African Arguments

Top Menu

  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

Main Menu

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
    • Climate crisis
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • #EndSARS
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Podcast
    • Into Africa Podcast
    • Africa Science Focus Podcast
    • Think African Podcast
  • Debating Ideas
  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

logo

African Arguments

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
    • Climate crisis
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • #EndSARS
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Podcast
    • Into Africa Podcast
    • Africa Science Focus Podcast
    • Think African Podcast
  • Debating Ideas
Politics
Home›African Arguments›Politics›Mali Regulatory Risk: A likely junta-ECOWAS agreement

Mali Regulatory Risk: A likely junta-ECOWAS agreement

By Uncategorised
June 1, 2012
1467
0

On 23 May, acting president Dioncounda Traore travelled to France for treatment of injuries sustained during demonstrations by pro-junta civilians and political parties two days earlier. Following the 22 March coup, the political landscape in Bamako has become increasingly polarised as the junta leader Amadou Sanogo negotiates with the regional body ECOWAS to select a civilian leader for the 12-month transitional government. Further, discontent within the Army has grown due to personal benefits awarded to Sanogo in ECOWAS negotiations in exchange for his acceptance of Dioncounda’s appointment as transitional leader. Growing economic pressures are likely to force the junta to accommodate ECOWAS demands for civilian leadership, lowering the risk of economic sanctions.

The arrest of around 50 people, including soldiers and members of pro-junta political parties, for the attack on Dioncounda indicates the junta is yielding to ECOWAS pressure. Further indicators would be Dioncounda’s return within a week, ECOWAS support for a national conference between political and civil society actors, and the awarding of concessions to other junta members.

The political impasse has resulted in declining tax revenues and suspension of donor aid, which contributed about 50% of the state’s budget. The government can only access a third of its budget, while banks have restricted access to credit and imposed caps on money transfers. The government’s inability to provide its share of funding has already resulted in the withdrawal of South African firm Illovo Sugar from its $312 million sugar and ethanol project.

The gold mining sector, which provides about 78% of export revenues, is likely to be targeted to boost revenues. On 16 May, the government adopted a proposal for a decree to increase the special commodities tax on gold from 3% to 5%, though this would not be applied retrospectively. While the revised mining code has been ratified, transition authorities have yet to implement it, presenting a growing risk that amendments will be introduced. The government is also likely to increase supervision of mining operations and audit mining exports to counter alleged fraud. The government will likely review controversial contracts signed under ousted President Toure’s government, such as the telecoms licence awarded to Monaco Telecom and Planor.

Exclusive Analysis Ltd is a specialist intelligence company that forecasts commercially relevant political and violent risks worldwide.

Previous Article

Burundi’s 50 years of independence: “The old ...

Next Article

Libya: Uncertainty around Elections and Federalism – ...

Uncategorised

Leave a reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

  • Congo-KinshasaPodcastPolitics

    AAP#1: Electoral Politics in the DR Congo with Jason Stearns

  • Politics

    Doing the Addis shuffle: Kiir and Bashir waltz again – By Aly Verjee

  • Politics

    Africa and the Eurozone crisis – By Jolyon Ford, Oxford Analytica

Subscribe to our newsletter

Click here to subscribe to our free weekly newsletter and never miss a thing!

  • 81.7K+
    Followers

Find us on Facebook

Interactive Elections Map

Keep up to date with all the African elections.

Recent Posts

  • Of cobblers, colonialism, and choices
  • Blackness, Pan-African Consciousness and Women’s Political Organising through the Magazine AWA
  • “People want to be rich overnight”: Nigeria logging abounds despite ban
  • The unaccountability of Liberia’s polluting miners
  • Africa Elections 2023: All the upcoming votes

Editor’s Picks

BurundiEconomyEditor's PicksPolitics

The (surprisingly political) cost of a goat in Burundi

Critics say state-backed farming cooperatives have become a tool for recruiting people into the ruling party and are sowing division. When Jean Niyangabo, 33, returned to his hometown in Muhuta, ...
  • At a media roundtable in Gondar, Ethiopia, in 2015. Credit: UNICEF Ethiopia / 2015/Tesfaye.

    Four ways the Ethiopian government manipulates the media

    By Meron Gebreananaye, Saba Mah’derom & Kisanet Haile Molla
    February 1, 2022
  • In 2015, thousands in Burundi took to the streets to protest against President Nkurunziza running for a third term. Credit: Igor Rugwiza.

    I cry, not for Nkurunziza, but for the lives he broke

    By Ketty Nivyabandi
    June 10, 2020
  • Nigeria’s tech sector needs recruits. Young people need jobs. And yet…

    By Shola Lawal
    February 10, 2022
  • In 2011, mass protests led to the downfall of President Mubarak. In 2013, the military retook power in a coup. Credit: Gigi Ibrahim.

    This is how our revolution in Egypt failed. Sudan, please be warned.

    By Osama Gaweesh
    June 5, 2019

Brought to you by


Creative Commons

Creative Commons Licence
Articles on African Arguments are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
  • Cookies
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms & Conditions
  • en English
    am Amharicar Arabicny Chichewazh-CN Chinese (Simplified)en Englishfr Frenchde Germanha Hausait Italianpt Portuguesest Sesothosn Shonaes Spanishsw Swahilixh Xhosayo Yorubazu Zulu
© Copyright African Arguments 2020
By continuing to browse this site, you agree to our use of cookies.
en English
am Amharicar Arabicny Chichewazh-CN Chinese (Simplified)en Englishfr Frenchde Germanha Hausait Italianpt Portuguesest Sesothosn Shonaes Spanishsw Swahilixh Xhosayo Yorubazu Zulu