Southern Sudan At Odds With Itself?
A new research report into local violent conflicts within southern Sudan, Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace, provides insights into the processes generating and sustaining conflicts. It debunks some important assumptions. The research team was headed by Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen, based at the LSE, commissioned through PACT Sudan and funded by DFID. The researchers conducted more than 300 extensive interviews in diverse parts of southern Sudan.
The standard explanations for ongoing violence in southern Sudan, are to blame Khartoum’s intrigues and “tribalism”. Unsurprisingly, both these accounts are at best incomplete. Although many people, especially local administrators, alleged that there was a hidden hand of northern Sudanese destabilization, the report finds almost no evidence adduced in support of such an opinion. Where specific groups, such as the Fellata Ambororo, were present and widely perceived as being northern-sponsored troublemakers, the actual evidence implicating them was thin to non-existent. To the contrary, southern Sudanese who contributed to this report provided much specific information and analysis for the local origins of conflicts over resources and territory, cattle raiding, and other violent disputes.
“Tribal conflict” has been used as shorthand for almost any violent conflict, whether within or between tribal units, and therefore its explanatory value is rather small.
In reality, the source of much of today’s conflict within southern Sudan is closely associated with the difficulties faced by the GoSS in handling competing political and governmental projects, such as capacity-building alongside decentralization, and consolidation of central authority alongside democratization. Typically, local administrators such as county commissioners are former military commanders, selected for their loyalty to the SPLM, who rely on patronage and tribal identities to build a local power base. This political process is occurring alongside a weak or nonexistent peace dividend in terms of development, a serious lack of law enforcement and other administrative capacity, and tensions arising over unclear administrative boundaries, competition over natural resources and resources dispensed by the GoSS (often in an opaque manner with perceived unfairness across communities), and population movements associated with returnees from towns and outside southern Sudan. A particular problem is that GoSS practice in establishing local government blurs the distinction between ethnic and administrative boundaries, leaving it open for local officials to create fiefdoms based on ethnic patronage. Given the amount of inter-ethnic mixing and population movement that occurred during the war and continues today, this is bound to generate conflict. In short, the mode and context of establishing state institutions is itself a cause of conflict.
The widespread belief that the causes of conflict are northern destabilization and tribalism has contributed to responses to the problem that are limited, incomplete and in some cases may actually have exacerbated conflict itself.
Most practical effort within southern Sudan, by local officials, chiefs, church leaders and NGOs, is expended on responding to inter-communal violence. However, the report finds a lack of clarity about what such peacebuilding entails. There are contradictory views on what constitutes an authentic or effective process. While some people argue that external actors should stay out, leaving local peace to traditional authorities that are capable of handling it alone, others see material resources to deliver a peace dividend and governance institutions such as law enforcement as essential components of peacebuilding.
In these circumstances, there are many efforts at peacebuilding, mostly focused on inter-tribal peace conferences, which have a very uncertain record of delivery. There is a lot of discussion at these conferences, which generates communication and goodwill. However, the outcomes rarely specify in detail who has the responsibility for further activities and especially implementation of recommendations. The channels of communication that are opened are not often sustained, through lack of investment in follow up.
In addition, the governance structure implicit in a peace conference is one that treats people as tribal subjects rather than citizens. The process privileges chiefs, many of whom have uncertain authority (and in this context we must note that many peoples in southern Sudan do not historically possess chiefly authorities, and such that existed have been undermined and distorted by decades of war, and by changing power relations consequent on the proliferation of light weapons among young men). The definition of the conflicts as “tribal”, and thus amenable to tribally-based reconciliation efforts, can be counterproductive insofar as it reinforces a particular definition of the conflict and lends itself to the interests of chiefs in consolidating their position and their patriarchal and conservative form of governance.
Also, the local-international dynamics of a peace process have their own impact on governance:
“Usually facilitated with outside help, the proliferation of peace conferences has created a paradoxical situation for many local leaders in which their power is expressed by the ability to fundraise for a local conference and gather support of an aid agency, yet simultaneously undermining their own authority to solve local problems without outside help. By defining conflicts as local and tribal, peace conferences have neglected the broader political context.” (p. 10)
Most importantly, the peace conference approach emphasizes one aspect of governance””inter-communal relations””at the expense others, which include institution building, development and democracy:
“Descriptions of peace meetings emphasise centrality of dialogue, compromise, forgiveness and negotiation – an approach that creates disjointed peace efforts by excluding issues of governance, such as accountability, justice, restitution, law enforcement and broader national peace processes despite better knowledge that these are vital for a comprehensive process. In fact, a number of respondents felt that peace meetings undermine the establishment of a strong rule of law, especially conferences that assumed that people could reconcile without a justice or reparation component. In contrast, programmes that address the structural causes of conflict and include addressing shortages in resources or infrastructure are more positively received by communities and are deemed to have long-term meaningful outcomes in conflict mitigation programming.” (p 76)
The CPA itself contains no mechanisms for addressing local conflicts, but in principle it sets up institutions for dealing with them – at such a time as they mature. With the onerous demands on the GoSS, governance capacities that can stand above, and effectively manage, such conflicts, is some way into the future. Putting in place the fabric for social peace is, ad interim, a valuable exercise, but as the report explains in some detail, it may have problematic consequences in the longer term.
One salutary finding of the survey is that a large minority of southerners (43%) believed that there will be a new north-south war (28% believed not, the remainder didn’t know), and that nearly as many believed there will be south-south violence in the near future (38%, but with 47% believing that there would be no such violence).
Fear of a new war instigated by northern Sudan is clearly widespread among southern Sudanese, and is a strong influence on southern Sudanese politics. However, an interesting finding reported is that many respondents believed that the GoSS preoccupation with the perceived threat from the north is diverting attention from internal problems including conflicts. In particular, many people see the referendum not just as an opportunity to vote for secession but also to address governance issues within southern Sudan.
“Some respondents pointed out that the single-issue debate, centred on the question of whether the outcome would be unity or separation, was misleading. The referendum is viewed as an opportunity to incite, push and support lasting change within the south. Indeed, some pointed out that GoSS was muffling its own support for separation by pitting the referendum debate solely against the north, rather than encouraging a credible and diverse political system to foster political debate and give a glimpse of a different political culture. Criticism about the way elections were conducted has made this point even more important.” (p. 31)
The report does not delve into the GoSS programmes of disarming the civilian population, which have been justified in part by the belief that armed civilians will be the basis for future northern destabilization. Disarmament programmes have been not only a source of violence in southern Sudan, but incomplete or inequitable disarmament, can be a contributor to conflict. Where one community believes that it has been disarmed and its neighbours have not (which, according to this report, is very common) it is likely to rearm itself and distrust the authorities. Cattle herders who have lost livestock to rustlers and raiders are also likely to acquire new arms and to suspect and resist or evade any new disarmament exercises.
The report has (thankfully) no catalogue of recommendations, but rather proposes new ways of approaching the challenge of ending armed conflicts within southern Sudan. The authors recommend four areas of focus:
(1) Providing a tangible “peace dividend” focused upon the improvement of infrastructure.
(2) Re-thinking the process of administrative decentralization which has contributed to local divisions and the “tribalization” of administrative units.
(3) Addressing the lack of clarity of political structures and development approaches, which refers to the incompatibility, at least in the short term, between the goals of decentralization, democratization, and the consolidation of the GoSS’s political authority.
(4) Putting into practice an ongoing and inclusive commitment to make peacebuilding a long-term, accountable and multi-faceted endeavour. The proliferation of short-term, donor-financed, fragmented and ad hoc or single-purpose peace initiatives needs to be replaced by a more strategic approach that overcomes all of these shortcomings.
This report is sure to generate controversy. Many will argue that this is not the time to focus on internal problems within southern Sudan, and instead to ensure that the key provisions of the CPA are implemented without obstruction over the next year. Others will make the case that the peacemaking efforts are necessary and irreplaceable. At minimum, the evidence provided and the strong analysis challenge the report’s critics to come up with a comparably strong case.
There are some excellent findings in this report. The most interesting to me is the finding that, like Alex mentioned, the MINORITY of southerners believe that a north-south war will follow independence. This statistic could be used to challenge those who are writing frequently about the inevitability of war (see Eggers and P-gast’s op-ed in the NYT titled, “War is Around the Corner in Sudan”).
Following that same thread of thinking, I also found the section “Referendum as a Moment for Change,” to be insightful, demonstrating that the current argument about the referendum (unity or separation) is too simplistic. The report reads that the “respondents [to the survey] pointed out that the single-issue debate, centred on the question of whether the outcome would be unity or separation, was misleading.” These findings could also support the idea that the referendum might not be the casus belli that so many seem to be saying it will be.
Dear Alex,
thanks for your views on our report.
I want to pick up on one of the points you make–the fact that the report is sure to generate controversy as it will be seen to focus on internal problems in the south at an inopportune time. I understand this concern, but I also have a very different view on it.
What the report aims to do is to reflect on the everyday experience of people living in southern Sudan right now. This everyday experience is markedly removed from high-level politics, but it is not at all removed from the CPA. The CPA is not understood to be solely a technical document by the southern Sudanese who had hoped for peace. Thus, it is important that it does bring peace—one reason why we have seen the proliferation of local violence is disappointment with the CPA’s ability to bring local peace. What was really striking during the research was a universal hope that the CPA would improve the situation.
As such, I would argue, implementing the CPA and dealing with internal problems of violence pursue the same aim. Naturally, doing both is an even bigger challenge than implementing the CPA. But almost everyone we spoke to during the research said how much they longed to live in better, peaceful conditions. These will not be achievable solely through high-level CPA implementation. Both government and international organizations have very important roles to play in approaching peace in a more holistic way.
Best wishes,
Mareike
DEBATING A SOUTHERNER (1): Akol Liai Mager
Washington, Mohammad Ali Salih:
Akol Liai Mager, from Warab state in Southern Sudan, now lives in Queensland in Australia. He is the SPLM representative in Queensland.
Recently, he and I exchanged e-mails.
This is an edited version.
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Mr. Mager started by responding to the following commentary I had written on a report by International Crisis Group (ICG) on Sudan’s neighboring countries and the coming referendum in the South:
1. Always, unity is better than disunity; an agreement is better than a disagreement; and civilized nations usually move closer to each other than apart. These are historical, national and moral obligations; also religious because major religions call for them.
2. The Northern Sudanese bear more responsibilities than their Southern brothers to strive towards agreements and unity. Because the Northerners were responsible for most of the past mistakes, and because they are currently able to help their Southern brothers.
3. What ICG mentioned on the position of Uganda was not a secret: that Uganda supports and encourages the separation of the South because it “needs a buffer zone on its northern borders.†But ICG didn’t’ mention an important reason: Uganda’s fear of the Muslim-Arab culture expansion. No force on earth can stop this expansion, even if Uganda sends tanks into the South to defend its “brothers.â€
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Dear Brother Mohammad,
Undoubtedly, the Northern Sudanese loud cry for unity these days is motivated by Southern Sudan’s natural minerals; especially by fear of losing the oil…
The Northerners have never loved the Southern Sudanese. They only love the one million square miles, oil and short-cut routes to Heaven…
There is no need for Ugandan tanks in Southern Sudan to stop Arab and Islamic cultures. The injustice and brutality of Arab and Islamic cultures are enough to stop their expansion…
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Dear Brother Akol,
International Crisis Group report said Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and Eritrea supported Sudan’s unity, Kenya leaned towards separation, and Uganda encouraged separation because it needed a buffer zone to the north.
I said Uganda was afraid of Arab-Islamic culture.
Do you agree?
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Dear Brother Mohammad,
All the countries you have mentioned as supporters of Sudan’s unity are self-Interest, driven empty barrels:
1. Egypt is motivated by the Nile waters, and to continue building Jonglei Canal.
2. Libya is motivated by the racist Arab disease call Arab-brotherhood and Islamic religion.
3. Ethiopia is motivated by the interest of the leaders to pay back their masters in Khartoum who brought them to power through violence.
4. Kenya is motivated by bribery and would support the will of the Southerners.
5. Uganda has firmly stood with the people of Southern Sudan, with only one major error, the death of Dr. John Garang De Mabior in their government care. But, this does not wipe off what Ugandan people did to their brothers and sisters in the South…
I don’t think there is a human who sees a Cobra snake coming into his sleeping room and does nothing about it…
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Dear Brother Akol,
After more than 30 years in America, I have come to believe that there are some similarities between North-South relation in Sudan and Whites-Blacks relation in America. I believe the Southern Sudanese need to follow the example of their Black brothers in America:
1. At first, the Blacks rightfully struggled against slavery and racial discrimination (with help from some Whites).
2. Then and gradually, most of the Whites acknowledged the injustice, and suggested to open a new page.
3. Now, there are laws against racial discrimination all over America.
4. Now, there is a Black President, Obama.
5. But, now and probably for ever, there are racial inclinations and subtle discrimination on the part of most Whites (also among Blacks, Browns, Yellow, etc).
I would respectively, hopefully and religiously, ask my Southern brothers to open a new page.
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Dear Brother Mohammad,
1. You are suggesting that an innocent victim must be ruled guilty and, therefore, should apologize to the offender?
2. SPLM/A kept all thousands of Northern Sudan Prisoners of War (POWs). Was that humane or inhumane, new or old page?
3. Northern Sudan’s Army killed all SPLM/A POWs. Was that humane or inhumane, new or old page?
4. SPLM selected Yasir Arman, a northern Sudanese and a heavy weight Unity believer, to run against Albashir. Was that old or new page?
5. NIF, Umma, DUP, SCP and Ba`ath believe not only in chopping heads off, but in dropping off opponents from planes in midair. (Captain Machuur Thon Arok is a living witness).
6. Jesus said to his Disciples, “how come you can see a tiny object in your brother eye, and you failed to feel a big wood in your own.â€
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Dear Brother Akol,
I agree with you more than you may expect:
1. Yes, since Independence, Northern governments’ policies towards the Southerners were deprived of freedom and justice.
2. Yes, before that, Northern slave merchants’ activities in the South (and in the North) were unjust.
3. Yes, activities by American and European slave merchants were not just.
But, I have two questions:
1. For how long are you going to repeat these facts and continue your anger?
2. Why don’t you open a new page?
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Brother Mohammad,
First of all I, and other concern Southern Sudanese, will work to put an end to anger, together with brothers and sisters in the North who acknowledged that the Southerners have suffered enough and have been badly treated by their Northern counterparts.
Secondly, to be honest, I am a unionist until the time I will vote in the referendum. I will be forced to vote for independence if the Northerners still stick to the separation programs represented by Arab and Islamic identity of Sudan.
Thirdly, the time for a new page will only come if the oppressors acknowledge that they are wrong, and are ready to change their racist attitudes toward the African Sudanese.
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Dear Brother Akol,
I repeat my earlier point about the situation of the Southerners in the Sudan as compared to the situation of the Blacks in America. Many years ago, the Whites in America agreed to open a new page and to issue laws that ended discrimination.
I believe the Northern Sudanese are ready to open a new page and to issue laws to end discrimination and prejudice.
What laws do you suggest?
What do you want?
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Dear Mohammad,
1. Sincere apologies from all Northern Sudan political and military forces to those families in Southern Sudan affected by their brutal and inhumane actions.
2. A Presidential decree to declare Khartoum a “National Capital City†and free of all racist and divisive Islamic laws
3. A Presidential Decree to compensate Southern Sudan for its oil revenues it has lost during the war.
4. Northerners must declare that Islam must not be used as a political weapon to fight non-Muslim citizens and, therefore, must stay far away from the state’s affairs
5. Lifting of social and cultural barriers that divide people such as marriage’s barricades…
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Dear Brother Akol,
Yes, the government of Sudan should issue, and implement, laws to guarantee, not only the Southerners, but also the Northerners, freedom and justice, and to end discrimination and prejudice.
No problem.
What else?
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Dear Brother Mohammad,
… We must work together to open new page and move forward. Only if we can leave the Americans, the Europeans and the Israelis alone, and blame ourselves for our actions …
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[email protected]
Dear Alex
If the post-1972 Addis Ababa Agreement period in South Sudan were to be carefully studied, the problem in South Sudan is the confidence between the Southemers themselves.This is being pre-empted by what some are dubbing as northern-sponsored trouble makers.
That some major tribes worry about the seeming domination of other tribes is a reality, and cannot and should not be wished away, by invoking a threat of manipulation by the North.
We are before half-baked solutions, and we need time to ,you have sometime back suggested an extension, I agreed with you then and here again, I may go further and suggest to the SPLM/A a delay, a new transitional period.
The right to self-determination,in my view, remains, and cannot be repealed by any force.
Dear Mohamed
I read with interest this exchange,and wish we Sudanese have had such exchanges long tine ago, now it may be too late though I still hope against all odds.
I am however, disturbed, by your comparing the situation in Sudan to that of the USA, white/black divide. You say, “I believe the Southern Sudanese need to follow the example of their black brothers in America”. There can be no comparison, all Sudanese are brothers of the black Americans, we are all Nubians after all, except that we in the Sudan, have so much forgotten who we are, and came to parrot our arabism at the expense of our africanism, even though the Bible and the Moslem history of Abraham (Ibrahim) Peace be upon him, tells us about the blood ties that link africans and arabs. (Genesis 16:13 and 16:15).
You seem to classify the Southern Sudanese as (blacks), what about the North? What about the non-arabs, who are the majority in the north? Is’nt this the wrong choice of identity,that led us to this crisis in the first place? How would you classify the people of Dar Fur, the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile, the Ingessena,the Hadandwa? The new ( Mashrou Alhadar), of the first days of the National Salvation Revolution,of 1989-1999), and the attempts to turn the Sudan into an Arab/Moslem Country, has caused the intensification of the war and divided the country, except for one simple detail, this time, people from the north, supported the SPLM/A , and even joined its ranks and file to fight the government in Khartoum, but tragically enough, some elements in the SPLM/A want to wipe that out,and go their own way. It is true the SPLM/A nominated Yasser Arman,and his campaign started as good national one, but it was the SPLM/A, itself that withdrew him, and the question that will always be asked, is why?
You say Uganda wants to fend off, the spread of the Arab/Islamic Culture? I wish to respectfully remind you that Uganda is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and has a considerable population of Moslems, around 30% of the population.
It is true that there were missionaries, who in the past and even to-day would want to create a buffer against the spread of Islam southwards, but islam is already there,it is in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, down to South Africa, not to mention that these were Islamic Kingdoms before the advent of the Portuguese.
I agree that Uganda, under Musevini, is for the secession of South Sudan, but for other reasons, Musevini,is seeking to protect his Hima minority dictatorship, moreover Uganda has always claimed parts of South Sudan, you would of course remember the late Idi Amin’s claims, on Sudanese and Kenyan territories, in 1974 ,when Sudan moblized its forces. What better chance to extend his hegemony over the region,than a new nascent state, groping its way? Don’t we all remember his failed attempt with Rwanda?
As for my brother Akol
I wish to tell him that Kenya counts more for the South than Uganda, Uganda being a land-locked country and so is South Sudan, and both need an exit to the Sea and that is through Kenya, even the talk of the pipeline to export South Sudan precious oil is to be build through Kenya.
Brother Akol, also talks about the laws that need to be changed, and there are no laws instituting discrimination,as was the case in the USA before, I was particularly intrigued by his call for the abolition of what he termed “marriage barricades”, and wish to remind both of you that marriage patterns in the Sudan are either exogamous (i.e.marriage outside the tribe) or endogamous (marriage within the tribe), and is not a government policy, just as in the North,the South too has endogamy, and may be a more strict form, notably among the Dinka,the Nuer and the Shilluk. Outsiders may not know this, save for the few who read Evans Pritchard, and the other British anthropologists who wrote about this subject,hence, people like brother Akol would use it for propaganda purpose,but you dont vote for secession on basis of propaganda, and a false misleading one .
I agree with brother Akol, that we can do better, if we admit that we have a problem of our own making, and that we alone can solve it. Whatever help the neighbouring countries promise, is good, but also has its price.
There seems to be a recognition now, that unless we change, the price will be unbearable, to both parties.
Dear Mohammed
“After more than 30 years in America, I have come to believe that there are some similarities between North-South relation in Sudan and Whites-Blacks relation in America”
I’d be very careful with this “belief”. The successive northern Sudanese governments and southern Sudanese have had a relationship of oppressor to victims. This is no different to other oppressor-victim narratives. Also, we cannot appropriate all blame on the north.
I also question how one can call another “brother” and harbor such language of hostility, spite, and even malice. Maybe the term “brother” should be dropped in such a context, while we find ways to heal deep wounds and scars.
Lastly, this issue of Islamism and Arabism is a legitimate concern voiced by southern Sudanese. It is a deep problem in northern Sudan and I have called many times for northern Sudanese to take a more ambiguous “laissez-faire” belief in Islam, if atheism is a difficult step to resolve. We all know Mohamed and his companions made up Islam for benign political organization, and I’m not so sure Jesus even existed. Northern Sudanese must begin to examine the constructed belief system of Islam, long antiquated and sub-optimal with respect to modern times. Southern Sudanese identity is separate from this identity and time and the Norths failures have proven that “no one can rule southern Sudan but the southern Sudanese”.
As such, it’s important for northern Sudanese “liberals” to drop this bid for unity and to recognize that some minds have been made up about the north. Our energy should be focused at transforming the north, not at pulling in the south to help us reform the north. Should northern Sudan hope to forge an inclusive and independent nation with recent migrants or remnant southern Sudanese, it should view these Islamic traditions and social belief systems for their mythical falsehoods. Terms like “kafir” are not mere slogans. They represent a deep-rooted disrespect and contempt for the non-muslim order.
Once the Southern Sudanese separatist establishment has been ridden from Sudan, the remaining greater Sudan should begin this foundational dialog amongst its circles. But I fear the elite are still chasing the dragon’s (NCP’s) tail. The northerners and southerners in the elite establishment who matter most are mostly quiet while the cantankerous ones continue to spread falsehoods that inevitably “rock the boat”
I would like to start a frank discussion amongst muslim Sudanese about their religious beliefs and if they agree with me that islam was made up. We need strength in numbers.
David Barsoum,
“some major tribes worry about the seeming domination of other tribes is a reality, and cannot and should not be wished away, by invoking a threat of manipulation by the North.”
Thanks very much for this honest opinion. I agree. It’s a consolidation tactic by the SPLM reinforced by the SudanTribune and her likes.
DEBATING A SOUTHERNER (2): Head, South’s Mission to USA
Washington: Mohammad Ali Salih
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Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth: Head of Southern Sudan’s mission to the US, in Washington , DC . Was Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) representative in US. Served as a soldier in Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA). Received BA in criminal justice from the University of Maryland College Park
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Q: In recent media interviews, you described the current talks between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) as towards a “peaceful divorce.†Why?
A: Many times, under President Salva Kiir Mayardit, we repeated that we are ready and committed to honest negotiations with the NCP because, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 (CPA), certain issued must be finalized before the end of the agreement’s duration. Therefore, talks about post-referendum should be honest and transparent. But, we lost hope in the NCP.
Honestly speaking, I think what we are entering into is negotiating peaceful divorce. Why?
First, there is not enough time left before the referendum for the two parties to agree on all pending issues.
Second, we are disappointed in the events since the singing of the CPA because the implementation of our goal to create a New Sudan seems now difficult if not impossible.
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Q: Will the Southerners choose separation or stay in the united Sudan ?
A: According to many international and local polls, if the referendum takes place today, 98 percent will vote for independence.
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Q: Recently, Ali Karti, Sudan’s new Foreign Minister, said the separation of the South would lead to a war worse that the war that ended in 2005?
A: The SPLM repeated many times that it wants peace, not war. By the way, I noticed that the new Foreign Minister has recently issued some extreme statements, and not only about the South. Those who talk about a new war don’t know what war is. We know. We have suffered form war throughout the decades, its killing, its bloods, the destruction, the widows, the orphans, the disperse of families, of villages and of a whole people.
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Q: Didn’t some Southern leaders also issue extreme statements? How about those who hare talking about an independent South that would cooperate with the US in its “War on Terrorism�
A: Under President Salva Kiir Mayardit, I represent the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in the US . Ask me about this, not about statements issued by other people and other organizations. You have to know that the Southerners, since the CPA, have become free to say what they want to say; we cannot stop them.
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Q: How about the slogan “ Sudan Jadid†(New Sudnan) that was criticized by many Northerners as a foreign-inspired plan to change Sudan ’s Islamic and Arabic identity?
A: H.E. late Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the founder and former president of SPLA/SPLM, had a vision of a New Sudan . He didn’t want to just end the war. He, also, wanted to establish guarantees that the war would not start again, and that would be by establishing a New Sudan with the following characteristics: First, diversity of religions, cultures and ethnic groups. Second, sharing of power and wealth. Third, writing a secular constitution.
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Q: Didn’t you just say the implementation of the “ Sudan Jadid†seems impossible? Has it failed?
A: Yes, for now, and for two reasons: First, the NCP which controls the North doesn’t want any changes towards secularism, diversity and democracy. They want to continue the Islamic military regime they established in 1989. Second, after the signing of the CPA in 2005, we called for “Wihda Jazaba†(Attractive Unity), and said the Northerners had a last chance to proof that they were serious and honest — by building in the South infrastructures, schools, hospitals, factories and others development projects. Now, five years have passed and we see nothing of that sort on the part of the Northerners.
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Q: Will the Southerners vote for unity if the Northerners construct these projects?
A: This is an “if†question.
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Q: What should the Northerners do for the Southerners to vote for unity?
A: First, official and popular, civilian and military apologies for the killing and destruction in the South during the war decades. Second, financial reparations for the physical and mental sufferings; also for the oil revenues that were not given to the Southerners duding the war. Third, free and fair elections to reflect the true powers and the diversity of the country – a step towards New Sudan .
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Q: What would be the following step?
A: A secular constitution, like the American one. The US constitution doesn’t segregate people because of their religions and races; it separates state and religion. Also, it doesn’t describe the Whites, their color, culture and religion as superior, although they are the majority. Also, it doesn’t say Christianity is the official religion, although it is the religion of the majority. I am not an Arab and I am not a Muslim. Why do I have to feel I am a second-class citizen in Sudan ? Why wouldn’t the Sudanese constitution be like the US one?
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Q: Under the new constitution, could states in the North declare Islam as their official religion, and, maybe, implement the Sharia, provided that the Southern states don’t have to do that?
A: In the US , there is no state that can mix between religion and government and discriminate because of race and culture. So, if a Northern state declared Islam as its official religion, what would be the situation of its non-Muslim citizens?
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Q: Some Southern leaders put impossible conditions on the Northerners. Like SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum, who said that Northerners should stop calling Southerners “Abeed†(Slaves)?
A: I also said that because it reflects the Northerners superiority complex; it is an Islamic and Arabic superiority complex. Many African countries suffer from that, but in Sudan it is very clear and very direct. That is why I am not sure that, even if the Northerners apologized and paid reparations, they would change in the way they treat the Southerners. And that is why we want a Sudan that recognizes its African identity. 60 percent said they are Africans. So, why does an Arab minority controls the county?
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Q: But the Northern Arabs and Muslims are also Africans?
A: If they are Africans, who do they look down to us? Why do they talk about the unstoppable Islamic and Arabic culture expansion in the South? This talk makes us feel unsure about the Northerners’ real intentions, and whether they would want to repeat the injustice that they inflicted on us in the past. Why can’t there be freedom and justice in Sudan as it is here, in the US?
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Q: Despite US laws against discriminations, some Whites call Blacks Niggers (slaves). Of course, this is not an important issue. The most important issue is that the Black Americans have come a long way, and the Black-White relations have improved greatly, to the extend that, right now, there is a Black President, Barack Obama?
A: In the US, there is a secular constitution and laws against discrimination and an independent judiciary that the oppressed appeal to. To whom and to what can the oppressed in Sudan appeal?
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[email protected]
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On 21 September, 2010, the Sudanese Media Centre website ran an article on the LSE report “Southern Sudan at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace.†The full text is below.
As the article significantly misrepresents the content of the report, I, as one of the authors of the report, would like to offer a few clarifications.
The Sudanese Media Centre website claims that “British institution reportedly warns of ‘violent clashes’ if south Sudan secedes.†It also states that “The report pointed out that the most violent clashes will occur if secession prevails.†This is not true. The report makes no prediction regarding violent clashes or passes judgement regarding a direct connection between violent clashes in case of succession. Instead the report points out that southern Sudanese citizens see potential for violence between north and south or within the south both in case of unity or secession—there is a general expectation that potential for violence in Sudan is high amongst all parties.
The Sudanese Media Centre states that the report says “that the southern [Sudan] government was unable, with the support of international institutions, to establish permanent and strong governance.†The report makes no such blanket claims, but instead outlines in detail the challenges the government continues to face in delivering services to its citizens and the international institutions face in clarifying their own goals in supporting southern Sudan.
The Media Centre cites—as a direct quote from the report—that “‘Some [southern] citizens did not hand over their weapons after the signing of the [Comprehensive Peace] Agreement and kept them in store so that they can use them in future”, said the report.†This is not a quote from the report. The report, however, points out challenges in civilian disarmament.
The Media Centre summary cites—again presented as if a direct quote from the report that “‘The role of the Khartoum government in supporting insecurity in the south is a mere rumour that has no basis on the reality on the ground’, said the report.†This is not a quote from the report. Instead, the report says that “testimony given by local authorities or civilians to support Khartoum’s direct involvement in local conflicts tends to be anecdotal, based on rumours and unsupported by actual events on the ground.†(P.6) It makes the point that a general assumption that all local conflicts in southern Sudan are instigated by the government in Khartoum obscures local dynamics that challenge implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
Please see the full text of the Sudanese Media Centre below, drawn to my attention by the BBC Monitoring Service:
British institution reportedly warns of “violent clashes” if south Sudan secedes
Text of report by pro-government Sudanese Media Centre website on 21 September
British institutions have drawn a gloomy picture of the security situation in southern Sudan which they attributed to what they called hidden flaws in the contradicting relations between the southern government and its citizens especially if the latter favoured the secession option in the upcoming referendum.
In a report recently released by the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) which the Sudanese Media Centre [SMC] received a copy, it was said that the southern [Sudan] government was unable, with the support of international institutions, to establish permanent and strong governance, justice and development policies due to insecurity which the southern citizen suffers from a lot because of violent attacks on civilians.
The report pointed out that the causes of tribal issues in the south comes from competition over water and land, absence of defined pastural borders, absence of political awareness and weakness of local governments.
“Some [southern] citizens did not hand over their weapons after the signing of the [Comprehensive Peace] Agreement and kept them in store so that they can use them in future”, said the report.
The report pointed out that the most violent clashes will occur if secession prevails. The report attributed this to some tribes’ efforts to gain power in the south.
It affirmed that the foreseen future violence comes as a result of objective factors which had been created through the experience of the last elections which affirmed that elections have become an opportunity for the [Sudan] People’s [Liberation] Movement to control the south.
“The role of the Khartoum government in supporting insecurity in the south is a mere rumour that has no basis on the reality on the ground”, said the report.
Source: Sudanese Media Centre website, Khartoum, in Arabic 21 Sep 10
A New Book By Francis Deng
Sudan at the Brink
Fordham University Press
2010 / 55 pages
Introduction:
I have known Dr Deng since the late fifties when we were students at the University of Khartoum.Many Southern Sudanese were supportive of the student union’s opposition to General Abboud’s regime(especially his policy in the South). I was one of the union’s leaders and was suspeneded then dismissed from the university. I remember our Southern Sudanese colleague Papiti who was actually killed in the South. Another ,known as D.K.(Daniel Kot Mathews) later carried up arms and became -after the Addis Ababa peace Agreement of 1972- a member of the Narional Assembly.I also remember Oliver B.Albino who returned to Khartoum from exile for the Round Table Conference 1965 and politely turned down my invitation to cross the river for a meal at my aunt’s house in Omdurman.
Some Southern students ,including Francis Deng, were apolitical observers of the struggle which eventually brought down the military dictatorship.
After the Addis Ababa Agreement ,which was concluded by General Numeiry(who started in 1969 as an ally of the extreme left and ended up in 1985 as an ally of the USA) needed some sensible Southern supporters and enlisted several sons of traditional chiefs (including Dr Deng) as ambassadors or governors.Francis Deng distinguished himself as Minister of State and ambassador to several countries. We lost touch;but we met briefly during my sabbatical year at Yale University 1980 when he delivered an eloquent keynote speech at the annual Meeting of the Sudan Studies Society. To my surprise ,he did not recognise me .Ten years later we met in Durham UK at the annual meeting of the Sudan Studies Society /UK .He interviewed me during an interval and discussed themes which he revisited again and again in his books including this latest one.
Old Ideas in a New Container:
This is not a new book. Not a newly written book.It is a collection of three documents. The first is a speech delivered in 1989(three months after the Inqaz regime came to power) during the Peace Conference in Khartoum. The second is a paper which Dr Deng presented at a UN organised symposium about Self Determination and Unity in 2009; the third is an article (compiled from earlier books) outlining Ten Principles For Negotiations . What is new in the 55 page booklet are only six pages plus a conclusion in another four pages .The short introduction updates the reader with the latest developments.
Size is not the main yardstick. This is an important booklet for all Sudan experts and all others in the flourishing “Sudan Bashing Industry”.It includes some significant revelations ;not completely new ;but not often spotlighted.
Dr Deng states (contrary to what he said in his 1989 speech) that John Garang was not a believer in the United Sudan . He used the slogan of unity as a PLOY in dealing with the North and the wider international community.The mind-boggling corrolary is that the New Sudan in the name of which thousands lost their lives was not a genuine Master Plan for peace ,stability and prosperity!
A second startling revelation is his assertion that the Northern opposition parties manipulate the SPLM/A in order to achieve regime change. This implies that the alliance in which the SPLM/A played a leading role (becoming both part of Government AND opposition,quite an anomaly)was not genuine.A footnote to this could be the near certainty that the Northern parties hope to use the SPLA/M as a bridge to cross over to those who support the South abroad.
A third revelation is the open admission that the promises made by the international community in Oslo in 05 to reconstruct the South were not honoured. This is not surprising ;considering the latest question marks about UN expenditure in the South.
A fourth revelation is the author’s declaration that he no longer believes that a “one country/two systems ” formula is valid. He advocates several systems.
I agree with him secession should not be viewed as the end of linkage.I hope like him that conditions could be created to reunite the country one day.By sheer coincidence, I attended a function at the German Embassy in London and was told that the building used to be the Embassy of the German Democratic Republic before reunification. I however ,differ with Dr Deng as we differed 20 years ago in the interview.He maintains that the Northern Sudanese have to change their identity. Not call themselves Arabs while they are Black Africans.
The root cause of conflicts is unbalanced development ;not the identity of Northerners or Southerers. One should also bear in mind that the first rebellion started in August 1955 (several months before independence) and that John Garang’s rebellion destroyed a great deal ,made any development impossible and distorted the economy of the whole country.When Dr Garang signed the CPA in 05 ;we thought that he accepted that an interim Constitution
that explicitly states that Sudan is a multi-racial multi-cultural multi-religious country was enough to guarantee diversity.All had the right to call themselves whatever they like ,without prejudicing the rights of others.
Furthermore;I do not agree with Dr Deng when he says that the colonial rule developed the “Arab Centre” and neglected other areas. The Gezira was developed ,not because it was Arab;but because of its even table-like plain; its satbility and its relative easy access to the Red Sea and Egypt. Other areas were remote and difficult to develop or persuade the private sector to venture.Moreover; the Centre was not ONLY or excusively Arab.People from the remote regions,including Southerners, moved to the Centre. That made it a melting pot.A place where tribal animosities vanished. It is no coincidence that political parties ,trade unions,football teams ,women’s associations were all formed in the Centre on a National Sudanese basis.By comparison both JEM and SLM are tribally based. so are some Southern Sudanese parties.The Centre is the crucible of modernisation in Sudan.Those in it did not descend from the moon. They came from Darfur, Kordofan , the East and the South.
What surprises me in Dr Deng’s articles and speeches is the way in which he disregards the international context.My view is that the context is of paramount importance.
The context as I see it is that there is no strategic conflict between Sudan and the West .On the contrary there is a great deal in common: trade,investment,regional stability and promotion of moderate Islamic thought.The Western powers (USA-UK)classify Sudan as part of Sub-Saharan Africa.Sudan sees Eye to eye with the West regarding the Middle East conflict.It supports the Road Map and has accepted the Arab League’s 02 peace offer to Israel (2 states /end of occupation ).Sudan like the West calls for an end to settlements and is not an admirerer of the Netenyahu-Liberman extremist expansionist policies. Israel sees Sudan as an extension of the Arab support for the Palestinians and has supported all Sudanese relellions directly(as professor P. Woodward has shown) or by proxy (as the UN report about JEM’s arms has illustrated.) Any anti-Arab voices in Sudan are (even if they do not mean to)part of this context.Abdel Wahid Nur (who has an office in Tel Aviv)wrote in the Wall street Journal that ending Sudan’s Arab and Islamic ties
was imperative before he joins peace negotiations.This ,needless to say ,is not the position of the UK or USA. Herein lies a possible explanation for the contradiction in the West’s Sudan policies. They have common grounds for coopreation ;but they have a recalcitrant ally who operates and cannot be ignored.
This booklet is important ;but it has disappointed me. Dr Deng is marking time in a futile -almost pathological-obsession with our identity in the North.We are more tolerant. We accept him as he is .