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Politics
Home›African Arguments›Politics›Doha: A New Beginning or Another False Hope?

Doha: A New Beginning or Another False Hope?

By Julie Flint
February 25, 2010
2160
9

The celebrations in Doha on Tuesday masked an agreement that has more questions than answers. One of these, if the so-called “Framework Agreement to resolve the Conflict in Darfur” (available here: Doha Accord) is to be taken at face value, as the signatories insist it must be, is this: Where in all this brouhaha is the resolution of the conflict? The gains for the NCP and JEM are obvious. But where are the gains for the people of Darfur, who in their vast majority (JEM propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding) reject the former Islamist politicians, most of them from a single tribe, who make up the rebel group’s top leadership?

The agreement that President Bashir says has ended the war in Darfur has everything to do with the interests of the NCP and JEM and precious little to do with peace in Darfur. President Bashir, who declared the war in Darfur over even as his forces attacked Jebel Marra, can parade himself as the candidate of peace when he kicks off his election campaign in al Fasher today. (JEM will presumably drop its insistence that he stand trial for genocide in line with the campaign JEM itself started in 2004. To do otherwise would hardly demonstrate the “goodwill” the agreement demands.) JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim gets money and pride of place among the rebel movements. He gets the death sentence lifted from, and a promise of freedom for, his half-brother, who led JEM’s attack on Omdurman almost two years ago. Above all, he gets what those who know him best say he has always wanted””political power in Khartoum, for that surely is what is meant by “power at all levels of governance” (the italics are mine).

Only time will show whether Khalil’s rehabilitation will have a wider reflection, as many are speculating, on Sudan’s divided Islamist movement.

Ceasefire aside, the only specifics in Tuesday’s agreement are concessions to JEM, as laid out in Articles 2-7: full amnesty and release of prisoners of war, “participation… in power at all levels of governance”, reinstatement of “all military and civil personnel… fired from service”, with “all necessary expenses” to be paid by the government in the switchover phase. Only three articles concern Darfurians””and these are nothing more than a wish list, a restatement of the central issues that were identified when negotiations first began in 2004: compensation and the right of return, the future administrative structure of Darfur, and wealth-sharing. In some respects, the “Agreement of Good Will and Confidence Building for the Settlement of the Problem in Darfur” signed by JEM and the NCP in Doha exactly a year ago offered more than this. It committed the parties to creating a “conducive environment” for talks on a final settlement””including halting the arrest of IDPs and facilitating the access of humanitarian aid. This agreement, which in calling itself a “framework agreement” purports to go further than last year’s “goodwill agreement”, makes no reference either to IDPs or humanitarian aid. It allows one month for the final agreement that has already evaded six years of effort””two months fewer than the 2009 agreement.

The new agreement makes no mention of power-sharing, one of the three main chapters of the Abuja negotiations. JEM, it seems, will decide who in Darfur shares power and who does not. Critically, for the people of Darfur, there is no specific reference to the infamous “˜janjaweed’. What will their future be in the new order dictated by JEM and the NCP? How will their concerns be met? How will the people they threaten be protected? There is no mention of justice, reconciliation, or widening the agreement to attempt to make it inclusive rather than exclusive. After Abuja, does anyone doubt that a peace that is not inclusive is no peace at all? Yet within hours of signing in Doha, Dr. Khalil rejected a suggestion by Ghazi Salah el Din that the government sit down with other rebel factions.

For most Darfurians, the exclusive nature of the deal is ominous. The Addis Ababa and Tripoli groups have coalesced over recent days and chosen the former governor of Darfur, Tijani Sese Ateem, as their leader. He is a widely respected Fur politician from a leading family, but has lived abroad for twenty years. Dr. Tijani has been noticeably absent from the celebrations. Darfur’s Arabs, many of whom form the backbone of the NCP in the region, gave Ghazi Salah el Din a difficult reception when he returned from N’Djamena, seeing a repeat of the 2006 DPA that rewarded a Zaghawa leader (and an Islamist to boot, this time) with little support outside his own tribe.

Darfurians see another parallel with Abuja. After signing the DPA, Minni Minawi and the Sudanese Government both labeled their critics as enemies of peace and used the agreement as a pretext to crack down. Today government forces are attacking Jebel Marra, and JEM is silent. In Nyala, the NISS has roamed the city, closing the offices of civil society organizations and locking up several activists accusing them of possessing subversive material. This has not escalated into a full-scale clampdown, but the warning signs are there.

Thabo Mbeki is the only senior international who refused to dignify this NCP-JEM charade and who stayed away from the signing ceremony in Doha. He is reportedly standing by the recommendations of the AU Panel on Darfur report which called for inclusive negotiations that include all issues, including those notably absent from the Doha accords, such as justice and reconciliation. On that he is surely right, but what is his plan now?

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Julie Flint

9 comments

  1. Bec Hamilton 25 February, 2010 at 08:58

    Hi Julie
    Thanks for this analysis. I agree that once again it is regular Darfuris who seem to be getting shut out.

    I have a picky legal question around the second article of the agreement – the grant of “general amnesty.”

    Both the UN and AU have policies in place to prohibit impunity for war crimes, and as far as I’m aware officials must get permission from the head of their organization (or at least the opinion of their legal counsel) to sign off on an agreement that purports to grant amnesty. With Bassole representing both organizations, can you confirm if the UN and the AU gave him this clearance to sign off on it?? . . . Seems like a backward step for SCSL Lome decision and related developments if they did (and if they didn’t I wonder what impact this would have on the validity of his signature?)

    Thanks, Bec

  2. Eric Reeves 25 February, 2010 at 11:12

    Julie Flint offers a superb overview of just what has and hasn’t been achieved with the Doha “agreement” between JEM and the NCP. The issues she raises should compel the attention of the various celebrants of this new bilateral agreement, forged once again by the Khartoum regime with only one element of its many marginalized populations. Her point about Khalil Ibrahim’s national ambitions seems especially significant, and we must fear what will occur on the ground in Darfur if the remaining SLA factions, denied by JEM their own place at comprehensive peace talks, respond militarily. A well-placed official on the ground in Darfur reports that JEM has already attacked SLA elements in Jebel Moon (West Darfur). Will JEM become Khartoum’s enforcer in Darfur as part of its role in the national government? Will it become the Khartoum-backed instrument for bringing “security” to the region? Here we should recall Khalil’s role in the National Islamic Front regime and his bloody history of raids on southern Sudan during the 1990s, which included massacres, rapes, and enslavement.

    The news that seems both important and potentially a hopeful portent for Darfur is the rapprochement between N’Djamena and Khartoum. Though we have seen this before, there are reasons to believe both regimes have finally concluded that military conflict by proxy is not in their self-interest. This has the effect of denying JEM sanctuary in Eastern Chad, and will significantly curtail the provision of military matériel. For this reason alone, Khartoum feels it has a strong enough negotiating hand to be able to resist calls from JEM for a delay in national elections. Ominously, however, there have been recent calls from Egypt for a delay in both national elections in Sudan and the southern self-determination referendum. The latter delay, if attempted by Khartoum, would almost certainly lead to renewed war. It is difficult to see how a peace agreement for Darfur—involving only one rebel group, and one that is far from representative of Darfuri civil society—could survive such a conflict. And if the peace talks aren’t more inclusive—involving the Darfuri constituencies Ms. Flint rightly points out have again been excluded—then there will be no real peace in any event.

  3. David Barsoum 25 February, 2010 at 14:17

    Dear Julie
    It seems to me the real question is not whether it is a (New Beginning or another False Hope), for whatever it may turn out to be, it still remains entrenched in this piecemeal approach, which leads me to the last paragraph of your entry about the position of President Thabo Mbeki’s recommendations and I ask all people of goodwill towards the Sudan to answer my question: Does the Sudan need reconciliation first or elections first.

    I also note the premonitions of Professor Reeves, this is not the time to inflame sentiments, the Egyptian Proposal, should not be taken out of context, and used a premise to mystify issue,this was tabled to both, the NCP and the SPLM/A and I am confident that both parties, notably the SPLM/A are mature enough to discern the consequences of such proposals which in actual fact come within several issues that the parties agreed to discuss in Cairo, talks that will only resume after the elections.

    It seems to me that many in the Sudan to-day, recognize that a delay in one would lead to the delay of another,interrelated and organically linked issues of reconciliation, justice, peace.

    Peace in Dar Fur is in the interest of all neighbouring states and more so to the nascent new Independent State of South Sudan, which Professor Reeves seems very concerned about.

    I would therefore appeal to each and all, to address the ways and means to help advocate and advance President Mbeki’s recommendations.

  4. Oscar H. Blayton 25 February, 2010 at 14:17

    Multi-party peace negotiations can be a messy business. There will inevitably be bitterness and discord. But acrimonious words and accusations are less destructive than bullets and bombs.

    Julie is right to have concerns about the exclusion of significant parties to the Doha agreement. According to Radio Dabanga there are still several movements that have not come to Doha to participate in the discussions:
    SLM-Abdel Wahid
    SLM- Khamis
    SLM-Juba
    SLM-Unity
    JEM-Leadership
    Those factions of SLM-Abdel Wahid who recently attacked Abdel Wahid
    and SLM-Minni Minnawi, having entered into an agreement earlier probably had no reason to be represented in Doha. (see link: http://radiodabanga.org/?p=10353)

    But, the situation is still fluid. An example of his fluidity is demonstrated by the fact that it was reported in “Miraya,” the radio station operated by the United Nations Mission in Sudan, that the Democratic Justice and Equality Movement (D-JEM) walked out of Doha earlier this week. (link:http://mirayafm.org/index.php/sudan/2054-government-and-jem-sign-framework-ceasefire-agreement-) But on Wednesday the Sudan Tribune reported that D-JEM had joined with nine other factions to form the Liberation Movement for Justice, which is indicating that it will soon sign a separate peace agreement with the GoS. (link:http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34232)

    The recently formed Liberation Movement for Justice is said to be comprised of ten movements:
    The Sudan Liberation Movement Revolutionary forces (SLM-RF) which includes six factions, United Resistance Forces (URF),
    Sudan Liberation Movement-Mainstream (SLM-M),
    Democratic Sudan Liberation Movement (D-SLM) and
    Democratic Justice and Equality Movement (D-JEM) – who earlier had walked out of Doha.

    Those of us who believe in the great value of inclusiveness in peace negotiations should continue to advocate that point, while pointing up the dangers that accompany exclusivity. But, because these situations are fluid, [a dynamic process] we should not despair when these negotiations are not as inclusive as we would wish at any particular point in time.

    Also, one can not ignore the fact that fighting is ongoing at Jebel Marra and everything possible needs to be done to end the killing, but the unfolding tragedy at Jebel Marra should not extinguish any hopes that we have for a future peace in Darfur. We are witnessing a slow and painfully messy peace process, grinding its way towards a conclusion. What that conclusion will ultimately be will reflect the assistance and support that the negotiators receive during the course of this process. Informed commentaries, like Julie’s, are helpful in that they foster constructive discourse while both, warning of the dire consequences of failure and recognizing the potential for success.

  5. Hafiz Mohamed 26 February, 2010 at 00:39

    Dear Julie,

    I do agree with all your points , but I go further than that, first I don’t see any cause for celebration, I think president El Bashir is looking for something to energise his dead election campaign as the NCP’s own election arithmetic doesn’t look promising and they are looking for something to lift up the morale of their activists.

    El Bashir is the only one who dance on the tune of this agreement. He has done it in Doha and in El Fash-air, his counterpart Dr Khalil JEM leader is very cautious, and it is clear that he doesn’t share El Bashir’s jubilant mode, that was clear from his news conference when he made it clear that he doesn’t recognise any other military movement and wants all the movements to join JEM and he will not accept any dual negotiations tracks. Khalil’s message is clearly directed to the mediation team.

    Khalil’s second point is that he doesn’t want the election to go ahead and wants to dictate the time for it. That complicates things more as the NCP is not the only party who decided on those issues. The SPLM and other political parties also have a say on that and I don’t think they will accept an agreement between the NCP and JEM which decided on those issues without their consent.

    What will happen to Minni Minawi and the DPA? Let us not forget Abuja 2006 when Minni signed the DPA his movement was the strongest at that time and JEM was the weakest. What will happen if JEM joins the government will Minni goes back to war and joins with other splinters groups to fight back? I am sure they will find someone who ready to give them arms, as many regional powers are not happy about Qatar taking the lead on this.

    I am sure nothing will come out of Doha negotiations by the 15th of March 2010 the target date for the negotiations to be concluding, according to the NCP, as they want to go back to the election campaign. I think this agreement raises more questions than answers.

    People are talking and planning for Sudan post July 2011, but my real worry is Sudan post April 2010 what will happen, does anyone have a clue?

  6. Alex de Waal 26 February, 2010 at 02:06

    Julie asks of Pres. Mbeki, “what is his plan now?” One defining feature of Pres. Mbeki’s approach in Sudan is consistency. The Panel made an analysis of the Sudanese crisis in Darfur and recommended a comprehensive solution, and that recommendation was adopted by the AUPSC and endorsed by the UNSC. Why should that change?

  7. Julie Flint 26 February, 2010 at 07:44

    Bec, I can’t answer your question. I don’t have the necessary legal expertise; hopefully someone will have. What this agreement makes very clear, however, is that Bassole, the official joint mediator, is not in control of the so-called peace process. This deal was hatched in Chad. As I understand it, there has always been a back track between the NCP and JEM, specifically between Ghazi and Khalil, and the final result of this is what we see now – facilitated of course by Bassole’s decision, when he took over in June 2008, to try to jumpstart things with a ceasefire between the hard men needed for a ceasefire – the NCP and JEM. (I think there was some sense to this decision, at least initially: the Salim-Eliasson approach of inviting almost everyone to the negotiating table had failed, conspicuously, and the acronyms Oscar Blayton cites are, in no few cases, just that: acronyms. We have consistently made the mistake of paying too much attention to acronyms and not enough to the commanders in the field.) Bassole was surely ambushed by this latest NCP-JEM agreement – I doubt he even stopped to consider the legality of the amnesty clause, if indeed it is an issue – and now has little more than two weeks to salvage something. He has, at the very least, been too cautious, a man who allows normal tides to flow. The real “peace-making” between the NCP and JEM has been done behind his back.

    On Mbeki, Alex, his recommendations have been clear and consistent, as you say. The AUPD’s recommendations were superb on what the Sudanese government needs to do to start re-legitimizing the state. Hybrid courts may be, as you yourself argue, I think, the least bad option. Everyone agrees on the recommendations made for the Mediation — inclusivity, rebel unity, securing a ceasefire and a framework agreement. But how to get there, that’s the point, and on this the AUPD report did not offer any realistic ideas. Hence my final question, as initially posed: “What is his suggestion for the way forward now?” (The word “plan” was not mine.)

  8. Bec Hamilton 26 February, 2010 at 08:13

    Thanks. I just posted on the meta problem you are pointing to of parallel processes: http://bechamilton.com/?p=1697#more-1697 Who has the leadership, vision, and legitimacy to pull this discombobulated state of play together into a one-track process? I guess Mbeki believes it’s him. . .

  9. Annah Pyndiah 11 March, 2010 at 07:38

    Dear Julie,

    I think that we should first of all appreciate the fact that talks of peace from the Sudanese government’s side are serious and have lead to a ceasefire between JEM ( a movement with the largest forces in the field) and GoS. Whether or not the ceasefire has in actuality been respected is another issue.

    However I just returned from Doha last week and all individuals who ever claimed to be rebels, a movement or what not were present apart from Abdel Wahed of course. The Qataris are making a great effort to make these talks as inclusive as possible by inviting as many of the rebel fractions and individuals who claim to be representing Darfuri people and points of view. In trying to make the Doha talks as inclusive as possible, the Qataris and the mediation are having a hard time trying to consolidate all movements present; one of these movements is made up merely of a man and his wife. However they represent a Darfuri community and should be present – is the ideology of the Qataris and the Mediation in order to obtain a good and strong peace agreement that will be successful unlike Abuja.

    In order to obtain a strong agreement and one that will be implemented I believe JEM has a point in refusing other bilateral agreements between rebel groups and GoS, as this will only enhance Bashir’s possibility further tension between signatory parties. By having many bilateral agreements GoS can easily play the rebel movements out against each other and thus peace will be unsuccessful for the Darfuris yet Bashir would always be able to claim that he did the right thing.

    Looking at the rebel groups in Darfur there are so many fractions and new ones are emerging constantly – their big issue is that none of them get on with each other, and trying to unity all of the rebel fractions in Darfur would be completely impossible. At the moment there are four major groups: JEM, Abdel Wahed, the newly formed Liberation Justice Movement (LJM) and the Roadmap group/Addis group.

    The Liberation Justice Movement are lead by Tigani Sese and includes;
    URF Bahr Abu Garda
    SLA Unity command Mahyoub Hussein former SLA Abdallah Yahia
    SLA Khamis fraction
    JEM Democratic
    Abdel Maged Dosa
    SLA mainline lead by Haida
    and Brehma who split from the URFF

    The Roadmap group is still under construction, some of the commanders left Doha last week and have gone to the field to join fractions, so far their head negotiator will be Sharif Harir and at the moment they include:
    SLA Abdel Shafi
    SLA Abdallah Yahia
    some Abdel Wahed commanders such as Abdallah Khalil
    and URFF lead by Ibrahim Zebedi.

    My thoughts of Doha so far is that they are inclusive, the main players at the negotiating table are JEM as they have the largest forces on the ground and thus are the biggest threat to the government troops. JEM can be criticised for their discourse about other movements and refusal to accept other movements on the ground, hopefully this will change in the future.

    Julie, you criticised the ceasefire for not including the disarmament of Janjaweed, however as a ceasefire between two parties it manages to focus on JEM soldiers and their future quite well. Incorporating JEM soldiers into the Army seems like a good alternative to the usual DDR programs which so often fail. JEM soldiers are trained by competent people, such as Soleiman Sandal former police officer.

    The Doha days are still early however unlike the Goodwill Agreement these talks are attended by all rebel fractions and now it is up to them to put aside old feelings of hatred and work together for a peace for the Darfuris. Whether or not Abdel Wahed will join is uncertain but his stubborness might not jeopardize peace as many of his commanders have deserted him, and his support must be diminishing among the IDP’s as he is now being so completely difficult to work with and having been out of touch with the field for so many years.

    The largest enemy for the rebels at the moment seems to be their lack of ability to corporate with each other, and the many narratives of the ‘other’ – they should bury the hatches and make the most of this opportunity as Bashir really wants peace as part part of his political makeover in order to ‘win’ the April elections and stay in Khartoum for the next five years.

    I think its important to keep in mind that what has been signed in N’Djamena and Doha is a ceasefire and the will to make a framework agreement, the actual framework is still under construction, there was a deadline 15 March however it seems that will be delayed due to the deadlock situation of the past fourteen days.

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