African Arguments

Top Menu

  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

Main Menu

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Climate
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • Think African [Podcast]
    • #EndSARS
    • Into Africa [Podcast]
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Africa Science Focus [Podcast]
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Debating Ideas
  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

logo

African Arguments

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Climate
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • Think African [Podcast]
    • #EndSARS
    • Into Africa [Podcast]
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Africa Science Focus [Podcast]
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Debating Ideas
EthiopiaPoliticsTop story
Home›African Arguments›Country›East›Ethiopia›Who can trust the Ethiopia peace deal?

Who can trust the Ethiopia peace deal?

By Mohamed Kheir Omer
November 8, 2022
755
3
The peace deal brings hope that two years of devastating war in Ethiopia could be coming to an end. Credit: Rod Waddington.

While many have celebrated the ceasefire agreement, some prominent Tigrayan groups see it as a surrender. 

The peace deal brings hope that two years of devastating war in Ethiopia could be coming to an end. Credit: Rod Waddington.

The peace deal brings hope that two years of devastating war in the Tigray region of Ethiopia could be coming to an end but the real challenges lie ahead. Credit: Rod Waddington.

After two years of devastating war, Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a landmark ceasefire agreement on 2 November. The deal, signed in Pretoria following talks mediated by the African Union, is surprisingly comprehensive.

Under its terms, the TPLF will accept a return to the previous constitutional order, including federal authority in Tigray. A new interim administration will govern the region until elections. And the TPLF will fully disarm within 30 days, recognising that Ethiopia has “only one defence force”.

In return, the federal government has agreed to improve the representation of Tigray in federal institutions, including parliament. It will expedite humanitarian aid to the region, where over 13 million people need food assistance. It will facilitate the return of displaced communities. And it will restore essential services, some of which have been blocked since the outbreak of the conflict.

Both sides also agreed to end “hostile propaganda, rhetoric and hate speech” and establish a new “transitional justice policy” to ensure accountability, redress for victims, and reconciliation.

Mixed reactions

Regional and international leaders have largely praised the deal, with the lead AU mediator Olusegun Obasanjo referring to it as “the beginning of a new dawn for Ethiopia”. The federal government has been similarly buoyant, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed telling jubilant crowds that Ethiopia had got “100%” of what it wanted.

Some groups, however, have been less pleased. Several dominant Tigrayan groups have responded with disbelief and denial, seeing the deal as a surrender. The Global Society of Tigrayan Scholars & Professionals (GSTS), for instance, argued that the Ethiopian military cannot guarantee security and rejected the disarmament of the Tigrayan Defence Forces (TDF). The network also criticised the ceasefire agreement for not calling on Eritrea forces to leave and lamented the lack of clear timeline for facilitating aid, restoring services, and returning displaced people.

Some Amhara groups, who have also been engaged in conflict, have been similarly critical and disappointed at not being included in the talks. The Fano militia denounced the agreement for endorsing the current constitution, which it sees as marginalising Amhara interests. Meanwhile, a politician for the opposition National Movement of Amhara (NAMA) complained that the deal does not recognise Amhara’s claim to two areas – Welkait and Raya – that are heavily disputed with Tigray.

Challenges ahead

The mixture of reactions points to the both the huge potential and the challenges now facing Ethiopia.

On the one hand, the opportunity for lasting peace created by the peace deal has been hard to imagine for much of the past two years. Since the war broke out, hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and millions displaced. There have been accusations of war crimes and use of sexual violence as a weapon of war on both sides. Ethiopian society has polarised amid a rise of dangerous rhetoric. In this context, any agreement that could bring an end to hostilities is a positive development.

Moreover, it is reassuring that mediators recognise that the hard work is yet to come. Obasanjo has emphasised that “this moment is not the end of the peace process but the beginning of it”.  Uhuru Kenyatta, another one of the mediators, has warned that “the devil will be in the implementation”.

On the other hand, many of the criticisms of the peace deal are valid and point to difficult challenges ahead. It is true that the agreement lacks a clear timetable for the provision of desperately needed humanitarian aid and the restoration of services. Many of the most contentious and intractable disagreements – such as over contested areas in which both Tigray and Amhara accuse the other side of ethnic cleansing – remain unresolved, with the deal just saying they will be settled according to the constitution. And the promise to disarm TPLF combatants within 30 days seems highly ambitious.

It is difficult to imagine how Tigray soldiers will feel confident laying down their arms when Eritrean soldiers, who intervened in support of federal government, are still believed to be present in the region – yet are not mentioned in the peace deal. It is similarly hard to see how they will put their trust in the Ethiopian army, which has been accused of countless war crimes against their forces over the past two years, to be their guarantor of security. The deal paves the way for federal forces to enter the Tigrayan capital Mekelle and take control of all airports, highways, and federal facilities. Moreover, disarmament and reintegration typically take months, if not years.

Indeed, trust will may the most difficult factor to rebuild going forwards – at many levels. For two years, Ethiopian officials – including Prime Minister Abiy – have spoken of the TPLF and Tigrayans as a cancer and a weed. Ethnic hate speech and hate crimes have soared, with Ethiopian society becoming more divided. And both sides have denied culpability in widespread war crimes despite the evidence.

In this context, the reintegration of TPLF combatants in the national military and the idea of reconciliation and transitional justice will be uphill struggles. So too will be reconciling other related conflicts in Ethiopia, such as in Oromia, which are not mentioned in the deal.

The guns have not yet gone silent in Tigray. The signatories to the agreement, which leaves much unsaid, are still discussing its details and implementation. Much rests on the good will of the AU and other international bodies to ensure the agreement is honoured. But any even tentative step towards peace after two harrowing years is a step in the right direction.

Previous Article

Why are Nigerians keeping migration plans secret ...

Next Article

“A struggle in a struggle”: Patriarchy in ...

Mohamed Kheir Omer

Mohamed Kheir Omer is an African-Norwegian researcher and writer based in Oslo, Norway. He is a former member of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).

3 comments

  1. Lubak Bok 8 November, 2022 at 23:41

    The way you twist facts is disappointingly crooked and biased. Such mediocrity which lacks basic investigative journalistic skills is contributing to the destruction of lives in the developing world. No Ethiopian or non of their officials refer to Tigreans as “cancer or a weed”. On the other hand, most Ethiopians agree that the TPLF (as a political entity) is definitely a cancer and a weed. It is its inept leadership that is the reason why Ethiopia is suffering needlessly today. Ethiopians also refer to them as hungry day time hyenas and shameless crooks and thieves. If you lived under their 27 year rule, you would know how cancerous they are. Their ethnic federalism was premediated to dismantle Ethiopia and create small banana republics by deliberately fanning genocide by pitting ethnic groups against each other. The Tigrean people, just as other Ethiopians, are victims of this cancerous weed. So instead of wasting other people’s time trying to pretend that you are balanced, understand the facts and report the truth. I do not want to speculate about your motive, but you are propagating the weed of hatred among brothers by distorting the truth.

  2. Abdu Adem 9 November, 2022 at 03:18

    Thanks Dr Mohamed Kheir Omer.
    Very concise and to the point analysis.
    I hope the Ethiopian federal army comply with agreement and work hard to provide the Tigriyans the security and trust they need, to proceed with building their civilian career in peaceful Ethiopia.

  3. nechtel 9 November, 2022 at 08:08

    indeed who can trust anything that is too good to be true

Leave a reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

  • Politics

    Saving Sudan from Disaster: Memorandum from al Sadiq al Mahdi

  • EthiopiaPolitics

    The Ethiopia protesters’ struggle moves to the athletics track

  • A woman who was detained by rebel forces in South Sudan. Credit: Nyagoah Tut Pur.
    SocietySouth Sudan

    Freeing South Sudan’s captive women and girls: 128 down, thousands to go

Subscribe to our weekly newsletter


  • 81.7K+
    Followers

Find us on Facebook

Interactive Elections Map

Keep up to date with all the African elections.

Recent Posts

  • We’ve already breached most of the Earth’s limits. How can we get back?
  • Africa’s topsy-turvy food paradox
  • Zambia: The president’s five-point plan to stay in power at all costs
  • The two defining challenges facing South Africa
  • ‘Don’t Agonize, Organize!’ Remembering Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem’s Advocacy on Sudan

Editor’s Picks

Editor's PicksKenyaPolitics

Siasa na Kusengenyana (aka When Kenyan politicians switch from English)

Kenya’s political discourse takes place in two very different realms: one conducted in English, one not.  The Supreme Court’s ruling on 1 September was one of the most startling in ...
  • A member of MONUSCO, one of the forces in the eastern DRC where the M23 is operating, clears Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). Credit: UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti.

    The return of M23: Is there a way out for the DRC?

    By Stephanie Wolters
    November 1, 2022
  • View of Lake Kivu at Bukavu, South Kivu, DRC. Photo courtesy: MONUSCO/Abel Kavanagh

    Lines through the lake: Why the Congo-Rwanda border can’t be redrawn

    By Gillian Mathys
    May 2, 2023
  • Bob Barigye, an enviromental activist, in the capital, Kampala. Photo by John Okot.

    “Enemies of the state”: Uganda targets climate activists in quiet crackdown

    By John Okot
    March 16, 2023
  • Mauritians protesting on the streets in August 2020. Credit: Matt Savi.

    Mauritius: A picture perfect democracy’s fall from grace

    By Roukaya Kasenally
    May 12, 2021

Brought to you by


Creative Commons

Creative Commons Licence
Articles on African Arguments are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
  • Cookies
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms & Conditions
© Copyright African Arguments 2020
By continuing to browse this site, you agree to our use of cookies.