Zambia: Sata gets tough on corruption (and this time it’s serious) – By Jack Hogan
Prior to their electoral victory in the September 2011 Zambian general elections, the Patriotic Front’s (PF) key promise was “˜Lower Taxes, More Jobs and Money in your Pockets.’ It forms part of their party logo and could be seen everywhere during last year’s election campaign. The 2012 Budget, themed “Making Zambia a better place for all” and due to come into force on the 1st of April, is billed as delivering these, and it may well do so.
In his inaugural speech, Zambia’s new president, Michael Chilufya Sata, promised to uphold democracy and the rights of Zambia’s citizens, to reduce poverty, improve public services and the work of civil servants and renew the fight against corruption.
While most of the PF’s electoral pledges remain to be fulfilled, the fight against what President Sata called the “˜cancer’ of corruption appears, on the surface at least, to have made a real start. There have already been a number of high-profile prosecutions, sackings and appointments, and the new government is certainly making all the right noises.
Almost immediately after the elections, Sata sacked Colonel Godfrey Kayukwa as Director General of the Anti-Corruption Commission, for bungling investigations and his close links to former President Rupiah Banda. Rosewin Wandi’s appointment to the role looks to have been a good one. On the 27th of March, during a speech launching the final report on the National Anti-Corruption Policy, she called for the removal of institutional obstacles to its implementation.
This is hardly a new problem. The Ministry of Health’s Permanent Secretary Kashiwa Bulaya was prosecuted in 2007 for abuse of office, but the case was reportedly severely hampered by the refusal of large numbers of civil servants, who had seemingly benefitted from Bulaya’s corrupt practices, to testify. Wandi’s work will be made a great deal easier by the Anti-Corruption Bill 2012, which has received cross-bench support in Parliament and which is intended to re-introduce the abuse of office clause, removed in 2010 whilst Banda’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was in power. It is hoped this will go a long way towards ending systemic corruption in Zambia’s byzantine civil service.
Another noteworthy new appointment is that of Mutembo Nchito, who had been a prosecutor for the Task Force on Corruption, dismantled during Banda’s time in what many understood as an attempt to neutralize the anti-corruption campaign. Following Sata’s election, Nchito was appointed Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Whilst a promising move, Nchito was recently summoned to appear before Chief Resident Magistrate in Lusaka to explain why the case against Maxwell Mwale, former Mines and Mineral Resources Minister, was being stalled by repeated adjournments, apparently caused by inaction on the part of the DPP. Mwale is charged with misuse of public funds for campaign materials.
Sebastian Zulu, PF Member of Parliament and newly appointed Minister of Justice, chaired the Commission of Enquiry into the sale of 75% of the state-owned telecommunications network, Zamtel, to LAP Green Network, a highly-publicised and politically charged deal in the run-up to the election. The Committee recommended the immediate reversal of the sale, describing the latter as a case of “˜economic sabotage’, intended to deprive the Zambian people of a projected 2015 value of Zamtel, US$5 billion. This was possible as, in the Commission’s view, “˜A proper valuation of Zamtel assets did not take place’ before the sale was sanctioned. Yet, the Ernst & Young audited accounts to 31st March 2010 give Zamtel’s position as one of negative equity. Therefore, from an accounting point of view, the company was worth nothing. This appears to have been ignored in the findings of what some have termed a politically motivated inquiry. The US$394 million sale was reversed on the 9th of January. The report of another Commission of Enquiry, into the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), proved equally damning, recommending the investigation of several former and current ZRA staff, four former MMD ministers and the former president, Rupiah Banda.
It has been suggested that the sacking of Alfred Chipoya, Sata’s Senior Private Secretary, for taking a bribe to arrange a meeting with the president is in some sense demonstrative of a willingness to pursue the new regime’s supporters as vigorously as its opponents. In the words of Wynter Kabimba, PF General Secretary, “For the MMD that were saying we were on a frolic of retribution, this is clear evidence that we are not taking up these corruption cases on individual basis or because we do not like certain individuals. Chipoya is just the first example. “Yet Chipoya had also been Senior Private Secretary to Banda and was associated with the MMD. Chipoya, then, was hardly a staunch PF cadre, and it is tempting to interpret his disgracing as a cheap way of persuading the public of the sincerity of the new regime’s commitment to eradicate corruption.
It is of course unsurprising that an anti-corruption campaign will target those who were formerly in a position to engage in corrupt practices. Yet the same campaign can also lend itself to less commendable political purposes – viz. the demolition of the opposition. On the 22nd of February, the day in which the opposition staged a walk out of parliament, Felix Mutati, an MMD Member of Parliament, claimed that “this government has been breaching the constitution…creating ministries and transferring responsibilities” without the consent of parliament.
This was followed by the Registrar of Societies attempt to de-register the MMD. This was stayed by a Lusaka High Court judge as, unsurprisingly, the MMD’s 53 MPs applied for a judicial review of the decision. The de-registration would have dissolved the MMD as a political party, and triggered by-elections in 53 seats. It seems highly unlikely that the Registrar of Societies would have been unaware of this outcome, or that the government were unaware of his intentions. This view is echoed by Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the second largest opposition party, the United Party for National Democracy (UPND): “what we want is a professional and transparent fight against corruption; a fight that will ensure that there is no selectiveness, and no vindictiveness. Unfortunately, at the moment it is very clear that the fight against corruption is being used to settle political scores.”
Corruption has been on the agenda in Zambian politics for decades, and the Zambian public expected Sata to do something about it. Likewise, donors have time and again voiced their concerns, and occasionally withheld funding over the issue. In ensuring something is seen to be done, Sata has thus far just tried to do the opposition in. But corruption in Zambia is not solely the preserve of politicians. In the police and security services, the professions, the education sector, even down to the level of minor civil servants, corruption takes many forms. It will take time to change this, but the litmus test of the new Zambian government’s commitment to change will be its pursuit of corruption regardless of the political identity of the perpetrators.
The PF came to power with a coterie of wealthy and influential Zambians behind it. On the 28th of March, Mutembo Nchito, Sata’s aforementioned new DPP, his younger brother Nchima Nchito, and Fred M’membe, owner and editor of The Post newspaper, the only Zambian independent daily, walked out of Lusaka High Court. The Post was instrumental in Sata’s victory, carrying both PF propaganda and continually criticising the MMD, and in particular Rupiah Banda. The editor also enjoys a close relationship with the upper echelons of the PF.
The Nchito brothers and M’Membe are currently being sued for their involvement in a scandal involving the now defunct Zambian Airways, in which millions of US dollars of public money were lost. The original investigation of the three for theft, fraud, money laundering and tax evasion began after Zambian Airways ceased operations in January 2009, and was revealed to be US$29 million in debt. It alleged that they attempted to persuade Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ), a government supported financial institution, to convert the debt owed to it by ZA as its share equity without showing how and what the loans were used for. At the time the investigation was thought to be politically motivated. They are now being sued by DBZ to recover public money alleged to have been embezzled when they were directors of Zambian Aiways. Their justification for the walk-out is that the judge was not ready to hear them and had already made a decision in the matter. However, it has been suggested that they are refusing to proceed in the matter as their preferred judge, Justice Wood, had recused himself, and they were no longer confident of the outcome.
The Zambian Airways saga is perhaps the first true test of Sata’s commitment to anti-corruption, and he cannot permit those close to him to flagrantly abuse the system he is claiming to be upholding whilst condemning his opponents.
Zambia’s regime change has been accomplished in an exemplary, peaceful manner, and it is to be sincerely hoped that the transition from corruption to probity will be equally successful. Whether this “frolic of retribution” will become “a better Zambia for all” will be the real test of the next six months of PF government.
Jack Hogan is a PhD candidate at the University of Kent.
English
Amharic
Arabic
Chichewa
Chinese (Simplified)
English
French
German
Hausa
Italian
Portuguese
Sesotho
Shona
Spanish
Swahili
Xhosa
Yoruba
Zulu
A great and well reflected upon and well researched article devoid of political and academic biases.
Civic Corruption—an Ontological Perspective
This is a talk about civic corruption and development. Several questions can be addressed: What are the links between political and economic liberalization—the strengths or weakness of state, political, and social institutions, and the kinds of corruption societies experience?
Corruption benefits the few at the expense of the many; it delays and distorts economic development, preempts basic rights and due process, and diverts [scarce] resources from basic services including international aid and assistance.
Where state institutions are weak it is often linked to violence and because of corruption, for millions of people “democracy†means increased insecurity and “free markets†are where the affluent tend to become more affluent at the expense of their fellow citizens.
I maintain most strongly that corruption is undemocratic and broadly deleterious to sustained economic and political good governance growth. Since the 1980’s corruption has frequently been seen as an effect, and cause, of incomplete economic and social political liberalization, with public institutions and the political engagement treated primarily as obstructions to the process. Public sector reforms have emphasized narrow goals of “good governance†while liberalization of economies and politics has proceeded without essential institutional foundations. I submit that efficacious reform is a matter not of only an improved public management rubric but of justice! Reform requires “deep democratizationâ€â€”not just elections but vigourous contention and dialogue over the real issues among people and groups capable of defending themselves politically, and of reaching political compromises sustained by their own lasting interests. This development and enhancement entailing the social ‘ownership’ of ‘good’ governance related institutions helped create democracy in societies where it is now strong. Prescriptive reform ideas are unlikely to graft and take root unless these social foundations are secure.
There has also been a sense that corruption itself is growing rapidly. As suspect regimes lost their ideological cover and other countries moved toward democracy and open markets, many scandals came to light—some new and others of longer standing. “Corruption†is both a provocative term and an attractive [ex post] explanation for a host of development and policy problems, which can involve the electoral process. Not surprisingly those elements seeking remedy action on the problem have portrayed corruption in dramatic terms. International corporations, and international aid agencies including lending institutions have begun to look at corruption within target nations, and within their own programs and operations in a more transparent and objective manner. Corruption has also become the focus of sustained international advocacy—Transparency International founded in 1993 continues to expand its activities on a variety of levels.
The suggestion can be tendered [by the writer] that no one really knows whether corruption is indeed expanding and growing. Corruption is a secretive process in most cases, with all who possess knowledge of such corrupt illicit practice will therefore have a strong interest in concealing these activities of a ‘corrupt’ – ‘venal’ nature. Instead, the most important contrasts are located at deeper levels—in patterns of participation and in the strength of institutions, and linking, the political, electoral and the economic arenas so as to determine or predict an ethos of unregulated [corrupt] behaviour.
Balanced and sustained democratic and market development depend upon—and indeed considered as a developmental ideal are defined by—open—free, competitive, but structured civic electoral participation in politics promoting good governance and in the facilitation of a strong effective economy which entails legitimate, effective governance institutions that both protect and restrain activities in public policy generation while maintaining clear boundaries and paths of access between them. Intensive economic competition does not necessarily create—produce broad based economic growth. Considered sound policies and institutions that facilitate and protect property rights, investment and a fair redistribution of wealth are also critical element in the promotion of an objective fair regime of economic political governance. Political competition alone—even if expressed through the civic electoral model [elections] is not alone adequate—elections must be legitimate and decisive as well as free and fairly competitive and access, rights and freedoms of expression between election campaigns are of crucial importance. Open, free-fair competitive electoral participation is essential if people [citizens] are to express their electoral preferences unencumbered and have their choices arbitrated [justly] by decision makers. A critical aspect of democracy is to be able to reward effective government and being able to oust the incompetent or abusive. Citizens who have real political and economic alternatives will be less vulnerable to exploitation and dependency upon the state for personal and economic protection from harm or sanction. Civic participation must be orderly and structured—total laissez-faire in the political and economic arena is likely to empower the few and enrich the few [oligarchs] and impoverish the many, while a political free-for-all among twenty or thirty political entities will not yield democratic mandates. Insecurity can induce politicians, unsure of their hold on power, to enrich themselves as quickly as they can, and economic entrepreneurs to buy official protection while insisting on maximum short-term returns.
Democratic politics rests not only on open competition, but also on normative assumptions of equality and fair play adumbrated by the notion of “one person—one voteâ€. Self-interest may drive the process but competition among the various interest groups must be entailed by specific previously agreed-upon judicially rendered boundaries entailing both conduct and performance to an agreed upon series of protocols.
Institutionalized paths and rules of access between the political and economic arenas of influence are just as important as the judicially rendered boundaries. These boundaries are essential for maintaining accountability of state to society, and for feedback that can send critical signals to policymakers and other centres of influence. Public officials require adequate autonomy to perform their work in an uncompromised, prescriptive authoritative fashion, while groups in society and the economy cannot be the instruments [tools] of the politicians and senior bureaucrats. Maintaining the balance is complicated enough in mature democracies—in transitional societies creating accepted boundaries and paths of access/influence could be a most fundamental challenge.
Problems with civic electoral participation and institutional degradation not only contribute to corruption but shape corruption in a variety of ways. Electoral corruption in some countries may consist of vote stealing and intimidation of citizens, while in other regions civic electoral corruption revolves around the theft of public resources to reward followers and to purchase electoral support. At times corrupt incentives are used by elites to keep elections from being genuinely competitive in the first place.
Corruption in civil society is of a deep normative concern and can be a matter of considerable ontological dispute in terms of the absolute essence essential in defining the moment. Precise and absolute definitions of corruption and corrupt practice can be considered as being a matter of a long running debate in attempting to parse with confidence the absolute definition as to the ‘real’ entailment–corruption.
Corruption involves the abuse of a trust—one involving public power for private personal benefit, which often emerges in the form of monies, and power, which to a degree can be considered as being not dissimilar. In rapidly changing societies it is not always clear what those limits are, and the term “corruption†may be applied broadly which could lead to the [homogenizational] denudation of the term if not concept of “corruption†and “corrupt practiceâ€. One definition of corruption can be stated as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit with emphasis that “abuseâ€, “publicâ€, “privateâ€, and even “benefit†are matters of contention and numerous societies and of varying degrees of ambiguity in most.
Civic electoral participation in forms both helpful and harmful proliferated while state institutions were being de-emphasized, curtailed or even defined as causes of corruption and barriers to development. For many citizens ‘democracy’ can entail increased poverty and insecurity in personal life, and ineffective leadership and the development of public policy in the public realm of providing good governance.
All too often in the policy debate, however, corruption has been seen as a generic problem. Its deeper origins, the ways it is embedded in political and economic processes, and its role as a symptom of diverse and problematical relationships between wealth and power, public and private interests, and state and society, are acknowledged but shrouded with extreme ambiguity in being understood in depth and with precision. How rapidly changing societies achieve a normative standard place is reduced to recommendations for technical changes in “governance†and requires “political will†to effect normative positive change.
Monte McMurchy
The Nchito brothers and Fred M’membe did not walk out of court in the DBZv Zambian Airways matter because the judge was not ready to hear them or because their preferred judge was no longer handling the matter. Rather, Judge Mutuna refused to hear their application to adjourn the matter. They wanted an adjournment to allow for proper investigations into why Judge Albert Wood recused himself. It is disingenuous to suggest Judge Wood is their preferred judge when the facts are that he heard the matter right through trial and then mysteriously recused himself most suddenly without giving any reason. Judge Mutuna said he woud hear the case de novo. Whatevert the merits of the DBZ case, this conduct of the trial looks decidedly fishy to any casual observer, never mind the actual parties.