The obstacles to Sudan’s landmark peace deal
The agreement is promising, but two influential rebel groups have refused to sign it, while paying for it will be challenging.
On 3 October, Sudan’s transitional authority and a coalition of rebel groups signed a final peace agreement aimed at ending decades of deadly conflict. The deal came after a year of negotiations. It addresses many issues such as power sharing, the distribution of resources, transitional justice, land, displacement and security.
The signing ceremony was held in Juba and attended by the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan and Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok along with representatives of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an umbrella group of rebel movements. Three key armed groups signed the document: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM); and the faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Malik Agar.
Several leaders of neighbouring countries were also present alongside representatives from the African Union, UN and European Union.
Representatives from two important groups, however, were notably absent. The faction of the SPLM-N led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu and the Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdel Wahid Nour (SLM-WN) have refused to endorse the deal.
The rejections of these two influential groups along with other challenges remain significant stumbling blocks to much-needed peace in Sudan.
What’s in the deal?
Under the new peace deal, Sudan’s 39-month transitional period of joint civilian-military rule will be reset to start from the date of the signing. The power-sharing arrangement between the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Transitional Sovereign Council will also be amended to include representation from the rebel signatories. These groups will get three seats on the Sovereignty Council, five ministers in the transitional cabinet, and a quarter of the seats on the yet-to-be-established transitional legislature.
Regionally, the agreement contains five tracks covering different parts of Sudan. Each has slightly varying arrangements with rebel signatories entitled to 10-40% of the seats on regional authorities. The agreement also required that women are represented at all levels of power at a proportion of at least 40%.
In Darfur, which has seen some of the most egregious human rights violations in Sudan’s conflicts, the agreement establishes a truth and reconciliation commission and empowers traditional justice mechanisms. As part of the process, the signatories also reaffirmed their willingness to cooperate with the International Criminal Court regarding persons against whom arrest warrants have been issued. Meanwhile, the government will be obligated to pay $750 million a year for 10 years to the region.
The Darfur agreement also paves the way for a new joint force called the National Forces for Sustaining Peace in Darfur. It will consist of soldiers from the armed movements and government forces. Its mission will be to maintain security, protect civilians and disarm the region.
In both Darfur and the Two Areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan), there will also be efforts to gradually demobilise and reintegrate armed rebel fighters.
The non-signatories
The new peace deal provides a moment of hope in a long history of conflict in Sudan. But it faces several challenges for it to be successful. The most immediate stumbling block is the fact that two rebel groups with significant presences on the ground have so far refused to sign it.
The SPLM-N, led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, withdrew from the negotiations in August after refusing to accept Deputy of the Transitional Sovereign Council, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti), as chair of the transitional authority team.
There have been significant efforts, however, to resume negotiations. In early September, Prime Minister Hamdok and Al-Hilu met in Addis Ababa. Their discussions led to a joint statement which asserted that the state must be secular. If this was not respected, they agreed that South Kordofan and Blue Nile – where the SPLM-N operates and is considered the strongest rebel group militarily – should be able to determine their own fate.
On 8 October, Al-Hilu then met Hemedti. In press statements after the meeting, the two men said the meeting was held in order to restore confidence and that they will resume talks after holding workshops to discuss the obstacles to peace. The first will take place on 14 October to discuss the separation between of state and religion.
The second significant armed group to refuse the deal so far is the Sudan Liberation Movement. Led by Abdel Wahid Nour, this group rejected the process and called instead for a national conference. The SLM-WN operates in Darfur and controls areas in Jebel Mara. It has clashed with the Sudanese army as recently as 28 September.
The peace agreement has also been opposed by some less powerful armed movements as well as some civil society organisations. The Association of Professionals and the Sudanese Communist Party argue that it will shift the balance of power more towards the military and away from civilians.
In some parts of Sudan, the peace deal has also faced resistance by groups who expect to lose out. In eastern Sudan, there have been recent clashes including groups that were party to the 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement and who feel excluded from the new deal. In Darfur and Kordofan too, there have been flare ups of fighting among disgruntled groups.
Paying for peace
Several international groups and governments – such as the UN, AU, EU and the Troika of the US, UK and Norway – have welcome the Juba agreement. They have called on the SLPM-N led by Al-Hilu and the SLM-WN to join the process.
To fully support the agreement, however, international partners may need to do more. One of the key challenges for Sudan will be to pay for the implementation of the peace deal. The economy is deteriorating and while donors have pledged to pay for the costs of the agreement, this will not be enough if the economy is too weak to create new jobs and improve living standards.
Sudan needs large-scale local and foreign investment as well as the ability to borrow from international financial institutions, which is currently restricted due to it being on the US terror list.
The new peace deal is promising and has more buy-in than those under former President Omar al-Bashir’s reign. However, as long as some major rebel groups are not signatories, it remains an incomplete peace.
If the new peace deal fails, it will be a major setback for both Sudan’s peace process and its transitional period. If it succeeds, it could provide the kind of stability Sudan desperately needs at it transitions towards a democratic system.
This is a good review for those interested in Sudanese current affairs. The problems of peace and stability are not of course unique to Sudan. Perhaps p, if one is to surmises, each of the countries in the neigbourhood – most of them that apparently comprise the Horn of Africa region – suffer, one or another, some kind of hot or cold disputes or conflicts. Each country has been trying to resolve them through military or political mechanisms, but with little success so far. One of the reasons one can alude to is that many of the challenges were legacies of dubious arrangements former colonizers have passed. This have been complicated further by successor foreign interests perpetuated by greedy or insensitive indigenous elites who tied their ambition and interests to foreign interest quarters.
In this regard, the role of the Sudanese elites is not one the Sudanese people could be proud of. Almost all of the post 1956 independence parties had damaging resumes that allowed the military to rule and ruin the country.
As the author of this article has opined, the mere fact of starting dialogue among the stakeholders is worth supporting. But the current distribution of power relation may not help the dialogue to achieve ends, unless the current elites leaders become better aware and try to close ranks in order to hold the military at bay. The latter is seen trying to out monuver them by going as far as committing the country and its people to something never imagined to happen such exchanging foreign support at the cost of one of Sudan’s most important foreign policy issue, namely, normalization with the Zionist entity in Palestine. The hope is rests in the fact the elites could give precedence to crafting some arrangement that can open way to unifying the state institutions. It is unthinkable multiple head of statehood would be a panacea for the country to streamline the dialogue. In addition, unless foreign interferences get limited, it would be difficult to unify national priorities.
Thanks brother Yaseen, I enjoyed the article.
An insightful analysis.
The worst floods in a century and the Corona virus have added to the economic crisis.
The government must deliver tangible results in order to guarantee popularity. Do far it has failed to do so. It is also not transparent enough with the people. The US terror sponsors’ list and the illogical linkage to normalization with Israel threatens stability.
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