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Politics
Home›African Arguments›Politics›Sudanese Political Parties Meet With the AU Panel: “This Should Be the Last Panel.”

Sudanese Political Parties Meet With the AU Panel: “This Should Be the Last Panel.”

By Alex de Waal
June 17, 2009
1932
0

The national Sudanese political parties active inside the country rarely meet together in the same forum. I asked a number of Sudanese political leaders when it last happened: some said not for twenty years. Earlier today, fourteen parties met together in a public hearing in Khartoum convened by the African Union Panel headed by President Thabo Mbeki. It included every party in the National Assembly and several others too. Parties that had boycotted the Sudan People’s Initiative last year, such as the Popular Congress Party and the Sudan Communist Party, participated. The fact that so many parties turned out, discussed the whole day until nightfall is a testament to the sense of urgency shared across the political spectrum over the Darfur crisis.

The AU Panel had earlier circulated a list of questions for the participants, under four headings: peace, reconciliation and healing, justice and accountability, and Darfur and Sudanese national politics (including the elections). Little of the discussion was focused on the past; most of it was concerned with what needed to be done. President Thabo Mbeki asked, “can the Sudanese political parties overcome their partisan agenda and face the common challenges facing the country? Is there a unified vision on a solution?”

On the details, opinions and proposals diverged. But none was in doubt about the importance of a rapid resolution of what all agreed to call “the Sudanese problem in Darfur.” No-one disputed that there needed to be a political settlement and not a military one, and that it should be a comprehensive national solution.

Imam Sadiq al Mahdi, president of the Umma National Party, chided me that he was far from exhausted. True to form, he presented an eleven point memorandum and a fourteen point declaration of principles for peace in Darfur which should, he argued, be adopted by all political parties, armed movements and civil society. Perhaps echoing his own experience of premiership which was forcibly curtailed twenty years ago, he said “elections are vital but cannot be viable without peace.” The next year, he said, is “the last chance for Sudan to avoid catastrophe.”

The NCP was represented by a delegation headed by one of its most senior figures, Ahmed Ibrahim Omer. He strongly defended the government’s plan of action, arguing that elections should not be held up and that the obstacles to a peaceful solution were to be held elsewhere. On this issue, he confirmed truth and apology as “authentic principles” and said that “accountability is part of justice and we are for it.” He acknowledged the principle of compensation, the importance of Darfurian representation in the central government, and sustainable and equitable development.

The SLM-Minawi delegation argued that the African Union initiative was late and complained of a “lack of the culture of implementing agreements.” They argued that justice was a transcendental issue that went together with peace. We have a vision, they claimed, and the solution to Darfur’s crisis lies in the hands of the Sudanese people, which can be found if people are ready to sit together. Citing its concerns over the electoral process, the SLM-Minawi has not yet registered as a political party. In a note of caution, the SLM’s Ali Tirayo said, “Concerning homegrown Sudanese solutions, I appreciate the idea. But if these are so good, why is it necessary for this forum to be organized by the AU Panel? We need a neutral body to organize around, without subtracting from the consensus we shall reach as Darfurians and Sudanese.”

The SPLM delegation explained its efforts in trying to seek unity among the Darfur armed movements, and reconciling among the Darfurians. Elias Nyamyell suggested a three step approach: first reaching agreement among the Sudanese political parties, then obtaining unity among the movements (before going into the details for an agreement) and then using the CPA as a model for a settlement. “Everything is there in the CPA,” he said, “we just need to implement it.”

Speaking for the Popular Congress Party, Bashir Rahma demanded an apology from the highest level of the government for what had happened in Darfur, especially apologizing to the displaced people, and a general amnesty for those arrested or convicted on the basis of events connected to the problem of Darfur. On this basis, he said, it would be possible to move towards forgiveness and negotiate a solution.

The Sudan Communist Party representative Siddiq Yousif castigated the NCP for its shortcomings in implementing agreements already entered into. He also located the Darfur crisis in the failure of successive development projects in Darfur, and identified numerous contributory problems including partisan state intervention in tribal affairs, the proliferation of modern weaponry, inequities in land tenure, and the immigration of foreigners who were settling on vacated land.

Eight other parties were represented, including the DUP and one of its splinters, three other groups that had split from the Umma Party, SANU and SSDF, and the Democratic Salvation Front.

All were concerned with elections, with a consensus around the twin issues of national democratization and the importance of Darfur in the national democratization process, with most parties arguing that free and fair elections would not be possible in Darfur without a peace agreement first. The issue of development was also stressed, including the need to make sure that financial transfers from central government to Darfur actually occurred rather than remaining paper commitments. Rashid Dau el Beit, a DUP member from Darfur, urged that the AU Panel “should be the last panel to consider Darfur.” Too many earlier initiatives had failed: “we are going to hell because of this crisis. A solution cannot wait any longer.” Dr. Yousif Bakheit Idris continued, “There are now 230 initiatives on Darfur. Yours should be the last one. You have listened to us. Now the question is how we can move to a solution, step by step.”

In his summation, President Mbeki picked up this point. “This should be the last panel. We agree. But in reality, whether this is the last panel or not, the last initiative or not, depends one hundred percent on this leadership that is sitting here in this room. If you do not act to solve the problem, there will be panel number 231. The matter is in your hands.” He went on to emphasize that there has to be peace, which requires negotiations, which must be inclusive. What we have heard, Mbeki said, is that the conflict in Darfur is a reflection of a larger problem in Sudan, and that the problem in Darfur can only be solved as an integral part of resolving the Sudanese problem. He concluded, “We take note of everything that has been said. We take note of the bottlenecks. There is no point in us making a recommendation that cannot be implemented. We want to ensure that whatever we recommend gets implemented.”

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Alex de Waal

Alex de Waal is Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. He was the founding editor of the African Arguments book series. He is the author of The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power.

0 comments

  1. Heather Adams 17 June, 2009 at 22:02

    Dear Alex

    “Little of the discussion was focused on the past; most of it was concerned with what needed to be done.”

    So much discussion about the tragedies in Sudan and elsewhere focus on the past. Your account of a peace initiative which looks for solutions, and to the future, is a welcome deviation from the norm. Perhaps we expend disproportianate energies apportioning responsibility for past deeds rather than moving forward. The leadership of this panel may be on to something – I hope so.

  2. Ahmed Hassan 17 June, 2009 at 23:23

    Dear Alex,

    Thanks again for an interesting article.

    In the Sudanese political dictionary, the “comprehensive national solution” does not refer to a comprehensive national plan and strategy of addressing issues, rather than refer to aspiration of the various political parties to be included in the power sharing process and to be given offices in the new (national government) structure.

    There has never been real concern from the side of the Sudanese political parties to seek lasting, comprehensive or intelligent solution to the chronic problems of the Sudan, albeit that fact that these problems were not a mystery and that everyone is able to point them with more than 90% degree of accuracy. The emphasis was, mostly, always about power (Sulta wa Karasey El-Hookm) and what is in it for the parties and not what is in it for the trouble regions and peoples of the Sudan, as it was apparently an issue of centre and margin conventional discrepancies’ problem.

    I disagree that the attendance of 14 political parties to this event implies increased sense of urgency about the Darfur problem by them. There is a lot of political hypocrisy and pragmatism in the Sudanese political parties’ behaviour and decision making processes. No doubts they agreed to attend out of some aspirations to be visible at a significant meeting and to potentially be on the list if it turned out that the calls for the so called “comprehensive national solutions” were enforced and materialized, hence they can get some piece of the pie.

    Over the last three or four decades we have witnessed all the Sudanese political parties’ ins and outs of their “political rhetoric” and “political practice”, be it in democratic regimes or dictatorship-based-or-affiliated ones, and with all the wide spectrum of their political agenda and promises, the practice was more or less the same, and amounts to your “Grading (of) the Prosecutor–And the Bench”. I may admit that some were given more chances than the others to prove their credibility and thy failed to do so. Those who didn’t get enough chance were only concerned about the fact that there was no enough time to enjoy the tasty pie. Accordingly, the simple answer to Mbeki’s question about the preparedness and the willingness of the Sudanese political parties to leave their limited partisan agenda and grow up and have a better focus on the bigger national picture is simply big fat (NO), because that is not the way they work first, and because it is not the greatest of their worries or concerns.

    I doubt that the Sudanese Political arena, with all the flowing rhetoric, could have the guts, courage, and determination to go through the painful path of comprehensive peace using the model of the truth and reconciliation. I also want to remind you of the diversity of the political representation in the Sudan Civil Project Conferences in Kampala in 1999 and 2000, and all that hot discussion about the past and current atrocities and the need to hold all accountable. Where is that discussion now? Are those attending the conference capable of accepting the consequences of all being held accountable to all past and current atrocities for us as Sudanese to have a comprehensive and lasting peace?

    Sudanese politics, if I may say, are politics of vain, things are generally done in extremely chaotic and random manners, and with great emphasis and assertion of personal or limited partisan interests. It is just amazing how we struggle to find patterns, provide justifications, develop frameworks, to fit things in our intellecatual model, yet in vain, and try to make sense of it.

  3. Abd al-Wahab Abdalla 18 June, 2009 at 02:12

    Dear Ahmed, Do not expect an ANC vanguard to reveal his hand until the last moment. Thabo Mbeki did not become President of the Republic of South Africa by swallowing shallow political slogans. The only political leader in Sudan who impressed him was the late Dr. John Garang.

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