African Arguments

Top Menu

  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

Main Menu

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
    • Climate crisis
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • #EndSARS
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Podcast
    • Into Africa Podcast
    • Africa Science Focus Podcast
    • Think African Podcast
  • Debating Ideas
  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

logo

African Arguments

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
    • Climate crisis
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • #EndSARS
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Podcast
    • Into Africa Podcast
    • Africa Science Focus Podcast
    • Think African Podcast
  • Debating Ideas
Politics
Home›African Arguments›Politics›The Hour of the Hardliners

The Hour of the Hardliners

By Alex de Waal
May 11, 2008
1548
0

Saturday’s battle in the streets of Omdurman was a defeat for the prospects of peace, democracy and human rights. The calculations of the leadership of the Justice and Equality Movement are puzzling–the attack looks much like an act of reckless military escalation, bold and daring no doubt, but possibly suicidal. But it would be surprising if JEM did not have other cards to play””possibly short-order attacks on al Obeid, the Meroe Dam or al Fashir.

The attack was a humiliation, for Sudan’s security and military chiefs. That is reason for worry. The raison d’etre of this government is security, and its failure to protect the capital has rocked its credibility. The government will not feel comfortable until it has evened the score. Despite their failure to stop the attack, the security and military leaders will now make the running. Also the fact that the JEM attack was repulsed by the forces of the regime’s core security institutions””National Intelligence and the Central Reserve Police””gives the hardliners the upper hand in what happens next. There will certainly be an internal reckoning within the upper echelons of the National Congress Party and the security services. But first, the regime will pursue the military option without compromise.

Khalil Ibrahim is a Darfurian but this war is not about Darfur. JEM is fighting for N’djamena and Khartoum. In part, the offensive is Chadian President Idriss Deby’s reply to the Chadian rebel attack on N’djamena in February, backed by Sudan. Khalil has dismissed the various efforts at a revived Darfur peace process over the last year, and has recently argued that JEM is the only force that is fighting the government and therefore the only one that should be represented in any talks. On Saturday, Khartoum dismissed any prospects of peace talks: there is fighting to be done first. A real peace deal between Sudan and Chad might have prevented this weekend’s debacle””now it is too late.

Spokesmen for JEM have said that they are fighting for the CPA and its fair implementation, but most people who have followed JEM’s politics consider this no more than a tactic to win the support of Southerners who would otherwise distrust JEM’s Islamist origins, its fierce opposition to Southern separatism and the Chadian fingerprints on its operation. JEM’s manifesto speaks of democracy and human rights””justice and equality no less””but its putchist strategy is the antithesis of compromise, democratic politics and civil liberties. Both the Omdurman attack and the inevitable government response imperil Sudan’s shaky path to democratization and the South’s aim of exercising the right of self-determination. First Vice President Salva Kiir Mayardit saw these dangers when he spoke out against the attack.

The three towns of Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North have enjoyed a remarkable social peace during the last quarter century of war. There has been everyday racism and discrimination but astonishingly little violence. That coexistence may now be in jeopardy. For many Khartoum natives and people of the riverain north””the awlad al balad””JEM’s attack was an assault on their hitherto peaceful and prosperous territory. It was a shock and a horror and many are rallying to the government. Opposition politicians from the north hope that their voices of moderation may help prevent pogroms against the Zaghawa and other suspected JEM supporters and keep alive the prospects of elections next year.

By contrast, for many Southerners, Darfurians and people from Sudan’s other peripheries, there was unconcealed glee at the evidence fear displayed by government’s leaders, and a wider feeling that at long last the nation’s elite was learning the reality of war””the chickens of regional inequity were finally coming home to roost.

Amid the near-certainty of a government crackdown on suspected JEM sympathizers, there is the worrying possibility of a polarization of Khartoum society and politics along regional-ethnic lines. Perhaps this is what Khalil Ibrahim, one of the authors of the Black Book, hoped for when he planned the assault””a blow at the national capital might so rock the foundations of the state that it would collapse. But if history is anything to go by, it is more likely to ignite destructive cycles of violence in the peripheries themselves. In this case, the bloodshed is most likely to begin in Kordofan and the cities of the centre and east where there are large numbers of Darfurian migrants. And we may see new attacks in north Darfur as well.

There were many reasons to be worried for Sudan last week. After the weekend’s battle of Omdurman, there are graver reasons still.

Previous Article

Shigeg Karo One Week On

Next Article

JEM’s Failed Attempt at Regime Change

mm

Alex de Waal

Alex de Waal is Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. He was the founding editor of the African Arguments book series. He is the author of The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power.

0 comments

  1. Vagn Sparre-Ulrich 12 May, 2008 at 18:57

    Dear Alex,

    I highly appreciate your analysis of the situation in Sudan after the JEM-attack. Your gloomy conclusion that we will see a hardening of the government’s stance on Darfur is evident.

    But I have a question which is based on my attempts to see Sudan as a whole: Where does South Sudan fit into this?

    1. I know that Salva Kiir condemned the JEM attack. But doesn’t the SPLM in this situation play it by a “wait and see position” in order to see what SPLM can gain from this situation. As I see it, the government of Omar Al-Bashir is weakened by this attack although it repulsed it militarily. For the first time in history the periphery in Sudan showed some power. And one of the main reasons for this weakening of the GOS is the strengthening of the SPLM political position – a part of the periphery. Suddenly, the SPLM is a key player in Sudanese politics. SPLM can really make demands to Omar Al-Bashir, or else? What about the Abyei enclave for example? Or the other non-fulfilled items on the CPA? I see a politically weakened Omar Al-Beshir government today as compared to before the JEM-attack.

    2. It seems as if the GOS army were more or less kept out of the main fighting. The bulk of the fighting was done by the different security organizations on the GOS side! And they lost a lot of lives according to some reports. To me it points to the fact that a great part of the GOS army has ties to Darfur. The periphery is being a part of the power system now, but not necessarily a loyal one.

    I just thought that maybe the South Sudan factor should be emphasized at this point in order to get the most precise picture.

    And maybe some officers would like a regime change in order to balance the power between the Center and the Periphery somewhat more? As another option.

    A politically weakened center or government can lead to many different scenarios.

  2. Alex de Waal 13 May, 2008 at 16:28

    There are many unanswered questions in the fallout from the battle of Omdurman. But the position of the Southern leadership is not in doubt. The NCP has signed the CPA and is therefore committed to elections and the referendum on self-determination. JEM has not signed and has no such formal commitments. The SPLM will stick with what it knows. And First Vice President Salva Kiir knows that when the NCP-security leadership is under threat and goes into security lockdown mode, his best strategy for influencing the course of events is to stand beside them and sway their internal debates.

    The division between the Sudan Armed Forces and the specialist security forces loyal to senior members of the government is a real cause for concern.

  3. Hamid E Ali 14 May, 2008 at 13:39

    Isaac Newton said when a force is applied to an object, it accelerates. That force is May 10 events. As result of this force, Sudan will acceleration in the direction of peace and democratic transformation. Let us allow the political process, sense and reasons prevail over demagoguery and false patriotism. Any Sudanese blood is valuable whether in Khartoum or Elfasher. Now the elites in Khartoum taste the bitterness of war that might accelerates the process of peace and reconciliations in Sudan and Darfur in particular. Previously, people heard about Darfur as if it is another planet. Now all, conclude that violence always will produce counter-violence that could proportionate more destructive. The government should realize that their policies reached the dead-end. There must be a U-turn; the government is in real need for a new blood and team instead of the old clique to carry out the transformation.

Leave a reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

  • Zambia 2021: President Edgar Lungu (centre). Credit: GCIS.
    PoliticsZambia

    Step by inevitable step: Lungu’s strategic march to 2021 and beyond

  • Politics

    Waiting for a miracle in Congo: a peace process with many processes and no peace – By Kris Berwouts

  • Politics

    What Future for Africa? – by Stephen Ellis

Subscribe to our newsletter

Click here to subscribe to our free weekly newsletter and never miss a thing!

  • 81.7K+
    Followers

Find us on Facebook

Interactive Elections Map

Keep up to date with all the African elections.

Recent Posts

  • Oligarchs, Oil and Obi-dients: The battle for the soul of Nigeria
  • Of cobblers, colonialism, and choices
  • Blackness, Pan-African Consciousness and Women’s Political Organising through the Magazine AWA
  • “People want to be rich overnight”: Nigeria logging abounds despite ban
  • The unaccountability of Liberia’s polluting miners

Editor’s Picks

Climate crisisEditor's PicksKenyaTanzania

“My house is crumbling”: Living in limbo along the East Africa pipeline

People along the route of the proposed 1,443 km oil pipeline talk of confusion, uncertainty and lives on hold. Following the recent signing of accords, the construction of a hugely ...
  • South Africa: Meet the queer vloggers taking back the narrative

    By Grant Andrews
    March 4, 2021
  • african books, best of the 2010s

    Best of the 2010s: Novels by African writers

    By Samira Sawlani
    December 17, 2019
  • Esraa, a customer of the bike lessons service Dosy, on the bike of a motorbike in Cairo, Egypt. Credit: Dosy.

    Egypt’s patriarchy says women don’t ride bikes. These women disagree.

    By Lara Reffat
    February 16, 2022
  • Africa COP27. UN Women/Joe Saade

    What African governments must fight for at COP27

    By Africa Climate Justice Collective
    October 11, 2022

Brought to you by


Creative Commons

Creative Commons Licence
Articles on African Arguments are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
  • Cookies
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms & Conditions
  • en English
    am Amharicar Arabicny Chichewazh-CN Chinese (Simplified)en Englishfr Frenchde Germanha Hausait Italianpt Portuguesest Sesothosn Shonaes Spanishsw Swahilixh Xhosayo Yorubazu Zulu
© Copyright African Arguments 2020
By continuing to browse this site, you agree to our use of cookies.
en English
am Amharicar Arabicny Chichewazh-CN Chinese (Simplified)en Englishfr Frenchde Germanha Hausait Italianpt Portuguesest Sesothosn Shonaes Spanishsw Swahilixh Xhosayo Yorubazu Zulu