Little change in Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan

Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan have all recently experienced democratic elections be they Presidential, representative or in the case of South Sudan, a referendum on its secession from the North. However, does the existence of elections across the region (Burundi and DRC could also be included in this analysis) mean that good democratic practises are being embedded in the fabric of political society? Are elections to be celebrated when they do not see a transfer of power from ruling parties which appear increasingly dominant?

Rwanda – Dr Phil Clark

Phil describes popular analysis of Rwanda as falling into 2 camps:

The reality is much messier.

Any analysis of elections in Rwanda must conclude that they bring the worst out in its current political climate. They reveal the fractured and often paranoid nature of contemporary Rwandan politics

2010 Elections

During 2010 it became apparent that President Kagame and the RPF had a stranglehold on power, to the extent that the elections were effectively uncontested. This was reflected in the polls by the RPF’s victory with 93 percent of the vote.

The most high profile opposition figure was Victoire Ingabire from the United Democratic Forces party. However, Phil argues that she was never in reality a serious candidate, being an obscure figure who had largely lived in the Netherlands until the early 1990s. Ingabire fought an ill-conceived campaign, and marked herself out as being desperately out of touch by her targeting of the Gacaca court process. In short, the RPF could have left her alone and still have won the election by a landslide.

A key question must be – why did the RPF crack down so harshly on Ingabire if it knew it would win anyway? Wouldn’t it have been better to allow her to campaign, win perhaps 5 percent of the vote, and be thus able to demonstrate to the international community the openness of Rwanda’s democratic system?

Demonising attitudes

Most demonising attitudes towards the RPF come from Human Rights groups. However, Phil argues that the “˜authoritarian’ and “˜dictatorial’ labels belie a more complicated reality. The RPF as a party does not act in the cohesive fashion in which it is often portrayed. The crackdown on the Ingabire campaign is a symbol of a highly divided government that is becoming increasingly factionalised.

The success of the Gacaca process is evidence to suggest that hardliners – those that have favoured a more heavy-handed justice system for perpetrators of genocide (including Kagame) – have not won out. In this case, the pragmatic, moderate argument has won the day to produce justice and reconstruction in an internationally palatable manner. What this shows is that Kagame, and those more hard-line than the President, do not always get their own way. The state is increasingly divided, and crackdowns occur against soft targets such as Ingabire.

In the last few years more moderate voices have been gaining power in the RPF, evidenced by the abolition of the death penalty, rejection of a “˜Uganda-style’ anti-gay law and the continuation of the Gacaca court system. In addition, more hard-line voices – notably dissident generals – have also left the RPF. All is not well within the party.

Phil, who has written extensively on Gacaca courts, critiques the analysis that they have been simply a form of “˜mob justice’ or localised tools for political control through the RPF. There have been approximately 11,000 Gacaca courts set up in Rwanda, a number that would make it impossible for RPF control (or intelligence) to have penetrated all of them. The reality is that Gacaca has become an important space for political contestation with no real danger of government interference.

In conclusion, the most recent Rwandan election has pointed to a ruling party that is divided and fragile. The aggressive treatment of opposition figures was an unnecessary error, but reveals much about the current internal state of the RPF.

Uganda – Zachary Lomo

Zachary illustrated what he sees as Uganda’s unsuccessful attempt to move from single person regimes to rule “˜by the people’ through a brief description of the country’s electoral history since independence.

Uganda had its first post-independence election in 1961 but then held no multi-party elections from 1962 until 80 under both the UPC governments of Milton Obote and Idi Amin’s military regime. In 1980 with the return of Obote (after Amin had been thrown from power) the UPC held blatantly rigged elections which Yoweri Museveni rejected and tried to “˜shoot his way to power.’ He was finally successful in 1986 and after the National Resistance Army had turned into the National Resistance Movement the “˜Movement System’ was created (every Ugandan becoming a member of this national political association.)

Throughout the 1990s political parties were banned, and whilst elections did take place for the constituent assembly seats no campaigning at a grass roots level was permitted. In the 1996 election Museveni triumphed with 75 percent of the vote.

The 2001 election saw the first instance in which opposition political parties were able to challenge the status quo. This came in the form of a challenge by the President’s former doctor – Kizza Besigye – who formed the Forum for Democratic Change and won nearly 28 percent of the vote. Besigye challenged the results of this election in the supreme court – accusing the government of rigging.

In 2006 Besigye was again the main opposition figure. Zachary described these elections as being the most violent in Uganda’s recent history with Besigye also being arrested on charges of rape (and later released). Museveni won with 59 percent of the vote, the 10 percent he had lost from 2001 going to Besigye who gained 37 percent.

The 2011 election did not follow the developing pattern of decreasing support from Museveni and the NRM. Whilst there was no real violence, it was suggested that the NRM’s far greater capacity to spend vast sums on its campaign was instrumental in its gains.

Zachary consequently argued that the fundamentals of democracy are not, and have never been, in place in Uganda. Elections must be part of a broader process, and in themselves they do not necessarily facilitate transitions to democracy. Uganda has not yet experienced a real democratic transition. Uganda essentially remains a military country, and institutions of governance and the party are infused. For Uganda to truly democratise it must truly desecuritise its systems of government.

South Sudan – Mareike Schomerous

South Sudan was chosen as a comparative example for this meeting owing to its recent and historic electoral experience with both the referendum (2011), and national election in 2010.

Mareike stated that both elections and referendum were both great technical achievements for the South Sudanese. However, it is important to analyse how such “˜democratic rituals’ actually affected the process of politics for the people of South Sudan.

It was commented that South Sudan’s recent electoral “˜events’ were also largely donor driven. They would not have happened without significant international investment. However, it was pointed out that “˜democracy is by nature transitional’ and as such cannot be expected to function perfectly, or to solve a multitude of problems without long-term investment.

Conclusions

The intention in hosting this discussion was to assess how “˜democratic’ the three countries in question (which have all recently held elections, or electoral events) actually are. Broad conclusions suggest that electoral events do tells us a great deal about the functioning of democracy in these three instances.

In Rwanda we have a paranoid and divided ruling party too concerned with controlling any opposition, Uganda remains a militarised state where the ruling party and the government are one and the same thing, whilst South Sudan is a very young country in which a great deal is expected from elections which simply cannot deliver these gains. Elections in all three case studies do not seem to deliver the “˜democratic transitions’ suggested in the event title, however they do function as revealing events in the political development of all three countries.

Thanks to all speakers, and to Thomas Mawan Muortat for chairing the event.

By Magnus Taylor