Sudan: Negotiating Southern Independence
The ruling parties in northern and southern Sudan, as well as international actors in Sudan currently are almost exclusively focussed on the referendum on southern independence. Given the delays to the referendum timetable and the ongoing war of words between the NCP and SPLM, this is not surprising. Nevertheless, the almost exclusive focus on the January vote threatens to divert attention away from the negotiations underway between the NCP and SPLM on post-referendum arrangements. Whether the parties are able to progress and strike viable deals in these negotiations is of crucial importance for the referendum and the associated potential for conflict. In my briefing, Negotiating Southern Independence: High stakes in the talks on post-referendum arrangements, I argue that deals could be based on existing interdependencies between north and south. Regardless of the referendum’s outcome, an expansion of north-south relations based on these interdependencies would provide the best options for stability – but close and stable relations between the two states are particularly important if (as is most likely) the south becomes independent.
North-south negotiations began in July and have since been taking place behind closed doors, excluding external observers or mediators. The parties may resort to the mediation of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP), led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, or employ the expertise of external consultants, but to date have hardly used these options. Little is known about their progress to date – partly because the talks are in their infancy on many points, partly because both parties have largely kept quiet thus far. As both sides and external actors are all occupied with the referendum itself, the talks are unlikely to be well-advanced by the date of the vote (i.e. 9 January 2011, according to the current schedule); moreover, it is questionable whether the two parties will have reached compromises on all key issues by the end of the CPA interim period on 15 July 2011 (when southern independence would become effective). The more protracted the talks are, the more likely is the emergence of conflicts between the two sides or their proxies in the run-up and aftermath of the referendum. Destabilising tactics and proxy warfare (such as through tribal militias and other armed groups) have long been part of both sides’ repertoire in negotiations, meaning that the risk of increasing instability is associated not only with the possibility of southern secession as such, but also part of the negotiations themselves.
Contentious points and possible solutions
The negotiations are structured into four areas, each of which is covered by a working group comprising representatives of both parties: Citizenship; Security; Economic, Financial and Natural Resources; as well as International Treaties and Legal Issues. Key negotiating points include an arrangement to divide up oil export revenues; the rights and duties of citizens across the common border (including rights of residence, work, trade and land use); the currency and national debt; water; and security arrangements. In addition, two issues that are not part of the negotiations in this context are nevertheless of major importance for future north-south relations: the delineation of the common border, and the status of Abyei.
There are a number of opportunities to stabilise the difficult relations between the two future states in the critical first few years after the referendum, by drawing on existing interdependencies. The arrangement whereby revenues from oil produced in the south were shared equally between the central and southern governments was perhaps the single most important factor behind the CPA’s success to date, as both sides had a vested interest in continuing the agreement. There is an opportunity to establish a mutually beneficial arrangement for the post-referendum era that could play a similarly stabilising role as its equivalent in the CPA. The necessity of such an arrangement is clear to both sides, not least because the southern government currently has no other option. Until the viability of an alternative southern export pipeline is established, an arrangement between the two sides will be primarily a question of how significant the northern share of southern oil revenue will be, and the method by which it will be calculated. This is not to say that there is no potential for conflict on this point: should either side use the instruments of pressure available in this area – such as a temporary export blockage by the north – this could potentially trigger war.
Another case in point are the rights and duties of northern and southern citizens on the other side of the common border. The central government has begun to exert pressure by threatening to expel southern Sudanese living in the north following southern independence. On the other hand, southward migration by northern groups is more developed than vice versa, including for cattle-herding Arab nomads (Baggara), who are an important constituency for the NCP. This strengthens the southern government’s negotiating position. Moreover, the regulation of southerners’ residence rights in the north will be linked to those of northern traders in the south. To increase the chances of a relatively stable transition to southern independence, the central and southern governments would have to build on these existing interdependencies to strengthen their bilateral relations, rather than trying to outdo each other in restricting access for the other state’s citizens. The more complicated – but ultimately more stable – solution would be a “˜soft’ border. This would require the detailed regulation of northern and southern citizens’ rights and duties on the other side of the border, given that unregulated migration and land use would be a recipe for conflict between local groups. An agreement on an open border with clear rules for cross-border movements would help stabilise north-south relations. An expansion of infrastructure linking the two future states could further bolster such a border regime.
These points are also relevant to the Abyei dispute, which is not part of the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements as such. The preparations for the Abyei referendum have experienced even more delays than the independence referendum, and the criteria for voter eligibility are fiercely contested. As a result, doubts are growing whether the vote will be held on time, and the Abyei dispute is increasingly becoming a negotiating point. In September, the NCP suggested that the Abyei referendum should be cancelled and the area should be turned into a demilitarised zone whose residents would have dual nationality. The SPLM has rejected the proposal, not least because it would represent a departure from one of the key components of the CPA, and therefore could ultimately raise questions about the independence referendum itself. Nevertheless, a negotiated solution would offer an opportunity to defuse the Abyei dispute. The Abyei referendum would be very likely to lead to violence in the region. The conflict not only has a national dimension (related to the oilfields located in Abyei) but is particularly explosive at the local level, where the rights to residency and land use of two groups are at stake – the Ngok Dinka (a key constituency for the SPLM) and the Misseriya (a Baggara tribe). The only stable solution would be one where the rights of both groups are guaranteed, regardless of whether Abyei becomes part of the north or the south.
A common currency could form another stabilising link after southern secession. Given that oil revenues are a fundamental factor for both states’ budgets, the Sudanese Pound could conceivably be used as a common currency. The question then becomes how the influence of each side on the institution responsible for monetary policy (the Central Bank of Sudan) would be regulated. From the central government’s perspective, a common currency would have to be backed up by mechanisms controlling fiscal policy in both states, as a fiscal or current account crisis in the south could destabilise the currency. The alternative solution – less attractive from the viewpoint of north-south relations, but currently favoured by the SPLM leadership – would be a temporary dollarisation of the southern economy.
There are a number of negotiating points where no obvious interdependencies exist, such as on the question of Sudan’s external debt, or on security arrangements. Nevertheless, there are opportunities for external actors to support compromises and function as guarantors of a wider north-south arrangement. With regard to Sudan’s external debt, for example, the central government will seek to hand part of its this debt over to the south in the event of secession. The SPLM strongly rejects this. Donor states have two basic options in this regard: either to initiate a multilateral debt relief addressing the entirety of old Sudanese debt (regardless of its repartition between north and south) or to apply such relief only to that part of the debt passed on to the southern government in the negotiations. The first option, planned as a process lasting several years, could have a major stabilising impact on north-south relations, by significantly increasing Western donors’ leverage over the central government.
Admittedly, an expansion of bilateral relations in parallel to the secession process will require significant effort – particularly for the south, which has already begun to strengthen its ties with its southern and eastern neighbours, as well as Western donors (particularly the United States). The SPLM, as a former rebel group that continues to be deeply suspicious of Khartoum, will likely seek to contain northern influence in order to assert the sovereignty of the emerging southern state. Conversely, the NCP is likely to see existing ties between the two states primarily as an opportunity to maintain and exploit its dominant position vis-í -vis the south. Both tactics run counter to the stabilising impact that close interdependence could have. Finally, there is a danger that too close relations between the two states could have a destabilising impact if the south is too exposed to Khartoum’s influence through its dependence on the northern oil export infrastructure, trade and currency.
Ultimately, the compromises necessary for close and stable relations will have to be reached by the two parties themselves. Nevertheless, the two sides should be encouraged to resist their likely reflex of erecting barriers and curbing ties between themselves. This is particularly relevant with regard to the southern government, which seeks the backing of Western donors as a counterweight to Khartoum’s influence. However, unless it is coupled with closer relations with the north, the expansion of southern ties with its southern and eastern neighbours and the West could deepen the polarisation between the two states. Instead of hastening the south’s uncoupling from the north and raise the risk of conflict between the two sides, external actors should seek to promote their integration, and prevent imbalances in north-south relations.
Wolfram Lacher is a researcher on Sudan and the Horn of Africa at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Dear Wolfram Lacher
The issue of Sudan is so complex, perhaps complicated more by some friends who seem not to understand it as it is.
Example are those who still maintain that it is an issue of “INDEPENDENCE”, in which case the whole issues you raise would not rise, how can a colony share in the debts of the colonizing power? Concede economic benefits to the colonial masters? etc….
This only shows the depths of the problem with some in the International Scholars. South Sudan has never been a colony, a fact that many tend to overlook.
Here we have two parties who make the Government of National Unity, the NCP and SPLM.
We have a referendum for people of the South to choose whether to continue in the United Sudan as it is or secede and to establish their own state.
The way in which some International Experts tend to write about Sudan has cast the case of Sudan so much confusion and generated too much bias against the North, to the extent that some top personalities in the International Community to-day take as a classic case of “DECOLONIZATION”.
I sincerely hope that those who write or volunteer their thoughts about the Sudan would be more precise about the terms they use, which is not difficult ,since the CPA is an open document to all those who which to refer to it.
Best regards.
Dear Mr. Lacher,
Thank you for highlighting the one-sidedness of discourse on Sudan’s future. With drum-beating arguments abound, being exposed to any alternative suggestion for a peaceful, rational and beneficial post-referendum negotiation seems almost alien.
Another lacuna, my most definitely uninformed self yearns to fill, is discussions on referendum administration (ballot forms, logistics, etc). Is there a possibility of introducing different options in the plebiscite, other than staying in unified Sudan or secede? With the UN “Scary Statistics” on South Sudan and general state of infrastructure and economy, can postponing secession, and not referendum, be an exception to the often referenced idiom “justice delayed, is justice denied”?
Presenting different angles on the myriad issues of Sudan’s future can only enrich intellectual exchange and, to the benefit of Sudan, put an end of the current ossifying state of discussion.
Best,
Jamila
I don’t think Barsoum has an understanding of what “independence” actually means. An entity does not have to be a colony in order for it to be independent!!
This analysis speaks of a certainty of independence and no one on this blog has raised analyses on southern Sudanese polls or voter opinions. Therefore, it is presumptuous.
So far the only explosively threatening group has been the SPLM backed by Western media eschatological literature and its “informed” and “well-meaning” analysts. I’m sorry but someone has to say it.
Dear Dr. Lacher,
Well done and clearly written. I’m not seeing anything eye-poppingly new, but it’s nice to see a sober assessment on how this could all work out. We need more reasoned approaches to the referendum like this.
In regards to the point about colonization and debt, this issue is more complicated than Mr. Barsoum might suggest. How much of the debt comes from the Southern government after it was established under the interim constitution? How will this debt be divided? If the temporary southern government racked up millions of dollars in debt over the past few years, shouldn’t they be responsible for paying for some of it?
Jamaleldin,
I second your concern. When such inquiry is raised, it is almost always implied that one of the following is true; First, SPLM is just as guilty as NCP of media censorship, voter-scaring tactics, etc. Second, South Sudanese are predominantly in favour of secession and dissenting voices are meager.
The blame isn’t on the lack of coverage, intentional or not, by Western analysts, but also on those Sudanese on the ground there. It is a political process in an African country, or Arab, where neo-patrimonial ties are interwoven in almost every fabric of interaction. Adding to the equation corruption in all its forms from nepotism to cronyism only presents a more conspicuous and grim, albeit predictable, picture of the Sudanese future.
Yes Jamila. That is inevitable and unquestionable point. Nevertheless, something must be said about the ease and liberties that these analysts have self-assumed on Sudan, in light of the NCP’s transgressions, I concede. It is not so much what they say but what they omit, that I take offense to. We must point to these failures equally, lest we be surprised when they drive up the temperature of vilification, post-separation. As you said, no proposed remedy can be one-sided. This analysis definitely is.
Wolfram Lacher has presented some interesting ideas regarding how the North and South can make the best of their situation if (as many people anticipate) the South votes to secede from Sudan. I believe that his comments are more helpful than those of writers who only predict doom and devastation if the South leaves Sudan, and I would like to expand a little on what he has written – both on this blog and in his briefing [a link to which is in the body of his post]..
It cannot be denied that the NCP has squandered opportunities – on several occasions – to present itself as a fair CPA partner. And there have been instances where the SPLA has not presented itself as an ideal partner either. Now Sudan faces a very short timeline during which it has to try to resolve many thorny problems that have existed for decades. But if we look, as Wolfram did, at the points of common interest shared by the North and South, there appears to be a possibility that a path can be hacked out through the thicket of difficulties in order to reach a peaceful co-existence for a Unity State, or two Separate States. I do not wish to “re-state†Wolfram’s post or his brief, but I would like to point out a few of his points that may be relevant and worth further consideration.
The short history of oil sharing during the CPA process provides a framework for going forward in working out agreements for the sharing of oil revenues. Differences have been discovered, discussed, and in some instances, worked out. There are many innovative arrangements that can be explored, and with much of the oil in the South, and the current infrastructure for getting the oil to market in the North, it is in everyone’s interest to come to some type of mutual agreement. I would argue that there is a foundation there upon which to build productive relations. But transparency in such a process would be essential.
Immigrant communities bring vitality to any adopted region where they settle. It is to the benefit of North Sudan to determine how best to gain from Southerners living in the North as a valuable resource. And as a significant number of Northerners are living and conducting business in the South, reciprocal arrangements guaranteeing rights and the lack of restrictions are in everyone’s interest. Additionally, there are the herding communities that will need a certain flexibility in the relations between the North and the South in order to allow for the mobility necessary for grazing. Both Southerners living in the North, and Northerners living in the South – as well as herding communities in the border area are stakeholders in the peace between the North and South in the Border Region. If they are not already given voice to the negotiations, perhaps they should be.
Wolfram suggests that a “Soft Border†be considered between North and South. And it is possible that some aspects of such a Soft Border arrangement could be predicated upon the centuries of per-existing nomadic culture in Sudan where spatial behavior differs from the “fixed†location precept that is predominant in Western culture today. Such paradigms of space sharing (land rights) have long allowed for the peaceful co-existence of varying cultures and are not necessarily noxious to the sovereignty of the nation state.
Cross Border Agreements could also stand as a type of Sudanese Declaration of Rights; securing the rights of individuals, communities and states in processes that allow for the free movement of individuals goods and information to constantly elevate the quality of life of those protected.
Though omitted from his post, Wolfram discusses the importance of water in his Briefing. Water is of vital importance to both North and South Sudan – and as it relates to the Nile River, it is important to Egypt as well. Reconsidering the Jonglei Canal project, as suggested by Wolfram, could be a means by which Egypt could participate as a stabilizing influence in the north south relations after the referendum. But moving in this direction would require a great deal of caution as there is local opposition in the South to the canal project. If discussions on this project are revived, local stakeholders and other appropriate parties should be given voice to the deliberations.
There are also security issues to be addressed, such as the disposition of the JIUs along with national, regional and local security concerns. And there needs to be a process for ensuring that no support is finding its way to parties in local conflicts. But again, resolving these issues can be based upon mutual concerns and interests of both parties.
I should not take the length to raise any more issues in this comment. My intention by posting here is to suggest that these issues can be managed if there is innovation and a willingness to find peaceful and equitable compromises that allow people to live in security, prosperity and dignity.
There is a great deal to be accomplished, but, like Wolfram, I believe that there are opportunities for shared interests to lay a path to mutual progress through cooperation leading up to the Referendum and even beyond the end of the interim period. And arrangements acceptable to both sides would be even more important in the event of a vote for unity.
Also, like Wolfram, I believe that infrastructure development can help the peace process, and if those international participants and Western nation states who say that they are for peace wish to demonstrate their sincerity, there would be no better time than now for them to step forward and offer what assistance they can for the development of infrastructure in an effort to support productive negotiations between the SPLM and the NCP and to foster the prospects for peace.
Dear Ahmed,
thanks for your comment. As I understand it, the national debt which the NCP is seeking to divide up in the event of secession by and large dates from the 1970s, and has burgeoned since the 1980s due to the accumulation of payment arrears, interest payments and penalties. It was largely contracted under Nimeiri in the period between the 1973 oil shock and the onset of the third world debt crisis in 1979. Despite the fact that this period coincides with the interlude established by the Addis Ababa agreement, I think it’s fair to say that the south benefited little from the loans contracted in those years. As a result, the reasoning behind sharing these debts is questionable, to say the least. The dubiety of such a plan notwithstanding, however, I believe that there is an opportunity for external actors to back up an agreement between the two sides by granting debt relief. This would be unlikely to apply to debts contracted more recently, i.e. during the CPA period, when the central and southern governments had separate budgets and contracted loans separately.
Dear Jamaledin,
I would agree that it is dangerous for foreign and Sudanese officials to publicly pre-judge the outcome of the referendum (as both NCP and SPLM, as well as senior US officials have recently done), since their statements raise doubts over whether they would accept an outcome that is contrary to their expectations. However, I don’t think it is preposterous for independent analysts to try to forecast the outcome, and what happens after. I am not saying that a vote for secession is certain, but I think that it is far more likely than a vote for unity. Admittedly, this assessment is not based on polls; rather, it is based on discussions with Sudanese in Khartoum and South Sudan, and therefore largely intuitive. Another factor to take into account is that the majority of the SPLM leadership (excluding its northern sector) are certain to campaign for secession. Judging from the SPLM’s influence and control over the April elections in the south, this further raises the likelihood of a vote for secession.
Dr. Lacher,
I was wondering if you could expound upon the impact that a common currency would have on an independent Southern Sudan. Fairly recently, there were some reports regarding Sudan’s monetary policy and dollarization of the Sudanese economy that caused me to think about this issue in greater detail. However, I had not realized that these options were being seriously considered in North-South negotiations.
Is the NCP or the SPLM seriously pushing for a common currency/common or intertwined monetary policy?
It seems, if an independent Southern Sudan retained a common currency, the NCP would then maintain significant control of Southern Sudanese finances – potentially affecting oil revenue, trade, etc. and, indirectly, fiscal policy in the South including infrastructure investment. This control could hamper the GoSS’s ability to independently provide certainty to trade partners regarding the stability of the South’s economy. This also has the ability destabilize many GoSS domestic and foreign ambitions.
In short, it seems as though a common currency would leave Southern Sudan only semi-autonomous in many ways and would provide a flash point for future disputes and conflict rather than a point of stabilization between two independent countries.