Congo: avoiding past pitfalls in a future peace deal with the M23 – By Judith Verweijen
The recent fall of Goma has starkly highlighted the shaky foundations of the “˜peace architecture’ that was built in the wake of the Second Congo War (1998-2002). Briefly, it once again seemed that the entire house of cards would collapse, drawing in the wider complex of state and non-state actors that drive conflict dynamics in the Great Lakes region.
Although the situation remains volatile and renewed fighting is not to be excluded, the start of direct negotiations between the Kinshasa Government and the M23 rebel group offers hope that an all-out collapse can be averted. However, there remains a risk that the need to end Kinshasa’s currently humiliating position will lead to hasty compromises that might mortgage the long-term prospects for a more stable east.
Previous negotiations with the M23’s “˜godfather’ – the CNDP – produced deals that did little more than temporarily patch up parts of the DRC’s fragile post-settlement architecture, failing to lay more solid foundations. The prospect that, this time, the compromise between a short-term end to hostilities and longer-term stability might be more successful looks rather bleak.
As was previously the case, the military balance of power is tilted in favour of the rebels, and Kinshasa’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre is small. Kabila had hoped to capitalise upon the M23 crisis by boosting his dented domestic and international legitimacy through playing the anti-Rwanda card, but this strategy has obviously failed. The recent nation-wide anti-Kinshasa demonstrations, the unruly behaviour of the FARDC, and the exposure of its Chief of Staff Amisi as heading an arms-trafficking ring, have all served to underscore the incompetence and unpopularity of his government.
The rebels, for their part, have attempted to gain a veneer of legitimacy by recasting themselves as a revolutionary movement with a broad basis of support. Only some time after its launch as a military mutiny, the M23 formulated a political agenda, first focusing on the implementation of the March 23 peace agreement and the grievances of the Tutsi community.
On the wings of its military successes, it then re-styled itself as a group advocating fundamental political reforms – as became clear from the list of demands voiced this week by Bishop Runiga, the M23’s political leader. Amongst other things, Runiga called for disbanding the Electoral Commission (CENI), freedom of movement for opposition leader Tsishekedi and the arrests of Generals John Numbi and Amisi.
Unsurprisingly, Kinshasa has dismissed these demands as a “farce” and rejected the M23’s call for broad peace talks that include the political opposition, civil society and the diaspora. On the one hand, the M23’s demands risk generating a diplomatic stalemate. On the other, they could be seen as an entry point for the construction of a more solid governance framework that might accommodate conflicting demands in a non-violent manner.
Much will depend on the diplomatic horse-trading currently taking place behind closed doors. Hopefully, the biggest aid donors to countries in the region will use their leverage over this process for the better, and not to protect long-standing ties with certain “pet statesmen”. In particular, they should ensure that any potential peace deal will avoid the pitfalls of previous peace processes.
In the following, I will discuss four of the root causes of failure.
1. Prioritising political grievances and politico-administrative integration
Most previous peace agreements have been essentially military deals, negotiated by military leaders and focusing on military issues. The “˜political’ part has been little more than a sideshow. Although the M23 only progressively developed a political agenda, there is no reason to dismiss the grievances it now brings to the table. In particular, its calls for anti-corruption measures, more respect for civil liberties and democratic reforms, are concerns that are widely shared.
This agenda could be seen as hypocritical, as most vote rigging in the Kivus during the 2011 elections took place in areas controlled by the ex-CNDP, and the latter’s leadership was involved in large-scale corruption and shady business dealings, while the M23 has shown to have a blatant disrespect for human rights in the areas under its control. However, given that these grievances are among the main causes for discontent with the current government, using them as a catalyst for change could ultimately contribute to stabilisation.
This also applies to the rebels’ demand for federalism for the Kivus. Whilst this is not presently politically viable, these demands could be met by making a long overdue start with decentralisation, the organisation of local elections and the development of the Kivus’ administrative infrastructure. Furthermore, efforts should be made to rescue the clauses of the March 23 Agreement that voice some long-standing concerns of the Tutsi community. These include facilitating the return of Congolese refugees from Rwanda, the elaboration of a reconciliation policy and the creation of local conflict mediation committees.
Addressing these grievances will be more effective if the M23 are made partly responsible for their implementation. This will require their integration into the politico-administrative apparatus, including at the national level.
The past strategy of prioritising military over political inclusion has proven to be ineffective, as it did little to tackle the roots of violent conflict. Political representation, by contrast, will allow rebels to maintain their grievances on the political agenda and address them through high-level channels. Furthermore, it might give the wider political-economic network to which the M23 is connected a stake in making them remain committed to the agreements. This will not be feasible without pay-offs, but the challenge is to make these pay-offs less dependent upon the use of violence.
2. Dealing simultaneously with other armed groups and communities
Due to the complexity of conflict dynamics in eastern DRC, addressing one piece of the puzzle at a time has thus far proved ineffective. The peace deal concluded in 2009 with other armed groups was entirely overshadowed by CNDP integration. It is therefore unsurprising that several such groups eventually withdrew from the process, partly to protest the CNDP’s privileged treatment within the FARDC.
This allowed such dissident groups to reinforce mobilisation and popular support, thus contributing to further destabilisation. The laws of action and reaction in the Kivus make it likely that any agreements with the M23 will have wider repercussions, all the more so given their loose alliances to other groups.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the dozens of armed groups currently active in eastern DRC, and continuing to integrate them into the military does not appear to be a viable option. Moreover, simultaneously signed agreements have tended to foster dynamics of competition, with each faction claiming equal rights to the most favoured group. Although armed groups are commonly projects of the elites of divided communities, in many cases they do voice concerns that the wider population identify with.
Inter- and intra-community tensions and armed group activity are interlocking processes, and both are again strongly interwoven with the way in which the national army operates. This makes it essential to address these components simultaneously. It may, once again, be possible to organise a Kivus-wide peace conference, as the M23 appears to have hinted at, but without repeating the mistakes of the 2008 Goma Conference.
This would necessitate inviting community delegations and local authorities (in place of armed groups) and avoiding doling out lucrative positions and generous per diems. It should then be up to the (civilian) delegates of such a conference to develop proposals for how to deal with the armed groups in their constituencies, and calculate whether demobilisation is a feasible option.
3. Army reintegration without rewarding insurgent violence
Earlier peace deals always involved the military integration of rebels. As I have explained in more detail elsewhere, both the terms of these integration deals and the way in which they were implemented eventually led to greater instability – they ended up rewarding those who took up arms, thus sending the message that insurgent violence pays.
A crucial part of this mechanism was the impunity granted to senior leaders suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the provision of pay-offs in the form of control over lucrative deployment locations. If the decision is made to reintegrate elements of the M23 back into the FARDC, careful deliberation is needed to see how such detrimental effects can be mitigated.
Putting higher officers back into top positions in the Kivus will certainly send the wrong signal – in particular to current FARDC troops, including the part of the ex-CNDP that have remained loyal. Furthermore, it will deal a further blow to Kabila’s domestic and international legitimacy. However, the fact that Makenga and Baudouin Ngaruye (respectively commander and deputy-commander of M23) refer to themselves as “General” and the recent promotion of other officers to higher ranks, indicates that the M23 aims to obtain ranks and positions in the FARDC. It is therefore crucial to find a more balanced way of integration, for instance by spreading M23 fighters in an even manner among units, training these units before redeployment, and appointing top officers only to positions they are qualified for and outside of the Kivus.
Integration should also address the serious identity-based tensions that exist within the army. As long as Tutsi troops do not feel safe, specifically when deployed far from their home areas, they will continue to be susceptible to dissidence. Preventing this requires investment in the sensitisation not only of troops, but also of populations in deployment locations.
4. Credible sanctions for violations on both sides
One of the biggest obstacles to the implementation of peace agreements in the DRC has been the lack of credible sanctions for violations and delays. Peace deals have generally been half-implemented , andnon-respect has been facilitated by vague formulations and the absence of clear time-lines. Enforcement will continue to be a major challenge for any future peace deal, and it is precisely here that international actors could play a more pronounced role.
The UN Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) must consider how far its role should include (threatening) the use of force. If anything, the latest crisis has demonstrated that the MONUSCO is not a credible player when it comes to deterrence and sanctioning spoiling behaviour. Either their mandate should be changed, or their contribution to implementation should be limited to monitoring and verification, technical and logistical assistance, as well as coordinating mediation and political pressure.
Such an emphasis on political instruments for enforcement is only possible if bilateral donors with more diplomatic leverage step up engagement and apply pressure where and when needed. These donors should stop using the UN as an easy scapegoat to mask their own lukewarm commitment to previous peace processes. An overall political solution to the crisis, however difficult to imagine in the face of current military realities, can only be possible if key diplomatic players put their full weight behind it.
As was painfully exposed by the fall of Goma, “˜engagement light’ will fail to address the complexities of the Great Lakes region.
Judith Verweijen is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Conflict Studies at Utrecht University.
I regret to say to you that you missed the right solution. The first solution is to change all political system of the country: new constitution with recognition of full rights for people living in Congo territories; policies for protection of minorities;new leadership for the country; federation structure. I prefer demobilization of rebels if there is real peace and no integration, freedom of choice to continue to serve in army.
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I think you are radical, but not radical enough. I think Congo as a nation is doomed. A country like this can never work – it is like the Austro-Hungarian empire that existed in Europe up to the first World War – but worse.
It is time to start to think about splitting up Congo – in a peaceful way, if at all possible.
Bert, why is it only clamor from a small fraction of Rwandese Tutsi installed in Northern Kivu, compared to millions of other tribes akimbo between Congo and its other neighboring countries,Congo has to fragmented?is it Tutsi imperialism or just folie of grandeur that make Kagame and Museveni think Might is right? to compare Congo to Austro-Hungarian empire, is blatant ignorance of facts!all excuses to implant Hima empire or reattach part of Kivu to Rwanda has no future! Rwandophones who want Congolese nationality should abide by Congolese norms found in Congo, not with Rambo occupation mentalities!
n marge des revendications du M23
Qui discrimine les populations rwandophones?
http://www.nyota.net| 29-11-2012 00:
Les populations congolaises sâ€™identifient selon les ethnies. Il y en a plus de 250 Ã travers les 11 provinces. La RÃ©publique dÃ©mocratique du Congo est entourÃ©e par 9 Etats et il y a, presque partout, des populations qui se retrouvent en Rdc et dans les pays avec lesquels nous partageons les frontiÃ¨res. Ce sont des populations transfrontaliÃ¨res.
Eden Nsi Bamfumu
Cas des Bakongo qui sont au Bas-Congo (Rdc), au Congo Brazzaville et en Angola ; il y a des Lunda en Rdc (Bandundu et Katanga), en Angola et en Zambie ; on trouve des Ngbaka chez nous Ã lâ€™Equateur et en Rca ; il y a des Azande en province Orientale et au Soudan du Sud. Lâ€™Ã©numÃ©ration nâ€™est pas exhaustive.
Toutes ces populations Ã©tant implantÃ©es aux lieux quâ€™elles occupent, avant la colonisation de notre pays par la Belgique, aucun groupe nâ€™est identifiÃ© par rapport Ã un Etat Ã©tranger comme cela est le cas au Nord-Kivu et Sud-Kivu oÃ¹ certaines tribus se collent lâ€™Ã©tiquette de Rwandophones (Pourquoi Rwandophone?)
A voir cette question de trÃ¨s prÃ¨s, on dÃ©couvre que ce sont des Rwandais qui ont Ã©migrÃ©s chez nous. Tant mieux. Le problÃ¨me se poserait si ces migrants sont conflictuels et quâ€™ils refusent de sâ€™intÃ©grer avec les populations qui les ont accueillis. Autrement, on assisterait Ã des scÃ¨nes comme ce donateur qui a vu celui quâ€™il voulait aider lui ravir et le cadeau et son bras !
Le document signÃ© le lundi 23 mars 2009 par le Dr DÃ©sirÃ© Kamanzi, prÃ©sident du Cndp (CongrÃ¨s national pour la dÃ©fense du peuple), ne donne pas le droit Ã nâ€™importe quel membre (politique ou militaire) de ce mouvement de se reconstituer en entitÃ© pour revendiquer quoi que ce soit en son nom. Durant prÃ¨s de 5 mois, les hommes du gÃ©nÃ©ral autoproclamÃ© Sultani Makenga ont malmenÃ© la population civile du Nord-Kivu au nom de lâ€™accord signÃ© par le Cndp et le gouvernement sans que le Cndp ne trouve Ã redire.
Des revendications farfelues
En relisant les 16 articles de lâ€™accord de paix du 23 mars 2009, nulle part il est fait mention de la possibilitÃ© pour les Rwandophones de reprendre les armes pour corriger toute discrimination, si discrimination il y a, Ã leur Ã©gard. Les voies strictement politiques dont on parle lâ€™article 1 de cet accord sont drÃ´lement violÃ©es par les tÃ©nors du M23 et non par le gouvernement.
Les revendications Ã©lastiques et changeantes de ce mouvement rÃ©vÃ¨lent le caractÃ¨re bouffon de ceux qui les Ã©mettent. En enfourchant les armes et en attaquant les Forces armÃ©es de la Rdc, qui du gouvernement et du Cndp respecte cet accord ? La recherche de la vÃ©ritÃ© des urnes et la gestion conforme de la Rdc passent â€“elles par des tueries ?
En exigeant des tables rondes oÃ¹ siÃ©geraient lâ€™opposition, la sociÃ©tÃ© civile et la diaspora congolaise, on voit facilement qui se cachent derriÃ¨re ces mutins. Comme des prÃªte-noms, ces dÃ©fenseurs des populations Rwandophones dÃ©montrent Ã la face du monde quâ€™ils sont incapables dâ€™Ãªtre des patriotes dans lâ€™immense Rdc.
MÃªme si la Rdc devenait un Etat fÃ©dÃ©ral, son armÃ©e restera toujours rÃ©publicaine et nationale. Ceci signifie que les soldats originaires des 11 provinces sont dÃ©ployÃ©s sur lâ€™ensemble du territoire national selon la mise en place faite par la hiÃ©rarchie et non selon le bon vouloir de chaque soldat de choisir le lieu oÃ¹ il doit faire son service militaire.
Les militaires tutsis congolais ou Rwandophones, entendez les membres du M23, soutiennent quâ€™eux ne peuvent pas aller loin de leur terre dâ€™origine, le Rwanda ou, Ã la rigueur, le kivu. Si câ€™est cela Ãªtre un dÃ©fenseur du peuple comme le targue le fameux CongrÃ¨s national pour la dÃ©fense du peuple, câ€™est simplement regrettable.
Depuis mardi 20 novembre dernier, journÃ©e qui a vu le chef-lieu de la province du Nord-Kivu tomber entre les mains de la rÃ©bellion du M23, les parlementaires de lâ€™opposition se frottent les mains. Ils travaillent sur deux axes :
IÂ° De lâ€™intÃ©rieur du SÃ©nat et de lâ€™AssemblÃ©e nationale, ils veulent dÃ©stabiliser lâ€™institution gouvernement : des motions, des interpellations contre le Premier ministre et les ministres pleuvent comme la pluie ;
2Â°De lâ€™extÃ©rieur des institutions, nombre des ces opposants attende la table ronde exigÃ©e par les agresseurs. Afin dâ€™entrevoir la possibilitÃ© dâ€™une ouverture, le partage Ã©quitable et Ã©quilibrÃ© du pouvoir, le retour Ã la pÃ©riode de la transition tant aimÃ©e par les pseudo-dÃ©mocrates qui accÃ¨dent au pouvoir Ã©lectif par des nominations.
Lâ€™exilÃ© de Paris, Roger Lumbala, est lâ€™opposant qui traverse le Rubicon en laissant des traces, exploitÃ©es par le gouvernement. Dâ€™autres se terrent dans leurs cachettes, en jouant Ã lâ€™autruche. Tandis que Vital Kamerhe hausse le ton en rÃ©clamant des nÃ©gociations. Au moment oÃ¹ Etienne Tshisekedi se frotte les mains en se disant : Â« Jâ€™aurai par le M23 ce que le peuple mâ€™a refusÃ©Â».
Les Rwandophones discriminÃ©s par qui ?
La RÃ©publique dÃ©mocratique du Congo a une superficie connue, attestÃ©e et inaliÃ©nable de 2.345.000 km2 pour une population de 65 millions dâ€™habitants. Avec ses 11 provinces (ce nombre sera portÃ© Ã 26), tous les congolais se sentent en paix partout sauf ceux qui sont utilisÃ©s par des forces Ã©trangÃ¨res. Cas des Rwandophones dont les parents (ancÃªtres ?) ont quittÃ© le Rwanda il y a des dÃ©cennies pour certains et quelques annÃ©es pour dâ€™autres. Mais, le Rwanda recourt aux jÃ©rÃ©miades pour se faire comprendre. AprÃ¨s avoir utilisÃ© longtemps le gÃ©nocide comme fonds de commerce, il nâ€™hÃ©site plus de fomenter des guerres pour mieux nourrir les compagnies internationales, les multinationales, en minerais de sang, lâ€™aÃ©roport de Kigali servant de lieu dâ€™embarquement Ã lâ€™exportation des ressources miniÃ¨res dont son sous-sol ne contient pas. Ridicule.
I think it is a delusion to think that the Tutsi are the only ones on Congolese soil who are malcontent and that all the other peoples are happy to be part of Congo. Congo – that great nation that is so rich in natural resources. Yet, it cannot educate its people, cannot provide healthcare, cannot provide jobs. Face the facts – Congo is a failed state.
Of course, I have respect for you and others who are still trying to make Congo work. But I think it is a waste of energy, to be honest. The Belgians, so rich and well-educated, cannot even keep their small country together. Congo as a country can never work.
It is a delusion too,thinking that everybody is Happy in the USA!Kagame’s dream to make Kivu the reservoir,to please his Western masters, and his Great Rwanda Reich development plan, later an Hima empire a la Stalin, is a dejas-vu.History tells us,Whenever the brute and his politburo appointees are taken out by demise or events, the all system crumbles! a shinning examples: Hitler and the USSR!Rwanda is under a shaky bondage of Kagame’s Stalinist Methods not trough genuine tolerance as across with 250 tribes in DRC and 2 in Belgium.The achievements branded to the world,are Gulag products.
True every Congolese is not Happy under Kabila,but all Congolese are unanimous: Congo with its today’s imperfections will never cede an inch of its territory to Rwanda!
Ah! So now you want to compare poverty and unhappiness in the US with poverty and unhappiness in Congo. Just one figure – Congo life expectancy: 56 years. US life expectancy: 78.5.
Anyway, I think we will not convince one another. You will stick to your point, I will stick to mine.
I DO agree with you on one thing, though: I do think that Kagame should not be allowed to create an larger Tutsi-dominated state.
He ist dieses ein großer Pfosten. Kann ich einen Teil auf ihm auf meinem Aufstellungsort benutzen? Ich würde selbstverständlich mit Ihrem Aufstellungsort verbinden, also konnten Leute den vollen Artikel lesen, wenn sie zu wünschten. Dankt jeder Weise.