Why Sudan is Doomed to Chaos: Ten Good Reasons
There are ten reasons why Sudan is doomed to chaos, why the 2010 elections will not take place and why conflict eruption is imminent in 2010.
The option of the 2010 referendum is simply not going to take place. I hate to be the one raising this point. But this is the reality of things, and there is nothing anyone can do about it. In few months, conflict will escalate in both Darfur and the South and all the dreams about the CPA implementation will shatter into pieces.
The differences between the North and the South will surface and become more difficult to manage and eventually result in armed clashes.
Traditional political parties will see an opportunity to overthrow the government and replace Beshir and as a result will conspire to fuel the tensions and provide assistance and support to the armed groups on all the active and dormant fronts.
With the failure of the elections to take place in 2010 (for the reasons presented below) and the frustration of the South that the referendum will not take place as well, confrontations between the government forces and the SPLA will intensify with possible declaration of an independent South Sudan state, supported by the USA that will use its advocacy machine to criminalize the Beshir government and that it did not respect the CPA and might eventually call for military intervention and a UN monitored and protected referendum.
There are so many reasons to anticipate this scenario; I will however mention only ten of these reasons:
1. Abeyei issue in not completely resolved yet. The Missireya did not accept the ruling and have strong reasons to fight back and forth because of basic cultural and livelihoods reasons. Even if we are trying to be positive here and downplayed what the Missirya can do, Hafiz Mohammed, of Justice Africa, raised a yet very legitimate question in his post “Abeyei Beyond the Arbitration Decision”, 1 August 2009: “The main question is who is going to oversee the implementation of the ICA’s resolution especially redrawing the borders at the time of lack of trust between the two parties to the CPA?” Just as a reminder, a similar decision was made by ICA for the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia on April 2002, the implementation remains a challenge up to this day.
2. The responsibility for the Sudan foreign debts (estimated at $36 billion) is not resolved yet. The question is that: will this debt remains as the sole responsibility of the North of Sudan, or is it going to be shared between the North and the South in case of secession? The South believes that it is the responsibility of the North, the North claims, on the other hand, that the debt was partially for projects in the South.
3. France will not support the secession of the South and the formation of a U.S embraced independent state in the South, and will support the North not to allow that happen.
4. Secession of the South will pose an unanswered question as to what will happen to the Southerners who live in the North if the South became an independent state. Actually, even their participation in the upcoming referendum remained a controversial issue between the North and the South for quite a while.
5. Egypt has strong concerns on the Nile water agreement, and would not like to see an independent South Sudan posing a new challenge for revisiting the Nile Water distribution agreement. Sudan’s quota distribution between, the mostly Sahara desert, North of Sudan and the rich Savannah South that controls the sources of one tributary of the River Nile, was not discussed in case of secession. For both the North of Sudan and Egypt this is a matter of paramount national security and survival concerns and both are prepared to go to extremes to make sure secession will never happen.
6. The North of Sudan ideology of political Islam, threatened by the potential of having strong ally of the war on terror in the independent state of South Sudan (a potential monkey on their back), will strive to make sure not to take that chance. U.S open aggression and sanctions on the North are expected to escalate at high proportions in case of secession. There are indications that the U.S sanctions and positions are softer now because of the U.S realization that at the current status quo Sudan means both the North and the South and the U.S would never like to hurt their ally in the South by imposing stricter measure on the whole of Sudan.
7. The presence of Abdel Wahid Nur in Paris, as one pawn for the French foreign policy on Sudan and as the protector of its challenged interests in the North, will make it very difficult for any deal to solve the Darfur problem to be realized and will easily compromise any meaningful election process in that region and consequently the whole 2010 expectations. With the French influence, Nur is destined to reject any U.S peace initiative in Darfur and is very much expected to escalate his military activities in the next few months to destabilize the region and prevent the elections. Darfur is actually doomed to be the battleground for the French and the U.S struggle for influence and Darfur is highly linked to both the elections and the consequent referendum of the South.
8. The participation of the SPLA/M in the elections of 2010 is another tricky area. There is an unanswered question of what will happen if these elections led to the SPLA/ M taking the power seat or any significant positions in the North, followed by the referendum resulting in the secession of the South. For the South, the nomination of a person for presidency seems to be still an unresolved problem because of the internal ethnic calculations, but also because of inherent divide over the issue of unity and secession.
9. Until this point, both the SPLA and the North government could not reach an agreement regarding the percentage of Southerners who should vote for referendum results to be considered. The CPA does not provide any details on this. The government suggested two thirds while the SPLA insists on 50%+1. SPLA is threatening to boycott the elections if no agreement is reached. Without SPLA participation no elections can take place in 2010, and without elections no referendum can take place in 2011 as well.
10. Within the diversity of the South and the apparent failure of the SPLA to provide a model of governance to the Southerners that is attractive enough for SPLA/M to be considered as a good option for all, it is expected that the internal conflicts within the movement, rival ethnic groups of the SPLA, and the dissatisfaction resulting from corruption and misuse of power, will all result in creating real challenges for the SPLA capacity as a potential leader of a new state and will consequently result in escalation of conflict in the South prior to the elections.
No matter if Ahmed Hassan is right in most of the issues he mentions in this piece, Sudan is on the brink of a turbulent sensitive period. If it will find its way through this mess relatively peacefully or through different armed conflicts, only time will show. But at the same time, Sudan has repeatedly shown a surprising ability to solve these kinds of problems its own way. In Sudan almost nothing develops according to mechanical predictions.
I know that peacebuilding takes time and that transformation of conflict is an arduous, difficult process. I know that there are many reasons for pessimism. But for the sake of millions of people, I will earnestly pray that you are wrong!
For all the reasons mentioned by Ahmed, the possibility of war resumption seems to be further and more distant than ever. At least these dangers will constitute a threat, which will deter the elites, both in South and North from going that far. It will be of high cost for both of them.
I would not go for scenarios or any kind of speculation, but rather analyzing the conflict and its parties, especially the link between the grievances at the constituency ( community) level and how it plays in the hands of the elites for their own greed. How the grievances in other parts will tempt the elites in those areas to enter the game, and to what extent the patron client system -described by Alex – would absorb them or otherwise fail, allowing them to maintain their independence, and become a new input in the balance of power.
This passage by Ahmed Hassan does not add value to the intellectual discussion brought up by some of the great authors on this forum. It is nothing more than pontification.
The following quote highly understates the fury that the SPLA/M will exact if no elections take place: “With the failure of the elections to take place…the frustration of the South that the referendum will not take place as well…”. There have been enough indications of belligerence displayed by the SPLA/M, with their partners’ backings, to warrant the notion that any refusal to enact the CPA will result in catastrophic war… not simply frustration.
The author clearly underestimates and misunderstands the ethos of the Northern Government of Sudan. This ethos is survival at all costs. They have nothing to gain by clinging on to the South and their Islamic ideology has been squashed by the internal dismissal of the Sudanese people as well as the larger Muslim-world dismission of a return to any form of Islamic governance. I see a ‘legitimate’ election return-to-power scenario followed by a free and fair referendum vote of secession. There is enough corruption and greed on both sides to agree to such a deal. These are not men of vision or resolve or ideology. Mr de Waal knows all too well the politics of subversion through delay and postponement. In the case of the north, the Bashir government will “further delay the question of the government’s legitimacy by encouraging the shift from a North-South population constituency to an all-new and exclusive Northern constituency. Subsequently deal with any internal developments with new machinations.” Survival is the name of the game. The Government of Sudan is not cornered and is not on its way out and Sudan is not going to enter into chaos. That should have happened a long time ago.
Sudan is certainly a political enigma… why has it not collapsed?
The defacto answer is that the Sudanese people are a highly forgiving, accepting, and buoyant people, despite years of miscalculations, misrule, and teetering on the brink of collapse, on the most Godforsaken real estate in the world. And yet, you find there is anything but Godlessness in Sudan. Indeed the strength and weakness of the Sudanese people is that they have a spiritual capacity possessed by very few civilizations in existence. Only with recent political developments have westerners poured in with magnifying glasses in order to study this ‘new’ anthropological dimension so that they may fill the missing bookshelves of the Library of Congress’ section on Sudan, add to their thirst for knowledge, and for some, vent and set up schools and camps of new age abolitionists and slaves. But before a Sudanese ego inflates, let it be said…one may certainly argue that there is, in Sudan, a dimension of irrational cultural and religious dogma that will continue to fuel the defective and “new-world”, ill-suited mode of social thought permeating through the sandy airs of Sudan. The concepts of “human rights” and “racial equality” that form the basis of academic, jurisprudence, and social cohesion (or lack of) in western countries is sorely lacking in Sudan. The west’s grievances with Sudan are spiritual, not political. This is the reason for the departure of political language and policy by the US when comparing the anti-Sudan and anti-Iran rhetoric. The Persian diaspora is seen as a trustworthy and aligned peoples. The Sudanese diaspora and opposition is not. There are also strategic and racial reasons for this departure in policy, but I will not get into those.
Blood will neither be shed, and neither will it help. This, many a Sudanese possess as a cultural wisdom. Even the survival prone GoS. However, this attitude will not fix the lack of direction and unity of the country. What is needed is less tolerance for political ambiguity in the minds of the opposition and Northern intelligentsia and more clarity of reasoning. This should not be seen as a vote of confidence to the gruff ‘black’ and ‘white’ SPLA diction. My point is, we have too many dynamically pessimistic Northerners, for reasons that are understandable. But if your emotional attachment and pessimism affect your value judgement, then postpone discussion until level-mindedness is reached.
Unfortunately I think most of the scenarios mentioned by Ahmed are more likely to happen, if things stayed as it is in the coming 2 months. Sudan is descending very fast to an all war state. People in south Sudan have all ready decided that the only option available for them is secession; they had enough, for me that is a foregone conclusion; let us think about how to keep the rest of Sudan intact after 2011, that itself is a big challenge. If the National Congress stayed in power and followed the same policies, self-determination will be an issue in Darfur, South Kordofan, South Blue Nile and the East. The NCP become a party for north of Madani (al Jazaira State), and the rest of the country just to serve the north I donâ€™t think those policies are acceptable now even within the NCP members, people from the peripheries realised that after it is too late.
For Sudan to stay intact we need a new thinking and new formula the status quo is not acceptable and will lead to more violence.
This discussion is fascinating. All the objective indicators point to crisis and a new war. Yet it is not in the interests of the rulers in Khartoum or Juba to enter a new war that would undermine, perhaps destroy entirely, their economic interests. There are also socio-cultural traits among the Sudanese elites including bargaining mechanisms that can restrain their rush to war.
One of the lessons of Sudanese history is that written agreements and constitutions, however solemnly entered into, do not count for much in the political calculus of either rulers or challengers. The mechanisms that prevent collapse (when indeed they work) are located elsewhere in Sudan’s political society. The international focus on the specifics of the CPA and other agreements may be missing this important point.
I did not claim to be bringing an intellectual added value through this contribution. I am just a simple concerned Sudanese who expected to able to exercise his right of expression and to enjoy some tolerance within this forum. I did not realize that I was intruding on an exclusive forum for Intellectual elite. I find your last statement â€œBut if your emotional attachment and pessimism affect your value judgement, then postpone discussion until level-mindedness is reachedâ€ unacceptable, non-objective, and reflects the same intellectual supremacy disease, to negate and submit the other, of the North Sudan elites that I consider as one of the main problems of Sudan, and one of the main reasons why we are heading to Chaos in the first place.
Sudan has greatly changed. The repeated dictatorships and police states and the protracted armed conflicts between the North and the South has brought new dimensions to the Sudanese political and conflict culture and reality that you seem not able or not capable enough to realize and acknowledge.
Beshir called for his opponents to remove him from power by arms if they can; for several years the east of Sudan experienced a fierce armed struggle from groups that never raised arms in the past. The Darfur conflict is no different from the North-South conflict by now; and on May 2008, one repel group crossed thousands of miles from the Sudan borders with Chad, in their military vehicles, to attack the capital city of Sudan. Talk to any political prisoner who happened to be kept in one of the security apparatus ghost houses and you should be able to see how Sudan and the Sudanese actually changed. These are not unrelated or insignificant issues. The Sudan that is boiling with hatred, rage, and grievances, is out there for us to see it, of course only if we have the â€œwillâ€ and â€œcourageâ€ to see and the capacity to acknowledge our psychological denial syndrome.
To boldly state that the era of the Political Islam is over, is yet another underestimation from your side considering the current dynamics of the conflicts within the region and their undeniable interlinks with the strategic interests of the same traditional and right wing Sudan political elites that are holding the country hostage and driving it into yet another banana republic, but with no Banana.
As I Sudanese living the crisis of my country and witnessing the huge internal transformation that its political and conflict culture is undergoing and precipitating, I assume that you are talking about another country and another nation with all that passion and praising, and I am not sure that I can any longer tolerate this naive rhetoric of the Sudanese forgiveness having been in the middle conflicts in the South, East, West, and witnessed what was actually committed by all parties involved in these conflicts in terms of brutality, disrespect for human life and dignity and destruction of lives and assets and properties.
Let us wake up from our dreams. Sudan as a fragile nation is not held together by any rational logic or wisdom or values of forgiveness, rather than it is loosely â€œglued togetherâ€ by force and power of the state apparatus. Once these powers are shaken and challenged, the collapse of the Sudan is inevitable.
The real test of Unity is to give all these regions and ethnic groups in Sudan the right to self determination, and then we can see if any of them will opt for Unity within a state that was kept as an unchallenged personal property of one and same group of elites that used to exchange the power seats under different disguises since the independence of Sudan in 1956. Already we have the South, the Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile of the list of self-determination, and this list could grow bigger probably at the west.
Unity of Sudan has never been a matter of choice, and what is kept by force will face the day when it submits to a greater force, the force of disintegration and inevitability. I simply believe that this force is already heating its engines and is in motion, and as long as we keep nurturing our illusions of an old and long bygone Sudan and wait for miracles = unique characteristics of Sudanese, to save the situation without exerting efforts to reverse the direction of events, this disintegration will start within a matter of months.
What you argue and what I argue for, remain open possibilities that only time can tell their validity and accuracy. I do not wish for the conflict to erupt and the disintegration to happen, the same way that I do not want to wishfully think that it will just just happen in the absence of a logical how. I cannot allow myself to be convinced or fooled by some â€œSudanese Magical Characteristicsâ€ that will suddenly materialize while the Sudan is moving to Chaos and automatically resolve all our issues and problems like a fairy tale. Apparently, Sudan had undergone serious transformations, and seems one of us is seriously underestimating these changes and their potential manifestations.
I used to be angry when some Eritrean friends used to mock me that Eritrea got its independence after 30 years of fighting, while when the Sudanese â€œwere offeredâ€ their independence they preferred to wait and take it after breakfast. There is definitely an unhealthy fatalism and too much false arrogance about us as Sudanese and the more I read about this wishful thinking regarding the future of our country, the more I become convinced that the Chaos is imminent.
I retract my statement earlier about the inadmissibility of your opinions and views. You are right… that sort of exclusion has no place in such a forum.
I would like to comment on this as well as your parable on Eritrea: “Unity of Sudan has never been a matter of choice, and what is kept by force will face the day when it submits to a greater force, the force of disintegration and inevitability”.
My friend, I say this with hesitation for I sense you are an experienced man. However, allow me to say: life is not ideal. Very few nations are given a choice of demarcating political boundaries on cultural, linguistic, and ethnic lines. We should try and deal with what we have been dealt. Whether that means secession or unity is up to the masses by the good graces of the CPA and its guarantors. We are in agreement there. I take the choice of secession lightly by wishing it upon our peoples if it is the meaningful way. I hope the GoS and SPLA/M can honor such a choice. Hopefully it is a peaceable path we follow, for there are far too many risks if the GoS tries to necessitate conflict. I sense that this is the GoS’s position, as murderous and blundering as they are. Although there is a high degree of mistrust, both parties understand that the stakes are high. War would be the action that an irrational player would exercise. As crazy as the GoS is, I do not think they are in a position to want to exercise irrational and impractical behavior. This sort of behavior would only be enacted by criminals that imminently faced expulsion. Unless you witnessed an American flagged tank a few kilometers from Khartoum, rest assured that GoS will continue to calculate and strategize like a rational player. Things took a turn in Sudan’s history with this current government, as things always have when forcible change has been introduced in post-colonial Sudan’s young history. These may be absolutely critically different times. But, when speaking about the “times” it is a relative conjecture. One cannot measurably say that this is absolutely the most significant, unique period of history we have ever faced for one risks obviating other unique experiences past, present, and future.
One can and should not minimize anyone’s personal experiences. And I will be the first to say this. Experiences do not have to be value-neutral ones in order for objective views to be provided. Lastly, and more importantly, I think there are characteristic qualities intrinsic to our society and political culture that we neglect sometimes. Key concepts such as “bargaining mechanisms”… these are signature Sudanese political maneuvers. If we explore and evaluate these mechanisms, we might be able to understand how to harness our capacity to live in an all-inclusive Sudan. We certainly are not magical people, in my estimation, although, in my experience, many a Sudanese family that plausibly or implausibly trace its lineage to the Mohamed the prophet’s ‘sahaba’ believe they are distinguished descendants!
In conclusion, I believe anticipative claims are good ones. And I hope they can be complemented with proposals and initiatives. I hope we all continue to combine attention to detail with vigilance and positivity. It is a shame that we have such vibrant and passionate individuals that cannot harness their energy by dialogging through civil societies with the GoS. Keep up the good work. I thoroughly enjoyed some of your past articles. Cheers.
Dear Hamdan Goumaa,
Thanks for your comments. With all my doubts I do, sincerely, hope that you are correct in your optimism.
I would like to continue my discussion as a â€œdevil advocateâ€ and continue to challenge some of our assumptions about the transformations of Sudan in response to your comments.
Early this year, I completed an interesting course on Conflict Analysis offered by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and, no wonder, it just confirmed to me that when ethnic or religious or injustice tensions transform into an active form of conflict, the last thing that the parties involved think of, when they go out for the kill, is what is it going to â€œcostâ€ them. When the organized and systematic genocide took place in Rwanda, I would be naive if I thought, for a single moment, that the elites missed to calculate these costs when they planned and systematically implemented the killing of millions of fellow human beings in front of the eyes of the whole world.
When an Islamic fanatic suicide bomber or a Jihadist is out for the killing, he doesnâ€™t have to calculate any costs of his actions simply because he doesnâ€™t plan to be back for any such worldly calculations. With the adrenaline-acceleratedâ€™ heightened levels of hatred and grudge and the roaring motives of revenge and of bringing oneâ€™s own justice by his hand or fighting for what he or she believes to be a just cause, individuals and groups can be fanatics in their own; that is ground rule number one behind conflict manifestations of crimes, brutalities and atrocities.
The elites, who provably benefit even while the country is under the tightest economic and other sanctions, are also able to swiftly transform themselves into warlords and benefit as much from the conflict that they ignite. The SPLA leadership, and any other rebel leaders for that matter, lived and can always live again as Kings and Princes while launching a conflict, and can equally be presidents and ministers in times of peace, so it doesnâ€™t matter for them as long as the centre is idiotically feeding their reasoning and justification for the conflict. That is what history and conflict cultures tell us as ground rule number two.
The type of the conflict analysis that you suggest is applicable to individual conflict cases, however, what we are experiencing in the Sudan of today is a more complex interaction of several levels of conflicts influenced equally by internal and external players and interests. It is no longer any more in the hands of the Sudanese good will and qualities alone to manage this complex, internationalized and protracted crisis.
Another equally important dimension is that the history of Sudan is that of continuously dishonoured agreements by the power elites of the centre starting from 1955 when the Umma Party leadership talked the Southerners into accepting the independence of a United Sudan, and deceptively promised them equality and fair treatment after the Independence.
Truly to what Hafiz again mentions in his comment in this post, and as a matter of the centre and the margins politics, the centre is already been given over 50 years in power to prove its good will and that Sudan could be one United nation with equal citizen rights, and failed miserably to do so and the whole margin remained as a second class Sudan giving chance to no other option than raising arms and pursuing their secession.
As far as the CPA implementation is concerned, the agreement was signed in 2005 and was never respected, and now magically we are talking about a possibility of resolving all the precipitations of that situation and removing all the mistrust while we are only few months from the deadlines of the elections. The North elites already lost over 90% of the time given to them by the CPA to make Unity of the whole of Sudan an attractive option, not only for the South, but for all the margins of the Sudan.
The basic questions remain: are these elites you are counting on really aware about the dimensions and magnitudes of these dangers and threats? Do they have any crisis prevention, management, or containment plans or processes in place? And do they have the time to implement such plans? But most importantly, do they really care?
There are strong indications that both sides are still girding for war.
First, both the northern and southern governments have been stockpiling war materiel.  This includes new defense imports (flouting the review authority of the Joint Defense Board), and, in the souther, some thousands of current and out-mustered Kenyan troops, many of whom are now on retainer for American private security companies which have sent them to Iraq for skill-building ahead of anticipated fighting in Sudan in 2010 or later. [1a]
Second, the NCP regime stands to lose access to considerable wealth in the event of national partition: presently, three-quarters of Sudan’s oil is pumped in the south, and an additional fifteen percent in the vicinity of Abyei.  In 2005, ‘Newsweek’ magazine reported that about two-fifths of known reserves were located in areas where the SPLM/A has writ.  Andrew Natsios reminds us that oil is central to the northern political calculus: “â€œ[It] allows the party to buy off opponents at home, guarantees a national growth rate of 12-14 percent a year, helps maintain prosperity in the Arab triangle, and supports a massive internal security apparatus.” 
Third, while the north may be militarily incapable of forcing the issue, it is already in a position of strength owing to the fact that southern oil is presently shipped via Port Sudan, while revenues are actually collected, then dispersed, in the capital. Thomas warns that these monies “could be cut off in one month if the South left unilaterally.”  Furthermore, the most lucrative oil regions are along what would become the international border, which is ground zero for serious ethnic strength.  Tomas perceives that neither the north nor the south possess sufficient military capability to police the entirety of that 2,000km line-of-contact.  The Southern Sudanese Minister of SPLA affairs, Lt. Gen. Nhial Deng Nhial, recently alleged that Khartoum was distributing arms to tribes on the mutual frontier. [7a]
Fourth, the south may perceive that it is a particularly auspicious time to run the risk of war. Although the end of major hostilities in the Darfur region means that the north will be able to shift considerable resources, including elements of the Sudanese Air Force, to the oil-rich border, it recently underwent a major purge in 2005. Natsios reports that about one thousand of Sudan’s “best senior officers” were cashiered, joining tens of thousands of already-disgruntled ethnic Darfuris who refused to do service against their ethnic brethren in the west. The morale of the Sudanese Army is now reputed to be quite poor, especially after defeats by the JEM in August 2006. 
 Heba Aly, â€œArms race, uneasy peace in Sudan,â€ The Christian Science Monitor, 12 November 2008 [electronic].
[1a] Ibid.; Simon Nicol, â€œContractors recruiting Kenyan troops for eventual operations in South Sudan,â€ Janeâ€™s Defense Weekly, 26 March 2009 [electronic].
 Edward Thomas, â€œAgainst the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudanâ€™s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,â€ Chatham House Report (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Catham House, 2009), pp. 13-14, 19.
 Alexandra Polier, â€œSudan: A Catalyset for Peace,â€ Newsweek.com, 21 February 2005 [electronic].
 Andrew S. Natsios, â€œBeyond Darfur,â€ Foreign Affairs, 87:3 (May/June 2008): 77-93, [electronic; no pagination].
 Tomas, “Against the Gathering Storm,” p. 28.
 â€œInvesting in Tragedy: Chinaâ€™s Money, Arms, and Politics in Sudan,â€ Human Rights First, Stop Arms to Sudan, Background, Chinaâ€™s Arms Sales to Sudan, March 2008, p. 4.
 Thomas, â€œAgainst the Gathering Storm,â€ 28.
[7a] Ngor Arol Garang, “South Sudan army accuse north of arming tribal feuds,” Sudan Tribune [online], 24 October 2009.
 Natsios, â€œBeyond Darfur,â€ n.p.
Many thanks for your comment, and likewise I do apologize if my response sounded little harsh. I guess we are all very concerned about what is going on in Sudan and how things might turn out with or without intervention. I agree with you and I just see that this could be considered as the real moment of truth and the most turbulent time in the history of our country as far as I can visualize it and it really scares me I do not see efforts happening. I am not an intellectual or a politician in that sense. As I mentioned, I am a technocrat and a very concerned Sudanese and I would like to be the devil advocate in the hope that we could all try to flag the problem and think of the possible way out for Sudan.
I do join you in your prayers that, for the sake of millions, I am wrong.
I learned that sometimes raising the question is part of the answer, and I am afraid that is as far as I can go. I do not have any illusions about my abilities. It is too sad the origin of any solution seems to have to stem from the conscience and will of those in power in Khartoum as well as those external having interests in the peace or conflict of Sudan.
Thanks for your input.
I just hate to admit my full agreement with your analysis and conclusions.
First let me commend you for your posts, which I believe have stimulated great discussions in this forum; one can rarely come across such fascinating insights elsewhere as far as the case of Sudan is concerned. I have equally enjoyed the thoughtful contributions of the rest of the fine group, who regularly take part in these discussions. I take the opportunity to commend Jamaledin for both his writings and his decision to tune to the spirit of the forum.
A quick response to your comment on my reaction to your post:
It is true that I am optimistic. How can I, or for that matter any other Sudanese survive what we have been through, given the miseries surrounding us not to be so?. However in this specific case my optimism has nothing to do with my thoughts, on the realities of the status quo. By the costs the Southern and Northern elites would incur I don’t mean the costs that the population would usually bear on their behalf, but rather the high opportunity cost they have to endure themselves, should they decide voluntary to go to war. Likewise even if the war become an inevitable fate because of the failure to manage or prevent it there will be dear gains’ loss as a consequence. Given the realized and potential gains thus far -I would argue- the two groups are not likely to choose on their own to take a route of a destructive war. I am sure if they opt for that they neither be kings nor princes afterward.
I can still see that they have not yet run out of tricks nor have they exhausted all the resources at their disposal. The patron-client system is so far working and even has influence among the Southerners. AsI mentioned, in a previous discussion both of them have become bankrupt of any mobilizing ideology. The envisioned New Sudan by its two versions seems to be withering away, whether the buried Islamic Project or our secular New Sudan, which has been put aside for the time being.
In another note and by all means I am not suggesting an academic approach or debate on issues of Sudan in this forum. Although I found conflict analysis and resolution discipline, includes useful framework and tools that could be relevant in studying the complex situation in Sudan.
More over the conflict of Sudan is not unique in its own right, Indeed it shares great deal of characteristics with similar intera-state, violent conflict and followed typically their path. From the initial phase to escalation, reaching hurting point and high costs for both sides and with no win no lose, similar to any conflict in Africa they will end at a negotiation table with the help of the UN and other International partners. This is typical, despite the complexity generated by new comers from the periphery and marginalized areas, with strong ethnic/ race or tribal capital to the political market.
For all this I think it is the high time for current situation to be studied and its complexity and dynamics as well as other driving factor to be understood in order to base policies and strategies on clarity. Such investment will save us a jump in the dark with a handful of scenarios and speculations.
Finally, I am not counting on the elites in any way to bring about lasting peace nor stability to Sudan. I am utterly misunderstood here; I am positively sure I have not said that.
The option of the 2010 referendum is simply not going to take place. I hate to be the one raising this point. But this is the reality of things, and there is nothing anyone can do about it. In few months, conflict will escalate in both Darfur and the South and all the dreams about the CPA implementation will shatter into pieces.
We notice that the Western powers, especially US, give a lot of “suspected” attention to Sudanese events and fights. We also witness the international interference for solving out the problem of South Sudan where fighting there continued during the last twenty years. However, such international interference resulted in a peace treaty that contains unfair terms. These terms might be viewed merely as preparatory steps for the separation of South Sudan and the establishment of a Christian country there.
Darfur & Western Interference
America and the West did their best to put such unfair treaty into action. Then they started to search for other means to achieve their goal. They, falsely, allege that “the Janjaweed”, Arabic-speaking African tribes, are charged of genocide against other African tribes in Darfur.
All the inhabitants of Darfur are Muslims and the fight among the tribes of Darfur is an old one that has nothing to do with religion. This fight happens among these tribes because of the disagreement among the shepherds concerning the lands they raze their cattle in. Most of these fights used to be ended by local customary councils. Such councils used to issue binding judgments that are to be applied by all tribes. However, America and the West alleged that there are genocides and rape incidents in Darfur in order to find a reason for their interference.
Aims beyond Western Interference
We know for sure that America and Europe fight the Muslims everywhere and seek their destruction. Why then they interfere to solve Darfur case in order to protect â€“ as they claim â€“ a Muslim party there? It looks like a myth for those who do not know their policy. Let us review the reasons beyond this interference:
First: They are afraid of the Islamic spread in Center and South Africa, especially in South Sudan. That is why they supported and backed the rebels of South Sudan during the last twenty years. They, ultimately, managed to enforce a peace treaty that paves the way for the separation of South Sudan. Furthermore, they aim at establishing a Christian country in South Sudan. This country is meant to accomplish some strategic goals: 1- To be a strong barrier in face of the spread of Islam. 2- To prevent the Muslims from any possible communications, in the future, with the persecuted Muslim peoples of Center and South of Africa. 3- To make the Muslim countries that dwell in the North of Africa in continuous disorder through exporting disorders from this new country that will be a home for the agencies of international intelligence.
Second: The issue of Sudanese Petrol: This Sudanese petrol is the target of the countries of colonial countries. The daily petroleum product is 350 barrels. Darfur, in specific, has most of this petrol which America uses to meet 16% of its daily needs. The US gets this petrol through petrol pipe that starts from Chad. Moreover, the dust of Darfur is abundantly mixed with uranium, a matter that makes this area a target of all imperial powers, whether international or regional ones.
Third: Controlling the source of Nile. Such countries aim at controlling the source of the Nile for the following aims: 1.Putting some political pressure on Egypt and Sudan so that their fate will be at the hands of the Christian country that controls the source of the Nile. Hence Egypt and Sudan will be politically subjugated by the imperial countries and finally loose their actual independence or lead a war against such imperial powers in order to defend their independence. 2. The waters of the Nile will be granted as a gift to Israel. Israel has been planning to get the waters of the Nile in order to ensure more luxurious life.
Fourth: Usurping the fertile lands of Sudan. The crops and the fruits of these lands are to be free or cheap food for such imperial countries that run the current Sudanese crisis. Moreover, more pressures will be exerted to keep North Sudan undeveloped and to prevent its people from using its lands in the prefect way through reducing the share of water. It appears, then, that the matters are totally different from the way they look. The US and Europe play the role of the kind-hearted patrol that always look after the poor peoples who are being persecuted and extinguished. However, the reality is that they are like the cunning wolf that spins and plans for devouring this part of Muslim World.
Now we are facing our nightmares and its our choice to face it the separation is our responsibility will we let it happen or we are going to fight the evilly power.
4g мобильные прокси