Of Lions and Mice in Darfur
The most recent effort to grapple with the far-reaching international response to the Darfur conflict comes from Steven Fake and Kevin Funk in “The Scramble for Africa, Darfur-Intervention and the USA.” The book offers a leftist critique of humanitarianism in Darfur that is inspired by Noam Chomsky’s accounts of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo. The central theme is that humanitarian arguments conceal an imperial-capitalist agenda through which the west, spearheaded by the U.S., seeks to subdue the rest of the world. Thus, campaigns for humanitarian intervention in Darfur serve U.S. interests, and therefore, Darfur activists are naí¯vely co-opted by big-power interests – an analysis reminiscent of Mahmood Mamdani’s recent book, although “The Scramble for Africa” was written before “Saviors and Survivors” was released.
The book is an interesting read and it is well-researched (as evidenced by the 180 pages (!) of endnotes). Also, the authors usefully point to some discrepancies between rhetoric and action in western countries’ response to the Darfur conflict, such as the rejection of Darfurian refugees or the lack of funding for AMIS peacekeepers.
However, the book has its own double standards. For example, it ignores that most Arab countries have remained largely silent on Darfur, while publicly denouncing the plight of Muslims elsewhere, from Bosnia to Palestine and Kashmir. Fake and Funk are also excessively anti-American, going as far as to demand that “Washington must pay reparations for past crimes in Sudan” (p. 125). The book ignores the helpful contributions of the U.S. in ending the North-South conflict, and it is one-dimensional insofar as it downplays Sudanese agency and exaggerates U.S. influence in Sudan. Jean-Franí§ois Bayart’s criticism of dependency theory is relevant here. Africa’s relations with the world are a two-way street and, despite power imbalances, “occasionally the puppets pull the strings” (e.g. when African dictators finance electoral campaigns of western politicians).
Throughout the book, one has the impression that Fake and Funk want to make a broader point about how the world works, choosing evidence from Darfur to suit this purpose. The problem is that Darfur is not a convincing example of Western imperialism and in many ways contradicts leftist analysis of international affairs.
If, as Fake and Funk contend, the US government in Sudan was primarily motivated by oil interests, counter-terrorism and geostrategic competition with China, would it not make sense for the U.S. to foster a good relationship with Sudan, similar to, say, Saudi Arabia? Would it not make sense to ignore human rights violations and focus on business relations and security cooperation? Indeed, this is how Sudan was handled during the Cold War, but things are different today. The U.S., especially under G.W. Bush, is antagonistic towards Sudan. It called the Darfur conflict genocide (the first time in an ongoing conflict); it issued sanctions against members of the Sudanese government as well as US companies operating in Sudan; and most importantly, it supports the arrest warrant against President al-Bashir.
These measures are significant and go much beyond, as the authors argue, “rhetorical and propaganda value” (p. 50). The Obama Administration has somewhat softened its approach and there was, and may still be, cooperation on anti-terrorist matters. Nonetheless, the relations between the U.S. and Sudan are currently not good, as China’s dominant role, the absence of US oil companies, and clashes in UN fora demonstrate. The most important reason for the strained relations is that US interests in Sudan are more humanitarian than geostrategic. This is not because the US or any other government is inherently humanitarian, far from that. Rather, it is because an influential domestic constituency – first on South Sudan, then on Darfur – that has developed sufficient leverage such that its normative agenda has prevailed over realpolitik considerations. The result of this development was quite positive in South Sudan, where the U.S. played a helpful role in brokering the CPA, but is more ambiguous in Darfur.
Finally, “The Scramble for Africa” offers an interesting example of the tension in left-wing thinking between anti-imperialism and human rights, as highlighted by Richard Just in his review of Mamdani’s and Garth Evans’ recent books. Those devoted to human rights seek to meddle in the affairs of governments that violate human rights, and they are willing “to judge, to oppose, and even to undermine such governments.” Anti-imperialists, on the other hand, are skeptical about interventionism as well as the norms and institutions underpinning such interventions, as they inevitably reflect power imbalances inherent in world politics. For example, it is unlikely that big powers will ever be the targets of humanitarian interventions or that one of their nationals will be tried by the International Criminal Court. Thus, following Fake and Funk’s analogy, the mice (small powers) will be caged, while the lions (big powers) are left free to roam the earth unfettered by international legal constraints.
In parts of the book Fake and Funk manage to strike a balance between human rights and anti-imperialism. This is the case for their discussion in the foreword of the ICC’s involvement in Sudan as well as their “manifesto for Darfur activism” (pp. 123-126) that contains a number of sensible policy recommendations (with the exception of the claim that the U.S. should pay reparations). Unfortunately, the “Scramble for Africa” reverts back to a maximalist anti-imperial position that paints all conflict intervention as a western conspiracy to undermine Africa. UN peacekeeping forces, for example, are described as “an integral element” in the subjugation of Africa by oil-thirsty big powers (p. 60). Therefore, the UN-AU force in Darfur “operates under significant Western influence, and thus will ultimately serve a humanitarian agenda only insofar as it serves an imperial one” (p. 88). In other words, the lions are back in Darfur, and they are wearing blue helmets. It is funny then that there are no lions, but only mice among UNAMID troops.
David Lanz is a PhD candidate at the University of Basel and works with the Swiss Peace Foundation, swisspeace. He can be reached at [email protected].
In his review, David Lanz raises the issue of “double standards” in our book. However, the book does not pretend to offer a systematic overview of the global response to Darfur. It was written as a work of advocacy grounded in scholarship. Lanz is quite right to note that “most Arab countries have remained largely silent on Darfur, while publicly denouncing the plight of Muslims elsewhere, from Bosnia to Palestine and Kashmir.” This response from the elite classes in much of the Arab and Muslim world is as predictable as it is shameful. Readers of this blog are no doubt well aware of the sense of betrayal Darfuris have expressed in this regard. In fact, the response is the mirror image of the Western response. Mass slaughters are highlighted or ignored in accord with their political usefulness. It is no doubt of some academic interest to document the hypocrisy of the Arab political classes on Darfur and of considerable importance for activists in that part of the world. As for ourselves, we are neither well placed to perform such a task nor in a position to effectively advocate around the issue.
Lanz calls us “excessively anti-American” for calling on Washington to pay reparations for past crimes in Sudan (namely the al-Shifa pharmaceutical attack and the crucial support provided to Nimeiri during his war against the south of Sudan). We have little to add on the merits of reparations but would like to note that the notion of anti-Americanism is an odd one and best abandoned in our opinion. For the term to mean what it implies, it must indicate an antipathy towards not just the government but its people, land, cultures, etc. Perhaps there were many Germans during the first World War who were truly anti-American, just as there was certainly a genuine anti-German sentiment in the U.S. at the time. But outside of such contexts, it seems an abuse of the word to apply it. The Australian journalist John Pilger recounts in his book Heroes (pg 511) of being accused by the then-U.S. ambassador to Britain of making an “anti-American†documentary because his film interviewed American GIs in Vietnam and documented their low morale. As Pilger points out, the film featured the plight of the soldiers sympathetically, so it’s unclear which Americans it was anti. The government is the country and the population is irrelevant, by this way of thinking. In a similar manner, it is almost as nonsensical to refer to divestment movements against Sudan and Israel as “anti-Sudan” and “anti-Israel,” as Marc Perelman does in Forward (http://www.forward.com/articles/3667/). A Bloomberg article (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aDBiT.cG_7Rw&refer=columnist_wasik) also identifies divestment activists as “anti-Sudan”.
Lanz criticizes the book for overlooking “the helpful contributions of the U.S. in ending the North-South conflict.†This may be a fair point, though elsewhere we have noted Washington’s useful role in reaching the CPA. For instance, in the April issue of In These Times magazine, we noted that the CPA “was concluded after neighboring countries and key foreign powers—notably the United States—made a push for peace and facilitated negotiations†and quoted a former Sudanese ambassador who said that the CPA “would have not been achieved without such concerted Western pressure on both sides.â€
Lanz believes our work “downplays Sudanese agency and exaggerates U.S. influence in Sudan.” Much as we write with an eye towards the West, and American activists in particular, we focus on those areas in which our expected readership can have an impact. Unquestionably, primary agency for the Darfur crisis lies with Khartoum, followed by Beijing. If we do not devote much space to fleshing out the details of their villainy, it is because we very consciously chose to look at a distinct issue. Indeed, part of the critique of the Save Darfur establishment in our book is centered on the oddity of U.S. activists focusing on a conflict over which their government has relatively little influence.
Lanz raises an interesting point in asserting that “Darfur is not a convincing example of Western imperialism and in many ways contradicts leftist analysis of international affairs. If… the US government in Sudan was primarily motivated by oil interests, counter-terrorism and geostrategic competition with China, would it not make sense for the U.S. to foster a good relationship with Sudan, similar to, say, Saudi Arabia? … The most important reason for the strained relations is that US interests in Sudan are more humanitarian than geostrategic†due to the influence of domestic lobbies. In response to Lanz, we might ask what Washington’s policies towards Sudan would look like in the absence of any advocacy groups. It is possible that these groups have restrained Washington from moving more openly towards an embrace of Khartoum. However, the principle issue originally was one of disobedience. Khartoum moved out of Washington’s orbit and sided with Iraq in the ’91 Gulf War. To this day, there is every indication that Khartoum would love to get Western oil companies to invest in Sudan, but less clarity that it would be a loyal client. This at any rate is the publicly stated perception of Khartoum. Bashir recently explained that Sudan is too “independent” for Washington’s liking (I’m afraid I don’t have a link handy but can dig it up if there’s interest). While this view is self-serving coming from Bashir, it is quite plausible.
Lanz sees a “tension in left-wing thinking between anti-imperialism and human rights, as highlighted by Richard Just in his review of Mamdani’s and Garth Evans’ recent books.” This “tension” is more apparent than real. In terms of first principles, human rights clearly precedes anti-imerialism. But we might ask how often they really conflict. Once propaganda and mythology are put aside, very few acts of war stand up to scrutiny for their humanitarian impact. In our book we cite the only case we are aware of (certainly in the modern era) in which a military intervention by Washington had a positive impact on human rights: that of Haiti in ’94. The most serious instances of interventions with humanitarian consequences (India in Bangladesh; Vietnam in Cambodia; Tanzania in Uganda) were not undertaken by the biggest powers.
Lanz holds that we see “all conflict intervention as a western conspiracy to undermine Africa.†We would respond that the word “conspiracy†is inappropriate, as the interests of major powers are self-evident and flow naturally from the nature of contemporary international power imbalances. No one in the West speaks of a Chinese conspiracy to pursue its interests in Africa – because self-interested motivations are taken for granted.
Lanz also questions our assertion that the UN-AU force in Darfur “operates under significant Western influence, and thus will ultimately serve a humanitarian agenda only insofar as it serves an imperial one.†He comments, “It is funny then that there are no lions, but only mice among UNAMID troops.” Strange at a glance perhaps but ultimately quite explicable – why send in the marines when cops on the beat will do? Western forces and the political costs associated with domestic fatalities are reserved for only the most imperative situations. However, the quote Lanz uses from our book does deserve elaboration. As a sort of truism, one we share with Lanz – who believes that we are “far from†a situation in which “the US or any other government is inherently humanitarian” – governments act in their own perceived interests – not least the big powers. This does not mean that their actions are always harmful, sometimes the incidental consequences are beneficial. In the book we review numerous UN interventions in Africa and conclude that (particularly in cases were major powers were indiferent to the conflict in question), the (almost always underresourced) UN peacekeepers were often able to have a modest positive impact. Such peacekeeping operations are funded to varying degrees by the West – who axiomatically perceive some interest in doing so. We may infer that peacekeeping is seen as an inexpensive way to maintain some minimal level of regional stability – an important thing for those who are troubled by matters such as unstable investment climates and unpredictable political dynamics.
The most pervasive ideology in the West is surely that of Western governmental benevolence – of purity of motives. In writing the book, we have attempted to put forward an analysis free of ideological blinders, though no doubt many will see in it the opposite.