging intentionality on the part of the United States. While the Bush Administration was clearly keen on the idea of Southern independence, probably for reasons having to do with ideology as well as oil, the Obama Administration is indisputably occupied with extracting this country from a pair of wars, not plunging it into a third, even by proxy. Blackwater hasn’t provided the South with heavy equipment, and it makes sense for the South to develop those capacities with or without Blackwater’s involvement. How would Blackwater’s arrival by any different than the commitment of a Kenyan training mission? Doesn’t Kenya have as much, if not more, interest at stake in Sudan than Blackwater? Why would the U.S. military exercise a greater or fewer number of “checks” relative to Blackwater? What do you believe that Blackwater will teach the South Sudanese defense forces that is different from what U.S. military forces teach their partners? Blackwater often hires directly from the elite fighting forces of the world; these men are usually professionals.
Preparation for war? Wouldn’t that be a natural concomitant to the possibility of a disputed outcome on secession? Why is it in any way traceable to Blackwater? Military providers offer services, including training, during peacetime as well as during wartime. Preparation for war may be alarming, but it is not necessarily evidence of intent to go to war.
Best,
Matt
Matthew,
The first paragraph of queries has quite expansive series of juxtaposed rhetorical questions (some may merit independent threads of discussion). Contrarily, the lead up to the follow-up question offers clear insight, indirectly and alarmingly standing on its own: “might genocide signal the necessity of abandoning reunion in favor of some other solution, possibly including formal partition?”
Partition of what? Darfur from the greater Sudan? the next point of inflection we should expect to hear/read? bold
the question, in of itself, sounds like an “accusation”, not “suspicion”: but we are in agreement that we should first establish there was indeed a “genocide”. It seems the crimes best not be qualified as a genocide for the time being. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal on the Washington Post on June 28, 2008, “Justice Off Course in Darfur” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/27/AR2008062702632.html
it is soundly logical not to wholly entrust extrapolated “facts” from reports by members of the international community whom spend years writing, revising, and debating figures. at the risk of sounding like a hard-balling obfuscater: its imperative to confirm data collection, data interpretation and analysis, and distinguish genuine data from echoes of the “going word”. its also difficult to verify how measurements were taken and statistical analysis was employed. Thought-provoking as that may sound, this doesn’t discourage the need for humanitarian work to quell the effects of the violence.
apart from the integrity of the data, or continual interpretations in light of ongoing inter-tribal violence, is the effect of its morphing and convenient impact on the media, public opinion and ‘clock gone awry’ public perception, and policy, which must be put to question; Like I said before, during the height of the 04-05 conflict, it was 300k dead from violence. Today it’s 200k+ dead from disease and famine related causes (i read the zoellick bit then; no surprise its hard to find; ill let you know when i do; nevertheless, Bush & Co. enjoyed a visibly improved relationship with the NCP)
This issue of “genocide” is one in retreat, visibly so in the eyes of busy but conscious objectors. What isn’t missed, on conscious (unforgetting) observers, is how quickly and quietly in unprofessional (media) spheres.
While revision of data continues, it is difficult to have a lack of “misapprehension of the problems in Darfur”. I have relatives working in Darfur and they speak for themselves and are very clear to me about what’s going on. Some have suggested that some refugees are profiting from renting out abandoned property to NGOs in favor of camps and price-depressed (free) staples.
There was sufficient ‘allaying’ of minority public misapprehension fed to us during the case for War in Iraq and Israel’s two-week fist-pounding on Lebanon. Dis-inhibited support may have been welcome then; that sort of sport is not welcome here, whether the call is for Western armed forces interference or blown out humanitarian presence without preconditions to GoS-backed security.
I never said genocide has moral ambiguities. War does. If it was implied, there’s no need for misdirection.
Praise for Blackwater’s demonstrable “professionalism” deserves commendation. It’s nominal transformation to Xe services also extricates its history. It is an “interesting” development. Also interesting is how elements of the SPLM are eager to pursue the referendum and forgo talks on the court-arbitrated border demarcation. In the backdrop the SPLM is consolidating security and receiving formal training from Blackwater. can someone say Kashmir in the making? even as an analyst, this one cannot so willfully elude the mindful.
Matthew, US energy security considerations that are being visibly neglected. WSJ> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.html.
A preparation for war can be subsumed for a diplomatic escalation or confrontation backed by energy security directives. A “silent” development to a proxy war is not as costly as is proposed. A “hard-charge” on the intentionality is not necessary as the doctor’s prognosis on U.S psychoactive behavior is quite clear.
And what, if I may ask, is a “silent peace” anyways? One would invariably hope that peace is silent, and if silent is sustainable.
Jamaledin
Dear Matt
Thank you very much, I really benefit a lot, reading your writings in this blog, whether i agree or disagree with your views, I have the deepest respect for you.
My problem Dear Matt, is that we are racing against all odds in the Sudan to-day, our country is facing disintegration,with in all honesty, was caused by ourselves before others. My hope is that our people, or rather our leaders will compose themselves and think clearly and objectively,transcend their petty divides. I pray that common sense prevails.
Outsiders,in all shapes,forms and manifestations will only seek their interests in the final analysis.
Incidentally, the Bush Administration,may not have been in support of secession of the South. In fact,i remember Jendayi Frazier, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in the Bush Administration, has stated that,as was quoted by Sudanile, i referred to this sometime back in this blog.
As for the competition among various interests with different agendas, we can talk and write ad infinitum.
Blackwater is but one of them. Religeous interests have and remain to be there in South Sudan,other interests, neighbouring countries seeking more influence,like Musevini’s Uganda,and many others.
Alahram Centre for Strategic studies, published a disturbing paper about a lecture by the one of the ex-directors of the Israeli intelligence service,about dividing the Sudan.
There is also the struggle for the Nile-waters,and the South Sudan could have a role.
There is oil and oil is lucrative,as you know.
There is alluvial gold, where at one time,the SPLM/A clashed with the Uganda Defence Force,but then there was John Garang,whom all the Sudan and indeed Africa lost.
We have blamed the North enough,but to-day,the Leaders of the South should also be called to face their responsibility,towards the Sudan and towards Africa,for the Sudan, as the great Historian Toynbee says, holds the destiny of Africa in it’s hands.
And Blackwater,the Christian Right,the Moslem Brothers,and the neighbouring countries hardly think in such noble terms.
Best regards
Jamaledin,
Apologies for not clarifying my thoughts on partition. I was speaking abstractly about possible responses to bitter violence, especially inter-ethnic, inter-cultural, or sectarian, in which diverging ways of life contribute to extreme post-conflict alienation. If we study history and conclude that certain ways of life often destroy others, or that the consolidation of the state forces “out-group” populations to conform to the norms of those in positions of power, then perhaps the solution is to grant the “out-group” an independent existence. My suspicion is that such a solution would be disappointing, and perhaps even detrimental, if applied to Darfur, which can probably have little hope of a prosperous existence as an independent state. Darfur is generally resource poor.
I am less interested in proving genocide, honestly, than simply agreeing on the fact that mass killing has taken place. It was intentional killing, initiated and enhanced by the Sudanese government. Alex and Julie correctly call the Sudanese government a “brutal mafia.” This killing was rarely systematic, and often by proxy, but it was not necessarily indiscriminate: the government targeted those whom it defined as rebel sympathizers; its agents, the Janjawiid, targeted those whom they identified as blacks; and both targeted anybody else who stood in their way, whatever their identity.
I said that the charge of genocide has moral ambiguities. It does. It implies that the target of killing is a measure of how heinous is the crime. That is almost grotesque. What is the value of any particular human life? Why do we seem to regret the killing of particular groups more than indiscriminate killing? Can the developing world ever be satisfied that the charge of genocide is not hypocritical if it is coming from Western nations that are themselves no historical strangers to genocide?
In Sierra Leone, the mercenaries in question were Executive Outcomes. Based on my limited knowledge of Blackwater’s history, I would avoid holding them apart as a sterling example of a responsible corporation — especially as new information regarding sanctions violations have arisen. I think that is typical of the entire industry. However, that isn’t something that couldn’t be regulated and more closely scrutinized.
If the SPLM prefers independence, and anticipates it — as do most Sudanese, to my knowledge — then isn’t the development of the South’s armed forces unsurprising? Also, I don’t know that they are receiving formal training at this time. I know that there has been some training and non-combat equipment provided by the United States, including pilot training. I know that some private military companies have been hiring Kenyan soldiers in anticipation of a border war between newly-independent South Sudan and (North) Sudan in 2011. And I know that the SPLM has purchased about one hundred T-72 tanks.
The fact that the United States is concerned about its energy security is not compelling evidence that it intends war between North and South Sudan. In fact, the ideal outcome for American investors would be a peaceful transition to independence, following by a broadening of cooperation between North and South Sudan. What benefit can war bring?
I would define “silence peace” as peace without justice — general amnesty for some or all of the persons known to have committed violence, or suspected of being responsible for violence. The question that post-war societies face is often whether to pursue justice, and possibly to sow bitterness and a sense of continuing community grievance, or to pursue peace in silence, at the potential cost of simmering tensions and feelings of unaddressed grievance. To borrow a page from Dr. Stephen David’s discussion of Israel’s policy of “targeted killing” (assassination, if you like), it is human nature to feel most comfortable when good and bad alike receive what are considered their “just desserts.” When those known to be bad go free, and those known to be good are not given compensation for their suffering, it may be that society as a whole is wounded, and the proper paradigm for group interaction somehow altered for the worse.
Best,
Matt
Dear Alex,
Thanks for the clarification. I thought the PTC refused to consider new evidence though, and made its decision based on the evidence that was available to the court when the first arrest warrant was issued in 2009?
It’s actually an interesting point of contention: that the ICC prosecutor is trying to push for consideration of new evidence–namely the conditions of the IDP camps–because he believes it strengthens the charge of genocide, while others believe that had the court considered this evidence it would have found that genocide is not ongoing (due to the shifting trends in and drop in lethal violence over the last two years).
Matthew,
“Why do we seem to regret the killing of particular groups more than indiscriminate killing?”
You are right. From my perspective, this is a disgusting state of affairs today. The imagery of discriminately killed “blacks” is the pornography of war and destruction that provides the transformative catalyst for the neurosis of “white man’s guilt” to evolve into the “never again” ego of “man’s burden”. In the backdrop, judicial reforms are underway to try “failing” states as a remedy.
Yes, the Janjaweed was not indiscriminate in its objectives and it was a proxy group. The Sudanese government IS a “brutal mafia”. There are similarly “legitimate” mafias that you mentioned that can also be characterized as brutal. The presence of state brutality is unfortunately on-going. We still wait to hear what the ICC is doing about ‘those’ states (Ocampo said, in an interview, “gaza is interesting”). It is that sort of equitable realist framework that i hope can be developed.
I want to turn to what you said about “blacks” being targeted however. I will bring up the Zionist underpinnings of “arabs” versus “blacks”, as if there are substantive non-blacks in Sudan. This is an improper and unacceptable qualitative description but its imagery has specific intentions and consequences on perception and the battleground of western policy.
Sudanese are all blacks. We can instead say, at the behest of the NCP, the predominantly ethnically baggara nomads fought against the predominantly ethnically zaghawa, fur, and masalit farmers, all whom enjoyed a visibly peaceable history until recently. The latter suffered atrocities and the NCP abetted crimes against humanity.
You once asked me to consider that American foreign policy on Sudan may not be so tinged with zionist influence. I ask you to consider the opposite for the idea is definitely not novel to me. I do distinguish true American policy from Israeli ones and most of the time they are in tandem (although its still unclear who is master and commander).
As is the case in other parts of the region, there may be a confluence of interest by members of the israeli and american zionist spectrum (in washington the going is how little, not how much, of a zionist are you). i cannot substantiate this, but what’s relevant is that i, and most sudanese agree its there. i wouldnt expect an admission in that regard. but, still, Id like to add, as far as Sudan is concerned, the Republican party has been most favorable to Sudanese political developments (in my view), for this party holds more galls against democrat Zionist liberal political traditions of interference. however the Republicans were also unclear about their policy towards the 2003 Darfur rebellion (their plate was full then). The NCP, having enjoyed a record-breaking comprehensive peace agreement, were enjoying improved communication with the White House and were developing a national plan of governance, a marked departure from the military navigations that have steered the country to social and economic ruin. On a relevant tangent, it deserves mention: the prior fallout of Turabi with Bashir was a significant ideological split in the NIF, that didn’t get its rightful weight in acceptance due to its then-obscurity. It can be said, if the fallout with Turabi was the ideological “crossing of the Rubicon”, the signing of the CPA was the ink that sealed it so. The NCP was eager to remove the military uniform for a chance at governance. Project “Islamization” would not have survived another decade. i think the ncp knew this. But even if the Islamization spirit remained, we can then turn to its ideologue for answers about this “racial” policy of eliminating “blacks” as is so eagerly accentuated in the media and literature, these days. You may be surprised to know the main founder of modern Sudan, of the Islamist party, Hassan Elturabi, has a PhD in Law from France and speaks a number of languages (including fluent english). Today’s Sudan is a deviation of Turabi’s Sudan, as today’s America is Reagan’s America. If you listen to the spirit of his religious/political teachings, you will note that even he is not a racial ideologue. Similarly, as much as we want to believe that 30,000 Iranian Jews are under threat of extermination from the state of Iran, well that simply isn’t the case. Sudanese traditions are influenced by sufist ones, not puritanical sunni or sunni wahabi ones. The islamic project is not the same “acid splashing”-type we hear about in afghanistan or the “chop off your stealing hand” we read about in the backwards God-doms of saudi arabia. You will note, islam did not spread to sudan through Islamic conquest, as it did in Egypt, but through cross-border trade and intermarriage.. a gradual history of voluntary assimilation. All this is to say matthew, the sudanese political establishment is not some black-fearing plantation owning collective. the “black question” is and was never a question as the “jewish question” tragically once was in Nazi Germany. the lack of distinction pervades the arguments of those who present this “black annihilation initiative” narrative without the political context it deserves. This trapping may be symptomatic of what psychologists call “projection”.
Matthew, blackness is no re-discovery to Sudanese as the presence of arab influences in Sudan are to sudan watchers.
was the NCP foolhardy? brash? knee-jerked reaction? irresponsible? must be held accountable? tyrannical? brutal? yes to all. It goes to show that this government is fundamentally incapable of ruling Sudan. however, i suspect a project of ‘white man’ guilting pressured on northern sudanese (if i can use the term ‘white man’ as a way to describe the arab and black relationship that is evoked by the term “black darfuris”). Whether its intentional or not, the moral ascendancy leveraged by the west is the climate condition that is creating dissent and is further stifling a northern sudanese opposition that must learn to fight the ncp on its own. if this point is understood, you shall hear little quarrel with me, or others, about the clear militancy of the NCP, suffered mostly by we citizens of Sudan, but poignantly reminded by non-citizens.
The early to mid-90s social trajectory of isolation and brutal civil war (suffered mostly by southern Sudanese victims and casualties of war but also depriving other regions through state management diversion) was inevitably leading to the NCP’s terminated rule. Incidentally, the discovery of oil changed the almost certainty of revolution. In Africa, the rule is that natural resources are a curse, not a blessing. Once southern Sudan cuts its lines from the north, the NCP’s political machine will loose its oil and the ailing economy shall naturally destabilize a governing NCP. But as long as the system remains oiled and in peripheral political turbulence (to the glee of some analysts), you shan’t see this bulls eye civic struggle. There was a lot of optimism in Sudan prior to the CPA. We were about to see the NCP “govern” and measure their reforms (or lack of) against a clear backdrop of political order and rule.
Israel’s “targeted killing”? In a world of MadTV parodies on the new iRaq and iRan, that sort of “discussant’s” (non-critic’s, if youd like) euphemism might be funny. (the term assassination excepts the “Rightful” land’s policies by distracting us with imagery of clandestine laser-precision operations; all other “blood libels” notwithstanding ofcourse). Let’s hear more moral lessons from Palestine’s “experiences” and parallel it with Sudan’s?
“The question that post-war societies face is often whether to pursue justice, and possibly to sow bitterness and a sense of continuing community grievance, or to pursue peace in silence, at the potential cost of simmering tensions and feelings of unaddressed grievance.”
That is the European experience, Matthew. It has definitely sown “bitter” states. But there may be alternatives. I invite you to study the Rwandan, South African, and Zimbabwean models.
Best,
Jamaledin
Jamaledin,
You’ve made some very interesting remarks here. I look forward to the ensuing discussion.
While I sympathize with your suspicion that it is an echo of the White Man’s Burden that spurs Western interest in African crises such as that in Darfur, I honestly see very little of that attitude at work here in the United States. (I would add that, ironically, some critics perceive the ready Western intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as evidence that Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin care only about white Europeans, rather than black Africans.) First of all, most Americans are so absorbed in domestic problems, and so poorly-educated in world affairs, that they scarcely heard of Darfur. Second, while some Americans do feel a responsibility to act in Darfur, it is probably due more to the fact that the conflict is highly accessible — the killing reached its zenith just as we entered a definitive turning point in the digital age — than that it satisfies hegemonic pretensions. Most of the agitation for intervention comes from the liberal side of the political spectrum in this country — from people who view American power as largely misspent in Iraq, and see in “barren” Darfur an opportunity to take purely altruistic action on behalf of suffering members of the global community. The “failed state” is a separate trope that draws heavily on the experience of Somalia after 1991. While the term has at times been used simply to delegitimize governments toward which the user takes exception, the concept as a whole is probably a good one, inasmuch as it is really designed to call attention to the fact that the forces putative responsible for law and order in a given territory have either been subverted or destroyed.
I think we have come to some agreement with respect to the killing in Darfur: it was perpetrated intentionally by the NCP and its agents, and targeted entire groups of people solely on the basis of their tribal affiliation.
I accept your criticism that the “black”/”Arab” dichotomy isn’t an actual cultural reality — that all Sudanese are black, and that the meaningful distinctions in Darfur are often made across tribal and vocational boundaries. It is sometimes argued that this angle was manufactured by persons trying to tell a compelling and, for Western readers, comprehensible story about the animosities that contributed to the killing and dying in western Sudan. I am happy to agree that identity is both subjective and, as anthropologist Dru C. Gladney has argued, contingent on relations between the individual and some “other.” Put simply, identity is a combination of how one things about oneself, as well as what others think, and will vary by time, place, and company. I am happy to agree that the NCP is trying to destroy tribal groups whom it links with specific rebel movements.
I would urge you to reconsider any attitude for which you can find no evidence. I am not sure how you have developed the opinion that Israel is largely responsible for the United States Africa policy. Indeed, I think a good case could be made for the statement that the United States has no coherent Africa policy. More important, I am unaware of any evidence that the Israeli lobby is a meaningful voice on policy as it relates to Sudan. I am willing to review any evidence of which you are aware. The fact that American politicians are loath to alienate the Israel lobby in the absence of a meaningful Palestinian or Arab lobby in the United States does not lead me to suspect any connection to American policy-making on Sudan. Incidentally, this is the first I’ve heard of the 30,000 Iranian Jews and their supposed plight. Americans are interested in Iran primarily because they regard the Iranian government as a clutch of bigoted fanatics that use the country’s oil wealth to fund terrorism throughout the Middle East. They are generally concerned that the Iranians are going to develop nuclear weapons — I believe that they have already done so, but oppose a preventative military strike as infeasible. They are concerned for Israel inasmuch as it is an ally, but the animosity toward Iran is much broader than that. For older Americans, it probably goes back to resentment over the humiliations inflicted during the hostage crisis. For younger Americans, it often has to do with Iran’s reputation for almost self-deceiving thuggery.
Why do you refer to “democrat Zionist liberal political traditions of interference?” The flexing of military, political, and economic muscle against others is better described as the natural act of a hegemon or superpower. Even when such major powers do not act using military force, they nonetheless purvey a certain set of norms that are intended to “stick” and proliferate. During the Bush administration, the United States abandoned any pretense of playing status quo power. The president’s cabinet was largely comprised of so-called neo-conservatives, former liberals who believed that the United States should attempt to remake the world in its image, especially through the forceful establishment of democracy in Iraq. By contract, the People’s Republic of China is now the best exemplar of a major power emphasizing the status-quo — sovereignty — in order to help blunt American influence.
As I’ve indicated before, it seems that Washington avoided pressuring the NCP largely because of its conspicuous cooperation after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Thus, Chapter 3 of the State Department’s 2006 Country Report on Terrorism (2007) reads, “The Sudanese government was a strong partner in the War on Terror and aggressively pursued terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan. [….] With the exception of HAMAS, the Sudanese government did not openly support the presence of extremist elements in Sudan. The Sudanese government took steps to limit the activities of these organizations. For example, Sudanese officials welcomed HAMAS members as representatives of the Palestinian Authority (PA), but limited their activities to fundraising. The Sudanese government also worked to disrupt foreign fighters from using Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for Jihadists going to Iraq. There was some evidence to suggest that individuals who were active participants in the Iraqi insurgency have returned to Sudan and were in a position to use their expertise to conduct attacks within Sudan or to pass on their knowledge.” If Bush was muted when it came to the NCP’s misdeeds, it may also have had to do with the sense that antagonizing the NCP would endanger the CPA. The charge was a common one.
Do not misperceive the point I was attempting to make in quoting Dr. David. The term “targeted killing” is obviously a loaded one, and was purposely chosen because Dr. David disagrees that strikes against suspected terrorists are either murder or assassination. You may be interested to know that when I took a course with Dr. David, students were required to read a number of different articles on the subject; his was but one of many. My point in drawing out the quotation was not to focus on “targeted killing,” but on his related but distinctive claim: societies function best when people, good and bad, are seen to get what they are believed to deserve.
My understanding of the tensions between peace and justice stem precisely from the South African context. Indeed, I would argue that Zimbabwe appears to have suffered badly from failure to properly address its past: Mugabe ruined the white farmers who held the predominance of the country’s investment capital and technical skill. (How could it be otherwise, when millions of blacks had been systematically repressed for so long?) Nobody can dispute that some arrangements were necessary in order to bring about greater equity in the economic relationships between black and white Zimbabweans. However, to dispossess the farmers as comprehensively (and brutally) as Mugabe did was to consign his nation to enormous suffering: Zimbabwe, once a net exporter of food, is now starving. In Rwanda, many of those directly responsible for the killing in 1994 fled to Zaire. The animosity between Hutu and Tutsi was merely displaced from one side of the border to the other. Today, President Paul Kagame is routinely accused of playing Tutsi strongman.
Best,
Matt
Thanks for the input. I wanted to space and time out the post. There’s a lot I’d like to reply to.
Lets start with the NCP’s targeting of tribal groups. I’ve said before, and I’m not alone in this: the NCP targeted tribes. Yes. But not for the purposes of homogenization nor ethnic extermination. While that isn’t an explicit requirement for disqualifying the NCP’s campaign as a genocide (as per Geneva Convention definitions on genocide), the NCP’s objective remained politically motivated. Don’t misinterpret my views as an endorsement of the NCP. But until you tell me of a world where political conflicts are not intertwined with tribal polarization and mobilization, then the word genocide will fall on deaf ears in the majority Sudanese circles. “Societies [do] function best when people, good and bad, are seen to get what they are believed to deserve.” Well before that, we must first recognize the crimes committed. I’m not kidding when I say, most Sudanese know that there was no genocide. However, there are sufficient crimes that can see Elbashir fit for capital punishment. But that’s no way to approach a crisis that may need reform for comprehensive settlement. As I suggested before, these Islamists might need a way out. Prior to the warrant for Elbashir’s arrest, there were plausible rumors that he would giving up the presidency by not running in the elections. While Washington continues to narrowly focus on Elbashir (due to Zionist congressmen) what is missed is that Elbashir is the buffer. The true Islamists are his associates.
At this point, I am prone to believing the NCP’s version of 20,000 dying from violence related causes as the international community has settled with the figure of 200,000 dying from famine and disease-related causes. We Sudanese were equally skeptical when the word terrorism or “war on terrorism” became a catch (scare) phrase. Regime change or not, Sudanese will never designate a Darfur holocaust month. It isn’t a part of the consciousness of the opposition in Khartoum even! Matthew, there is a project of homogenizaton happening somewhere, not far from Sudan. Genocide is not so unsystematic or ambiguous there.
“the animosity toward Iran is much broader than that. For older Americans, it probably goes back to resentment over the humiliations inflicted during the hostage crisis. For younger Americans, it often has to do with Iran’s reputation for almost self-deceiving thuggery.”
I fear the user has opened a can of worms. Does the user really believe that all this language of hostility in the press has to do with the mere “thuggery” of Iran? And who is Iran threatening exactly? Does the threat of war, that we constantly read of, have to do with a “hostage” crisis from 1979? If only older Americans would recall the USS Liberty attacked by the IAF in a bid to escalate tensions in the region and launch the US into a war with the Arabs. Surely such “thuggery” couldn’t fail to equally drive up the drivel for war between the US and Israel. Democrat President Lydon Johnson squashed the “incident”. My point is: I would think that Iran’s “thuggery”, as a pretext for the U.S.’s disposition, is conveniently self-deceiving. Also, before submitting to the demonization of Iran, we must agree that Tehran was created by Eisenhower’s America, whether willfully or not is irrelevant. Enough with selective disregard for history. Ironically, Eisenhower was the first man to stand up to Israelis in telling them to leave Sinai. America is safer with Republicans in power, a theme you shall hear me talk of more in the coming paragraphs. The rest of the world may not be so lucky with Republicans, but it is certainly worse off with Democrats.
Matthew, it is Israel who beckons to go to war with Iran, for obvious reason. Iran remains ideologically and unshakably inimical to Israel. This has nothing to do with nuclear weapons anymore. And it was the Bush administration that prevented an attack from happening! The necons were not prepared to put America into war for Israel’s sake on this one. This is what I mean. Republicans might be irrational. But they are not crazy. Iran’s response of funding destabilizing operations (terrorist if you prefer) is a natural response to its perception of security threats posed by the invasion of Iraq and Aghanistan, which can be viewed as part of a broader policy that has seen America loose sight on its real national security interests, in Latin America, America’s forgotten “backyard”. It seems that only four-star generals sitting before congressional committees can make murmurs of discontentment, begging for a strategic rethinking of US foreign policy. Only Republicans can stand against suicide, unlike their euthanasia-prone counterparts.
I never said Israel is responsible for the US’s Africa policy. But Sudan is in no uncertain terms hostile to Israel and that will not change with any regime unless Palestinian sovereignty or citizenry is resolved. Similarly, depending on who Israel’s friends with, in the region, America follows. Sudanese are not as gullible or compliant as their gulf or Egyptian counterparts. The user mentioned the averseness of loathing the Israel lobby due to a lack of robust Arab lobbies; as if that were a sound reason in of itself to restore democratic integrity and accountability to a kleptocratic and morally bankrupt political machine that has become DC and its peripheral counties. But, the state department was not mentioned.
Once hailed as an African hero, Mugabe’s Zimbabwe has now been cornered as southern Africa’s story gone bad. In Zimbabwe there was no room for negotiation with white farmers. What? Do you believe the white farmers were going to leave quietly and forgo their wealth and property? This situation was escalated by defiance, obstinacy, and political maneuvering–on both sides. The media (i.e. BBC) strategized its selectively opaque and transparent reporting. Inevitably, it was going to lead to British interference, as most Zimbabwean white farmers are dual citizens. Mugabe cannot be defended entirely. He exploited the conflict to gain political favor. But how could it not be so? The UK pulled the EU into the mess and escalated the diplomatic and economic tensions. Zimbabweans are paying the price for this collective punishment when Mugabe was just protecting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty (whether done rightly or not is irrelevant). Everybody knows it but so called “liberals” who continue to deceive the 3rd world in thinking they actually care. It’s an argument I’ve heard many-a-time. “Yes, Zimbabweans needed the reform, but Mugabe consigned his citizens to death when he brutally administered his campaign”. Clever. What escapes the argument is the issue of “compliant negotiation” (or lack of) of the white farmers. What imaginative alternative scenarios would have seen a justifiable and just reversion of wealth? As I said before, liberals are dangerous. Conservatives, while also hegemonic, are very linear, and predictable. Liberals are fickle. And I say this to most immigrant populations who take solace with the progressives’ agenda of safeguarding their domestic de-segregationist concerns while flippantly paying heed to foreign policy.
“Iraqi insurgency have returned to Sudan and were in a position to use their expertise to conduct attacks within Sudan or to pass on their knowledge”
Matthew, like Darfur’s genocide, there is no such thing as ‘terrorism’ or a ‘war on terrorism’. This is a word that has eluded my circles for a long time. It does not exist in our discourse or perception. It’s a ruse. Live outside the US long enough and it will become apparent. No terrorist attacks have ever been conducted in Sudan by outsiders. The only “terrorizers” are the NCP. I’ll be the first to say, we should stay focused on that one. We don’t need the user to project hegemonic political misperceptions with Sudanese ones.
Kagame was funded and supported by the CIA. Kagame ignited the civil war and genocide. Kagame prevented American requests to intervene during the height of the genocide. Ironically, he is now being addressed as a problem child.
How long shall we remain at the mercy of the hegemony’s capriciousness and revolving-door penchant for fresh views, interns, analysts, and policies? Have “liberals” finally gotten sick of the war? Well then its time to pack up and leave! Just like that. Ten years later: Iran.
Best,
Jamaledin