On 1 August 2026, Ethiopian federal and Tigrayan forces clashed in western Tigray, a northern Ethiopian region bordering Eritrea and Sudan.  By 3 August, fighting had subsided, but hundreds of Tigrayans, including wounded fighters, had crossed into war-torn Sudan. The clash followed Ethiopia’s 1 June election: Tigray did not vote, while Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party won 438 seats.

Tigray’s 2020–2022 war followed a power struggle between Abiy and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which governed Tigray and dominated Ethiopia’s ruling coalition until Abiy took office in 2018. Eritrean and Amhara forces supported the federal government. An African Union-brokered agreement signed in Pretoria in November 2022 ended large-scale fighting and provided for disarmament, restored services and an interim administration pending elections.

Those alliances have since shifted. Ethiopia’s government alleges cooperation among Eritrea, the TPLF faction led by party chairman Debretsion Gebremichael, and elements of Fano, a network of Amhara militias whose fighters once supported Abiy but now fight his government. Eritrea and the TPLF deny cooperation. Ethiopia also accused Eritrea of occupying its territory and backing armed groups. Eritrea denied the charges.

The 2018 Ethiopia–Eritrea peace agreement made joint war in Tigray easier than lasting cooperation on borders and trade. The breakdown in relations reshaped outside support for rival Tigrayan factions. Pretoria left territory and authority unresolved. Control of government funding, gold mines, border routes and armed forces helps rival leaders hold power, while residents have little say.

Two presidents, no public mandate

After the Pretoria agreement, Abiy reportedly vetoed Debretsion as interim president. TPLF official Getachew Reda became interim president after an internal party ballot. Residents had no vote in either process.

In March 2025, Debretsion’s faction pushed Getachew aside. Abiy then appointed Tadesse Worede, commander of the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF), the region’s wartime army. Abiy extended Tadesse’s tenure in April 2026. In May, the TPLF revived the regional council elected in Tigray’s 2020 vote, which the federal government had rejected. The council elected Debretsion regional president. Tadesse maintained his claim.

Ethiopia’s government controls federal funding, official recognition and superior military resources; Debretsion’s camp controls much of Tigray’s party organisation, regional administration and armed forces. The federal government cites Pretoria to extend an unelected administration. The TPLF cites its 2020 mandate. Neither asked Tigrayans who should govern them now

War-damaged homes in Werkamba, Tigray, 2020: Jnyssen

This is also a struggle over post-war resources. The International Crisis Group reports that senior TDF officers have business interests in Tigray’s gold mines and that factions have contested control of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, a large party-linked business group. Federal funding, salaries and mining revenue help finance rival authorities.

Getachew, now Abiy’s adviser, joined an alliance with members of the Tigray Peace Force, a TDF splinter militia. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) says this force appears to receive federal ammunition, food and pay.

In July 2026, Human Rights Watch documented abductions and unlawful recruitment by Tigrayan authorities, including ofchildren as young as fifteen. The TPLF denied forced recruitment.

How allies became enemies

The July 2018 Joint Declaration, signed by Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, ended hostility after their 1998–2000 border war and promised cooperation. Reopened contacts helped divided families and traders. Yet it established no publicly accountable rules for trade, currency exchange, land or border crossings. Even Assab, a Red Sea port in Eritrea, carried no Ethiopian trade during the thaw. Cooperation depended on the two leaders, with little public oversight.

That cooperation was redirected towards war. From November 2020, Eritrean forces fought beside Ethiopian and allied Amhara forces in Tigray. A 2025 medical and legal investigation concluded that conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence constituted crimes against humanity. It documented violations by all sides and found Eritrean forces most frequently identified as perpetrators in the evidence it collected in Tigray. Accountability and survivor care remain inadequate.

The Pretoria agreement stopped mass killing but also changed the alliances. Eritrean and Amhara representatives were excluded from the talks; Crisis Group reports that Isaias opposed an agreement that halted the TPLF’s military defeat. Debretsion’s camp later sought an understanding with Eritrea, perhaps to avoid fighting both Ethiopia and Eritrea at once. Eritrea, in turn, could gain a partner against Ethiopia. The relationship remains contested: accounts differ on whether it amounts to an agreement not to attack each other or closer military coordination.

Getachew, once a TPLF negotiator, is now aligned with Abiy. Debretsion’s camp seeks an understanding with the state whose army helped devastate Tigray. Fano networks that fought beside Ethiopia’s government now fight it. These shifts suggest that leaders’ survival takes priority over public reconciliation. Ethiopia and Eritrea use these internal divisions to pursue their rivalry within Tigray.

Abiy and Isaias, 2019: Ethiopian Prime Minister’s Office

Ports and the war in Sudan

Ethiopia, landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, needs reliable access to the sea; Eritrea fears Ethiopian domination. Tigrayan and Amhara authorities both claim Western Tigray, while disarmament remains incomplete. More than 95 per cent of Ethiopia’s import-export trade by volume travels through neighbouring Djibouti, so seeking other routes is reasonable. Eritrea has rejected claims that Ethiopia’s need for trade access gives it a right to Assab.

But who negotiates access and benefits from port fees and customs duties? Ethiopia’s February 2026 letter combined accusations about occupied territory with an offer to negotiate access through Assab, linking trade negotiations to security pressure. Within Tigray, control over federal funding, mines, disputed land and routes towards Eritrea and Sudan sustains rival factions. These routes affect who can return home, collect taxes and supply fighters.

Amhara forces took control of Western Tigray during the war. Decisions about who can return, own land and vote will shape both territorial claims and future elections.

Sudan’s war, fought between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, widens this contest. Crisis Group describes shifting regional alliances: Eritrea and Egypt lean towards the Sudanese army, which accuses Ethiopia of helping the Rapid Support Forces. Ethiopia and its ally, the United Arab Emirates, deny such support. Crisis Group also reports that thousands of Tigrayan fighters known as “Army 70” are based in eastern Sudan and have fought alongside the Sudanese army.

What peace agreements leave unresolved

Peace agreements still matter. The 2000 Algiers Agreement ended Ethiopia and Eritrea’s 1998–2000 war. An international boundary commission defined their border in 2002, but obstruction prevented it being marked on the ground. Implementing these decisions would clarify the border. Pretoria saved lives and restored services.

Yet these agreements do not settle who governs Tigray, how displaced residents shape decisions over Western Tigray, or whether port and border authorities serve citizens rather than those in power. The 1998–2000 war showed that Badme, a disputed border town, alone could not explain a conflict also driven by competing visions of statehood, trade disputes and leadership struggles among former liberation movements.

Crisis Group is right that discreet talks, a halt to foreign support for armed groups and sustained mediation may be necessary. But extending the interim administration by agreement among leaders would prolong rule without public consent. Pressure from lenders such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank might discourage an assault on Assab; it cannot decide who governs Tigray or restore displaced people’s rights.

A durable settlement must set a clear timetable for elected government in Tigray, with displaced people and political opponents able to participate meaningfully. Public oversight must extend to federal funding, mining revenue and port and border arrangements. Disarmament must protect communities from forces left armed. Survivors need care, accountability and reparations. Past abuses cannot be set aside because perpetrators become useful allies.

Peace should be judged by whether people can return home, challenge those who govern them and influence how resources are used. Agreements that leave rulers free to select local authorities, monopolise resources and change alliances preserve the conditions for renewed war.