African Arguments

Top Menu

  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

Main Menu

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
    • Climate crisis
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • #EndSARS
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Podcast
    • Into Africa Podcast
    • Africa Science Focus Podcast
    • Think African Podcast
  • Debating Ideas
  • About Us
    • Our philosophy
  • Write for us
  • Contact us
  • Advertise
  • Newsletter
  • RSS feed
  • Donate
  • Fellowship

logo

African Arguments

  • Home
  • Country
    • Central
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Congo-Brazzaville
      • Congo-Kinshasa
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Gabon
    • East
      • Burundi
      • Comoros
      • Dijbouti
      • Eritrea
      • Ethiopia
      • Kenya
      • Rwanda
      • Seychelles
      • Somalia
      • Somaliland
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Uganda
      • Red Sea
    • North
      • Algeria
      • Egypt
      • Libya
      • Morocco
      • Tunisia
      • Western Sahara
    • Southern
      • Angola
      • Botswana
      • eSwatini
      • Lesotho
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • South Africa
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • West
      • Benin
      • Burkina Faso
      • Cape Verde
      • Côte d’Ivoire
      • The Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Liberia
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • São Tomé and Príncipe
      • Senegal
      • Sierra Leone
      • Togo
  • Politics
    • Elections Map
  • Economy
  • Society
    • Climate crisis
  • Culture
  • Specials
    • From the fellows
    • Radical Activism in Africa
    • On Food Security & COVID19
    • #EndSARS
    • Covid-19
    • Travelling While African
    • From the wit-hole countries…
    • Living in Translation
    • Red Sea
    • Beautiful Game
  • Podcast
    • Into Africa Podcast
    • Africa Science Focus Podcast
    • Think African Podcast
  • Debating Ideas
Politics
Home›African Arguments›Politics›A Crisis of Confidence in the Government of Sudan – By Asim Elhag

A Crisis of Confidence in the Government of Sudan – By Asim Elhag

By Uncategorised
October 1, 2013
1692
0

AsimElHagObservers of Sudan see clearly a crisis of confidence between the majority of the Sudanese citizens and the government. This gap between the citizens and their rulers is increasing day by day. Continuation of the civil war in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile without a political solution shows the large gap between people in the marginalized areas and the central government, while the recent increases in fuel prices which the government announced on September 22, 2013 revealed the depths of crisis of confidence between the government led by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the majority of the Sudanese citizens. This was shown in the powerful reaction of the citizens when the uprising of September 23 began against the NCP and President Omar al Bashir.

During this uprising, citizens are targeting the property and assets of both the government and the NCP, while the government police forces, National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) troops and NCP security apparatus used all tools to terrorize citizens to try to halt the uprising. This led to the martyrdom of dozens of Sudanese citizens. This has been covered in the international media and press, specifically the French press agency and Al-Arabiya TV news and other Sudanese activists’ websites.

The ruling party, Minister of Finance and National Economy of Sudan and the Sudanese President failed in addressing the Sudanese public and allaying their concerns, before increasing the fuel prices. Also, their rhetoric to Sudanese people carried overtones that aroused people’s sense of dignity, and so the reaction came as a response against the government and the NCP, as well a cynical reaction to the speech of President al Bashir and his Minister of Finance. These spread across all platforms of social networking in the Internet, while the justification  for increasing fuel prices was not acceptable to Sudanese public opinion and every observer to Sudan political and economic scene, in part due to the message continuously purveyed by the government media which promised the Sudanese that there will be  advances in the national economy, due to increasing gold exports, revenue from oil pumped from South Sudan, increase of taxes, export promotion and reductions in government expenditure. The fuel price increase came immediately after the announcement of the resumption in flow of the oil from South Sudan and the increase of gold exports, and therefore the Sudanese public opinion was asking, “Where are these funds going and why does the government impose these increases on fuel prices, which will raise the value of consumer goods and subsequently increase poverty rates?”

The NCP and government made matters worse by not being clear or honest about which kinds of fuel would have their prices increased. The increases in the prices of gasoline and gas canisters for cooking came as a surprise, and worsened the crisis in confidence between the public and the government.

The National Salvation government since it seized power on June 30, 1989, required Sudanese citizens to be extraordinarily patient and promised them that the country’s economic condition would soon recover. But their inability so far to fulfil this obligation in addition to aggravating the political crisis in the country, spread of civil wars and tribal fighting, have all put the credibility of the government led by the NCP to the test. Meanwhile the class division which was pointed out by President al Bashir in his address to journalists at Friendship Hall on September 22, has also become deep. Al Bashir noted that a wealthy class dominates of all the wealth of the country and a poor class does not have the means to live from day to day. President al Bashir claimed that these increases in fuel prices are in favour of the poorer classes! Which shows that the President is not aware of the problem. And Sudanese public opinion does not agree with him, knowing that fuel price increases will hit the poorest hardest.

The NCP should identify the trend in Sudanese public opinion and learn what is driving this trend. Only then can it act to gain the confidence of the people of Sudan and continue in power. But if the ruling party does not respond to public demands and instead turns to repression and brutality against citizens, it will only expose itself to a deepening crisis of confidence which will inevitably lead to its overthrow.

The solution of the Sudan crises lies in creating a national consensus, to start a process leading to national dialogue and a constitution that meets the aspirations of all Sudanese. The current government must accept to the need for political reform that involves all the Sudanese political forces in the political process through an agreed program for democratic transformation. Economic reforms can not now be implemented without concurrent political reform. Political and economic reforms are complementary to the each other. Sudanese public opinion must be taken into account and not brushed aside, and the use of violence against the public will generate local, regional and international pressure to remove the regime.

This post is also published on our partner blog Reinventing Peace – hosted by the World Peace Foundation.

Previous Article

“Find some starving Africans”: Reporting Disasters – ...

Next Article

Africapitalism: Unleashing the power of emotions for ...

Uncategorised

Leave a reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

  • Politics

    Why William Ruto must go to The Hague for his own trial – Eugí¨ne Bakama Bope

  • #EndSARSEditor's PicksNigeriaPolitics

    #EndSARS: Not just a name or statistic. The tragedy of Rinji Bala

  • Politics

    Rethinking Zimbabwe to be retired

Subscribe to our newsletter

Click here to subscribe to our free weekly newsletter and never miss a thing!

  • 81.7K+
    Followers

Find us on Facebook

Interactive Elections Map

Keep up to date with all the African elections.

Recent Posts

  • Crisis in Lasanod: Border Disputes, Escalating Insecurity and the Future of Somaliland
  • Oligarchs, Oil and Obi-dients: The battle for the soul of Nigeria
  • Of cobblers, colonialism, and choices
  • Blackness, Pan-African Consciousness and Women’s Political Organising through the Magazine AWA
  • “People want to be rich overnight”: Nigeria logging abounds despite ban

Editor’s Picks

Covid-19Editor's PicksSociety

Africans don’t just live to die. A response to the New York Times.

If reporting on Africa just caters to readers craving a glimpse into the strangeness of how the other half lives, we lose the chance for true internationalism. Were it not ...
  • Marking Mawlid, the Muslim festival full of diversity, dhows and donkeys

    By Jaclynn Ashly
    November 17, 2021
  • Angola’s oil could actually be the DR Congo’s. Here’s why it isn’t.

    By Patrick Edmond, Kristof Titeca & Erik Kennes
    October 3, 2019
  • The violent eviction of the Maasai community in Tanzania to create a game reserve recently drew widespread shock and condemnation. Credit: Dylan Conway.

    Fortress conservation is heading for a crisis that can’t come soon enough

    By Simon Counsell
    July 28, 2022
  • A road in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Credit: abdallahh.

    The genocide that never was and the rise of fake news in Côte d’Ivoire

    By Jessica Moody
    January 21, 2022

Brought to you by


Creative Commons

Creative Commons Licence
Articles on African Arguments are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
  • Cookies
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms & Conditions
  • en English
    am Amharicar Arabicny Chichewazh-CN Chinese (Simplified)en Englishfr Frenchde Germanha Hausait Italianpt Portuguesest Sesothosn Shonaes Spanishsw Swahilixh Xhosayo Yorubazu Zulu
© Copyright African Arguments 2020
By continuing to browse this site, you agree to our use of cookies.
en English
am Amharicar Arabicny Chichewazh-CN Chinese (Simplified)en Englishfr Frenchde Germanha Hausait Italianpt Portuguesest Sesothosn Shonaes Spanishsw Swahilixh Xhosayo Yorubazu Zulu